aggression upon man either because two men want the same thing, or because one man is afraid that another will attack him first, or to preserve his self-esteem. The three principal causes of quarrels therefore are competition, diffidence (i.e., distrust), and glory. "To this war of every man against every man this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice." And his conclusion is that in a state of nature the life of man is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” The views so lucidly presented by Treitschke are the logical corollary to the theory that States are sovereign and independent units, and it is the working of these views in practice which we may observe if we look at Prussian State-craft and diplomacy" and the Prussian methods of waging war either under Frederick 11 Diplomacy had its birth with the sovereign independent State. Prussian diplomacy to-day reminds us of Stubbs' statement (op. cit., lect. x., p. 269) that diplomacy was "in its beginning a sort of Kriegspiel, in which threats and bribes on paper took the place of mobilisation and marches, sieges and invasions." the Great or in the twentieth century. If the State is supreme and independent, it logically follows that the preservation of its sovereignty entire and its aggrandisement at the expense of other States are its chief end, and that treaties are only one means to that end; force and fraud are other means to the same end and militarism and dishonest diplomacy are enthroned; "honour " means, not honesty or chivalry or justice, but wide territories and a dominating trade and an armed force which shall strike terror into the hearts of all possible rivals. We may well apply to the philosophy of international relations held by the German school the expression "reasoned savagery" which Huxley in his famous Romanes Lecture used of the political philosophy of fanatical individualism.12 12 Evolution and Ethics, p. 115. II. THE CUSTOM AND PRACTICE OF CIVILIZED NATIONS ALL nations, however, are not so clear-headed or so logical as the German. Most writers of other nations, and some Germans, have not carried the theory of sovereignty to its logical extreme. No custom," it has been said, “is 66 ever a purè mistake, as is the case with many theories, and with the doctrines which rest on them." No matter how loudly professors and statesmen have proclaimed the theory of the absolute independence of States, custom has always rejected it. The whole structure of socalled Private International Law has been built up in spite of this theory of independ 1 Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations, vol. i., p. 28. ence.2 It is upon the custom and usage of nations that most English writers have based their views of International Law without an over-nice respect for logical consistency. If we wish to understand where things stood in 1914 we must understand the views generally held outside Germany at that date. I propose therefore to state and examine as summarily as is consistent with substantial accuracy the usually accepted rules and principles of International Law bearing on the question of Stateindependence. That those States which are recognized as members of the family of nations are sovereign, independent, and equal is an assumption which underlies almost all that has been written upon International Law, and by many writers that 2 When a child is born in America to an Englishman the jus soli declares the son an American; the jus sanguinis declares him an Englishman. Each country may according to its own laws claim him as its subject. When a Frenchman owns property in England it may become necessary on his death to decide whether the property descends according to the French or English law; when a Spaniard, resident in Germany, becomes bankrupt the question arises as to whether Spanish or German law is to be applied, and what recognition one State will give to the application of the law of the other. A contract may be entered into in Austria between a Dutchman and a Greek to be performed in Japan, and enforcement of it may be sought in the American Courts. Which law applies? The resolution of these and like "conflicts of law" arising from the intercourse of modern independent States is the domain of "Private International Law." assumption has been regarded as an essential and fundamental postulate. So Halleck,' the American general whose book on international law may be found on every British warship, calls "the independence of sovereign States the true basis of international jurisprudence." But law must be in conformity with fact; and it is very clear that States are not in fact equal in every respect. It is scarcely more true that States are sovereign or independent in an absolute sense. International jurists have recognized this, and have overlaid the postulate of sovereignty, independence, and equality with so many exceptions and provisos that the words have acquired for publicists a very different meaning from that which they bear in their primary sense. We must endeavour, therefore, to ascertain what is the meaning to international lawyers in its practical application of each of these three terms. §1. THE MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY An eminent Oxford historian recently wrote in a letter to The Times: " Sovereignty is a 3 International Law (4th ed.), ch. I., vol i., p. 7. |