In United States v. Knight Co. (156 U. S. 1) the Supreme Court has this to say:

The

Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it. power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed, and is a power independent of the power to suppress monopoly.

Thereby holding that commerce was separate and distinct from the business of manufacturing.

In International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts it was held that the manufacture of paper is not commerce. (246 U. S. 135.) The mining of coal or ore is not interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court of the United States has so held in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co. (259 U. S. 344) and the Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord (262 U. S. 172).

See also Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi (257 U. S. 129).

How, then, if Congress has not the power to regulate manufactures, can it, by passing this bill, divest itself of nothing and at the same time confer something upon the different States? Congress has not this power to give; it has never had this power to give, and surely no one will assert that any State under our form of government has the right to regulate or control the manufactures, mining, and other industries of another State. It is a simple proposition in arithmetic. Nothing subtracted from nothing leaves naught, and naught added to naught gives nothing.

It may be argued where, then, does the power rest? It certainly does not belong to Congress and the right abides in each of the several States.

Once an article is manufactured, mined, or produced and becomes the subject of interstate commerce, of course, the constitutional power of Congress immediately attaches, as has been pointed out, to prevent discriminations by the States.

The question is, Can Congress, by act, designate certain articles as being subject to discriminatory legislation by the States because of the method of their production, and, at the same time, allow other articles of the exact nature to enjoy the privileges and immunities of interstate commerce? The answer is "no," for to admit the affirmative of this proposition would give to Congress the right to regulate the manufactures, mining, and other producing interests of the States and deprive them of this valuable and necessary power.

The Supreme Court in United States v. Knight Co. (156 U. S. 1) says:

It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes preplexing, should always be recognized and observed.

There is another feature of this proposed legislation, and an important one, to which I desire to call special attention. In his admirable work, Watson on the Constitution, page 532, he has this to say:

Closely akin to the question of regulating manufacturing is the question whether Congress can forbid the hauling of a commodity by a carrier of interstate commerce which was manufactured in a State, for instance, by women or children under a certain age, as has recently been maintained. This question is of far-reaching effect, and if such power exists in Congress it would result in the most complete invasion of the sovereignty of the States by the General Government which has ever been accomplished under the Federal Constitution.

In Hammer v. Dagenhart (247 U. S. 251) it was held that the child labor law can not be sustained on the theory that Congress has power to control interstate commerce in the shipment of child-made goods in States where the evil of child labor has been recognized by local legislation and the right to employ child labor has been more rigorously restrained than in the State of production.

See also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (259 U. S. 20), in which an act imposing a tax on child-labor-made goods was held unconstitutional.

I hope that I have made my objections to S. 1940 clear. In the first place, I frankly believe that the proposed law would be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court for the reasons which have been assigned.

In the second place, the bill is analogous to the proposed child-labor legislation and constitutes an unwarranted and dangerous invasion of the rights of the sovereign States.

In the third place, it seeks to do indirectly that which can not be done directly and is intended to circumvent the Constitution of the United States.

In the fourth place, Congress can not change the nature of things by act. Frequently acts are passed to alter the records and show that a man was not a deserter from the military or naval forces, but the act of Congress does not alter the fact that he was a deserter. Interstate commerce is interstate commerce and Congress can not alter that fact.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over. The bill (S. 1266) to create in the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor a division of safety, was announced as next in order.

Mr. KING. The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BAYARD] is interested in the measure and he is not here to-night. I ask that the bill may go over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over. The bill (S. 2292) providing for the employment of certain civilian assistants in the office of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, and fixing salaries of certain officials was announced as next in order.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over. The bill (S. 1831) to authorize the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to class as secret certain material, apparatus, or equipment for military and naval use, and for other purposes, was announced as next in order. Mr. FESS. Over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over. The bill (S. 759) to give the Supreme Court of the United States authority to make and publish rules in common-law actions, was announced as next in order. Mr. BRATTON. Over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over.

CHARLES R. SIES

nounced as next in order. The bill (S. 151) for the relief of Charles R. Sies, was an

Mr. KING. Over.

Mr. SHORTRIDGE. Mr. President, I ask the Senator if he will withhold the objection for a moment? Mr. KING. I will. Mr. SHORTRIDGE.

