made by the City of Rome's bow.

room drowned.

Everyone inside quickly "On the S-4 the hole made by the Paulding was much smaller, the water entered the battery room less quickly. The six men in the torpedo room managed to close the door at the forward end of the battery room, while the men in the control room succeeded in shutting the afterdoor to the same compartment. The damaged compartment was thus isolated, and the remainder of the ship should have stayed dry and in the hands of the crew. Under such circumstances Lieutenant Commander Jones, left in possession of the control room, should have been as well off as either S-5 or S-48. But he was unable to remain. Chlorine gas or water (probably both) leaking in through the forward bulkhead, which is pierced by numerous cables and lines, soon forced the captain and crew to leave the control room and take refuge aft, where they closed and dogged down tight the door leading to the control room.

"Had Lieutenant Commander Jones been able to retain possession of his control room, the history of the S-4 would have been vastly dif ferent. This room is the heart of the ship. Here are the connections to the compressed-air banks with which he could have expelled all his fuel oil and all the water from his undamaged ballast tanks; he could certainly have brought the stern of his boat to the surface, if not the whole boat; and in any case so lightened up the bow that a slight pull from the special lifting cable in the Bushnell's stern would have brought up the 8-'s bow. He could have fed air gradually from the banks to his own men and to the 6 men forward; and finally, had it been necessary, the 33 men with him could have passed up one by one through the escape trunk, to be assisted to the surface by divers. All this could have happened had the forward bulkhead of this room stayed tight against gas and water. It was possession of the control room that allowed the crews of the S-5 and the 8-48 to lift their boats and save themselves; and it was the loss of the control room that meant death to the crews of the S-51 and the S-4.

"Consequently, the type of door on a submarine bulkhead and the tightness of the stuffing boxes around the numerous electric cables, pipes, and rods going through the bulkheads are of primary importance. The control room doors, at least, should be of the sliding long-arm type, which require no releasing of catches, and which will cut through a heavy stream of water and still close. Leakage of chlorine gas through supposedly tight bulkheads nearly killed the crew of the S-5; fortunately, they got the stern of their boat up before chlorine forced them to abandon the control room. The crew of the S-4 were apparently not so lucky.

"A trapped submarine crew needs both a supply of fresh oxygen and the removal of the carbon dioxide from the foul air to live very long. Fresh oxygen can be obtained either from the compressed air in the ship's banks-provided the crew has access to the control roomor from oxygen flasks stored in each compartment. The S-4 had one such flask in each compartment-with the men evenly distributed through the boat this should suffice for about 72 hours. But fresh oxygen is not enough. If the quantity of carbon dioxide generated by breathing rises to 7 per cent, unconsciousness and death quickly follow. Consequently, if nothing is done to remove the foul air from the compartment, the results are fatal.

"For purification purposes, all submarines should-and most of ours during the war did-carry a supply of soda lime in each compartment. When this is exposed, it absorbs the carbon dioxide, and a moderate quantity will purify the air for several days. The S-4 had no soda lime aboard. though it appears that her commanding officer had previously asked for it. Soda lime in the after compartments might have prolonged life till after the divers came on Sunday; forward it might well have prolonged life till the weather moderated and diving was again possible on Wednesday.

"All our submarines have what is known as the compartment salvage air line; this starts from an external valve in the side of the conning tower and runs the length of the boat, with a branch leading into each compartment and discharging into it through a nonreturn valve and a gag valve. The intention is that the gag valves shall be left open so that, in case of accident, aid can be supplied from the outside. In the flooded compartments, this air is supposed to enter and expel the water, but, as it is practically certain that the damage that caused the flooding will extend to the top of the compartment, any air entering such a compartment will promptly escape and do no good.

"In the compartments where men are alive, if the outside air line is connected up, the men are supposed to take air when they want it and then close the valve in their room. However, the nonreturn valve prevents bad air from leaving the room, and it shortly happens that if the men take air this way, they will build up a pressure in their room that will soon equal the outside water pressure. The trapped men will then be subjected continuously to the same pressure as the diver; the latter can stand it only a few hours; the submarine survivors will probably not be able to stand it that long before they contract severe pneumonia from the heavy pressure and very quickly die.

"I can not recollect a case in the history of our submarine disasters where the compartment salvage air line has ever been of use. On the

S-51 it was cut in half by the stem of the City of Rome; on the S-4 the survivors also reported it flooded on Sunday night. The compartment salvage air line should be removed immediately from all submarines, and replaced by either one or two valves attached directly to the hull in way of every room on the ship. In this way, even with one valve per compartment, fresh air could be supplied by a hose from the surface, bad air could be vented out, and the men in the room subjected only to a little above atmospheric pressure, under which they could survive indefinitely. Hot soup for food could be run through the same hose. Such an arrangement was urged on the Navy Department after the S-51 disaster by at least one inventor. It was not then adopted, but no more time should now be lost.

