may weigh it in the light of the actual criticism it has received. Royce (Proceedings Fourth International Congress of Philosophy, Heidelberg, 1908) is able to include it as a factor in his system of absolute "voluntarism." Bradley, in articles in Mind (1908-10), in turn considers it a partial truth long done justice to in the development of intellectualism. So far as the apostles of the movement would themselves agree upon the psychological experience of which truth is the organ and reality is the presupposition, I suppose it would be the heart, the "passional nature," the Iwill to believe" (see James' The Will to Believe, 1897, for both these phrases).

66

If, then, no final result can be reached by logical reasoning, what is the critic to do? The weapon of rationalism is broken by the pragmatist before the fight begins.

Consequently criticism, taking another form, deprecates the attempt to solve the problem of philosophy by elevating one or two of the mental functions-intellect or feeling or will -to a place of high dignity and monopoly, at the expense of other functions. Who made reason more reliable than feeling, or will more potent than argument? The whole mental life— all aspects of experience-must be concerned in the apprehension and management of things, and philosophy should not disparage certain functions in order to dignify others. should try to discover what partial contribution each of them makes to the full meaning of the world and of man.

But it

This form of pragmatism, at least, amounts then to a philosophy in which personal passion, choice, feeling, preference, supplies the touchstone or a touchstone-to value and validity, and it may be described as an "affectiv- This issues in another-a fourthism," taking the term in somewhat the point of view from which each of the same sense that the systems of its three doctrines so ably represented critics are respectively described as in recent discussion seems partial "voluntarism" and "intellectualism" - although partially true. Pragma(or rationalism). Indeed, the presence tism is a revolt against the abuse of of the mystical motive-the motive to reason; but rationalism is equally displace discursive and rational ma- a revolt against excess of passion chinery by immediate and direct feel- and caprice. A logical machine would ing of value-is so prominent in perhaps be a better guide than a James' later work (see his A Plural-weather-vane-to have in one's head! istic Universe, 1909) that it cannot fail to suggest to the reader the procedure of historical mysticism. Personally, too, James did not hesitate to show his sympathy with this type of thought (cf. his Varieties of Religious Experience, 1907), and temperamentally he exemplified it.

Philosophers have thus again boxed the compass. Intellect, will, feeling -rationalism, voluntarism, mysticism -each of this exhaustive trio has had its new apotheosis. In pragmatism the last two, feeling and will, join forces against the first: temper versus reason, will versus conviction, results versus logic-this is now the issue joined.

Stated in this way the futility of criticism from any of the traditional points of view becomes evident. One is temperamentally a rationalist or a pragmatist; and so far as the philosophical motive is concerned, pragmatism is exemplified from the start.

But we are not shut up to one of these. Will informed by knowledge and moved by feeling-this is what every normal man has and is, not one of these alone nor two of them. So the protest arises against dividing the personality and considering the glimpse of reality that one part gives more to be esteemed than the vision which comes from the whole.

Hence attempts to trace out the mental life as a whole, and find its issue in some mode of experience comprehensive of all the partial meaning's reality has here or there. Bradley (Appearance and Reality, second edition, 1897), claims that reality comes to us most fully in a state of superpersonality which lies beyond the contradictions of thought. Bergson (Les Données immédiates de la Conscience, sixth edition, 1910) finds in a higher "intuition," a sort of further instinct, the immediateness that logical processes lack or destroy.

Baldwin ("Knowledge and Imagina- | a system that is to commend itself tion," Psychological Review. May, to men, as are the consistency, dis1908) explicitly claims that in æs- interestedness, and universality of apthetic experience the partial insights plication of the verbal propositions of intelligence and feeling are mu- it comprises. tually conserved and supplemented, and the things of personal desire and worth are reconciled with the things of truth and fact. "Contemplation would be perhaps the term best suited to express the function these writers in common have in mind. It is a mode of apprehension in which all the values of experience regarding the world, are taken up in a richer sense of self. Knowledge is instrumental to practice, and practice is instrumental to knowledge, while both serve the ends of personal feeling; and each must do its perfect work, if we would discover the full reality of the most prosaic things of life. Everything may be looked at from the point of view of æsthetic perfection.

Such a point of view has never been worked out as a philosophy, though many among whom one thinks of the great master Lotzehave protested against the partial character of the solutions which alternately come into vogue in the progress of thought. Just now, in pragmatism, it is "the heart that has its vogue; but the heart, too, is but part of the human person.

The net gain to philosophy, however, from recent discussion is great. The working out of motives profoundly rooted in the soil of the nineteenth century has issued in instrumentalism and pragmatism: the motives of evolutionism, scientific naturalism, social solidarity. These are enemies to absolutism, mysticism, individualism. The development, indeed, is not yet complete. Pragmatism, as so far stated by its principal advocates (James, Dewey, Schiller), is too individualistic. It hinges on private will and feeling and on utility to the individual, just as the evolution of the early Darwinians (Huxley, Romanes) dwelt upon individual struggle and prized individual utility. But for all that, never again can scholastic rationalism or logical dogmatism hold its own in the theater of public discussion. Experimental proof, utility, personal acceptability, are hereafter to be as important in

Esthetics.-The recognition of the aesthetic experience as of value for its revelation of reality—even as being more than a sort of pleasant luxury-has been made possible by positive researches. The work on the phenomena covered in German by the term Einfühlung is very noteworthy. It was associated originally with the name of Lipps (see Lipps, Esthetik, 1903-06, and Weiteres zur Einfühlung, 1905), who pointed out that in æsthetic experience there is a "readingin or feeling-in" (Einfühlung). a sort of projection-of the observer's personal life into the beautiful object. We find ourselves carried along with the thing we admire by a sympathetic movement of our personality. We are taken up in body and mind by the lines of a Gothic cathedral, and we imitate by incipient movements the poses of a rhythmic dance. two ways is this seen: we go over into the work of art, joining in doing what it seems to do, sharing what it depicts; and besides this, we retain our sense of self, our personal proprietorship of the process, so that it is really an intimate movement of our own immediate self-not merely an outgo of sentimental sympathy with a thing that is really deadthat we feel. Our personality is thus advanced, idealized, perfected in the meaning with which the work of art is charged. We have a sense of identity and communion with the thing which the art impulse selects and presents.

In

Apart from the detailed and somewhat fanciful applications of this principle by Lipps and some of his followers (the whole thing is ably criticised by Lalo, Les Sentiments esthétiques, 1909), there is no doubt that the facts are new and that they justify their name: the art work is a thing of " empathy" (Titchener, Ward), of "fellow-feeling" (Mitchell), of "inner sympathy " (Groos), of

sympathetic projection (Urban), of "semblance of personality" (Baldwin), all terms suggested by different writers as renderings of the German

Einfühlung (see Mitchell, Structure
and Growth of the Mind, 1907; Groos,
Der Aesthetische Genuss, 1902; Bald-
win, Thought and Things, vol. i, 1906;
Urban, article "Sympathy, Esthetic,'
in Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology). It brings art, in com-
pany with play, into line with the
series of imaginative functions in
which hypothesis and discovery, no
less than personal reading and ideal-
ization, are embodied; and shows the
possibility of an experience in which
the barriers between
"inner
and
outer," the self and the world, are for
the time broken down. While in the
state of rapt contemplation of a work
of art, the spectator loses his sense
of the opposition and hindrance of
fact, and also his sense of embarrass-
ment through error. He is carried
away in the anticipation of the ideal
in which both truth and value reach
their consummation. In an impor-
tant monograph, W. D. Furry has
shown the possible significance in this
direction of the aesthetic category for
the theory of knowledge (Furry, The
Esthetic Experience, 1908).

Another significant recent contribution to æsthetic theory is to be found in the second part of J. A. Stewart's Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. Professor Stewart shows the psychological conditions of æsthetic appreciation in the imaging function.

Religion.-Psychology has made alliance with anthropology, history, and statistics for the investigation of religious phenomena as such (James' Varieties of Religious Experience is a documentary study of historical cases). An able discussion of the psychology of religion by Höffding, and others, is to be found in the Proceeding of the Sixth International Congress of Psychology, Geneva, 1909. King, The Development of Religion, 1910, carries pragmatic principles into the psychology and anthropology of religion.

But the final synthesis of systematic philosophical thought is also found in the treatment of religion. American philosophical works culminating in religious theory are by Ladd (his latest work being Philosophy of Religion, 1906), and Ormond (The Foundations of Knowledge, 1900, and The Concepts of Philosophy, 1906). Ormond's systematic work incorporates the motives of recent advanceespecially the social and genetic motives-very completely; but he hardly appreciates the force of the instru mentalist position in logic. He reaches a monistic spiritualism with a leaning toward the æsthetic. The bearing of Darwinism on religion is discussed in the works cited above as brought out by the Darwin centennial.

ADDENDA

The Occult.-The phenomena of has been so far, however, I think, "psychic research" have had their no case or event so unambiguous as customary exploitation and popular to carry conviction to the minds of discussion: startling revelations hav- those not already over sympatheticing been announced at regular inter-ally inclined. vals. As usual, it is physicists mainly who have been convinced of the truth of spiritism, although certain psychologists have taken up the expectant attitude. The reader should look for himself into the works of Hyslop (Problems of Psychic Research, 1908), and Sir Oliver Lodge the latter a distinguished physicist who speaks on everything from spirits to the Apostles' Creed with a positiveness inversely proportional to his authority; the former a philosopher of standing and a genuine inquirer who is convinced of the authenticity of messages from the dead. There

Events.-The recent event of most significance in this department was the death of Prof. William James on August 26, 1910. His latest and greatest honor, coming in 1910, after a multitude of other distinctions, was his advancement to be Associate of the Institute of France. He had been Foreign Correspondent in the Philosophical Section of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques for several years. At the time of his death, in the opinion of many of those competent to judge, he was the most influential philosophical thinker of the world. Other productive men who

The International Philosophical and Psychological Congresses met after their stated periods, the former at Heidelberg in 1908, the latter at Geneva in 1909. Their proceedings, as formally cited above, afford good indexes to the topics of current philosophical interest and discussion. The Psychological Congress voted to meet in the United States in 1913, under the following officers: Hon. President, William James; President, J. Mark Baldwin; Vice Presidents, E. B. Titchener and J. M. Cattell; Secretary, J. B. Watson. The Philosophical Congress is to meet at Bologna in the spring of 1911.

have recently been removed by death | odical devoted to experiment are Paulsen of Berlin (1908), and ies. An international commi Ebbinghaus of Breslau (1909.) Paris as chairman, to see to been constituted with M. troduction of the results of mental psychology into ele education.

works mentioned in the t Bibliography.-Besides the reader will find in the Psych Index, published annually Psychological Review, full c lists of titles; see also the ph ical Bibliography, printed Revue Néo-Scholastique. Selec ences topics of Baldwin's Diction are given under the Philosophy and Psychology. bibliographical projects not Progress in educational psychology tive bibliography of philosop augurated include a general d is indicated by the foundation of two dertaken by the International new journals-the Archives de Pé- osophical Congress at the Hei dologie of the Belgian Pedagogical meeting, and a bibliography of Institute, and the Journal of Educa- publications, projected by the tional Psychology, an American peri- | Philosophical Society.

XXVIII. MEDICINE AND HYGIENE

ALEXANDER LAMBERT

MEDICINE AND MEDICAL DISCOVERY