The House has passed a companion bill which will be found on page 16 of the calendar. It was reported favorably by the House committee, passed by the House, and has been reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. I hope that we may substitute the House bill for the Senate bill and that the House bill may be put upon its passage.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

Mr. KING. I have not seen the House bill, but I notice on page 2 of the report on the Senate bill an adverse recommendation; that is, it is equivalent to that. I read from the report:

The bill (S. 151) is identical with the bill (S. 3033), Sixty-ninth Congress, which was referred to the Bureau of the Budget, and in regard to which the Navy Department is informed that the proposed legislation was in conflict with the financial program of the President. I ask the Senator to let the bill go over until Thursday eve

ning, when I shall be very glad to cooperate with him.

Mr. SHORTRIDGE. May I ask the Senator if he will in think he will agree with me that it is a meritorious bill. the meantime have the goodness to read the full report? I

Mr. KING. I shall be glad to do that.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over. The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 57) requesting the President to immediately withdraw the armed forces of the United States from Nicaragua, was announced as next in order, and as being an adverse report.

Mr. ODDIE. Over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution will be passed over.

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 99) to amend joint resolution directing the Interstate Commerce Commission to take action relative to adjustments in the rate structure of common carriers subject to the interstate commerce act, and the fixing of rates and charges, was announced as next in order.

Mr. FESS. Over.

Mr. METCALF. I hope the Senator will not insist on the objection.

Mr. FESS. It involves a controversy and I must ask that it go over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution will be passed over.

The bill (S. 2532) to provide for the designation of clerks and employees of the Department of the Interior to serve as registers and receivers in the land office in Alaska, was announced as next in order.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Over.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold the objection for a moment?

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Certainly.

Mr. BINGHAM. I call attention to the bill that has been asked for by the Secretary of the Interior, who says that—

It is believed that the enactment recommended will promote efficiency in the public service and at the same time work in the direction of economy.

I hope the Senator will not object.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I ask that the bill may go over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over. The bill (S. 2679) to limit the period for which an officer appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate may hold over after his term shall have expired was announced as next in order.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be passed over. LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS The bill (S. 3151) to limit the jurisdiction of district courts of the United States was announced as next in order. SEVERAL SENATORS. Over.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, will the Senator objecting to the bill withhold his objection long enough for me to have a couple of amendments to the bill passed on, to which there will be no objection and which will relieve most, if not all, of the objections to the bill when they are examined later. After that is done, then we can pass it over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the objecting Senator withhold his objection?

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. President, I am bound to object to the bill. I was not the only Senator who objected, however. There were several who interposed an objection.

Mr. NORRIS. I do not intend to try to pass the bill to-night. I understand it will lead to some debate, but I want to offer two amendments to which there can be no possible objection, and then I am going to ask that it go over.

Mr. BRUCE. Very well,

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. There is a committee amend

ment.

Mr. NORRIS. Instead of the committee amendment I am going to offer another amendment. The reference in the committee amendment is not quite right. It ought to be as follows

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate should disagree to the committee amendment first.

Mr. NORRIS. I want to offer it in lieu of the committee amendment.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. That may be done.

Mr. NORRIS. Instead of the committee amendment insert the following words:

United States Code, title 28, section 41, paragraph 1.

That makes the proper reference.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the bill is before the Senate as in Committee of the Whole, and the amendment is agreed to.

Mr. NORRIS. I now offer another amendment to which there will be no objection because it narrows down the effect of the bill and will leave it so there will be no objection whatever, I believe. It affects the diverse citizenship jurisdiction of the court. It takes away everything except that one.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. President, I am bound to say I think it will be a little premature to take up the amendments now to limit the jurisdiction of district courts of the United States. I am frank to say that I have received more letters making objection to this bill than with reference to any other bill on the calendar.

Mr. NORRIS. When this amendment is agreed to, if the Senator will then examine the bill I feel as confident that he will favor it as that I am in favor of it myself. I think it will remove any possible objection except from one class of people.

Mr. BRATTON. Mr. President, let me suggest to the Senator from Nebraska that he have his amendment printed and lie on the table before the Senate acts upon it, in order that it may be examined in connection with the bill.

Mr. NORRIS. Of course, I will do that. I will not offer it at all if there is objection. I realize that it takes unanimous consent, but in order that Senators may understand it, let me say that the bill takes away certain jurisdiction of the Federal courts. The amendment narrows down to one particular thing the jurisdiction that it takes away so that those who object to the bill will find it less objectionable, of course, when the amendment is agreed to. They can still object to the bill after that. Of course, as soon as the amendment is agreed to, I will ask that the bill go over.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection the amendment will be received, printed, and lie on the table, and without objection the bill as already amended will go over.

Mr. NORRIS. Oh, no, Mr. President. I ask Senators to withhold their objection to see if we can not adopt the amendment. There can not possibly be any objection to it, because those who object to the bill now taking away jurisdiction will have less objection when a part of their objection is entirely removed.

Mr. COPELAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. NORRIS. Certainly.

Mr. COPELAND. I think I may say to the Senator from Maryland, because I brought up the objection to the bill in the first place, that the bar association of my city is very much opposed to it. However, I can see no objection to the adoption of the amendment. That completes the bill, but it is still on the calendar. It is not passed in any sense, but is still before us.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, the Senator tenders the amendment, and now the Senator from New York indicates that by the adoption of that amendment it would complete the bill other than the final vote upon it. Some of us might want to offer an amendment to the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska. It does seem to me it would be better to have the bill go over and have the amendment printed and lie on the table.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair understands the objection to be maintained on the part of the objecting Senators, and the order of the Chair already entered is that the amendment will be received, printed, and lie on the table.

Mr. COPELAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point a resolution and statement of the committee on jurisprudence and law reform of the American Bar Association in connection with the bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution and statement referred to are as follows: RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION IN OPPOSITION TO SENATE BILL 3151

To the Senate of the United States:

The within resolutions and statement in relation to Senate bill 3151 are transmitted to the Members of the Senate by direction of the committee on jurisprudence and law reform of the American Bar Association. HENRY W. TAFT, Chairman.

APRIL, 27, 1928.

Resolution of the executive committee of the American Bar Association, adopted at a meeting on April 24, 1928, in Washington, D. C. Whereas there have been introduced in the present Congress of the United States certain bills which, in the judgment of the executive committee, are inconsistent with the advancement of the science of jurisprudence and the promotion of the administration of justice and uniformity of legislation and of judicial decision throughout the Nation, as defined by the constitution of the American Bar Association; and Whereas the executive committee is of opinion that it is the duty of the association, acting through its proper committees, to oppose the passage of all bills intended to diminish the powers and to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the committee on jurisprudence and law reform be, and it hereby is, authorized in the name of the association to oppose the passage of any bills intended to diminish the powers and to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts,

Resolution of the committee on jurisprudence and law reform of the American Bar Association, adopted at a meeting held in Washington, D. C., on April 26, 1928

Pursuant to the authority conferred by the preambles and resolution of the executive committee of the American Bar Association, adopted at its meeting on April 24, 1928, authorizing the committee on jurisprudence and law reform in the name of the association to oppose the passage of any bills intended to diminish the powers and to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, the said committee on jurisprudence and law reform unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the committee on jurisprudence and law reform of the American Bar Association, in behalf of said association and in its name, opposes the passage of Senate bill 3151, by which it is sought to deprive the United States district courts of the larger part of their jurisdiction in common-law and equity cases, conferred upon them by paragraph (1) of section 24 of the Judicial Code (sec. 41, U. S. C.), being the most important part of the jurisdiction conferred by that section and that most frequently exercised;

Resolved further, That the reasons for the committee's opposition to Senate bill 3151 are set forth in a statement hereto annexed;

Resolved further, That the chairman of the committee be authorized to cause the said preambles and resolutions, together with the said statement, to be printed in convenient form and sent to each Member of the United States Senate.

STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION IN OPPOSITION TO SENATE BILL 3151 Senate bill 3151, introduced by Senator NORRIS and favorably reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee, seeks to amend paragraph (1) of section 24 of the Judicial Code (sec. 41, U. S. C.) by taking from the United States district courts jurisdiction at common law or equity in the following cases, viz:

1. Where the suit is between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States;

2. Where the matter in controversy exceeds $3,000, exclusive of interests and costs; and

(a) Arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States or treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; (b) Is between citizens of different States; or

(c) Is between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

As a result of the proposed amendment litigants would be forced in all of the above cases to resort to State courts having jurisdiction.

By the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, establishing the judicial courts of the United States, the Federal courts were given jurisdiction in all cases specified above, except those of citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States and those relating to controversies arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. In the latter cases jurisdiction was conferred by the act of March 31, 1875.

