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but a constant swinging back and forth many times during the day. You can realize the impossibility of safely using such a market for the legitimate purpose of hedging or as a basis for the purchase of wheat from the farmer.

I do not advocate the complete abolition of trading in "futures," but I do believe that measures should be adopted that will prevent gambling in foodstuffs by hosts of small speculators and a comparatively few large ones having no legitimate connection with the production, processing, or distribution of grain and its products.

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A longer letter that preceded this, to which this letter came as a supplement, contains the information that the price of wheat was broken by the great drive 172 cents a bushel. It would represent prosperity to every wheat grower in America if he could get 172 cents cash more per bushel for his wheat than he had been getting; but he does not get it because somebody gambles in his product and prevents his reaping the world's price for it.

The letter is too long for me to read, and I ask that it be inserted in the RECORD, together with a supplementary letter of May 1.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the letters will be printed in the RECORD.

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United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR CARAWAY: I understand that your bill with regard to the control or elimination of "future" trading in grain is now under consideration, and I have been asked to write the Senators and Representatives from this State urging them to oppose its passage.

I am unwilling to do this, as, not having copy of the bill at hand, I am not familiar with its provisions.

That trading in grain "futures" has in the past been most seriously abused is unquestionable. It is carried to such extremes as to make hedging, which is a necessary factor in the merchandising of the crop and the milling of its products, an added liability rather than a protection, which it was designed to afford.

So intolerable had this fictitious grain trading become in 1924-25 that many in the milling industry believed that prohibition of "future" trading in wheat would be decidedly the lesser of two evils.

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During the last two years, owing partly to closer relation of supply and demand the world over, and the consequent lessened opportunity for wide speculative swings, and partly, perhaps largely, to the activity of professional speculators being centered upon the stock market, these causes combined resulted in a reduction of future" trading from an average of perhaps 65,000,000 bushels per day-occasional peaks of eighty or ninety million bushels, and on some occasions during the period referred to of 100,000,000 bushels; in one day 150,000,000 bushels, or nearly one-fourth of the entire crop of that year-to 10,000,000 or less bushels per day up to within a few months.

As a result of the unfavorable crop conditions in a part of the wheat area, gambling in grain has again assumed large proportions and is now running in the neighborhood of 60,000,000 bushels or more per day. On this basis, the entire prospective crop of the United States is being sold in Chicago alone once every two weeks. By far the greater proportion of this trading is by outright gamblers having no direct or indirect connection with the production, processing, or distribution of the actual grain or its products.

This has resulted in an advance of over 40 cents per bushel in " "May " and July" wheat in Chicago. This has been of little advantage to the producer, because nine-tenths of the crop had already left his hands.

The activities of this gambling element will probably, as in the past, be on the opposite side of the market as soon as the farmer begins to make deliveries of the new crop. At that time, not the weight of the crop itself, but the added weight of the millions and millions of bushels of paper wheat thrown on the market will tend to depress the price unduly.

As in the past, there will be such wide fluctuations in price as to make it necessary for the country dealer to protect himself, so far as possible, by a wider margin between central market price and price paid the farmer.

The miller will be unable to hedge with any safety or to calculate accurately the cost of his product. There were long periods during 1924-25 when a miller could not tell, from one hour to another, within 25 to 50 cents per barrel, or more, what it was costing him to make a barrel of flour.

I would like to point out that the greatly lessened activity of grain gamblers during the past couple of years was not due to any reforms by the grain exchanges, which have persistently refused to publish from day to day information regarding volume of trading, segregated as to months; total of outstanding "short" interest in each month, etc. All of this information is in possession daily of the grain futures administration of the Government, but the Agricultural Department has shown no disposition to publish such information, although it has been called for by the Millers' National Federation and by numerous individual millers throughout the country. No sound reason can be assigned for the refusal to publish this information; its suppression can only be in the interest of the professional grain gamblers. Its publication would involve no additional expense to the Government. I believe it should be insisted upon by all who favor minimizing the evils inherent in trading in breadstuff" futures."

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DAILY STOCK LETTER

BERNARD J. ROTHWELL.