'Quick lifting of the boat is the most important feature in rescue work. Derricks and salvage ships are useless in such cases as 8-51 and S-4, where rough water and deep water prevail. As an instance of this, when the S-51 sank off Block Island, the weather was good enough for divers to work steadily for the next five days, passing heavy wire slings under the S-51's stern, which was just clear of the mud. Nevertheless, the commercial salvage company that was hired at that time, and had its two largest derricks at Point Judith, 15 miles away, considered the weather too bad for derricks and refused to send the derricks out to the wreck until the fifth day, by which time it was certain all hands were dead.

"Pontoons can be used in any weather in which diving is possible. Derricks require that the water be smooth, or they will probably carry away their booms if they do not capsize. Pontoons are the quickest and surest method. After the S-51 job we designed a new type of pontoon that can be lowered and secured in less than an hour. (Most of the Navy pontoons have since been converted to this type.) It is possible for the Falcon to lower and secure a pontoon in less than an hour; six pontoons can be secured in less than 12 hours, and are enough to lift half of a completely flooded S boat; 12 pontoons can be secured in 24 hours and will lift the entire boat, even if completely flooded. But to do this requires 20 experienced divers, a welldrilled crew on the Falcon, and a quick means of attaching chains.

In using any external lifting means attachments to the submarine are necessary. Our boats have none. On the S-51 it was necessary to dig tunnels under the boat to get the lifting chains under. With the ordinary means (a fire hose) our first tunnel took several weeks to dig, and several divers nearly lost their lives when the tunnel caved in on them. We then employed an improved nozzle, which allowed us to cut tunnels faster; the time was reduced to two days for a moderate length tunnel under the S-4. But even with this nozzle tunnelling is still slow and dangerous, and I marvel that men can be found who in cold blood will hazard the perils of burrowing in the darkness and the cold at the bottom of the sea through sand and mud beneath a buried submarine. For salvage work this method, while slow and dangerous, is at least feasible. For rescue work, when the lives of a trapped crew may depend on a quick lift, it is ridiculous.

"The strain in lifting on each chain of a pontoon is only 40 tons. It is easy to provide permanent padeyes on the side of every submarine, For an S boat 12 such padeyes properly spaced to take pontoon chains.

on each side will permit attaching 12 pontoons in 24 hours; the weight of all the padeyes is less than 6 tons. The need for tunnelling is eliminated; the divers can quickly shackle the pontoon chains to the submarine and with a proper salvage crew and 24 hours of moderate weather the boat will be afloat again. But it must be remembered that to do this requires sufficient divers, a salvage ship well drilled and not too far away, and a set of pontoons somewhere in the vicinity. Deep-sea diving is vastly different from diving in shallow water. Our Navy has developed the art; practically every deep-water diver in this country was trained in the Navy or by Navy instructors. Except for ex-Navy men, there are probably not half a dozen qualified deep-sea divers in this country. But even in the Navy such divers are not so common as they should be. For the S-51 job it took more than a week to gather up 12; meanwhile we could find only 4 qualified civilians. Trained divers in large numbers constitute a major safety factor for submarines. A salvage ship like the Falcon should always carry at least 12 divers in her crew. By constant drill, both with divers and pontoons, the captain of the Falcon will be able to swing into action when a submarine sinks with the speed and precision of a battleship going into action against the enemy.

The up a

-six

raise

"How far the Falcon was from this state of readiness can be judged from the fact that on the day the 8-4 sank there was only one quali filed diver attached to her crew-Chief Boatswain's Mate Carr. Falcon had not handled a pontoon since the day the S-51 came year and a half before. The pontoons themselves were scattered in New York and four in Norfolk-not enough in either place to a submarine. The four in Norfolk had not yet been converted to the new design and were slow and dangerous to handle. For proper prepa ration there should be a complete set of 12 pontoons in every major district where submarines operate. Two hundred pontoons, more than 16 complete sets, can be built for less than the cost of one moderatesized Vulcan. These 16 sets scattered over our Atlantic and Pacific coasts will insure that pontoons are close at hand wherever submarines operate.

"The Navy has two salvage ships, the Falcon and the Widgeon, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. These boats, converted mine sweepers, are ideal for the purpose, being small enough to handle easily and moor quickly in a seaway. They can hold position when a larger ship would be swept away by the wind, but though much crowded, they can carry all necessary machinery. Under Lieutenant Hartley the Falcon has done wonders, but really to fulfill her purpose such a ship must be given ample opportunity for drill. In addition, there should be at least four such ships properly to cover the areas where submarines work.

"And finally, in case a boat can not be raised, or the crew must be taken out before the raising equipment can arrive, the last desperate means must be provided to allow the crew to escape from the boat as it lies at the bottom of the sea. An airlock is the answer. This is a small trunk with one hatch below opening to the boat and another, either at the top or side, opening to the sea. The members of the crew enter the lock from below, one at a time, and close the lower hatch. Then either by compressed air or by admitting water to the lock, they raise the pressure inside till it balances the outer sea pressure, when the hatch to the sea can be opened. The man inside is then supposed to float up with the air released from the lock. The other members of the crew inside then close the outer door by a wire attached to it, drain out the water from the lock, open the lower hatch, and the next man enters.

