been made, is not a bar to the recovery of the money where upon a second trial the verdict was for the defendant.

Citing Thorne, et al. vs. Ins. Co., 30 P. F. Smith, 15; Harger vs. Commissioners, etc., 2 Jones, 251; Federal Ins. Co. vs. Robinson, 1 Norris, 359; Duncan vs. Kirkpatrick, 13 S. & R., 292.

Travelers' Ins. Co. vs. Heath.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 26.

ASSIGNMENT.

PA. S. C.

§ 2. LIFE.-Of Policy in Benevolent Association.-What Constitutes.—Distinguished from Will.—Interest of Wife and Children. -S. was a member of a mutual association, according to the provisions of which he was entitled to certain benefits in case of personal injury, and the association was liable to pay $2,500 in case of his death. This latter sum, according to the rules of the association, could be disposed of by will, and if not so disposed of, should belong to and be paid to his widow, or in case he had no widow, then to his legal heirs or representatives. S. made a will devising the proceeds to children by a former marriage, delivering it and his certificate of membership to the executor appointed. Afterwards, he being absent from home and indebted for assessments which he was unable to pay, sent his wife a writing that it was his wish, made in sound mind, revoking all former life insurance policies, this day he made his life policy read for her benefit in case of his death, and for her special benefit and all that might be derived therefrom, and also wrote to her of his inability to pay his dues, and that "this makes the policy yours if you will keep it up," and she paid the assessments accordingly. Held, that the document was not testamentary, but in connection with the wife's acts amounted to an equitable present assignment of the sum payable by the policy on his death, but not of the sum payable for personal injury, and that on his death she was entitled to receive the sum due on the policy in preference to the executor under the will. Held, that neither the wife nor children of the insured had any interest in the insurance previous to the assignment; the contract was wholly between the insurer and insured, and the latter had a right to assign the same.

Swift vs. Railway Pass., etc., Ass'n.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 53.

ILL. S. C.

§3. LIFE.-Of Policy by Insolvent to "Wife.—Rights of Creditors.-Construction of Wife's Policy Law.-Construction of Illinois Statute as to Transfers Between Husband and Wife.—Preferred Lien.-Where an insolvent debtor holds an insurance policy upon his own life, he may assign the same to his wife, who may hold the proceeds of the policy exempt from the claims of creditors of her husband, except as to the amount of premiums paid by the husband within five years, the period of limitation, and interest thereon. Such a transaction is within the spirit of section 54, ch. 73, Rev. Stat. of Illinois, 1874, entitled "Insurance," which provides that a married woman may, by herself and in her own. name, or in the name of any third person, with his assent as her trustee, cause to be insured for her sole use the life of her husband, etc. That statute is remedial in its character, and should be liberally construed in furtherance of the purpose of its enactment. Deere vs. Chapman, 25 Ill., 610; Good vs. Fogg, 61 Ill., 451; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. vs. Brant, 47 Mo., 419; Burroughs vs. State Mut. Life Ass. Co., 97 Mass., 359.

Section 9, ch. 68, Rev. Stat. of Illinois, 1874, entitled, "Husband and Wife," providing that where husband and wife shall be living together, no transfer or conveyance of goods and chattels between such husband and wife, shall be valid as against third persons, unless such transfer or conveyance be in writing, and be acknowledged and recorded, is not to be so construed as to require an assignment of a chose in action between husband and wife to be acknowledged and recorded. So, the assignment by the husband to his wife of a policy of insurance upon the life of the former, is not, in that regard, embraced in the statute. Where a creditor files a bill to subject property or a fund in the hands of a third person, to the payment of his debt, he thereby acquires a lien upon such property or fund, and upon recovery will be entitled to a preference in the satisfaction of his claim to the exclusion of other creditors. And where the bill is filed after the death of the debtor, the same rule of preference applies.

Lyons vs. Robins, 46 Ill., 276; Rappley vs. Internat. B'k, 93 Ill., 396; Ballentine vs. Beal, 3 Scam., 204; Alexander vs. Tums, 13 Ill., 221; U. S. B'k vs. Burke, 4 Black, 141.

Cole vs. Marple.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 47.

ILL. S. C.

CONSIGNEES.

84. FIRE.-Liability to Consignors After Loss in Case of Insolvency of Company.-When one, not under contract to insure another's goods, does insure them together with his own, and, because the insurance companies become insolvent, does not receive enough insurance money to cover his own loss, he is not obliged to pay any portion thereof to the other, even though he had included his goods in a statement of loss rendered the insurance companies.

Reitenbach vs. Johnson. Rep'd Jour'l, p.15.

MAS. S. J. C.

CONSTRUCTION.

$5. MARINE.-Findings as to Negligence of Master.-Seaworthiness.-A contract of marine insurance upon a steam tug provided that the insurer should not be liable for losses arising from "the following or other legally excluded causes, viz.:

* *

* incompetency of the master or insufficiency of the crew, and want of ordinary care or skill in navigating said vessel." It appeared that the master, while navigating Lake Michigan, the fuel being exhausted, let go the anchor in a storm, and with his crew, abandoned the tug and went ashore; and that a few hours afterwards, the cable parted and the tug was wrecked. In this action upon the policy the jury found specially that the master did not do "all that a skilful, careful and prudent seaman could do to prevent the wrecking of the boat," and that it was his duty "to remain on board of the tug, or leave a man there to attend the cable;" but, to the question, " Did the master leave said boat only when, in his opinion, to stay longer would endanger the life of himself and the crew?" they also answered "Yes." On appeal from a judgment in plaintiff's favor. Held that the findings are so inconsistent as to require a new trial.

Haas Adm'r vs. C. & N. W. R., 41 Wis., 64; Kearney Adm'r vs. C. M. & S. P. R., 47 Wis., 144.

To render a ship "seaworthy," within the meaning of a contract of insurance, she must be sufficiently furnished with proper cables and anchors.

1 Kay's Law of Shipmasters, 90; Wilkie vs. Geddes, 3 Daw., 57; Merch. Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Sweet, 6 Wis., 670, and cases cited.

Lawton vs. Royal Canadian Ins. Co.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 17.

WIS. S. C.

CONTRACT.

§ 6. LIFE.-Notice of Acceptance Necessary to Complete.Agent of Both Parties by Stipulation.—Practice.—Construction of Application a Question of Law.-Suit was brought by the company to recover on a promissory note. It was alleged in defense that the note was given for a life policy which had never been received, and was therefore without consideration. The application had been accepted by the company, and the policy forwarded to its agents for delivery, who notified the company that it had been delivered, but afterwards testified that they did not know what had become of it. The insured had agreed in a written stipulation that the agents should be his own agents as well as those of the company. Held, that the contract was complete from the time of its acceptance by the company, but where the proposal came from the insured, it was necessary that he should be notified in order that he should be bound. Until that time it stood as a proposal for insurance.

Taylor vs. Mer. F. Ins. Co., 9 How., (U. S.,) 398; Planters' Ins. Co. vs. Ray, 52 Miss., 328; Kern vs. Home M. Ins. Co., 42 Mo., 41; Palm vs. Medina Ins. Co., 20 Ohio, 529; Kohm vs. Ins. Co. of N. A.,1 Wash. C.C., 96.

Held, that there was nothing inconsistent in the agents of the company acting also as agents of the insured for the acceptance of the policy; there was no necessary antagonism between the parties in this respect.

Case of Planters' Ins. Co. vs. Myers, Miss. S. C., distinguished.

Held, that under the stipulation, notification to the agents was notification to the insured. Held, that the application should have been construed by the court, and not given to the jury. Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. vs. Herron.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 68.

MISS. 8. C.

CO-OPERATIVE.

§7. LIFE.-Is a Life Insurance Company Within the Statutes of Missouri.-Construction of Mo. Statutes.-The object of the

corporation according to the constitution, was, "to give financial aid to the widows and children of deceased members, or to such uses and purposes as such member shall by his last will and testament direct." The members were divided into classes on the co-operative plan, an initiation fee was according to the by-laws to be applied as a permanent fund, the interest of which with the assessments on the death of a member were to be used for advances for members, in anticipating their dues on the death of a member, and defraying the current expenses. Held, that the corporation was a mutual life insurance company, and the fact that its object was benevolent and not speculative, had no bearing upon the nature and effect of the business conducted, and the contract made by the corporation to pay a sum upon the death of a member according to the number of members in his class. Held, that the corporation was subject to the general insurance laws of Missouri touching mutual life insurance companies, and was not exempt under the acts of March 8th and May 19th, 1879, concerning benevolent and religious associations.

Citing and discussing case of Conn. Mut. Ben. Company, 105 Mass., 149; Schunk vs. Gegenseitiger, etc., 44 Wis., 370; Erdman vs. Mut. Ins. Co., etc., Id. 376; Dietrich vs. Madison Relief Ass., 45 Wis., 79; Ky. Mass. Ins. Co. vs. Miller, 13 Bush., 489; Masons' Ben. Soc. vs. Winthrop, 85 Ill. 537; Ill. Mas. Ben. Soc. vs. Baldwin, 86 Ill., 479; Gov. of Alms House vs. Am. Art. Union, 7 N. Y., 228; Com. League of Am. vs. People, 90 Ill., 166. State vs. Merchant Ex. Mut. Ben. Society.

Rep'd Jour'l, p. 59.

DIRECTORS.

Mo. S. C.

§ 8. FIRE.-Liability of in Case of Worthless Bond of Defaulting Officer.-Directors of a corporation are required to show reasonable capacity for the position, scrupulous good faith, and the exercise of their best judgment. Directors who act in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence, but nevertheless fall into a mistake, either of law or fact, are not personally liable for the consequence of such mistake. The by-laws of a corporation provided that the board of directors should elect a secretary, whose term of office should be twelve months or until his successor was elected, and who was to give bond with security for the faithful discharge of his duties. The board elected a secretary,