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get object maps. All of these things have to be done well. And signal processing has been militarized to the point where it can handle a lot of the transmissions. If we deploy by 2003, we are told by the Air Force we will have downgraded some of those things in order to meet that deployment date. One of the downgrades will be in the signal processes. And transmission, we will go from a potential 5 megabits to 1 megabit, 20 percent of the capacity of the optimized system.
You have been on the Senate Armed Services Committee, general counsel before, do you think it is a good idea for Congress to arbitrarily legislate or to legislate IOCs? And if we do that, by the way, let me finish my thought, what we do is we get a system that will handle adequately the national missile defense mission but it will handle inadequately the theater missile defense mission and particularly address one MRC at a time.
Mr. WOOLSEY. There is always a question in the Congress and in the administration, for that matter, in any administration, between setting deadlines in order to make developments occur and give impetus on the one hand, versus bringing technology along and only deploying it when it is mature.
I haven't made a study of the Brilliant Eyes IOC debate but I think I know you well enough to say that the facts you stated I would stipulate to. I imagine you are quite correct. My response in that case would probably be, what, about 2004?
Mr. SPRATT. You said something like that, 2004, you begin deployment and you are there by 2006.
Mr. WOOLSEY. It seems to me that the national defense debate might or might not involve the need for a Brilliant Eyes IOC of 2003, but if that is a central feature of all of the potentially useful national defense programs, then it seems to me what is necessary is a dialog between the executive branch and the Congress on a precise date.
I don't hold any particular philosopher's stone that will let me see whether or not 2004 is necessary or whatever. I think the commitment to a deployment by this point has come to be an important feature of actually getting there, and although there may be adjustments that need to be made in dates, it seems to me that the important feature is for the country to decide to move forward both in its negotiations with the Russians and with its technology toward a date certain, which might slip by a year or so, in order to get this thin type of national defense that I have characterized.
Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.
Mr. GAFFNEY. Mr. Chairman, before we break for lunch, could I ask your indulgence, if I may, just before you break, there were several questions that Congressman Spratt put that I would like to respond to as well. I don't know if he cares to hear the response or not. If I could have your permission, I will leave it for the record. I am sure you will get a chance to look at it later.
I just wanted to make the point that I do not agree that the most urgent threat we face is that of theater missile attack. We have lived for several years now, as those who watched Desert Storm will recall, with the danger that people will launch ballistic missiles at our forces overseas and our allies. That is a present danger. There is no disputing it.
The problem is that we have no capability to defend the American people against even a single ballistic missile attack today. That I would argue from the standpoint of just a regular citizen is an urgent national security priority, arguably the most urgent.
On setting initial operational capabilities (IOC's), I agree with Jim Woolsey, the Congress tells the executive branch all the time what to do and when to do it—whether it is achievable or not. I believe in the case of technology, stressing that it needs to be done as a national priority is the best incentive in the world to getting it done. And just at the risk of repeating myself, Congressman, if you want to have something deployed quickly that will defend large theater areas as well as the American people with or without Brilliant Eyes—I strongly recommend that you seriously look at the recommendations here on the Navy-wide area defense system. Whether we get Brilliant Eyes in 2003 or 2004 or 2006 or 2010, it will help immeasurably with this system as well as with others. It need not be the pacing item to defending our people.
Thank you very much.
Mr. EHRLICH. Bear with us just a moment. I thank you both very much.
Speaking for the freshmen who were here, this is a very important issue and your expertise is very much appreciated. We are reading and learning an awful lot about what I think will be a major issue in this country for the foreseeable future.
What we are going to do is break. We have a vote on the floor. We will break until 1:15. The next panel will be convened at 1:15 sharp. Thank you.
Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, is it your intention for the committee to be able to submit questions to the witnesses, further questions, so we might get answers?
Mr. EHRLICH. That certainly would be my intent. Without objection, so ordered. Thank you.
The committee stands in recess.
(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m.]
Mr. EHRLICH. The subcommittee will come to order.
The Chair would like to introduce our third panel consisting of Dr. Keith B. Payne and Mr. Michael Krepon.
Dr. Payne is the president and director of the National Institute for Public Policy, specializing in international security affairs, Russian defense policies and arms proliferation. He is the author of dozens of articles and 11 books on international security, including many on ballistic missile defenses.
Mr. Krepon is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington think tank devoted to arms control and international security, and he is the author of seven books on international security.
If the witnesses would now stand pursuant to the committee rules, I will swear you in.
STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL KREPON, PRESIDENT, THE HENRY
L. STIMSON CENTER; DR. KEITH B. PAYNE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Mr. EHRLICH. Gentlemen, welcome, and whomever would like to proceed can begin.
Mr. KREPON. Keith, since your side of the debate has been heard for the preceding several hours, how about if I went first?
Mr. PAYNE. I will defer to Michael Krepon.
Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the full text of my remarks be placed in the record.
Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection so ordered. In fact, I would ask both of you to hit the highlights of your testimony so we can get to the Q and A.
Mr. KREPON. Thank you, sir.
We need stronger and better protection against weapons of mass destruction. We also need stronger and better protection of taxpayer wallets. The real question before this committee and the subject of this hearing is how we get better protection of both the United States and taxpayer wallets.
National missile defenses constitute the last line of defense. National missile defenses constitute the last 15 minutes of the problem facing our country. When an ICBM-intercontinental ballistic missile or submarine launched ballistic missile is heading in our direction, that is about the time we have in order to respond.
It is extraordinarily difficult to defend the country in the last 15 minutes, even if we spend tens of billions of dollars by deploying national missile defenses. We have to know that. And therefore, we have to spend a lot of time and effort, and, if necessary, money, on everything that comes before the last 15 minutes to increase the odds in our favor. If we do a bad job on everything that precedes the last 15 minutes, we are in deep trouble, even with national missile defenses.
This committee and its counterparts in the Congress can authorize as much money as you like for the last 15 minutes of the problem, and it will not work if we fail at the front end of the problem. If the front lines of defense are weak, the last line of defense will be porous.
The front lines of defense are all of the nonmilitary means that we use to protect ourselves. That means good intelligence, good cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, early warning. It means good diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, coercive diplomacy when necessary. It means threat reduction and destruction treaties like START.
I am not just talking about START II. I am also talking about START III and START IV and START V, because we really have to draw down the potential threats to our country to increase the chances of successful defense.
The front lines of defense are export control regimes that work, that become broader and broader, and stronger and stronger, bringing more people in. There are all kinds of front lines of defense against this problem. You know what I am talking about. I am talking about the Nunn-Lugar program that was discussed earlier this morning. I am talking about NEST teams, the Nuclear Emergency Response Teams that receive taxpayer money to work the problem of nuclear accidents in this country. I am talking about FEMA and having a FEMA that works against the kinds of terrible contingencies we are talking about. All of that constitutes the front end of the problem.
Now, the second line of defense is our military forces, and they have to be properly trained and equipped. They have to have the means to take care of these threats, if it comes to that. It costs a lot of money, and it is worth it.
The last line of defense is ballistic missile defenses, and they come in various kinds. You heard about missile defenses against short-range ballistic missiles, tactical ballistic missiles. You heard about theater ballistic missile defenses, and then there are national ballistic missile defenses. I would like to give you—if you could have one of your staff people come here I could hand this out. I would like to give you all a chart that was prepared by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization for Under Secretary of Defense Paul Kaminski, and if you would be so kind, I would like to put it in the record as well. This chart
Mr. EHRLICH. Without objection so ordered. [The information referred to follows: