werp, Lisbon, and Genoa, which, of course, would be equivalent to a declaration of war against Belgium, Portugal, and Italy. We would even have to go further; with similar consequences we would have to blockade all ports of the mainland; we would have to declare war against the whole of Europe. This supposition is absurd, but it proves, nevertheless, that even if our blockade were absolutely tight, all the goods needed by our enemy could certainly be brought into a neutral port and transported thence over the railroads to any other point of the mainland.

What is defined here as an insipid supposition has become the sad truth in the world war. England has carried out her alleged blockade in such a manner that it should have had the effect of a declaration of war against the neighbouring States, even of a war challenge to Europe.

But the affected neutrals were satisfied with protests on paper, and, when Germany, suffering greatly from the English violations of law and from the patient toleration of the neutrals, took recourse to the principle of self-help and enacted reprisals from which the neutrals, too, had to suffer, then America declared war, not, as one had a right to expect, against the English, but against the Germans, who were already hit hard by the brutal violations of law.

England had little regard for any law whatever, but simply represented the selfish point of view, without being in the least disturbed in it by America. "What does it avail us," thus declares the English note to America of July 23, 1915, "that we blockade the German ports, if Rotterdam, for example, is the nearest port of exportation for several German industrial centers?" But I maintain a question of right and not a question of utility is to be decided here. "Is it, perhaps, useful" to neutral Holland that her ports remain closed contrary to law? Must Holland yield to a violation of law because such a violation is useful to England? Here we have the naked point of view of might which has been the characteristic trait of the English policies since times immemorial, while at the same time the English Government announces publicly the watchword: "Subordination of might to right," in order to confuse public opinion. But America, which has always played before the whole world the rôle of the guardian of international law, has shown a surprisingly deep understanding for English arrogance. In its notes of March 5 and March 30, 1915, the Union Government has indeed left no doubts in the minds of the English that it does not consider the English closing of the sea a real blockade, but-thus it stated-under the methods of present-day warfare, particularly in view of the submarines and airships, it has become physically impossible to maintain a tight blockade. However, the radius of action must be restricted, and neutral vessels must be permitted to pass through the blockading ring

at least to neutral ports. But even this remained a platonic demand. This self-same America, which failed to evince the least understanding of the peculiar position of the submarines, to which no objection can be made from the point of view of international law,1 and of Germany's attitude of retaliation, agrees in this case to the theory of adaptation to conditions, accepting thereby-though in a somewhat modified form-the English "blockade adapted to the conditions of modern war and commerce." For that reason I demand in the first place absolute abolition of the commercial blockade.

II. But if this should not prove feasible, then the blockade of commerce must at least be reduced again to the legal basis of the London Declaration of maritime laws. In accordance with this declaration the following minimum demands should be formulated:

1. The blockade must be limited to enemy ports or to ports and coasts occupied by the enemy;2 neutral countries and harbors must not be drawn into the blockaded circle.3

This ought to apply "regardless of the interest which a belligerent may possibly have in it, on account of the importance of this neutral port to the matter of provisioning the enemy.

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2. The blockade must be conceived as nothing else but a "temporary military occupation of a sea territory" or as an "effective military siege." 7 From this follows the necessity for a strictly local application; the demand for effectiveness and the rejection of the theory of an uninterrupted (continuous) voyage."

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It is high time that the neutral nations obtained their rights. A neutral is not permitted to render military assistance to either side, and in return he ought not to be exposed to attack by either belligerent faction. It is quite conceivable how a neutral may have to yield to a blockading squadron that is engaged in a military operation.

If the vessels of the neutrals throw themselves between the combatants, as happens, indeed, when they attempt to run an effective blockade, then they have no right to complain, in case they become the victims of warfare. If one places his fingers between the door and the hinge, he will naturally have his fingers smashed. The neutrals can not expect that the combat shall be interrupted or restricted on their account.1

• Liepmann,

Sp. 925.

10

"Die Freiheit der Meere," in Deutsche Juristenzeitung, 1917, Nos. 21-22,

7 Niemeyer, "Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechtes," 1909, p. 24.

8 Article 2 of the London Declaration of maritime laws and customs.

9 Ibid., Article 17. See Hansemann, "Die Lehre von der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande," Dissertation of the University of Würzburg, 1910. 10 Niemeyer," Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechtes," 1909, p. 28.

Similarly, in warfare on land the non-participants have no claim to unmolested access to the field of operations; the same principle applies in our daily life and is taken for granted: If we do not wish to become involved in a brawl we had better keep away from a fighting crowd.

But outside of the fighting arena freedom of movement exists and the interests of the neutral nations calls for consideration.

If during a war between Russia and Japan Norwegian ships may be seized because they have received orders to sail for certain East Asiatic ports which were proclaimed to be in a state of blockade at the time of their departure, then this constitutes interference with neutral trade, which is just as unendurable as it is useless.1

Niemeyer is right: The theory of a continuous voyage is "a bluff for the purpose of covering up one's own weakness through an artificially created fear among the neutral nations.” 2

Nevertheless one can snap his fingers at the demands for effectiveness, even in view of the extraordinary elasticity of the sphere of activity that is so greatly favored in England. The official elucidations endeavoured to supply the definiteness that is lacking in Article 17 of the London Declaration of the laws and customs in maritime war, in the spirit of the French interpretations, which were declared to be "the best commentary." But in the last analysis we have here only "a beautifully styled phrase," which contributes very little to a better understanding and which offers but a weak protection against English abuses.

1 Niemeyer, op. cit., p. 25. He is also right in stating further on : "On the other hand, only such a belligerent takes no interest whatever in the theory of a continuous voyage, who does not intend or who is not in a position to take seriously the principle of an effective blockade. For, whoever has proclaimed a real blockading ring, is absolutely certain that no neutral ship will be able to spoil his plan. Why should those warships waste their time in searching neutral vessels for passports so far away from the line of blockade? Such a procedure is a pure waste of energy and provokes neutral opinion." 2 Op. cit., p. 26.

3 Article 17 of the London Declaration of the laws and customs in maritime war. 4 Loreburn-Niemeyer, p. 84.

CHAPTER III.

THE RIGHT OF CONTRABAND.

SECTION I.-THE ONE-SIDED POINT OF VIEW.

§ 7. THE EXAGGERATION OF THE RIGHT OF CONTRABAND.

I. The freedom of the sea or the over-sea trade of the neutral nations is threatened more by the right of contraband than by that of blockade.

The right of contraband, too, found its previous covenanted regulation in the London Declaration of 1909 of the laws and customs in maritime war. The introductory section reads as follows:

The signatory powers are united in the declaration that the regulations contained in the succeeding chapters agree essentially with the universally recognized principles of international law.

The official interpretations emphasize the fact that the conference had for its object above all "to determine, define clearly, and to supplement, as far as necessary, the principles which could be regarded as laws established by usage." The accurateness of this conception may be a debatable question.

How seriously the German Government took the London resolutions and how disinterestedly it set to work is proven above all by the fact that, immediately upon the adjournment of the London Conference, it enacted an "ordinance concerning sea prizes," into which were embodied all the London conventions in full, and the provisions concerning contraband taken over literally. This ordinance received the imperial sanction as early as September 30, 1909 that is to say, fully two years before the London Declaration of maritime laws came up for discussion in the English House of Lords. Furthermore, in spite of the unfavorable attitude of the English House of Lords, but in expectation of a more welcome reception at the hands of the enemy Governments, it was proclaimed immediately after the outbreak of the war, on August 3, 1914, in the Reichsgesetzblatt, page 275.

This law regarding sea prizes was to be in force in every war, according to the German point of view, as is proven by the mere date

92437-19

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