NEW YORK, May 3, 1928.-Two important financial developments scheduled for to-day are the meeting of the New York Federal Reserve Board, which may possibly increase the rediscount rate and publication of monthly loan figures by the stock exchange. Heavy selling featured yesterday's market on widely disseminated reports that the New York rediscount rate would be raised and that loan figure reach the $5,000,000,000 mark. A strictly economic interpretation, even assuming these anticipations were realized, would not be bearish, The business of the country will always have first call on the money market and the stock market will get the money only when there is a surplus. Legislation would not change the economic flow of money. If New York is to be the largest of international money exchanges, moreover, why should brokerage loans be limited to $5,000,000,000? The total borrowings in New York City real estate alone, we understand, exceed that figure. The psychological effect of a higher rediscount rate and a very large increase in brokerage loans would undoubtedly inspire some selling of weakly held securities. We would not look for more than a temporary setback, however, followed by the usual upward procession in selected stocks.

While Radio is making an impressive showing, the volume is not sufficiently large yet to indicate that the present is more than an intermediate move preparatory to a broad advance somewhat later. We note impressive buying of General Motors by interests who are not seriously disturbed by Ford competition. The rank and file of traders have been selling General Motors short and the technical position is considered strong at the present time. American Can broke through its old record high, and we again advise its purchase at the market. We look for a large increase in Can's earnings, not so much on account of a heavy increase in sales, but rather on account of the introduction of new machinery which will lower the cost of production. American Can Co., we understand, has exclusive control of patents on this new machinery. We look for a consolidation of the recent sharp gains in the oils stocks which we have been recommending, followed a little later by new high prices. In the rail group we are decidedly partial to Canadian Pacific, which offers speculative possibilities on a basis of possible segregation plans which are not matched by any American railroad. Four months ago the average daily trading in wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade was less than 10,000,000 bushels a day. Now transactions are running at the rate of about 100,000,000 bushels a day. This gauges the big increase in public participation in the commodity markets. Interest in securities and commodities is nation-wide and the public is in a decidedly bullish mood. It will take more than a minor economic influence to shake the public's confidence, and we note no major influence on the horizon at the present time.

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have not yet seen the volume of trading yesterday, but I presume that it ran in the vicinity of 75,000,000 bushels.

I also inclose telegraphic advice of the market report in to-day's Chicago Tribune and Chicago Journal of Commerce, and also on the telegram marked "4" some private advice as to the character of the trading.

To-day's wheat market was a wild one in Chicago, price covering a range of over 5 cents per bushel, and fluctuating widely back and forth every few minutes, finally closing about 4 cents per bushel lower than yesterday.

I mention this simply as confirming what I stated yesterday-that such incessant fluctuations make impossible either accurate calculation of wheat values in the country or of the cost of manufacturing grain products.

Yours very truly,

BERNARD J. ROTHWELL.

The

Mr. CARAWAY. I have here a letter from the Texas Wheat Growers Association, at Amarillo, Tex. These gentlemen are engaged in the marketing of wheat. Many of us know that northern Texas produces a considerable amount of wheat. letter is so short and to the point that I want to read it: TEXAS WHEAT GROWERS ASSOCIATION, Amarillo, Tex., March 22, 1928.

Senator CARAWAY,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR SENATOR: The country for six years has been stirred from center
to circumference by the graft and scandal in the Teapot Dome lease
case, but if the editorial written by Carl Williams in the Oklahoma
Farmer Stockman of March 15 is correct, and it evidently is, the Teapot
Dome graft is a small affair compared with the exposures made by Mr.
Williams.

The editorial says: "On July 30, 1926, Chicago, December wheat touched $1.50. On or about that date two big speculators began to sell short and kept on selling until by September 4 they had between them accumulated a short line of more than 23,000,000 bushels. This was the largest volume of speculative wheat ever dealt in on either side of the market at one time by any two men in the history of the Chicago Board of Trade. As a result of the short operations of these two men, and for no other known or guessed-at conditions whatever, the price of wheat dropped 18 cents a bushel between July 30 and September 4. So far as I know this is the plainest and the worst case of artificial manipulation of the wheat market known in history. In August, September, and October more than 60 per cent of the wheat crop of the United States goes to market. During these three months of 1926 these two speculators for their personal profit took 10 cents a bushel out of the pockets of the farmers who sold wheat in the United States. It meant a direct loss of not less than $40,000,000 to the wheat growers solely because two heavyweight speculators with plenty of money for manipulation saw a chance to grab more."

That shows that in 35 days the wheat farmers were deliberately swindled out of more money than is involved in the Teapot Dome case. Then from the best information that we can get the public lost in margins they had bet on the game of these two men more than $86,000,000. Thus, robbing the farmer and the public of $126,000,000 in 35 days. Why does not Congress take cognizance of this crime and graft and either stop it or create public sentiment so it will stop it? Awaiting your reply, we are,

Yours truly,

TEXAS WHEAT GROWERS ASSOCIATION,
L. GOUGH, President.

I have in my hand a letter from the American Cotton Association and Better Farming Campaign of Greenville, S. C. They are headquarters of the American Cotton Association and Cotton News, St. Matthews, S. C. The letter is signed by Harvie Jordan. I presume everybody knows who Mr. Jordan is. The letter is too long to read, and I want to insert it in the RECORD. Mr. Jordan is protesting, in the name of the cotton growers of the South, against a continuation of the conditions which he says and which his association says-because he writes as the president of his association-are robbing the southern cotton growers of what little chance they have under the law to make a profit.

I ask to have the letter inserted in the RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The letter is as follows:

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familiarize myself with its terms. The legitimate cotton trading system as at present organized depends upon "hedging" practices to insure against market fluctuations in the price of spot cotton bought from farmers for future sale and distribution to consuming mills. This has been necessary, due to the dumping methods of marketing in the fall months, when a large proportion of the crop has to be bought, stored, and financed until sold to the mills for forward delivery.

On the other hand, the system employed on the exchanges which permits unbridled speculative purchases and sales of cotton-futures contracts by persons and firms not engaged in any department of the legitimate industry has developed evils which seriously jeopardize the welfare of the growers and interfere with the orderly business of manufacturers. For several years I have contended that limitations should be placed by law upon the unbridled sales of fictitious cotton futures by individuals and firms for speculative purposes. I have also contended that when a contract or contracts for spot cotton sold on the exchanges is tendered to the purchaser, and not accepted, that such cotton should not be permitted for retender under future contract sales.

This would prevent the accumulation of a lot of spot cotton in any market for purposes of futures trading and consequent manipulation. I am now and have always been interested in the welfare of the cotton growers, and have never felt that our system of marketing and pricing spot cotton was fair or just to the farmers. I have had experience as a cotton grower for 50 years. While the evils of the present system of cotton-futures trading and control of spot markets by exchange dealings should be cured by proper amendments to the Federal cotton futures act, I doubt the wisdom of abolishing the system without a better and safer method being provided. There is but one way I have been able to work out that would simplify the market system, maintain fair prices for spot cotton, and protect the growers without so much reliance of the cotton trade on futures contracts. The plan in brief is to store and retire from the market each year the estimated surplus or carry-over for several months until it is needed by the mills for consumption. Dumping the surplus on the market every year is what depresses prices, fixing them upon as low speculative basis as the industry can stand, and with consequent heavy financial depression on the growers, who are merely pawns in the world cotton industry. If Congress, or the banks of the South, would provide a fund of, say, $100,000,000 as foundation capital to be handled by a strong financial organization in the South, it would be ample as a revolving fund to protect and retire the surplus cotton each year.

When only the actual supplies of raw cotton are placed in the markets for a 12-month period, based upon consumptive requirements, the legitimate laws of supply based upon demand will function and the staple will command its fair value unhampered by speculation. When the surplus is gradually sold its value, less interest, storage, insurance, and costs of handling, should be distributed to the growers who produced it, less loans advanced.

It should be handled by proper agencies in the South and the business put under the administration of trained and efficient bankers. The details of storing and making loans on the surplus cotton would have to be handled by local bankers of each county, each county's part of the whole prorated. The cooperative marketing associations could handle While the great masses of the surplus prorata part of their members. the growers could be reached through the county unit system. The evils and depressing influences of speculation in raw cotton, with or without futures exchanges, will never be corrected until a sound system of protecting the surplus of crops is properly provided for. There can be no stability of prices so long as several million bales of cotton is dumped upon the markets each year that are not required for consumption purposes during the year in which it is sold. Safety to the farmer and minimizing the evil effects of extreme speculation depends upon a proper solution of that problem.

I am presenting these suggestions for your thoughtful consideration.
With best wishes,
Yours very truly,

HARVIE JORDAN.

Mr. CARAWAY. I have here a letter from Shreveport, La., from F. R. Shuford, who for six years was the auditor of a cotton association, and for a number of years had to do with a broker's office. It unqualifiedly condemns gambling in the future market. I ask to have it inserted in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD. The letter is as follows:

Senator CARAWAY, of Arkansas,

SHREVEPORT, LA., April 17, 1928.