"This is the theory. The practice is far different. In deep water the pressure would so collapse a man's lungs that he would have no buoyancy and would sink instead of rise. In deep water such escape has never been effected. In shallow water, it might be done. The only instance I know of where it was successful occurred on the British K-13 when the captain and first officer attempted to escape to give warning of the loss of the boat and her condition. Here the top of the conning tower was only 50 feet below the surface, and the pressure was not great. One officer rose successfully; the other was killed in the attempt.

"Each submarine bas an air lock in the conning tower, but it often happens that the crew can not get to that. In addition, there should be one at each end of the boat, so that a crew, forced to get out or die from chlorine or because of lack of air to last them till divers or rescuers can arrive, can at least take this last desperate gamble with death. If divers are at hand but can not lift the boat, then the locks can be used with comparative safety. In such a case, the diver stands outside the lock, holding an extra diving helmet heavily weighted down and with air hose attached and blowing, ready to slip it over the head of each man as he comes out, before lifting him to the surface. In this way, one at a time, divers can rescue the entire crew of a submarine, provided the crew can get to air lock. To make this possible, all submarines should have at least three, one at each end, as well as the present one in the conning tower."

Mr. CELLER. Secretary of Navy Wilbur, in a letter to me September 24, 1926, said, "Raising the S-51 was good, arduous work ably performed." He goes on to say:

"Advancement in rank is reserved in other than very exceptional cases for especially meritorious service in war. It is the practice, however, to advance in rating enlisted men for efficient service in time of peace."

Raising the S-51 (and subsequently the S-4) was an exceptional case. Furthermore, it is time to recognize distinguished and meritorious service in peace time. Admiral Plunkett recognized that Ellsberg's achievement was of the highest merit and recommended accordingly advancement in rank. Furthermore, advancement went to Peary and Byrd and Lindbergh for peace-time service.

Admiral Plunkett, under date of April 17, 1928, writes me that his original recommendations in regard to Lieutenant Commander Ellsberg, Lieutenant Hartley, and Chief Boatswain Hawes, whose splendid work raised the S-51, were still good and that

Much

"I was fully convinced that they had done a magnificent job. of the work they did was beyond what could ordinarily be expected of officers and men, and they had not hesitated to risk their lives in their efforts to solve the difficult problem which faced them."

Furthermore, Ellsberg in the 8-51 expedition served in every capacity. He was salvage officer charged with technical responsibility for the expedition; he supervised and directed every diver on every dive made on the job; he acted as a draftsman in working out the designs; he acted as a seaman in handling the pontoons and the boats on the surface; as an inventor he perfected the existing inefficient underwater cutting torch so that it became a reliable salvage instrument; as a diver he did a fair proportion of the actual cutting with underwater torch on the S-51. He made several dives on the S-51 in emergencies when conditions were so bad that no other diver would go down, and the reason that the divers stuck to the job when conditions were desperate and success looked hopeless to them was mainly because he went down to the bottom of the sea with the divers and each diver knew that he was never asked to tackle a job that Ellsberg was not ready to undertake himself if necessary (no other naval officer in charge of a salvage job has ever before done this); and he personally worked out the

salvage method and persuaded the Navy Department (with Admiral Plunkett's enthusiastic backing) to let the Navy do the job instead of entering into a ridiculous contract with a private salvage company whereby the Navy was to furnish at its own expense practically everything (including divers) and then pay the private company a fantastic price (more than the job cost the Navy) for the privilege of having the private company supervise the job.

The morale of any military organization is improved by promotion for achievement, not by stating that it is contrary to department policy to reward exceptional service. The Navy Department is quick to punish officers for their lapses, and demotion through loss of numbers quickly follows catastrophe through negligence or bad judgment. If the department's policy is to demote officers for their faults, fairness and consistency require that it approve the promotion of such officers as go outside the ordinary routine to risk everything to achieve success in hazardous and exceptional undertakings.

The raising of the S-51 from its grave in the open sea was an undertaking generally considered impossible in engineering and naval circles both in the United States and in foreign countries. (It was authorized by the Navy Department not because success seemed possible, but to appease a storm of public criticism raised by numerous disasters to the Navy at the time-the destruction of the Shenandoah, the loss of Commander Rodgers and the PN-9 off Honolulu, the Trenton explosion.) The only comparable operation ever attempted in the raising of a large submarine from deep water in the open sea (the S-5 off Delaware in 1920) was a total failure after nine months of work and was abandoned when the public had forgotten the matter.

The successful accomplishment on the S-51 brought luster to America and to the Navy.