A

During the fiscal years of 1927 there were commenced in the district courts of the United States, exclusive of admiralty and bankruptcy cases, 19,340 private suits. On June 30, 1927, there were there pending in that court undetermined 29,870 of suits of that character (Rept.

of the Attorney General, 1927, p. 81). Most of these suits are of a kind in which the district courts would not have jurisdiction if the Senate bill 3151 should become law.

In the annotated copy of the United States Code, under section 41 (Judicial Code, sec. 24), there are over 400 pages of annotations to paragraph (1), most of which relate to litigation of which the district court would be deprived if the bill objected to were passed. Under all of the rest of the 28 paragraphs of that section dealing with other heads of jurisdiction there are only 200 pages of annotations.

The annotated copy of the code also shows that under the first paragraph of section 41 (Judicial Code, sec. 24) 955 subjects have been dealt with by the courts-the number of decisions upon each subject varying while under all the other paragraphs of the section the subjects, excluding admiralty, number only 194. The pecuniary importance of the business of the district courts is indicated by the fact that in the year 1927 judgments were rendered for the plaintiffs for an aggregate of $92,310,602.85 and for the defendants of $4,913,158.38.

If the Norris bill should become law, the greater portion of the litigation indicated by the above figures would be withdrawn from the Federal courts, and there would probably be no further need for the present judicial establishment. Special courts would be able to deal with admiralty and patent causes, while government causes would be committed to special tribunals-the first step toward a system, alien to Anglo-Saxon ideas of civil liberty, of having one kind of law and procedure governing the rights of individuals among themselves and another controlling rights growing out of their relations to the Government. The benefits of the harmonious and consistent body of law built up in the Federal courts during a period of 140 years would thus be largely lost and the systems of 48 States substituted, often inharmonious and inconsistent.

B

There has been built up by the Federal courts during a period of 140 years, and especially during the last 40 or 50 years, which have been marked by an unprecedented development in agriculture, industry, and transportation, a great body of Federal jurisprudence. The decisions relating to interstate commerce and to due process of law under the fifth and fourth amendments of the Constitution alone constitute a body of law of yast importance to the growth and prosperity of the country. Federal jurisprudence relating to these and other matters owes little to the decisions of State courts, while the Federal courts are constantly contributing to its development. Indeed, the interpretation of the Federal Constitution and statutes has become so associated in the minds of the American public with the Federal courts that to transfer it to the State courts would give a rude shock to the bench, the bar, and the business interests of the country, because it would seem to be a sinister attack upon one of our institutions heretofore regarded as the keystone of the constitutional system.

our

Apart from considerations based on this historical background there is something essentially unfair and contrary to the spirit of national system of government in forcing a litigant claiming that a State statute is void under the Federal Constitution to resort in every case to the courts of the very State which has enacted the legislation and presumably in response to a sentiment prevailing among its citizens. And the prejudice such a litigant would naturally suffer under such circumstances will be enhanced where the claim of unconstitutionality depends upon issues of fact which must be settled under the rules of evidence and procedure of the State court, often quite different from those prevailing in the Federal courts. The settlement by the trial court of matters resting in its discretion, the settlement of findings of fact, the making up of the record on appeal, and the limitations upon the power of the highest State appellate court to review the findings or conclusions of the trial court-all of these matters may, and not infrequently do, combine to present in the Supreme Court a case in quite a different aspect from that which would result from the uniform methods and procedure prevailing in the Federal courts; and they might conceivably defeat a litigant in fairly presenting a question of constitutionality to the Supreme Court.

A striking illustration of what might have happened if the Norris bill had been law is afforded by the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters (the Oregon school case, 268 U. S. 510), where an injunction was granted by the district court to restrain the enforcement of a State statutean initiative measure adopted by the people--requiring parents to send their children to the public schools. The district court held that the statute was in violation of the fourteenth amendment, as it was an unreasonable interference with the liberty of parents in bringing up their children. It was charged among other things that the object of the law was to destroy parochial schools, and it was argued in support of the law that the voters might have been alarmed "at the rising tide of religious suspicion." Here is a typical case where a plaintiff, forced to bring a suit in a State court, would be seriously handicapped in an atmosphere of hostile public opinion based on religious prejudice and where the supporters of the State law would avail of every procedural expedient to prevent their opponents from securing a review in the Supreme Court.

Many other cases will occur to an experienced lawyer. We mention a few by way of illustration.

In Truax v. Raich (239 U. S. 33) a suit was brought to restrain the officers of the State of Arizona from enforcing what was alleged to be an unconstitutional statute. The suit was heard before three judges under the provisions of section 266 of the Judicial Code (U. S. C. 380). The statute was adopted under the initiative provision of the constitution of the State and presumably reflected the prevailing sentiment of the people of the State. It was assailed and held to be unconstitutional as being repugnant to the fourteenth amendment in that it denied to aliens equal protection of the laws, by restricting the number of them who could be employed in a business to 20 per cent of the entire number of employees. The plaintiff was a cook in a restaurant, dependent on his employment for his livelihood, but being an alien was excluded by the terms of the statute. Obviously, he fared better in the Federal court than he would have in a State court.

Contracts for the future delivery of cotton, involving immense sums of money, are made in Illinois, New York, Louisiana, and other States. Several States, notably Georgia, have passed laws declaring that such contracts are gambling contracts. On the other hand, the courts of New York and Louisiana, and the Supreme Court of the United States, take the opposite view. If, therefore, a resident of Georgia incurs an indebtedness to a New York, Louisiana, or Illinois resident upon Я transaction in cotton futures, and the latter is forced to go to Georgia to collect it, the courts of that State will reject his claim, and he can only collect by resorting to the Federal court.

In case of the insolvency of great railroad or industrial corporations having property and operating in a number of States, with different receivers, complications arise even in the Federal courts, as they did in the Northern Pacific receiverships. But the difficulties would be infinitely greater if such corporations were forced to have their affairs liquidated in the courts of a dozen States. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court could grant relief, and the confusion thus created would involve enormous waste of values and great delay in the resumption of normal business, which would in turn affect the welfare of hundreds of thousands of employees dependent for their livelihood upon a resumption of the business of the bankrupt concerns. In some jurisdictions ancillary receivers decline to transmit assets to the receivers in another jurisdiction until creditors in their own localities are fully paid; and the tendency to take this attitude is greater in the State courts than in the Federal courts.

C

Human nature has not changed since Justice Story, speaking for the Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter (1 Wheat. 304), said that the Constitution had presumed that

"State attachments, State prejudices, State jealousies, and State interests might sometimes obstruct or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between States; between citizens of different States; between citizens claiming grants under different States; between a State and its citizens or foreigners; and between citizens and foreigners, it enables the parties, under the authority of Congress, to have controversies heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals."

It will be observed that the opinion of Justice Story is not predicated alone upon the actual existence of "attachments, prejudices, jealousies, and interest" but upon the supposition that they exist; and that supposition continues unchanged.

It was to avoid discrimination based on such conditions as these that Federal courts were authorized by the Constitution, and lawyers as well as laymen who have given attention to the subject will agree that the following expression is as true now as it ever was, viz:

"The exercise of this jurisdiction [i. e., Federal] tends to promote confidence and commercial intercourse between the citizens of the several States of the Union by furnishing them a comparatively impartial tribunal wherein to adjudicate and enforce the controverted and unsatisfied claims growing out of such intercourse." (Judge Deady, Goldsmith v. Peters, 36 Fed. Rep. 484, 487; aff'd, 147 U. S. 150.)

A man would be blind to conditions in different parts of this country who did not realize that attachments, prejudices, and jealousies and differing social, economic, and political views continue to influence (if sometimes unconsciously) lawyers, judges, and jurymen, when they are called upon to adjudicate upon the rights of citizens from distant States. It is not necessary to charge an unjust point of view in fellow Americans living in different parts of the country. But that marked differences of outlook and opinion exist which influence both legislation and judicial proceedings, especially when the interests of nonresidents are involved, is undeniable.

The commissioners on uniform State laws, appointed by governors of the several States, have been attempting to bring about uniformity in the laws of the several States, and have been successful in certain subjects of legislation; but in many cases where local traditions, prepossessions, and prejudices have resulted in prevailing views on economic, social, or industrial conditions the States have refused to be influenced by the desirability of uniformity. Some States indulge themselves freely in experimental legislation, which is a reflection of dominant local sentiment. Such legislative tendencies do not afford much assurance that a person from a distant brought into a State court

will always obtain the same kind of justice as that available to him in a Federal district court.

In contrast with the uncertainties created by the varying conditions existing in the State courts, the necessity for uniformity in the decisions and procedure of the district courts, creates in the judges a sense of judicial responsibility and an esprit de corps which can never exist in the judges of 48 State courts beyond the influence of a unified administration of Federal jurisprudence. This was anticipated by the framers of the Constitution as was pointed out by Chief Justice Taney in Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506. He said:

"But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not peacefully be maintained, unless it was clothed with judicial power, equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution; for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be expected to be always free from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and another thing in another."