Washington, D. C. DEAR SIR: I am interested in a small way in the cotton investigation that has been going on for several weeks in the Senate. It occurs to me, though I am only a small figure in the cotton world-but have worked from the Carolinas to west Texas during the past 20 years as interior cotton buyer-that the Senate or House either in Washington does not know how to go at finding the faults in the cotton market South, or

else know and don't want to know for political and financial reasons. This I do not believe holds true with yourself.

Let me ask you to bring out from witnesses the culling out of cotton and redelivering all bad-classed bales they find in cotton they take up. This is bad abuse. I have seen 100 per cent consist of parts of 40 contracts-of course, this was the cull-out of cotton received on the exchange. It has been abused during my time of over 25 years in the business. The way to stop it is that 100 per cent must contain one serial contract number and can not be retendered if split or part of the original 100 taken out without being recertificated in hundred bales; then the classers might turn the cotton down as off grade. Let me say that classers get off, all of them, at times, on the exchange or anywhere else; and then we don't know but what the big fellows can reach a small man classing cotton in many ways-you can only deliver late 100 per cent New York. It should contain only one serial numberNew Orleans the same, Houston for Chicago-50 per cent is the contract. It will prevent culling out the good cotton in the contracts and retendering the offs of all contracts in class and staple.

To find out about manipulation introduce and pass bill that all sales across the ring of all exchanges must actually be kept correct by the superintendent of the exchange-who bought them and who sold them and what months traded in; the broker must give the person or persons he has traded for or acted for; make a strong penalty attached, and that the Senate committee has access to check these exchanges up any time. A manipulator will buy and sell through a dozen brokers, called floor traders. Cut out floor trader and make him tell who he is buying or selling for. I have been from Mississippi to west Texas recently, and all of us poor little cotton men laugh at the investigation as a farce. If the superintendents of the exchanges are forced by law to keep the sales of all-every-contract daily, as to seller and purchaser, with some Government agency authorized to check the exchanges, you could discover the manipulation. I venture to say that every cotton buyer in the Cotton Belt knows that the big fellows, Anderson-Clayton Co. and McFadden, with their New York friends, manipulate the market constantly. It is easy for them, but is a complicated business to the average business man, big or little. If the cotton exchanges were prohibited or done away with the farmer and the public would be better off in the South. In the West, if the grain exchange was done away with the western farmer would be better off. If the stock exchange, New York, was done away with the public generally would be better off. These are institutions sponsored and regulated and brought into use for financiers; they are not for the poor man in any way, shape, form, or fashion under the sun. They have made the Senate and House think they are needed for hedging purchases. That is the veriest rot of it all. Did it ever occur to you that the financiers need an exchange for marketing everything the farmers grow and their own stocks, but they do not need any exchange to market any articles or anything they produce for the consuming public?

The farmer does not need any exchange. What in the world is there to guarantee the farmer after he puts his seed in the ground whether he will harvest a crop at all, whether a good one or small one?

It took me over 20 years to decide that the cotton, stock, and grain exchanges were for the rich people only. They are of no use to the farmers of the West and South, and the public ought to stay out of the stock market.

I am sure the South in few years would reap advantages if the cotton exchanges were done away with.

A small crop of cotton advertises itself very quickly to the trade and a big crop the Government advertises in July to the world. What chance has the farmer?

Cotton should be marketed like all other merchandise, covering a period of about eight months, the mill buying the cotton as they sell the goods, or otherwise suiting themselves, and it does not need any hedges-that's a farce to fool the Washington politician.

I will venture the assertion that the cotton crop of 1927-28 has been sold through New York and New Orleans over one hundred times, probably 150,000,000 bales bought and sold. I have seen in my time 500,000 traded in one day.

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erated, and I am frank to say I have no definite idea just how they could be regulated so as to serve the grower instead of the speculator. I notice you have a bill which, if passed, will destroy the exchanges, for the reason they could not exist if confined in their trading to actual hedges of spot cotton.

If you have not the information as to how many bales of cotton are bought and sold through the exchanges, it will be very interesting to you, and I suggest that you get these figures for use before the committee. You will have to get this data from the Department of Internal Revenue in Washington, they having the record of tax collected on each trade executed. This is the only place the figures can be secured, and then it will take your influence as a Senator to obtain them.