The raising of the S-4, made possible primarily because of Ellsberg's work, again proclaimed to the world an outstanding achievement. Recognition by Congress of this type of service is essential. Mr. CELLER. We must remember that Lieutenant Commander Ellsberg would have been in the ordinary course of events elevated to the rank of commander if it had not been for the enactment of the equalization bill. In a sense we can almost admit that he would have been a commander so that there would not probably be any recognition in his advancement to the rank of commander.

Mr. BRITTEN. Commander Ellsberg, it has just been suggested that some members of the committee might like to report a bill that would make you a commander in the active Navy. Would you prefer that sort of recognition; would you care to return to the Navy as a commander?

Lieutenant Commander ELLSBERG. I have always prized my service in the Navy very highly and if I ever have another chance to do something for the Navy I will seize it. What I have done since resigning was for our Navy and the men in it.

However, I must decline from two points of view. The first is that I think it would be unfair to my old classmates at Annapolis who are now in the Navy to take a man who has resigned the service and been out for several years and restore him. Even though that man had not sought reinstatement, still it would cause hard feeling to bring him back into the Navy at an advanced rank. You might say that such action was being taken for a special reason, but nevertheless, having been out of the Navy, there would probably, even though unwittingly, be in the minds of those officers a feeling that somebody was being taken from civil life and put ahead of them.

My second point of view is industrial. I did not seek to leave the Navy. After working on the submarine 8-51 job two months and when the prospects of success were very dark, indeed, I received an offer from a commercial concern, which offer I had not sought, to become their chief engineer. They desired that I resign immediately and take over their work. I considered the proposal, a while and told the concern that I simply must finish the job in connection with the submarine S-51. With their consent I remained in the Navy six or seven months after that, and at considerable loss to their work, in order to finish the job in connection with the S-51.

I do not mind saying that I think it would be unfair to my associates in the industrial world now, those who have stood by me and behind me in the past and given me this opportunity, to tell them that now that Congress offers me an opportunity to get back into the service at an advanced rank I am going to leave them and go back to the service.

I regret to say that from both the Navy and the industrial side I hardly think it would be fair to anybody if I should return to the Navy. On the other hand, if I should remain in the Volunteer Naval Reserve Force my services would be available to the Navy in times of emergency, just as they were available in this last catastrophe. I do not mind saying that I think that such is the best solution. That is the answer to your question, Mr. Chairman.

There are a few other remarks I would like to make later, with your permission.

Mr. BRITTEN. You may proceed right now, if you will.

Mr. MILLER. That is a remarkable statement by the gentleman.
Mr. HALE. It certainly is a fine statement.

Mr. MILLER. It is magnanimous from every point of view. Lieutenant Commander ELLSBERG. It is difficult, as you gentlemen appreciate, of course, for anybody to speak about himself, therefore I shall speak principally about Lieutenant Hartley and Boatswain Hawes. I have worked with those two officers on two different jobs in situations that presented great danger. I have a very vivid recollection of Boatswain Hawes risking his own life in trying to make successful the salvage of the sunken submarine S-51, and that at a time when success seemed very remote indeed. I would hate to think that because some years in the past he took an examination for ensign and failed on three subjects that anybody should say now he is not fit to be an ensign in the regular Navy. I hope you will consider that.

sion.

As regards Lieutenant Hartley, he came into the service as an enlisted man long ago when I was a small child. He became a quartermaster. During the war, because of his qualifications, he was made a temporary officer, and afterwards he was given a permanent commisI know of no officer who has come from the ranks who is better qualified to be an officer than is Lieutenant Hartley. He is in every way qualified to be an officer of the Navy. But he is not a young man. His service in the He is probably 10 or 12 years older than I am. Navy can not last much longer, because under the action of law, I think, he will be forced out after a certain number of years in the service.

Lieutenant Hartley was a lieutenant during both of these salvage operations. His knowledge of seamanship and his knowledge of weather and his handling of the Falcon on several occasions prevented her being lost and the submarine from being sunk again.

On one particular occasion we were coming down the East River after the submarine S-51 had been raised. We were in sight of the navy yard and thought all our difficulties were over. The Falcon was towing astern of the S-51 and constantly pumping air into her to keep her afloat.

There was a distance of only 150 feet between the two vessels. We had taken on a civilian pilot stationed on the leading tugboat to take us down the East River. The pilot left his course, tried to pass between two reefs, and stranded the S-51. She stopped dead. You can imagine how short a time it takes for a ship to travel 150 feet and we were only that far astern of the submarine. We had only six seconds, but in that time Lieutenant Hartley had his engines going “ Full speed I tell you astern" and had swung to port enough to miss the S-51. that if he had hit the S-51 in the stern, the S-51 would have sunk, a total wreck. There would have been no possibility of raising her. She would be there to-day, a danger to navigation. Instead of that, Lieutenant's Hartley's skill allowed us to bring her safely in. He used to be a Lieutenant Hartley, moreover, is a diving expert. However, he was too old to do any diving in connection with diver. salvage operations of the S-51 and the S-4.