Federal district judges, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, have the same salary and hold office during good behavior. They frequently sit in States and districts far removed from their home districts. They are generally men of high character and wide experience, and have made a study of our Federal system. State judges, on the other hand, sit only in their home States and, frequently, only in their own counties; their terms of office and salaries vary; some are elected, some appointed, and some are subject to recall. Uniformity in their experience, capacity, legal learning, or judicial temperament is not to be expected.

D

The development of the sparsely settled portions of this country has been made possible by the investment of capital by security holders residing not alone in the more populous centers, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco, but, and especially since the war, in every part of the country. Investments have been made, not alone in the securities of the great systems of railroads, but in industrial projects having plants, works, and mines in States other than those where the security holders themselves reside. Billions of both Eastern and Western capital have also been invested in Western banks, trust companies, mortgage companies, and have been loaned on farm mortgages, livestock, cotton, and crops of all kinds. When nonresident investors learn that they must in an emergency depend on the State courts to protect their interests the confidence which has for generations been based upon the security afforded by the right to resort to the Federal courts will be seriously impaired; and a serious blow will be directed at the financial structure which has been built up in a long course of years. And this blow will be reflected not alone in the contraction of investments and loans, but in the increase in the rates of interest, especially on farm mortgages.

E

1. The report of the Judiciary Committee recommending the passage of the Norris bill lays stress upon the jurisdictional limitation as to amount involved. That amount was originally $500 and has been changed by statute from time to th..... There is ample power in Congress to change it again. The subject is irrelevant to a discussion of the highly important matter of emasculating the long-established jurisdiction vested in the Federal courts.

2. Another argument used by the committee in its report is embodied in the statement that a nonresident "is given a choice that the resident does not have"; that is, for example, that a resident of New York can go into the State of Pennsylvania and there sue in either the State court or the Federal court. But it is equally true that a resident of Pennsylvania can go into the State of New York, and he there has the choice as to which tribunal he will resort to. In other words, any socalled privilege is reciprocal.

3. The committee also says that "It is a practice becoming more or less common in many States for corporations to be incorporated in one State while they do business in another, and it is believed that this often occurs simply for the purpose of being able to have the choice of two tribunals in case of litigation."

If there are such cases, they do not occur with such frequency as to justify the drastic change proposed by the bill. In most cases the choice of a State in which to incorporate is dependent upon much more important considerations than the creation of a diversity of citizenship. What generally determines the place of incorporation is the taxation system of a State, the stock and bond structure permissible under its laws, and the general liberality, workability, and fairness of its corporation laws. Furthermore, in the case of railroad lines running through a dozen States, it is necessary that one of the States shall be selected as the place of incorporation, and it follows that the corporation can not avoid being a nonresident in all of the other 11 States. And the same is the case with a great industrial corporation

like the United States Steel Corporation, which was incorporated in the State of New Jersey, but has plants and mines in probably a dozen other States, in which it or its subsidiary companies could resort to the Federal courts.

4. The committee asserts that corporations can "make litigation so expensive that their antagonists in the lawsuits frequently submit to unjust and unreasonable demands rather than go to the expense of litigating their rights in the United States courts."

Under the present practice an appeal may be taken to the circuit court of appeals, and thence to the Supreme Court, and in some cases (as in suits provided for in sec. 266) directly to that tribunal. The expense of this process would generally be far less than would be involved in the State courts, where, after a trial in the court at nisi prius, an appeal would perhaps lie to an intermediate appellate tribunal, thence to the highest court of the State, and thence by a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States-a circuitous and expensive process.

In view of the foregoing considerations and the opposition which has been manifested to the provisions of Senate bill 3151, it would seem suitable that the bill be recommitted to the Judiciary Committee, in order that hearings may be had.

The bill (S. 1794) establishing additional land offices in the States of Montana, Oregon, Idaho, and South Dakota was announced as next in order.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, I shall not object to the bill, but I shall be very glad to have the Senator explain it.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, if the bill is before the Senate, I want to be heard.

Mr. BRUCE. I feel bound to object to the bill, though very reluctantly.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator refer to 634, the bill to limit the jurisdiction of district courts of the United States?

Mr. DALE. In connection with that bill, if an insurance company had a great many cases, as they do have in all the States of the Union, would they not be excluded from the Federal courts and be compelled to bring their cases in each separate State?