I can not see why these figures should not be published the same as sales of spot cotton each day and the sale of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange; however, it is not done. To prove how they guard these figures, just send some one around without letting them know you as a Senator want the figures, and see what he may be told.

It will be particularly interesting to see how many bales of actual cotton are delivered on contracts through the exchanges.

The last figures I have are for the year 1921-22, when 78,361,700 bales for New York and 40,701,700 for New Orleans, as published in the report of the Federal Trade Commission in 1924. During this year about 640,000 bales were delivered on contracts. The volume of business is larger now, and the Chicago Exchange will add quite a volume of business not included in the above.

I think it would be good to amend your bill so as to require the publication every day of the number of bales traded in through all the exchanges the same as spot-cotton sales are reported and published in all the different markets.

If the exchanges are to serve the grower as a vehicle for hedging his crop, the minimum number of bales for a trade should be reduced to 25 or even lower, instead of being 100 in New York and New Orleans and 50 in Chicago.

There is one thing we must not overlook in thinking of the exchange as a clearing house for all cotton markets, as they may term it, and that is, for every sale there must be a buyer, and if conditions are too rigid against the buyer, the markets might be restricted and thus prices depressed more easily. On the other hand, the reverse might be true if rules are too rigid for the sale of cotton. What we want is a more stable value for cotton. It appears now that trading facilities are more favorable to the speculative seller than the buyer.

While I have no definite information to support my belief, it is my firm conviction that the drive made on the market during the past few months has been a determined effort to destroy the cooperatives, and unless some strong Government agency is created to finance the surplus control of farm products the big spot dealers, together with the speculative interests, will always control prices. Personally, I like the Jardine plan for providing funds for surplus control as against the equalization fee as provided in the McNary-Haugen bill. Doctor Kilgore does not represent the thought of more than a very small percentage of cotton growers, and his attitude should be more practical. I am a member of the cotton cooperatives and president of the Louisiana association at this time; and while I am speaking personally, I know the Louisiana cotton growers with whom I have talked are in favor of the appropriation by Congress of a fund as suggested by Jardine instead of the equalization fee. Doctor Kilgore represents the thought of a few of the cooperative leaders who decided that is the right plan to stand out for. This may be all right, but I want to see the machinery set up and worked out in a practical way by capable men after it is started, if we can do no better.

I write only to possibly give you some thought that might be of assistance, for this is a great big question and one that affects vitally every cotton grower in this Nation.

Yours very truly,

N. C. WILLIAMSON.

Mr. CARAWAY. I am not unmindful that many may say that legislation of this great importance ought not to be included in a revenue bill. It is the only way, however, in which we are going to get a chance to have a vote, uninfluenced by other considerations, on this question of short selling.

Let me say again that I presume that most of us who live in the South grow cotton. I commenced when I was 7 years old working in a cotton field. I believe I know all about its production, and I am reasonably familiar with its sale. I have been a hired hand; I have been a share cropper; I have been a tenant; and now I am what is called in my country a shade-tree farmer. I have an equity in the land, and I rent it out, and between the sheriff and myself we get what the cotton grower makes off of it. The sheriff gets the most of it. Therefore, I am not speculating about what I am talking about.

I have seen the price of a load of cotton, where it left the plantation to go to a gin not in excess of 2 miles away, drop $10 a bale while the farmer traveled those 2 miles. There will come a wire that the Liverpool market opened at such a figure. Every cotton merchant in America drops his price immediately. There is a decline. On the other hand, if there is an advance,

he says, "I will wait to see whether that is a reaction or whether it is just a temporary flurry." He follows every decline down, but he does not follow every rise up; and it is perfectly reasonable that he should not do it, because as long as you give to people the right to sway and control a market by betting that the price will go up or down, that there are more people on my side than on your side, nobody can do business safely on that sort of a market; and he necessarily hedges at the expense of the grower of the product.

I said I have seen cotton drop $10 a bale in the time I mention, and that is more profit than the people who grew that cotton had in it. They lost more while they were going from the plantation gate to the gin than a year's toil produced; and the result is I do not know how it is in other States, but I can speak with authority for my own-that I know hardly a single producer of cotton on a large scale who is not insolvent.

This gambling, Mr. President, is reflected not alone in the loss of profits by the growers of cotton; it is reflected in the loss of industry in New England; it is reflected in the loss in the buying power of all the people living in the southern cottongrowing belt. It is reflected, therefore, in every walk of life in America; and I presume what is true about cotton is true about wheat.

