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Institute of Defense Studies
military-political conditions, when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Organization still existed. Only when it became clear that Russia would unilaterally refuse to fulfill this part of the CFE Treaty in case that line was continued did NATO begin to show readiness to take Russia's interests into account. But in exchange they demand that Russia remove objections to the NATO bloc's eastward expansion.
e. Westem attempts to counteract integration trends operating within the CIS framework are obvious. This is manifested most openly with respect to Belorussia[sic], which is more ready than the other former Soviet republics to undertake close integration with Russia. On the whole, however, this opposition as well as NATO's eastward expansion, the activeness of Turkey and Western oil companies in the Caucasus and the Caspian, attempts to coerce Russia into unilateral disarmament, barring it from world markets of high-tech products and, finally, the economic model being imposed on Russia by the IMF and World Bank all are links in the same chain: Creeping expansion of the United States and its allies having as its ultimate goal eliminating Russia as a state and turning its territory into a raw materials colony of Western countries.
2. Strategy for neutralization of external threats and for national survival of the Russian Federation
a. A most rapid, fundamental change in the country's economic course appears to be fundamentally important to the Russian state's survival. The general outlines of such a change are presented in detail in programs of a number of political parties and blocs which plan to take part in the 17 December 1995 parliamentary elections. They include in particular rejecting cooperation with the IMF and World Bank; revising results of privatization of state property; imposing elementary order in foreign trade, in the banking system, and in exporting sectors of the economy (even within limits of existing legislation, which will permit reducing the outflow of capital abroad and thereby increasing state investments in converting the military-industrial complex and in modernizing and restructuring national industry); increasing import tariffs for 15-25 years; i.e., until national industry and the national agrocomplex will be able to withstand the competition of imported goods relatively painlessly;
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extraordinary measures in fighting organized crime and corruption, and expropriation of criminal money and property, and economic integration within the CIS framework.
b. Preventing illegal exploitation of Caspian Sea shelf resources by Westem oil companies is a vitally important goal for Russia, and the problem of deterring the "Turkic" and "Islamic" factors should be considered above all in this light. The main task here in the short term is a most rapid end to the war in Chechnya by imposing constitutional order throughout its territory, providing for the elimination of Dudayev's armed units and disarming the population. It is obvious that this is possible only by force; therefore, it is advisable to stop the so-called "peacemaking process and renew operations of federal forces to disarm and eliminate illegal armed units.
Another very important task is to prevent fulfillment of the "Caspian oil contract" in its present form. In this case it is advisable to carry out a set of measures such as officially refusing to recognize that part of the Caspian stipulated in the contract as a zone of Azerbaijan's jurisdiction; taking practical steps, including also steps of force, should it be necessary, to stop any oll production activity of foreign companies in the former Soviet part of the Caspian until its legal status is determined; preventing Turkey's territorial tie with the main part of Azerbaijan territory; and exerting pressure on the regime in Baku; e.g., by creating threats of a fragmentation of Azerbaijan and of an Armenian military offensive on Gyanzha (sic) and Yevlakh.
C. Opposition by force to the NATO bloc's eastward expansion seems an extremely urgent task. At the same time, in the case of Poland and other Eastern European countries, it is obvious Russia has no real opportunities to hinder this by way of force, and threats not backed up by corresponding actions only discredit a state. An example of such discrediting was Russia's reaction to the NATO military operation in the Balkans in September 1995. But the need also is obvious for creating a military bloc of CIS countries, particularly the involvement of Central Asian countries in confronting the NATO bloc. With respect to Ukraine, it obviously will refuse to participate in such a military alliance in the foreseeable future.
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The situation with respect to Belorussia has a different look. Close military cooperation on a bilateral basis should be developed here, and a key element of such cooperation should be the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belorussia in the Kaliningrad Special Area, and on naval ships of the Baltic Fleet. The need for such a step lies in the fact that out of economic considerations Russia cannot permit itself to have a large Army today as the USSR did 10 years ago. NATO now surpasses Russia by 2-3 times in numbers of troops and conventional weapons in Europe. This gap will grow even more after Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia join the Alliance. Under such conditions the only possible and economically realizable way is to deter NATO by relying on tactical nuclear weapons capable of eveling enemy superiority in conventional means i.e., the idea is to adopt the strategy to which the NATO bloc itself adhered in "cold war" years. And it is a question not only of the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD), including the former Soviet-Polish border and Baltic Sea waters, but also of the Northern Theater of Military Operations, encompassing Russia's border with Norway and Barents Sea waters, and the Southern Theater of Military Operations, encompassing Black Sea waters and bases of Russian troops in Crimea, Abkhazia, Georgia and Armenia-tactical nuclear weapons must become the basis of Russia's defense in all three European theaters of military operations.
The situation is completely different with respect to the Baltic as compared with Eastern Europe. In general, a neutral status of the Baltic republics similar to that of Finland during the "cold war" probably would meet Russian interests, but in case NATO should venture to accept the Baltic republics in its makeup, then.RF Armed Forces must be introduced to the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
It should be noted that Russia has all legal and moral grounds for introducing troops to the Baltic. First of all, an extension of the NATO military infrastructure to this region will present extreme danger to RF national security interests. In the period of the "Caribbean crisis," when the USSR began deploying nuclear weapons on Cuban territory at Cuba's request, a similar situation from the U.S. standpoint provoked a naval blockade of the island by the United States accompanied by direct threats of military invasion and led to the most acute crisis of "cold war" times. Inclusion of the Baltic in NATO would
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present no less a threat from Russia's standpoint than did the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba at one time from the U.S. standpoint....
Secondly, there are illegal, antidemocratic regimes in Estonia and Latvia similar to those that previously existed in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In these biethnic republics, one ethnic group arbitrarily deprived people of the other nationality of their civil rights and usurped all power. Under these conditions, the part of the population being discriminated against (so-called "non-citizens") have the right to establish their own parallel structures of authority and power structures. In case force is used against them, they have the right to turn to Russia for armed support. With respect to Lithuania, it does not recognize the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact." Consequently, Russia and Belorussia have the right to take back Klaipeda and Vilna Kray.
Thirdly, the Baltic is a criminal zone living chiefly on smuggling and controlled by Mafia structures. Considering the precedent of the U.S. invasion of Panama and the arrest of General Noriega, Russia also has the right to arrest and indict a large number of Baltic figures in Russian courts. It is obvious that a Russian return to the Baltic must be accompanied by the deportation to the West of persons who sullied themselves by complicity in discriminating against people of different nationality and who do not wish to live in republics where the scope of civil rights does not depend on nationality.
With respect to presumed Western reaction to the probable introduction of Russian Armed Forces into the Baltic, an analysis shows that one in the West plans to fight Russia over the Baltic. Economic sanctions are possible, but they most likely also will not be in the nature of a total embargo. Above all this concerns the export of Russian energy resources. In particular, it is expected that in the foreseeable future Europe will experience a natural gas consumption deficit of 100' billion mo per year. At the same time, Russian natural gas reserves make up one-third of world reserves. The experience of the conflict over the "gas/pipes" deal in the 1980s persuades us that the FRG, France, Italy, Finland, Greece, and Eastern Europe will continue to buy raw material resources from Russia as before, which will provide funds for
Translator note: the first digit is only partially legible, but the figure appears to be "100".
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conversion of the domestic military-industrial complex and for the country's reindustrialization.
Finally, in case of a total break in relations with the United States Russla the euch convincing arguments for it as the nuclear-missile potential and the
threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world, which 'with skillful tactics can play the role of a kind of trading card. And in case Russia is persistently driven into a corner, then it will be possible to undertake to sell military nuclear and missile technologies to such countries as Iran and Iraq, and to Algeria after Islamic forces arrive in power there. Moreover, Russia's direct military alliance with some of the countries mentioned also should not be excluded, above all with Iran, within the framework of which a Russian troop contingent and tactical nuclear weapons could be stationed on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
d. Concerning the question of the attitude toward strategic nuclear forces, & should be noted that the Russian nuclear potential is one of the few arguments convincing to the West that Russia inherited from the USSR and that is not yet fully destroyed: There needs to be a most rapid formation of a program for developing the strategic nuclear forces based on the fact that they must develop within the framework of the START I Treaty over the next 15 years. The RF Ministry of Defense must develop such a program in a short time, and Parliament must provide financing for its realization. Funds for these purposes could be found, for example, in case of a termination of financing of recovery work in the Chechen Republic and of a large number of other programs, the need for which is not obvious.
An analysis shows that if the strategic nuclear forces develop within the framework of quantitative limits of the START I Treaty, then this is a technically and economically fully realizable option, even considering Russia's loss of production capacities of the former USSR Ministry of General Machinebuilding on Ukrainian territory. And in the first stage the warranty operating life of part of the MIRVed ICBMs in the inventory today--UR-100N, R-36 MUTTKH, R-36 M2, and RT-23 UTTKh--obviously should be extended to 20 years. In the second stage (by the beginning of 2009), ballistic missiles equipped with six
?Possible expansion "Upgraded specifications and performance characteristics"