The making of treaties of peace and commerce are within the powers thus granted, but have the people as yet conferred upon any or upon all three of the co-ordinate branches of the government the power to form or unite in a "League of Nations," even for so beneficent a purpose as the guarding of the peace of the world, and if so how and when was that power conferred?

Peradventure, however, it has been determined to assume that the power has been conferred, and to act upon that assumption, and if it be erroneous, to trust to indulgent ratification of acts done under the assumption, what is to be the proper basis of representation in such a league of nations as the self-appointed representatives of America are talking about in Paris? Is it to be population, military status, naval supremacy, economic production, or merely national autonomy.

Are Germany, Russia, Turkey, Mexico, to be admitted as members in full communion and equal voice, and what is to be the status of the South American and Central American Republics, Greece and the Balkan States, and of that vast expanse of the seductive Orient, which in the time of St. Paul was Mesopotamia.

And in this connection permit me to commend to your careful study and consideration the masterly address recently delivered by the distinguished President of this Association before the Institute of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, and printed by the Union League Club, of which also he is President, and the suggestions of former President Taft, who recently with great lucidity outlined the plan and scope of a combination of nations, while defining with precision the limitations within which it should or could act, if you will carefully analyze what is said by both these eminent men, you will find that they in no way depart from the

immutable principles to which the great expounders of International Law have adhered for centuries, and will be thoroughly satisfied that if some combination of nations to maintain the peace of the world, and to minimize the pretext and opportunities for future wars is desirable, that it is imperative it should be framed upon something more substantial than a rhetorical predicate.

Does the freedom of the seas, aside from the matters of which I have spoken, involve more than the right of privately owned vessels to traverse the seas in time of war so long as they do not carry that which is contraband of war; is it not true that what is contraband never has been and never will be settled by an interested belligerent; is it not too changeable a matter now to admit of definite determination?

Consider the general desire of the old world for expansion in the new world, its wish for the development of Central and South America, and of Mexico. Will that desire in any way conflict with that bulwark of our territorial and economic security enunciated by President Monroe, a doctrine which now, as in the past, removes the whole western hemisphere from the possibility of foreign intrigue for military or political supremacy.

If we insist upon a Monroe Doctrine for the United States, with what consistency can we refuse it to Australia and New Zealand.

Is it not visionary to think that we can depend upon moral suasion or moral force to prevent war? Does not the situation in Russia this very afternoon conclusively demonstrate the unwillingness of the great nations of the world effectively to enforce peace?

Even at the moment they are planning a league of nations hereafter to enforce it, are they not unwilling to send a sufficiently large force into Russia by way of Vladivostok and

Archangel, effectively to quell the ruinous ravages of the Bolsheviki?

Is it not doubtful whether in the twentieth century the aspiration for perfection will enable us successfully to surpass the methods of the Amphictyons. Admirable as we fancy was that of the Delphians, Thessalians, Dorians, Ionians, Phocians, Dolopians, and their colleagues; practically the only complete record of its action obtainable to-day is to be found on that Delphic stone containing the decree of the Amphictyonic Council relative to money due from them to the Delphic Treasury, indicating that even in halcyon days under the idyllic democracies of Greece there was a disposition among the aspiring people of Attica to evade those mutual obligations into which so solemnly they had entered.

Did the war come because there was no machinery of arbitration, or because Germany wanted war, and expected by war to dominate the world?

There may be much to be said in favor of a defensive league of nations, but are we prepared to become copartners in an offensive league? Can we determine in advance what demands may confront us with membership in such a league? Suppose friction between China and Japan results in a declaration of war by either, is it probable that Congress would authorize the sending of an American army to the far east to take the part of either power for the sake of preventing such a war, or that an American army would fight to attain that end?

Is it not equally the rule of political conduct and morality that responsibility is the inevitable accompaniment of exerted authority, can we exert or assist others to exercise authority without ourselves accepting responsibility, would not the attempt to shirk it forever disgrace us?

Will not the creation of a League of Nations annihilate the status of neutrals?

These are but a suggestion of the questions which inevitably arise in every reflective mind when contemplating embarking on a voyage upon an uncharted sea of speculative humanitarianism for an unknown port imagined to be somewhere upon the amethystine coast of perfection, with an ecstatic and sublimal although somewhat uncommunicative pilot at the helm of the ship of State.

Thus, gentlemen of the Bar, it is that I venture to suggest that in dealing with the proposed expansion of the application of the fundamental and immutable principles of International Law, we do not altogether forget the limitation suggested by Cicero that we should do for the conservation and happiness of others all that is in our power, as far as this is reconcilable with our duties to ourselves. The history of the race has demonstrated that a time of emotional hysteria is not the best period to decide upon policies from which there can be no honorable retreat; policies irretrievably committing us to action, however advantageous to others, which may result in disaster to ourselves; that we thoroughly consider whether always being prepared unhesitatingly to defend national rights, on land or sea, a profound love of justice, wise laws, impartially administered and promptly executed, a liberal cultivation of commerce, the arts, the sciences, a high reputation for valor, for inviolable fidelity, a national life so ordered as in the main to meet the approval of an omnipotent and beneficent deity, will not go far in defining the place of our nation among the nations of the earth, and secure to us, as was suggested by Washington, formidable alliances in time of war.

The President:

We will next have the pleasure of hearing from Mr. James M. Beck.

James M. Beck, of New York:

Mr. President and Gentlemen.- When I accepted the invitation with which this association greatly honored me, it was with the distinct understanding that nothing more would be expected of me than that I should participate in a general discussion of preceding papers; therefore I have not come here with any prepared speech.

It was suggested that I could possibly supplement something that had already been said by my own observations drawn from recent experiences on the other side.

This has been a war of superlatives. Even the American disposition to use superlatives can now be gratified, as the conference now in session in Paris is in every aspect the most wonderful in recorded history.

At first blush this would seem an ideal time for nations to reconstruct society upon surer and more stable foundations, and thus to inaugurate a new era in human affairs. But I think that view may be superficial. On the contrary I fear that this may prove the worst time for nations in their collective capacity to reconstruct human society upon abstract principles. The future may show that no more unfortunate time could have been selected than the present for providing new machinery for world government.

I say that for two or three reasons: First, I would have you observe that in the peace problem the abstract and the concrete are both elements, the abstract being the concept of a League of Nations and the concrete, the restoration of peace with the Central Powers. Such a treaty of peace is of such urgent importance, that the Allied nations might well confine themselves to that feature for the present, or at least give that practical problem precedence. I am not saying to