We will get a vote on it, Mr. President. As I said yesterday, let me repeat, there is not a Senator on this floor who would record his vote in favor of opening a gambling hall in the District of Columbia.

There is not a State in this Union that licenses gambling. They all pronounce it a crime. Yet the greatest gambling institution the world ever knew would pale into insignificance compared with the gambling on the cotton and grain exchanges in America. The double crime is that the people are gambling, not in their own wealth, but they are gambling in the sweat and toil of every man, woman, and child who eats his bread in the sweat of his brow. If Senators would not vote to license a man to open a gambling house here in the District of Columbia, where he can bet his own money and lose his own money, or win somebody else's money who may bet with him, can we afford to license a gambling place that is not only an infinitely worse one but that is going to take the profits of people who never saw it and had no chance to win on its gamble?

REVISION OF ARMY PROMOTION LIST

Mr. BLACK. Mr. President, due to the fact that a flood of telegrams has come to the Members of the Senate in the last few days from a certain group of officers with reference to Senate bill 3089, introduced by me, without attempting to go into the merits of the bill completely I desire simply to give a sufficient explanation so that those who are here will understand the source of the dissatisfaction and the reasons for the introduction of the bill. I shall be very brief, and I desire to make this statement in order that Senators may understand something of the underlying reasons behind the bill and behind the objections.

When the war was over there was a large group of officers who desired to be admitted into the Regular Army. Provision was made for examination. Any person who desired to get into the Regular Army had a right to apply for appointment to the grade he believed himself qualified to fill. If he thought he was capable of being a captain, he could apply for a captain's commission. If he thought he was capable of being a major, he could apply for a major's commission. If he thought he was capable only of being a second lieutenant, he could apply for a second lieutenant's commission. Every man in the United States who wanted a commission in the Army, whether he was already in the Army or not, had a right to take that examination. The statement has been made to Senators in telegrams that the examination was not open to all. That is incorrect. It was open to any man who was in the Army or out of the Army.

An elaborate system of examination was prepared. Men were invited to come into the Army under this competitive system. I have in my possession here the rules governing that examination. Age was to count. Business experience in the outside world was to be considered in the grade or commission which the man received.

Under this elaborate system of examination competitive tests were held. Various commissions were issued to thousands of officers some of them received appointment as second lieutenants after they applied for this particular commission and met the test provided, some of them were made first lieutenants, some captains, some majors, and some lieutenant colonels.

After they had stood these tests they received their commissions. Then the War Department, interpreting the national defense act in such way as to deprive these officers of the benefits of the competitive test, scrambled together the lieutenants and

captains and permitted 1,500 lieutenants to skyrocket over night above 1,500 captains. This stepping-up process was without examination or test. Many who had stood the examination for second lieutenant, who wanted nothing else, who evidently felt that they could get nothing else, stepped immediately over the men who had stood the examination for captain, and to-day the men who received the captain's commissions by competitive test have standing over them, blocking their promotion, men who either could not or did not stand the test. This has blocked the promotions of worthy and capable men, without fault on their part, for a period of about 10 years.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, will the Senator permit an interruption?

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Mr. KING. What class of men was it who received those discriminating benefits?

Mr. BLACK. The class of men mainly were provisional second lieutenants-and I will explain that in just a moment— or Regular Army officers.

Mr. KING. Were they graduates of West Point?

Mr. BLACK. Some of them were; some of them were not. There is one major who has given a study to the effect of my bill who in 1916 was a cadet at West Point. A man who is now a captain and is blocked was at that time a lieutenant colonel in the National Guard on the border. That lieutenant colonel stood an examination and received a captain's commission. To-day the man who was a cadet at West Point in 1916 is a major, although he has been in the service only since 1916, and this other man has been in the service about 10 years longer.

When war was declared, the Government needed officers, and an order was issued to the effect that any man who had been to West Point and had made as much as 30 per cent on his test, even though he had flunked and failed to stand the prescribed examination, should be given a provisional second lieutenant's commission. Four hundred and thirty-three men who had previously failed to pass the examination at West Point were given second lieutenant's commissions. Those men to-day rank the graduates of West Point who were in their class and who successfully stood the examination. One of them is here lobbying against this bill. He failed in the class of 1916. He failed to pass the test at West Point, but under the needs of war time received a provisional second lieutenant's commission. This officer to-day ranks every member of his own class of 1916 at West Point, although he failed and the other classmen passed satisfactory examinations. The reason he ranks them is the same reason these other officers are ranked by men who previously had lower grades.

The provisional second lieutenants, in the main, were granted commissions before they did a day's service in the Army. They were selected and were given commissions that same day. On the other hand, the emergency officers who went to the training camps were compelled to work three months, and then, if they met the test, secured their commissions. That gave to the provisional second lieutenants, it will be noted, a longer range of service, counting from the date they received their commissions, than was given the man who received an emergency captain's commission in the training camp. The War Department interpreted the national defense act to mean that officers should be promoted according to length of service only, so that if a second lieutenant, who had received a provisional commission started into service the same day a man had started in service in the reserve officers' training camp, that provisional officer's commission ranked from the day he went into the service, but the reserve officer's commission ranked from the day he completed his service in the training camp and was commissioned. So we have the strange and anomalous situation to-day in the American Army, fought for and contested for by these men who are sending the telegrams-the men who receive an advantage which is not theirs-we have the strange and anomalous situation of men who were second lieutenants July 1, 1920, standing above the men who were captains on the same date.

I know an officer who was a captain in a training camp, and he is ranked to-day by every provisional second lieutenant whom he trained as candidates for commissions. He did not get credit even for the length of time he served as a captain-instructor, and he turned out provisional second lieutenants of a less mature age, youthful men, and this weird system switched them above him where they are to-day. They object to this bill on the ground that it is unjust to them. What about the captain? Those provisional officers are some who are dissatisfied with this bill. They feel that since they have something, they ought to keep it. They have had it for practically 10 years, and in the meantime these men who stood the examination and met the test have their way absolutely blocked by these younger men. We have that situation defended by the War Department, although

the War Department declared at one time that this condition was a menace to the American Army. Yet they say, "Do not try to rearrange it, because it will create dissatisfaction." Of course, it will create dissatisfaction among some of those young officers who have been promoted over older men, who block the way now for those officers who gave up their service in the outside world and entered the American Army with the promise on the part of the Government that they should receive such commissions as they proved themselves capable of holding, but who, strange to say, saw their hopes turned into ashes the very day they won the prize.

Mr. KING. Mr. President

Mr. BLACK. I yield.

Mr. KING. Does the Senator's bill provide for taking these persons who have these advantages, apparently discriminatorially, and reducing them en bloc and elevating en bloc those who were denied the advantages to which they were entitled? Mr. BLACK. It provides exactly this

Mr. KING. It seems to me that to remedy the situation those persons who have been denied advantages ought to be put over the heads of those others, and, if necessary, the others who have had advantages to which they were not entitled should be reduced.

Mr. BLACK. I have provided that the promotion list shall be rearranged and readjusted so that those who were captains in 1920, when they stood this test, shall rank those who were first lieutenants and second lieutenants when they stood the test. That is the reason Senators are receiving telegrams from groups who have obtained something which was not justly theirs and who wish to cling to it.

Mr. COPELAND. Mr. President-
Mr. BLACK. I yield.

Mr. COPELAND. Not for a long time has there been a bill before the Senate concerning which I have had so many letters and telegrams; but they are not all one way.

Mr. BLACK. That is correct.

Mr. COPELAND. I get many telegrams and letters favoring the bill, and others in opposition to it. If the Senator will bear with me, I would like to read from some letters I have and ask him about what is said in them. Here is a letter which states:

We feel that no legislation for a long time has been so calculated to favor the few at the expense of the many or has promised to be so damaging to the democratic spirit of the service.

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Granting that injustice may have been done at the inauguration of the present promotion list, it has been in effect now for eight years. change at this late date would only serve to bring about fresh injustices at the expense of officers who have given their best to the service during this time and bring about the resignation of the best of them.

Unfortunately, the only officers who would suffer are World War veterans who came into the Army from civil life and remained in the service. We believe the Black bill is class legislation in its most superlative form.

Mr. BLACK. I will be glad to explain that to the Senator. Mr. COPELAND. Let me read another, and then the Senator will have them both.

I am taking the liberty of addressing you with reference to the Black promotion bill.

Those are the criticisms. I have no desire to enlarge upon them. I do not know enough about it to do so, but I would be glad to know what the Senator has to say in reply.

Mr. REED of Pennsylvania. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BLACK. I would like to answer the Senator from New York first, but if it is in line with his question I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. REED of Pennsylvania. This is my suggestion. As the Senator knows, and as other Members of the Senate do not know, a minority report was filed against the bill. The committee was divided on it. I am betraying no secret when I say the vote was 6 to 5 in favor of the bill of the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. BLACK. It was 9 to 7.

Mr. REED of Pennsylvania. The Senator must have included some who were not there.

Mr. BLACK. Yes; those who voted by proxy.

Mr. REED of Pennsylvania. In any event, the minority report has been filed and the bill will lead to a long debate. This is what I want to ask the Senator: I am wondering whether it is worth while to start that debate now while we are considering the tax bill. Would not the Senator find that his remarks had greater force if he made them while the bill itself was before the Senate and not now when the tax bill is here?

Mr. BLACK. I expect to do that, but the reason I am making the statement now is this: These telegrams are coming in very rapidly, and a large part of the time of myself and those in my office is consumed in giving information concerning the bill. I am not going to argue the bill at length now. I simply want to explain something about the situation.

Mr. REED of Pennsylvania. While the Senator is doing that will he explain this feature? I have a telegram from an officer in the Second Division, down in San Antonio, an officer who had long experience in the National Guard and who was in the same battery with me in training camp in 1917. He got his commission in August, 1917, and served at the front practically all the time until the armistice. He wires me as follows:

I want to thank you for your splendid support of the customs of the old Regular Army. Any change in the present promotion list will be a huge injustice. At a meeting of a group of officers of the Second Division it was estimated that fully 80 per cent of the lieutenants and captains stationed here will lose hundreds of files. Many contemplate resignation if present promotion list is revised.

Mr. BLACK. I am glad to explain that. In the first place, the contemplated resignation is not limited to any one group. It is the desire of the Army, or at least it is believed by these emergency officers to be the desire of those in charge, that every effort under the sun be made to eliminate them from the Army. That is based upon numerous statements, to the effect that "There is a hump in the Army and we have to relieve it by getting the emergency officers out." In my judgment there is no group of officers more thoroughly competent to fill their positions in the American Army than are the emergency officers who came in from civil life. If I were to put in the RECORD the vast number of letters and telegrams which I have had from men in the American Army who see suspended above their heads the sword of Damocles, proposed by the War Department and

I will ask the Senator to listen to this and tell me whether sponsored by the minority report of the committee, the informait is correct:

As I understand it, these bills provide that all classes which graduated from West Point after the declaration of war, up to and including the class of 1921, and a small group of other officers, gain hundreds of files at the expense of World War officers who entered the Regular Army in 1920, especially former National Guard officers. I am informed that many of the officers who are thus adversely affected were not afforded an opportunity to appear before the Committee on Military Affairs. Are those statements true up to that point?

Mr. BLACK. No. Those mainly benefited are former National Guard officers and World War veterans. Everybody was entitled to appear before the committee.

Mr. COPELAND. The letter continues:

I am personally acquainted with a number of officers who served creditably with me during the World War, who, upon their return to the United States, became officers of the Regular Army.

While I have every respect for the United States Military Academy, I do not think that Congress would really care to discriminate against men who, while former citizen soldiers, served their country faithfully during a period of emergency and who, prompted by motives of patriotism, decided to remain in the Army. I shall be very grateful for anything that you may do to prevent the passage of a bill which would thus unfairly treat men of the highest standing, who are a credit to the Military Establishment of the United States.

tion would be surprising to many.

Why do I say that? The first bill proposed by the War Department was a bill to create an arbitrary board of five general officers, with power to pluck any officer they saw fit in the American Army without a trial. They stood for it. They testified for it before the committee. They urged it. They urged that a system of autocracy be perpetuated in the American Army which would be as bad as any that has ever existed in any despotism in the world. They urged a board of five general officers, with absolute power, without a regulation, without a restriction, with the right to put a sword over the head of every officer in the Army and say, "We will put you out if we do not like the color of your hair or the color of your eyes."

Against that bill I had letters from emergency officers all over America and as far as the Philippine Islands, begging and pleading that the American Army be not permitted to hang such a sword over the heads of its officers. These emergency officers wrote me almost as with one accord: "We believe from the evidence before us that it is intended to get rid of the emergency officers who came into the Army in 1920."

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The minority bill retains that board of officers. They keep the board limited by such rules and regulations for "plucking officers as may be promulgated by the President of the United States. In the first place, I am unalterably opposed to giving the President or any bureau or any board the power to enact

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