When you consider that he is not an Annapolis man and is consequently much older than lieutenants from Annapolis, you can see that promoting him 5 or 10 numbers does not mean much. You would do nothing but absolute justice by rewarding him, whether it meant 400 numbers two years ago or 200 numbers now, by making him a lieutenant commander as of the date suggested in this bill. I am sure that you will find no criticism of that action by officers or enlisted men of the Navy.

Hartley's value to the Navy is far beyond the value of the average Heutenant, even though Hartley did not come from Annapolis. When the next submarine disaster comes, I am of the opinion that the Navy will have to rely upon Lieutenant Hartley, and it ought to give him some appropriate rank. If he were given the rank of lieutenant commander there would not be so many officers with higher rank around him to interfere with his operations when he goes out in charge of salvage work on the Falcon. So much for Hartley.

As regards myself, I can only say a little. I think Admiral Leigh has made a few slight errors unwittingly. I was actually the senior lieutenant commander in the line of promotion in the Construction Corps at the time of the accident to the S-51 and at the time of my resignation in December, 1926. However, the Navy register, published before that, may have shown me as No. 2 on the list of lieutenant commanders in the Naval Construction Corps. The only man ahead of me had been passed over repeatedly by all selection boards and could not have been properly considered in line for promotion when the S-51 was raised. I was therefore No. 1 on the list. Two or three vacancies occurred in the Construction Corps the very next month. You passed the equalization bill in June, which abolished all future vacancies, and we raised the submarine S-51 in July. Then one naval constructor with rank of captain died and another rear admiral retired. If you had not passed the equalization bill, that would have made two vacancies, to one of which I would have been promoted even if I had never done anything special. If I had, so to speak, simply done my ordinary duty and kept out of trouble I would have been promoted to commander very shortly after July 1, 1926. I would have been promoted even if I had never seen a submarine disaster or had anything to do with trying to raise one.

Therefore, if it is a question of promotion of one rank, it seems to me that I should be promoted from commander to captain in the Naval

Reserve Force, and that would mean nothing to officers on the active list.

I feel that if the Navy Department has not, as a result of the World War, actually recommended any officers for promotion, the fault is the Navy Department's and not that of the officers concerned. It would seem to show that the American Navy is proceeding upon a wrong principle. Nothing will so bolster up the morale and achieve results as a prompt recognition of exceptional service. A famous general who appreciated that more than anybody else, so it seems, took the rabble and the mob and made of them the best army of its day. I refer to Napoleon. If a man of extraordinary qualifications did any thing well in the army of Napoleon, he was promptly promoted, so that when trouble happened Napoleon had a man on the job who could handle it.

I expect that to apply to both Lieutenant Hartley and Boatswain
I trust that you will consider this.
Perhaps our military policy is all wrong.

Hawes.

If so, it is not the fault of the officers who have done the things that Admiral Leigh has recited. It is the fault of the Navy Department, it seems to me.

I should like to know whether the department as the result of the World War, recommended anybody for promotion? Perhaps it has not, but in spite of that several people have been retired by the Congress in an advanced rank.

As has been stated, Commander Byrd was a lieutenant when he left the service and after retirement he became a lieutenant commander. Then Congress, by its own action, made him a commander on the retired list. His was an outstanding case.

I will say for the men who worked on these two submarine jobs that for a man to expose his life under the conditions that we faced on the S-51 and the 8-4, on the surface and on the bottom of the sea required a greater amount of courage over a longer period than it does, we will say, for a person in the heat of action on a battle field or on a battleship to perform an act of bravery that may suitably be rewarded by a medal. It requires a cold courage over a long period to keep a man going in the face of danger for the several months required for the carrying through of a job like salvaging the S-51 and the S-4 successfully.

As for myself, I can earn my living on the outside, but Boatswain Hawes and Lieutenant Hartley will stay in the Navy until they are retired. Earnestly, I should like to see them get, not just a few numbers, but a substantial recognition that will be worth something to them and will be an example and inspiration to the officers and men who are in the Navy.

I do not think of anything else I have to say, unless gentlemen of the committee care to question me.

Mr. BRITTEN. Inasmuch as it is 12.30, let us adjourn to meet at the call of the chairman.

Thereupon at 12.30 o'clock p. m., Friday, April 20, 1928, the com mittee adjourned to meet at the call of the chairman.

MUSCLE SHOALS

Mr. SCHAFER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks in the RECORD and to incorporate therein a short editorial appearing in the Wisconsin Agriculturalist and a letter from the president of the Milwaukee Association of Commerce on the Muscle Shoals legislation. The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered. There was no objection. Mr. SCHAFER. Mr. Speaker, under the leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following short editorial appearing in the Wisconsin Agriculturist, and a letter from the president of the Milwaukee Association of Commerce on the Muscle Shoals legislation:

Hon. JOHN C. SCHAFER,

MILWAUKEE ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE, May 14, 1928.

