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medium-yield-class warheads and presently being developed within the scope of RDT&E for creating the D-31 naval missile complex obviously should be deployed (400-500 of them) in silo launchers of the above MIRVed ICBMs as well as in certain UR-100K ICBM silo launchers. After 2008 (when the effect of the START I Treaty will end) it is advisable to begin deploying approximately another 100 such missiles in a railroad flatcar basing version.

It appears extremely important to offer opposition to U.S. plans for creating a "tactical ABM defense system" and in this connection changing the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty. These plans essentially are another attempt at dragging the SDI idea in through the back door and they present a significant threat to strategic stability in the world and provoke the PRC and other "small nuclear countries" to a sharp buildup in their nuclear missile forces. In China's case, for example, its nuclear forces, which even so are heavily inferior to the strategic forces of Russia and the United States, can be completely depreciated by the deployment even of a very limited U.S. ABM defense system. In view of this, a sharp quantitative increase in PRC nuclear-missile forces, above all in the MIRVed ICBM grouping, should be expected if a U.S. ABM defense system is deployed. This in turn obviously will have a provoking effect on India, which in that case will follow the PRC. Then Pakistan also undoubtably will join in the nuclear race.

Russia must not consent to any kind of changes to the text of the Treaty which would contradict that part of it which prohibits giving tactical ABM defense systems characteristics permitting their use for strategic ABM defense purposes. Arguments according to which Russia and the United States should cooperate in the area of creating a "tactical ABM defense system" in view of the fact that they allegedly have common enemies sound altogether unconvincing. is obvious that such countries as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are not Russia's enemies. Secondly, any kind of cooperation between Russia and the United States hardly will be possible at all under conditions of the approaching "cold peace" connected with the upcoming NATO bloc expansion. Finally, by virtue of a policy of "dual standards" being followed by the United States relative to the Israeli nuclear program, which is aimed against Russia among others, any U.S. argument regarding the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should be viewed with suspicion--in view of the power of the proIsraeli lobby in the United States, one should not expect any kind of serious

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steps by the United States to force Israel to give up its nuclear potential.

On the whole, we should take into account the fact that, as an analysis shows, the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons most likely cannot be preserved over the long term and the number of nuclear powers will grow steadily. Israel already has approximately 200 nuclear devices in the inventory. The range of Israel's nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is up to 2,500 km (i.e., Moscow is within reach of Israel's nuclear forces). It is obvious that Israel will not give up its nuclear potential and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under any circumstances. It should be understood that Israel's nuclear potential was created not just for deterring a non-nuclear attack of Arab countries, but also for blackmailing the USSR to compel it to exert a deterring influence on the Arabs in case of their conflict with Israel and the latter's military failures.

A final decision on creating nuclear-missile forces of small size to deter the PRC and Pakistan also was made in India not long ago at the level of the country's political leadership. And this decision is the product of national consent of all of India's political forces and in all likelihood no arguments of the world community about the inadvisability of turning India into a nuclear power will be accepted by India's leadership and no threats of sanctions against India will influence its resolve to create its own nuclear-missile forces. At the same time, it is obvious that equipping the Indian Armed Forces with nuclear weapons will deprive the world community of any kind of arguments against Pakistan turning into a nuclear power, already the eighth in count (after Russia, the United States, UK, France, PRC, Israel, and India). Along with this, Algeria, in which there is a great probability of Islamic forces coming to power, also has everything necessary for creating such a potential in a short time if its leadership makes the corresponding political decision.

Under the conditions which are shaping up, Russia has two possible options of behavior. The first option presumes a continuation of the present RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs line toward cooperating with the United States in order to pressure potential Third World possessors of nuclear weapons to give up realization of their nuclear programs. It appears that such a line will suffer total failure already in the short term. The second option presumes Russia's refusal to follow the U.S. line in the question of non-proliferation of nuclear

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weapons and missile technologies and an unfolding of its cooperation in the nuclear-missile area above all with India. dia today is one of the few world countries whose national interests do not run counter to Russia's national interests Russian and Indian cooperation in the nuclear-missile area according to the model of U.S. and UK relations, where the United States supplies the UK with delivery vehicles--Polaris and Trident missiles--on which the UK installs its own nuclear warheads, is seen as most rational. And it is important to remember that India also is capable of creating its own nuclearmissile forces independently, and in the extreme case undoubtedly will do this. But it would be extremely advantageous for it to cooperate with Russia in this matter. The economic advantage to Russia in case of such cooperation also is obvious.

In the more distant future Russia also could develop cooperation in this area with Iran and a number of the Arab countries. It appears that such cooperation not only would bring Russia appreciable commercial advantages and political influence in South-West Asia and North Africa, but also would be capable of exerting a certain deterring influence on Russia's Third World partners with respect to the content and direction of their work in this area.

e. The course toward integration within the CIS framework, above all with Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan, must become a very important direction of Russian policy. With respect to Belorussia and in part to Kazakhstan, it can be said that these republics probably will welcome integration tendencies coming from Russia. The situation appears enormously more uncertain with respect to Ukraine. At the same time, an analysis shows that, judging from everything, the results of Kuchma's "reforms" will be even worse than those of Gaydar's "reforms" in Russia. In contrast to Russia, Ukraine has no oil and natural gas, and the West will not be able to place Ukraine on full support. This fundamentally distinguishes the prospect of Ukraine's development from that of the Baltic, for example. Because of the small size of its population, the latter can be subsidized by the West in the extreme case within the range of $3-5 billion per year--this is little for Ukraine but enough for the Baltic. On the whole, it should be expected that in 3-5 years Ukraine's economy will approach a final collapse and the republic quite probably will go to pieces. Under these conditions its eastern and southern parts obviously will express a desire to voluntarily reunite with Russia.

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Realizing this, the West and Western Ukraine's nationalist forces may try to provoke a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Crimea might be the cause, and the goal would be to start the two peoples quarreling and sow hatred between them, as the West succeeded in doing in the former Yugoslavia with respect to the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, and thereby make any future reunion of Russia and Ukraine impossible.

In this connection it should be emphasized that the West's goal is to provoke a sharp deterioration of Russia's relations not just with Ukraine, but also with such countries as China and Iran, and to create powerful, constant pressure on the periphery of post-Soviet space in the Tajik-Afghan and Asia Minor zones. It appears that Russia on the one hand should be decisive in following its line concerning NATO expansion, the Baltic, Chechnya, the Caspian shelf, and the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. But on the other hand it should react with extreme caution to provocations of Western Ukrainian nationalist forces in Crimea and in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, especially as Crimea's present political elite is comprador-oriented and totally corrupt.

On the whole, it appears that if a judicious policy is followed, there are all grounds to count on restoration of a renewed union state in 5-10 years made up of Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, the greater part of Ukraine, as well as the Dniester region, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. And Russia's relations with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia could develop according to the model of relations which existed earlier within the framework of CEMA, and with Moldavia, the Baltic, and Western Ukraine according to the model of SovietFinnish relations of 1944-1991 times.

This document may be used in developing a new Russian
Federation military doctrine.

Document prepared by

Adviser, Institute of Defense Studies,

Candidate of Technical Sciences

/s/

Anton Surikov

Mr. ERHLICH. Could you discuss it real briefly?

Mr. WELDON. Internal-I want to make the point, this is not established Russian military policy. But to give you some idea of some of the thoughts going through internal Russian leadership, this document was prepared by, I believe his first name is Anton, Anton Surikov, Institute of Defense Studies, and it's scary. It's scary because some of the things that it talks about, I mean it talks about many of you probably have Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians in your district.

It says, and I will read, "The Baltic is a criminal zone living chiefly on smuggling and controlled by Mafia structures." And it goes on to say that the United States, if it puts its troops there, will never defend the Baltics because we don't have the backbone, and it says that we never-that the Russians never have to worry about us defending the Baltics because we will never jeopardize our troops to go in and defend. But then it goes on to say that if Russia gets backed into a corner, it should share its nuclear technology with Iran, with Libya, with Iraq, and with other rogue Islamic States. It's right there in the military document as an option for Russia to share this technology if, in fact, there are some circumstances not described here that would cause Russia to be, in their opinion, backed into a corner.

So the document is an internal document that's being used for discussion, but it presents some very scary scenarios.

Members of Congress-and I sent this, I had it translated in January of this year, and I had this sent to all the Members of our House National Security Committee. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, you want to put the entire document in the record. But understand, this is not established policy, but it is a-it is the discussion occurring within the Russian military that we need to be aware of because that's the future threat.

Mr. EHRLICH. I have made that part of the record.

Last, let me get one thing straight in my own mind. Is it your personal opinion-I understand the distinction between development and deployment-that the deployment of the space and/or sea-based missile defense will or will not constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty?

Mr. WELDON. The ABM Treaty allows each of the two signatory countries to have one single-site system. The Russians exercised their option with the Moscow system. We have not because the Congress has never agreed to fund it. We are allowed to have one single-site system. That we can do.

Mr. EHRLICH. So it is your opinion that it would not

Mr. WELDON. And the Russians agree with that. We can deploy one single-site system.

Mr. EHRLICH. Thank you.

Karen.

Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of questions. Mr. Weldon, evidently the Department of Energy has asked for $95 million to increase the nuclear safety and security at Russian facilities. Do you believe that increase in that funding would assist in combating the threat from smuggling?

Mr. WELDON. I think it will help. The Russians have a terrible problem with smuggling. As a matter of fact, for the past 4 years