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I have worked with DOE to have them establish guidelines for operating Russian nuclear power plants.

I sent a letter to President Clinton before the G7 Summit on Nuclear Safety asking him to do two things, asking him to establish among all nuclear nations a standard set of guidelines that we developed with the Russians for the nuclear power plants which hopefully will be done, and secondarily to consider establishing an international commission to monitor nuclear wastesites and nuclear disposal sites. That's a terrible problem worldwide. Both of those issues we have to be helpful with the Russians.

And, in fact, in our bill this year we again put $15 million in the Defense bill to help the Russians deal with their nuclear waste problem in the Arctic. As you may know, they have been dumping their nuclear waste in the Arctic for the past 30 years. Mr. Seoblikov documented that for Yeltsin 3 years ago. We have helped them come up with alternatives and, in fact, at the summit Yeltsin agreed to abide by the London convention and no longer dump nuclear waste in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea or the Sea of Japan.

So we are making progress, and, yes, I support those efforts.

Mrs. THURMAN. I guess some of our energy companies would like to have that same opportunity, right?

Mr. WELDON. Well, most of the actual work is being done by our energy companies with American dollars, as you probably know. Babcock and Wilcox is doing a lot of the engineering work over there.

Mrs. THURMAN. In the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, they suffered, what, a 30 percent budget cut this year. Do you see that shifting over to the Department of Defense or somebody else to take care of this problem? Or do you think we should put that money back in?

Mr. WELDON. Well, I am not one to say that arms control agreements should be totally wiped away. They are important. I think they can provide confidence-building measures. I think the point is, if you are going to focus totally on arms control, which is what this administration does, then you also need to support the enforcement of those agreements.

And that's what I have my main criticism of this administration is. However, I think it should be a balance. The balance should be, yes, have agreements that we can agree on. We should enforce them and they should enforce them with us if we violate them. But also have the ability to protect our people. And that's what—in this case, I think the administration is lacking on both fronts. We don't have a commitment to defend, and we don't have support of the requirements to enforce the arms control agreement.

So what do we have? In my opinion, we have a severely lacking foreign policy.

Mrs. THURMAN. But do you think that helps us with a 30 percent budget cut in those very areas that would help us with that? I mean

Mr. WELDON. I am not here to take a part in—I can tell you they still had a reception for me when I went to negotiate with Mr. Koltunov, so I guess there was some money available over there. I don't know.

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Mr. EHRLICH. Curt, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. EHRLICH. Before I call the next panel up, I would acknowledge the presence of our beloved chairman, Bill Želiff.

Mr. ZELIFF. Thank you, very much.
Mr. EHRLICH. Mr. Chairman, welcome.
Thanks, Curt.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. EHRLICH. Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Gaffney, would you all stand, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. ERHLICH. Welcome, gentlemen. As many know, certainly people in this room, Mr. Woolsey has had a long and distinguished career which recently included serving as President Clinton's Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He brings special expertise in a number of areas, but particularly in the understanding of the ballistic missile threat and its implications.

Mr. Gaffney is a director of the nonprofit Center for Security Policy and is also a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, senior Defense Department position responsible for nuclear forces, arms control and U.S./European defense relations.

Gentlemen, welcome. I would ask you to make your opening sta ents and try to highlight, if you would, your opening statements, because I know we have some questions for you. Thank you.



Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I would ask that my seven-page statement be inserted inside the record.

Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. WOOLSEY. I will talk briefly to the main points.

About 3 months ago, I was in Taipei when the Chinese Government announced its intention to begin the ballistic missile launches just off of Taiwan. The original statements from the administration left something to be desired. They seemed to emphasize that there would be consequences should these tests go wrong.

The main point should never have been what would be the problem if the Chinese turned out not even to be able to hit a square in the ocean 20 miles on a side. The main point-and I think finally the administration got around to much stronger and positive statements, as well as sending the aircraft carriers—always was what the consequences were when actions of this sort, by China or any other government, go right.

The problem is that off Taiwan this spring, as well as in Tel Aviv and Riyadh in 1991, we have been given a major insight into the future of international affairs, and it is a very ugly picture. It is a picture that emphasizes the potentiality for blackmail, terror and efforts to drive wedges between us and our allies using ballistic missiles.

Let me say a few words about the ballistic missile threat in general before I turn to the National Intelligence Estimate, at least as it has been publicly described, that was issued a few months ago.

Ballistic missiles are normally discussed in the same breath with weapons of mass destruction, but it's certainly not always necessary to deploy nuclear, chemical or bacteriological warheads for them to be used effectively for terror and blackmail. Certainly, the Chinese tried to do this in March. Saddam tried to do it particularly against Israel as an effort to split our coalition in the war against Iraq.

Second, even with respect to conventional warhead missiles, we are in an era of revolutionary improvements in missile guidance. To mention only one, the Global Positioning System satellite network is in the process of being made available not only in its degraded form, but in a very accurate form, free to the world. It will not be too long before Saddam or the Chinese rulers will be able, for example, to threaten to destroy precisely the Knesset or precisely a Taiwanese nuclear power plant in order to create an intentional Chernobyl incident and with, again I stress, conventional weapons, not weapons of mass destruction.

Third, of course, even relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles can be given an awesome capability if they are equipped with chemical, bacteriological or nuclear warheads. Often, as in the colloquy here with Congressman Weldon, the emphasis is on a nuclear capability, and as some of that questioning indicated, it is certainly true that the loose controls, especially over fissionable material in Russia, are a substantial problem.

We used to be able to tell what the Soviet Union was going to do in nuclear programs by watching its test ranges and the deployment of ICBMs in Siberia with our technical collection systems, such as reconnaissance satellites, but a couple of years ago the Russian Interior Ministry arrested a janitor from a nuclear power plant or a research reactor facility, I forget which, who had some substantial quantities of plutonium. We didn't used to have to watch janitors in Russia in order to understand what was happening with fissionable material. But for all the looseness, and it is troubling, there are at least some important constraints on the flows of fissionable material.

I believe that chemical or even, more terribly, bacteriological warhead systems will be with us and will be possessed by rogue states in the very near future. Bacteriological systems, for example, are relatively inexpensive to manufacture and produce and weaponize.

Fourth, it is not at all necessary, for purposes of threatening terror or blackmail against the United States, to threaten an effective counterforce strike—that is, a strike against our own nuclear forces, such as bomber bases or ICBM silos in the interior of the lower 48 States. That was the issue that dominated much of the discussion during the cold war.

For example, I was the principal drafter of the Scowcroft Commission Report in 1983 as a commission member, and that was pretty much the whole focus of our concerns.

But in current circumstances, for blackmail purposes, it's perfectly adequate for North Korea, China or any other country to be able to threaten Anchorage or Honolulu.

Fifth, we should not automatically assume that the post-cold war world is going to be one in which we have a relatively benign Russian democracy moving slowly toward a free enterprise economy, and a relatively benign Chinese free-enterprise economy moving slowly toward democracy. I think it's at least as likely that we will have an increasingly autocratic and imperialistic Russia, regardless of who wins the election next month, and I think we saw China's new international face solidly in the Taiwan Straits this past spring. The possibility of chaos and disorganization in both of those countries also has to be taken seriously.

I think it's important in this context, let me put it this way, to focus on the fact that the recent National Intelligence Estimate that covered, “Emerging Missile Threats to North America During The Next 15 Years," is a very different kind of document than the National Intelligence Estimates that have been produced over recent years with respect to this threat. It is a very limited document. It is one that focuses on a portion of the threat to the United States.

The problem is that even if the NIE is accurate within its four corners and within the limited subject which it addresses and is the best that the intelligence community can doon that limited set of issues, that may, in fact, be the case-it is quite wrong, I think, because of the limited nature of the NIE, to make broad statements such that intelligence indicates that ballistic missiles don't pose a serious threat to U.S. interests.

In the first place, the last time I looked, Alaska and Hawaii had not been admitted to the Union on terms that exclude them in some way from the common defense that is called for in the Constitution's preamble. For purposes of blackmail, they are certainly of no less concern to us than, say, Oklahoma and Kansas. And this contiguous 48-State frame of reference for the National Intelligence Estimate is, in some ways, akin-making a generalization from an NIE of that limited nature is somewhat akin—to saying that because we believe that for the next number of years local criminals in the District of Columbia will not be able successfully to blow up DC police headquarters, that means that there is generally no serious threat to the security or safety of police in the District. The conclusion simply doesn't follow from the premise that is discussed.

The concentration in the National Intelligence Estimate on indigenous ICBM development also seems to me to limit too much the important concerns that one needs to focus on in these days and times. Indigenous development of ICBMs was of heavy interest during the cold war because the Soviets were trying to maintain a monopoly on this technology. But, again, as was pointed out in some of the colloquy with Congressman Weldon, transfers of technology and materiel-ICBM launch services for space vehicles and all the rest—deserve a great deal more attention now than they did during the cold war. And in any case, transfers or indigenous development, let's put it this way, by countries that are currently hostile to the United States are only part of the problem, because a country may change its allegiance and focus and national orienta

tion rather quickly, and certainly within a 15-year timeframe. Iran, certainly did that at the end of the 1970s.

Finally, I think it is a bad idea in the field of ballistic missile defense for us to study only what we see through intelligence today. By assessing only what we could actually see, we badly underestimated Iraq's efforts in the area of weapons of mass destruction before the Gulf war. And so one important aspect of assessing the national problem with dealing with ballistic missile defense is that we need to look technically at what is possible, not only what we actually see other countries doing.

So to the degree that President Clinton was extrapolating a general conclusion about a lack of threat from ballistic missiles to American interests from this very limited National Intelligence Estimate, I believe that this was a serious error.

Let me finally turn to the current state of arms control negotiations. As was remarked by Congressman Weldon, the 1992 negotiations that followed President Yeltsin's January speech of that year, in which he called for cooperation between the United States and Russia on ballistic missile defense, were a promising development. What has happened since 1992 in addition to policy changes, I believe, by the Clinton administration, is that President Yeltsin is now surrounded by advisors such as Mr. Khorzakov, Mr. Primakov, Mr. Barsukov and others who have, to put it mildly, not yet established solid reputations as democratic reformers. To be blunt about it, several of these individuals have strong ties to rogue States of the Mideast. They represent the most unreconstructed portions of the old Communist establishment. They are quite close to the military and industrial managers who produce military hardware and are interested in selling it for personal, as well as organizational, profit.

And so whatever the causes of the shift during these last 4 years, from Russian willingness to cooperate with us to Mr. Primakov's recent effort to undermine the effectiveness of our theater ballistic missile defense programs by some of his statements, the change really is very striking.

I would suggest that in negotiating with the Russians on this point we take something of a leaf from their strategy of negotiation. I negotiated a treaty in 1990 in the Bush administration, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which I believe is a sound treaty. It had some provisions in it which limit substantially the then-Soviet Union's ability to deploy the overall number of their forces that are permitted to their northern and southern flanks.

A lot has changed since 1990. The Soviet Union is now Russia and the other former soviet states. Some of the flank areas are now in different countries, and the Russians want more flexibility with respect to some of their flank deployments within the agreed limits.

I think some such adjustments are reasonable. They are reasonable as long as we continue to coordinate our responses and our increased openness to flexibility with our NATO allies who are most concerned, in this case Norway and Turkey. If Norway and Turkey can go along with some of these deployment changes, I think it is a reasonable thing for the Russians to ask and a reasonable thing for us to work on.

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