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN: It is our understanding that the House of Representatives on Wednesday, the 16th instant, will take further action in regard to the Muscle Shoals bill, Union Calendar No. 324, S. J. Res. 46.

Our national affairs committee, composed of representative Milwaukee business leaders, and the chairman of which is Max W. Babb, AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co., has to-day carefully considered this bill by request of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and of Wisconsin business interests.

As a result the Milwaukee Association of Commerce is opposed to this proposed legislation on the premise that it is unwise and unsound for the Government to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling commercial fertilizer in competition with private industry.

It is our belief, furthermore, that the Government should without exception refrain from undertaking any phase of business which can be successfully conducted by private enterprise.

It is our earnest hope, therefore, that you will deem it consistent to oppose the passage of this legislation not only for the reasons above stated but because of our understanding that in the event this legis

lation is not enacted at the present session of Congress, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States will cause a complete investigation to be made of the matter and the result of which will doubtless be made available to the Congress.

Assuming that such action might be consistent on your part, we should be glad also to have you cause the comment herein to be read into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Yours very truly,

O. F. STOTZER.

[From the Wisconsin Agriculturist, May 19, 1928]

MUSCLE SHOALS FERTILIZER BILL

Many schemes have been projected to utilize the power plant at Muscle Shoals. Disposition of the plant has been before Congress ever since the close of the World War.

The bill now before Congress has been hailed with joy by some farm leaders and politicians because it seeks to put the Federal Government in the fertilizer business. It proposes to provide working capital, amounting to $10,000,000 so that a corporation may utilize the full power of the Muscle Shoals plant for making fertilizer which shall be sold for cost, spot cash at the plant. It also authorizes the corporation to sell power, the proceeds to be applied to reducing the cost of fertilizers made. It also proves that new sources of rock phosphate may be acquired and operated.

Will such a measure help farmers in general? We do not think so. Most farmers do not buy fertilizers for spot cash. Most farmers prefer

to deal with their local agents. Most farmers probably could not secure their supplies from the Shoals plant because Government operation in business has not proved its efficiency.

The plan sets a dangerous precedent. Why not have the Government take charge of the farms as well as the fertilizer business? Perhaps it could succeed as well as it did with the railroads, but probably not. The experience with Government railroad management is not a strong recommendation for Government in business.

With the following committee amendment: Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: "That hereafter the Chief of Staff of the Army, while holding office as such, shall have the rank and title of general, and shall receive the pay and allowances of a major general, and in addition thereto, the personal money allowance prescribed by law for the officer of the Navy serving as Chief of Naval Operations. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations shall take rank between themselves according to dates of appointment as such."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill as amended was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. DEFINITION OF TERMS CHILD" AND CHILDREN AS USED IN THE ACTS OF MAY 18, 1920, AND JUNE 10, 1922

66

Mr. MORIN. Mr. Speaker, I call up the bill (H. R. 12449) to define the terms "child" and "children" as used in the acts of May 18, 1920, and June 10, 1922, and ask unanimous consent that it may be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the words "child and "children as used in section 12 of the act approved May 18, 1920 (41 Stat. 604), and in section 4 of the act approved June 10, 1922 (42 Stat. 627), and in section 12 of the act approved June 10, 1922 (42 Stat. 631), as amended by the act approved June 1, 1926 (44 Stat. 680), shall be held to include legitimate natural children, stepchildren, and adopted children.

With the following committee amendment:

On page 1, line 10, strike out the comma after the word "children'

The committee amendment was agreed to.

RANK OF OFFICERS IN THE ARMY AND NAVY

Mr. MORIN. Mr. Speaker, I call up the bill (H. R. 9961) to equalize the rank of officers in positions of great responsibility in the Army and Navy, and ask unanimous consent that it may be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole. The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Chief of Staff of the Army, from the date of assuming said office until date of relinquishment thereof, shall have the rank and title of general. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations shall take rank between themselves according to date of appointment as such and shall both take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army and Navy.

SEC. 2. That the President be, and is hereby, authorized to designate not to exceed 12 officers of the Army for the command of major territorial or tactical commands of the Army, and, after being so designated from the date of assuming such command until relinquishment thereof, not more than three of such officers shall each have the rank and title of general and the others shall each have the rank and title of lieutenant general; and the ranks and titles of general and lieutenant general in the Army, as authorized in this act, shall correspond with the ranks and titles of admiral and vice admiral, respectively, in the Navy, rank and precedence as between officers of the Army and Navy of corresponding ranks and titles to be determined by date of appointment therein: Provided, That in time of peace officers for the command of major territorial or tactical commands, as authorized by this act, shall be designated from among the general officers of the line.

SEC. 3. That in time of peace every general officer of the line temporarily holding a higher rank and title under this act, shall be entitled while holding such higher rank and title, to the pay and allowances of a major general and to a personal money allowance per year as follows: While holding the rank and title of lieutenant general, $500; while holding the rank and title of general, $2,200.

SEC. 4. That nothing in this act shall create any vacancy in any grade in the Army or increase the total number of officers authorized by law Provided, That this act shall become effective when the present Chief of Staff of the Army shall vacate said office.

The bill as amended was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL MILITARY PARK AT BATTLE FIELD OF MONOCACY, MD. Mr. MORIN. Mr. Speaker, I call up the bill (H. R. 11722) to establish a national military park at Monocacy, Md., and I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER. Is there objection? There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That in order to commemorate the Battle of Monocacy, Md., and to preserve for historical purposes the breast works, earthworks, walls, or other defenses or shelters used by the armies therein, the battle field at Monocacy, in the State of Maryland, is hereby declared a national military park whenever the title to the lands deemed necessary by the Secretary of War shall have been acquired by the United States and the usual jurisdiction over the lands and roads of the same shall have been granted to the United States by the State of Maryland.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to cause condemnation proceedings to be instituted in the name of the United States under the provisions of the act of August 1, 1888, entitled "An act to authorize condemnation of lands for sites for public buildings, and for other purposes" (25 Stat. L. 357), to acquire title to the lands, interests therein, or rights pertaining thereto within the said Monocacy Battle Field National Military Park, and the United States shall be entitled to immediate possession upon the filing of the petition in condemnation in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland: Provided, That when the owner of such lands, interests therein, or rights pertaining thereto shall fix a price for the same which, in the opinion of the commission hereinafter referred to and the Secretary of War, shall be reasonable, the Secretary may purchase the same without further delay: Provided further, That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to accept, on behalf of the United States, donations of lands, interests therein, or rights pertaining thereto required for the Monocacy Battle Field National Military Park: And provided further, That no public money shall be expended for title to any lands until a written opinion of the Attorney General shall be had in favor of the validity of title thereto.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to enter into leases with the owners of such of the lands, works, defenses, and buildings thereon within the Monocacy Battle Field National Military Park, as in his discretion it is unnecessary to forthwith acquire title to, and

such leases shall be on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and may contain options to purchase, subject to later acceptance, if, in the judgment of the Secretary of War, it is as economical to purchase as condemn title to the property: Provided, That the Secretary of War may enter into agreements upon such nominal terms as he may prescribe, permitting the present owners or their tenants to occupy or cultivate their present holdings, upon condition that they will preserve the present breastworks, earthworks, walls, defenses, shelters, buildings, and roads, and the present outlines of the battle fields, and that they will only cut trees or underbrush or disturb or remove the soil, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and that they will assist in caring for and protecting all tablets, monuments, or such other artificial works as may from time to time be erected by proper authority: Provided further, That if such agreements to lease cover any lands the title to which shall have been acquired by the United States, the proceeds from such agreements shall be applied by the Secretary of War toward the maintenance of the park.

SEC. 4. The affairs of the Monocacy Battle Field National Military Park shall, subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary of War, be in charge of three commissioners, consisting of Army officers, civilians, or both, to be appointed by the Secretary of War, one of whom shall be designated as chairman and another as secretary of the commission.

SEC. 5. It shall be the duties of the commissioners, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to superintend the opening or repair of such roads as may be necessary to the purposes of the park, and to ascertain and mark with historical tablets or otherwise, as the Secretary of War may determine, all breastworks, earthworks, walls, or other defenses or shelters, lines of battle, location of troops, buildings, and other historical points of interest within the park or in its vicinity, and the said commission in establishing the park shall have authority, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to employ such labor and service at rates to be fixed by the Secretary of War, and to obtain such supplies and materials as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.

SEC. 6. The commission, acting through the Secretary of War, is authorized to receive gifts and contributions from States, Territories, societies, organizations, and individuals for the Monocacy Battle Field National Military Park: Provided, That all contributions of money received shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States and credited to a fund to be designated "Monocacy Battle Field National Military Park Fund," which fund shall be applied to and expended under the direction of the Secretary of War, for carrying out the provisions

of this act.

SEC. 7. It shall be lawful for the authorities of any State having had troops engaged at the battle of Monocacy to enter upon the lands and approaches of the Monocacy Battle Field National Military Park for the purpose of ascertaining and marking the lines of battle of troops engaged therein: Provided, That before any such lines are permanently designated the position of the lines and the proposed methods of marking them by monuments, tablets, or otherwise, including the design and inscription for the same, shall be submitted to the Secretary of War and shall first receive written approval of the Secretary, which approval shall be based upon formal written reports to be made to him in each case by the commissioners of the park: Provided, That no discrimination shall be made against any State as to the manner of designating lines, but any grant made to any State by the Secretary of War may be used by any other State.

SEC. 8. If any person shall, except by permission of the Secretary of War, destroy, mutilate, deface, injure, or remove any monument, column, statue, memorial structure, or work of art that shall be erected or placed upon the grounds of the park by lawful authority, or shall destroy or remove any fence, railing, inclosure, or other work for the protection of ornament of said park, or any portion thereof, or shall destroy, cut, hack, bark, break down, or otherwise injure any tree, bush, or shrubbery that may be growing upon said park, or shall cut down or fell or remove any timber, battle relic, tree or trees growing or being upon said park, or hunt within the limits of the park, or shall remove or destroy any breastworks, earthworks, walls, or other defenses or shelter or any part thereof constructed by the armies formerly engaged in the battles on the lands or approaches to the park, any person so offending and found guilty thereof, before any United States commissioner or court, justice of the peace of the county in which the offense may be committed, or any other court of competent jurisdiction, shall for each and every such offense forfeit and pay a fine, in the discretion of the said United States commissioner or court, justice of the peace, or other court, according to the aggravation of the offense, of not less than $5 nor more than $500, one half for the use of the park and the other half to the informant, to be enforced and recovered before such United States commissioner or court, justice of the peace, or other court, in like manner as debts of like nature are now by law recoverable in the several counties where the offense may be committed.

SEC. 9. The Secretary of War, subject to the approval of the President, shall have the power to make and shall make all needful rules and regulations for the care of the park and for the establishment and marking of lines of battle and other historical features of the park.

SEC. 10. Upon completion of the acquisition of the land and the work of the commission the Secretary of War shall render a report thereon to Congress, and thereafter the park shall be placed in charge of a superintendent at a salary to be fixed by the Secretary of War and paid out of the appropriation available for the maintenance of the park.

SEC. 11. To enable the Secretary of War to begin to carry out the provisions of this act, including the condemnation, purchase, or lease of the necessary land, surveys, maps, marking the boundaries of the park, opening, constructing, or repairing necessary roads, pay and expenses of commissioners, salaries for labor and services, traveling expenses, supplies, and materials, the sum of $50,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appro priated, to remain available until expended, and disbursements under this act shall be annually reported by the Secretary of War to Congress. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read the third time, was read the third time, and passed.

A motion to reconsider by Mr. MORIN was laid on the table.

RESERVE DIVISION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Mr. MORIN. Mr. Speaker, I call up the bill (H. R. 11683) to create the reserve division of the War Department, and for other purposes, and I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole. The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request that it be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole?

Mr. SPEAKS. Mr. Speaker, I regret very much to object to the present consideration of this bill. Owing to its importance and far-reaching possibilities, I feel that it should go over until the subject can have more time for deliberate consideration. No hearings have been held on the bill by the House Military Committee and I have been informed that certain organizations desire to present their views on the proposal.

Mr. JAMES. There have been hearings on the bill in the Senate.

Mr. SPEAKS. But no hearings in the House. The Senate hearings were not satisfactory, owing to the absence of persons desiring to oppose the bill.

Mr. JAMES. There were no requests for hearings, and they said they did not want hearings because the evidence had all been produced in the hearings in the Senate, and they said it was very urgent that the bill be passed at the present session.

Mr. SPEAKS. Because of the interest displayed in the bill by my friend from Michigan, I hesitate to object. However, I feel it a duty under the circumstances to ask that it go over for the present. I wish it understood that I am not unfriendly to the reserves.

Mr. JAMES. Of course, the gentleman from Ohio understands that if I were to insist upon my rights we might consume about two hours in a discussion of this bill. Many other bills are following this one in which Members of the House are interested, including a bill sponsored by the gentleman from Ohio, which I favor, and as I do not want Members of the House to suffer because of my insisting upon my rights, I will therefore withdraw the unanimous-consent request that my bill be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole.

Mr. WAINWRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I will offer an amendment which may cure the difficulty raised by the gentleman from Ohio, and with which amendment I would be glad to vote for the bill; and if it is not adopted I should oppose it. I move to strike out, on page 2, line 12

Mr. GARNER of Texas. The bill is not before the House for consideration yet.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania that it be considered in the Hous as in Committee of the Whole?

Mr. SPEAKS. I was prepared, Mr. Speaker, to offer the amendment suggested by the gentleman from New York, but considering conferences I have had with representatives of groups greatly interested in the bill, I feel under the necessity of objecting for the present.

The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.

Mr. MORIN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw the bill. REQUIRING CERTAIN WAR DEPARTMENT CONTRACTS TO BE IN WRITING Mr. MORIN. Mr. Speaker, I call up the bill (H. R. 12352) to require certain contracts entered into by the Secretary of War, or by officers authorized by him to make them, to be in writing, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania calls up the bill H. R. 12352, on the House Calendar, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That hereafter whenever contracts in excess of $500 in amount which are not to be performed within 60 days are made on behalf of the Government by the Secretary of War, or by officers authorized by him to make them, such contracts shall be reduced to writing