Mr. NORRIS. Yes; an insurance company incorporated in the State of Vermont, which took out a policy in the State of Nebraska, under the laws of Nebraska, and did business in Nebraska, would have to go into the Nebraska courts to settle its controversies. That is what would happen. There is not anybody that I know of that objects to the bill except insurance companies, railroad companies, and large corporations who want to go into a State and do business under its laws, but refuse to go into its courts.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Vermont having yielded the floor, and the time of the Senator from Nebraska having already expired

Mr. COPELAND. Mr. President, I ask that the colloquy we have had to-night be printed at one place in the RECORD. The other day the Senator from Nebraska and I had a running colloquy all the afternoon, and I think I have had a hundred letters with reference to it. This is an important matter. I include in my request that the amendment suggested by the Senator from Nebraska be printed in the RECORD, SO that all the information may be there for the benefit of our various constituents, because we shall have hundreds of letters about this matter.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The amendment proposed by Mr. NORRIS is as follows: On page 1, line 4, after the figures "41" and the comma, insert "title 28," and on the same page, line 8, after the word 'sue," strike out the period and insert a comma and the following words:

or between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants from

Mr. BRUCE. I saw the Senator from Nebraska on his feet. Mr. NORRIS. Yes; I am about to speak on the bill, although another bill is technically before the Senate. I am entitled to five minutes on the bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.

Mr. NORRIS. I want to call Senators' attention to just what the bill does. Senators are objecting to it because they have received objections from attorneys. The bill, as introduced and as reported by the Judiciary Committee, took away from the district courts of the United States certain matters of jurisdiction. Among a number of things that it deprived the courts of jurisdiction over was jurisdiction of cases arising by reason of diverse citizenship. The objection comes, I conceive, mostly from that ground, but there are other objections, because it includes other things of which it deprives the courts of juris

diction.

All my amendment would do would be to restore the bill to such form as to relieve it of all points except that one, so that anyone objecting to the bill certainly can not object to the amendment because it narrows its scope. I realize the objection would have still been made, but I wanted to put it in such shape that it would be confined to one thing alone. If the amendment was agreed to, the only thing it would apply to would be to diverse citizenship, and the only thing that it would elimi nate from the law would be the following words:

Is between citizens of different States.

I want Senators to know just exactly what the bill does, and then they can understand what is attempted by the bill. I am not expecting the bill to pass to-night; but I wanted to have it so thoroughly understood that there would not be any further controversy, at least, as to what the bill did.

These are the words that this bill would take out of the present statute:

Is between citizens of different States.

That is all. Those words would be eliminated and the statute would be just the same as it is now. The amendment would narrow it down to those words; and I can not possibly see how anyone who objects to the bill would possibly object to the amendment, because it makes it nearer the present law than it is now.

Mr. DALE. Mr. PresidentThe PRESIDENT pro tempore. Mr. DALE. May I ask the question?

Mr. NORRIS. Yes.

The Senator from Vermont. Senator from Nebraska a

of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or (b) is between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. No district court shall have cognizance of any suit (except upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover upon any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover upon said note or other chose in action if no assignment had been made. The foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy shall not be construed to apply to any of the cases mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. President, I simply want to ask the Senator a question. As I understand, this does away with the jurisdiction of the district courts based on diversity of citizenship.

Mr. NORRIS. Exactly. I am not trying to controvert that. I want to confine it to that. The amendment does not affect that. That is still left. I expect that the Senator will oppose it, and a good many other Senators who will be moved by those who like to go into a State and do business under the laws of that State, but who will not submit themselves to the courts of that State, who want to drag the citizens of the State into the Federal court and make their litigation expensive, and thus wear them out, even though they may have a good defense, with expensive litigation.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will restate the next bill on the calendar.

ADDITIONAL LAND OFFICES IN MONTANA, OREGON, IDAHO, AND SOUTH DAKOTA

The bill (S. 1794) establishing additional land offices in the States of Montana, Oregon, Idaho, and South Dakota was announced as next in order.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. This bill was considered on April 13 and amended.

Mr. BRATTON. Mr. President, my colleague [Mr. CUTTING] proposed an amendment to this bill yesterday. He had it printed. It is lying on the table. During his absence I propose that amendment on his behalf. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. stated.

The amendment will be

The CHIEF CLERK. On page 3, after line 17,, it is proposed to insert the following new section: