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looked as though we were in a fair way to succeed. But we did not succeed, and hence our troubles of to-day.

One thing the Washington conference did for us--it served as a notification to the rest of the world that the 5-5-3 ratio was the basis upon which the United States proposed to keep up its Navy. Secretary Hughes, who presided over our delegation at the conference, stated clearly the position of our country in referring to the celebration of Navy Day on October 26, 1922, when he said:

This Government has taken the lead in securing the reduction of naval armament, but the Navy that we retain under the agreement should be maintained with efficient personnel and pride in the service. It is essential that we should maintain the relative naval strength of the United States. That, in my judgment is the way to peace and security. It will be upon that basis that we would enter in future conferences or make agreements for limitation, and it would be folly to undermine our position.

I firmly believe that the position taken by him expresses the will of the American people.

Last summer, Mr. President, at the instigation of the President of the United States, and to follow up the attempt made by our representatives at the Washington conference, a conference was held at Geneva to consider a limitation of armament of ships other than capital ships and carriers. France and Italy refused to take part in the conference other than to send cbservers, and the conference was thereby limited to Great Britain, Japan, and the United States.

The delegates of this country went to the conference with the honest intention of securing a limitation of armament in the classes of ships indicated. They were ready and willing to accept a tonnage figure on these classes of ships-cruisers, destroyers, and submarines-below the actual naval needs of the country as recommended to Congress by the Navy Department, provided the limitation could be made on the same basis as the capital-ship ratio.

The American proposal at the conference was 250,000 to 300,000 tons of cruisers for Great Britain and the United States and 150,000 to 180,000 for Japan. As we have but 155,000 tons of first-line cruisers built, building, or appropriated for, the lower figure would have involved the building of nearly 100,000 tons of new cruisers.

As the British have built, building, or appropriated for 337,410 tons of first-line cruisers they would have had to scrap about 87,000 tons of their present cruisers. The Japanese, with 196,205 tons of first-line cruisers built, building, or appropriated for, to come within the ratio would have had to scrap about 46,000 tons of their present cruiser force.

The first proposal of the British at the conference was 600,000 tons of cruisers, which offer was later cut down to 510,000 tons. The United States raised their offer to 400,000 tons, though protesting at the time that it was against their better judgment to do so.

The representatives of Japan were at all times in favor of a low figure for a limitation. They asked that the ratio of 5-5-3 be changed to 5-5-3.5, but were not insistent upon this specific demand.

The American demand was for a limitation of total tonnage in cruisers with permission to build cruisers of any size within the limitation up to the 10,000 tons of the treaty cruiser. The British contention was that on account of their far-flung naval bases and insular possessions they needed a great number of smaller cruisers and that therefore the number of 10,000-ton treaty cruisers should be limited.

They insisted that their naval needs required 70 to 75 cruisers, and sought to limit the construction of cruisers to two classes, those of 10,000 tons, carrying 8-inch guns, and those of 7,500 tons and under, with a limit of 6-inch guns, which proposal was later changed to 6,000-ton cruisers with 6-inch guns. Their original proposal was for fifteen 10,000-ton cruisers, which in one of their later offers was modified to 12.

The position of the United States that a limitation be placed on the total tonnage, with permission to build ships of any size within that limitation up to the treaty limit of 10,000 tons, was maintained throughout the conference by the American delegates, because on account of our almost entire lack of naval bases and the fact that our operations away from the fleet would necessarily be carried on overseas and in proximity to hostile bases, we need the maximum cruising radius and maximum protection in armament, so that it is imperative that we build almost exclusively ships of the larger type. The smaller type of ship with a lesser cruising radius would be of little value to the United States, and necessarily we would not feel justified in building such ships. While it is perfectly true

that the naval needs of Great Britain are not necessarily based on the possibility of any hostilities with us, yet the fact remains that if she builds up to her expressed naval needs and we do not she will have a navy that is stronger than our Navy and we lose that position of equality which was the whole basis for the ratio of the Washington conference.

There are people in this country who believe that we should never consent to any agreement that would deny us the right to maintain a navy equal to that of Great Britain, and yet hold that it is not necessary for us to exercise fully our rights under such an agreement. It is true that there is nothing in the agreement of the Washington conference that obligates us in capital ships and carriers to keep our Navy up to the ratio basis, nor would there be in all probability any such obligation in any future conference agreements, yet if we do not do so for any reason we would necessarily be left in a secondary position until the deficiency in strength should be made up, and at any given time that would involve, with the intricacies of modern naval construction, a delay of several years before the Navy could be brought up to its permitted strength. Obviously in case of a sudden call for our Navy such an agreement, if we did not exercise fully our right under it, would be of little value to us.

The representatives of the United States had no objection to the other countries party to the conference building smaller vessels if they saw fit to do so, but were unwilling to bind the United States to an agreement that would force her in order to maintain her position of equality to build ships for which she had no use.

This failure to reach an agreement on types of cruiser and on the total tonnage of cruisers to be allowed caused the conference to break up without reaching an agreement. Tentative agreements could have been reached and practically were reached in regard to submarines and destroyers, including de stroyer leaders, but as the main proposition-the cruiser proposition-failed, no final agreement was reached in respect to any class of ship in the conference.

We went into this Geneva conference in an honest attempt to bring about a further limitation of armament. We figured that in the Washington conference almost the entire sacrifice had been made by ourselves. In the Geneva conference we hoped that Great Britain, which was in much the same position in regard to cruisers at that time that we occupied in regard to capital ships at the time of the Washington conference, would sacrifice her cruiser superiority as we had sacrificed our capitalship superiority, but we hoped in vain. The shoe was now very much on the other foot. We were not at this second conference in the lordly position that we occupied at the first one. We had no great partially completed program that we were willing to sacrifice in the interests of world economy. We were asking another country to assume that rôle and the other country did not feel that it could assume it, so the conference failed, as all such conferences in the future will fail unless the nation which has come to the top is willing to give up that advantage for some reason which to her seems justifiable.

We were able to bring the Washington conference to a more or less successful conclusion because we were on top at that time. Great Britain could have done the same thing at the Geneva conference at the price of sacrificing her cruiser superiority. In the same way France could undoubtedly bring about an agreement for a limitation in land forces if she were disposed to give up her military preeminence; but Spain could not do it, or England, or Italy, or any other country that was unable or unwilling to bring up its military strength to that of France.

The great striking force of the Navy is the Battle Fleet, which is made up not only of battleships but of aircraft car riers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries.

The striking unit of the Battle Fleet, in so far as gun power is concerned, is the battleship. Next is the cruiser.

While no agreement was reached at the Washington conference limiting the number or aggregate tonnage of vessels of this class, an agreement was reached that in the future no cruisers should be built of over 10,000 tons' displacement or mounting any guns heavier than 8-inch guns.

The reason for the treaty limitation on type of cruiser adopted at the Washington conference was that Great Britain already at that time had built and building four cruisers of approximately 9,750 tons, mounting 7.5-inch guns. The modern tendency is to build cruis ers of the treaty tonnage, and all of the nations party to the conference have laid down, built, and are building ships of this class.

The duties of cruisers are when with the fleet to guarel he fleet movements as scouts, and to act as a protective screen for

the fleet. In fleet action cruisers are necessary to attack on their own part the cruisers of the enemy, to break down destroyer attacks, and to carry in their own destroyer attacks, and to a certain extent they may also be used to augment the fire of the battle line.

When the fleet is away from its home base cruisers are needed to guard the lines of communication and to escort convoys. Away from the fleet they are the vessels primarily used to break the enemy's line of communication, to protect our commerce, and to destroy the enemy's commerce.

The treaty cruisers are very fast ships, in some instances reaching a speed of 35 knots. They carry 8-inch guns, which, though they have not the striking power of the heavier guns of the battleships and battle cruisers, have, through elevation of guns, almost the range of the larger guns.

With their great speed the treaty cruiser can keep out of the way of battleships and even battle cruisers, which while much faster vessels than battleships do not attain the speed of the treaty cruiser.

And with their 8-inch guns they themselves can destroy all other surface types of naval vessels that come within the range of their guns.

Mr. President, the needs of our Navy for cruisers, as pointed out to Congress by experts in the Navy Department, is for 26 vessels to accompany the United States fleet, with 2 additional cruisers as destroyer flagships, and 15 for detached service, including protection of our commerce and guarding convoys, making a total of 43 cruisers.

Should we build this number of vessels we would then have in modern cruisers 33 of a tonnage of 330,000 tons, and 10 of a tonnage of 75,000 tons; in all, 405,000 tons.

At the present time we have built and building 8 of the treaty cruisers aggregating 80,000 tons and 10 of the 7,500-ton cruisers, giving us a total first-line cruiser tonnage of 155,000 tons when the 8 now building are completed.

These 18 modern cruisers will not be enough to take care of the needs of the fleet alone by some 10 vessels, and will allow us no additional cruisers for destroyer flagships for detached service or for the protection of our commerce. In this very important branch of the service we are distinctly lacking, and until the deficiency is made up the fleet can neither operate effectively nor can our commerce receive that protection which it manifestly should have.

Great Britain has 13 treaty cruisers of 10,000 tons and 1 of 8,300 tons built and building. She bas, further, 1 of 8,300 tons appropriated for and 5 more authorized, 1 of 10,000 tons and 4 of 8,000 tons.

If she keeps up her program, she will have in 1931 20 of these cruisers, and aside from this she has 39 first-line cruisers of 190,810 tons, running from 9,770 tons down to 3,750 tons each, none of which carry 8-inch guns, although 4 of the larger vessels carry seven 7.5-inch guns and are very much more powerful than are our 7,500-ton cruisers, giving her an aggregate tonnage of first-line cruisers of 337,410 tons.

Japan has, built and building, 8 of the treaty cruisers and 21 smaller first-line cruisers running from 3,100 tons to 7,100 tons each, with an aggregate tonnage of 196,205 tons.

The Geneva conference having broken up with no agreement reached, England having insisted that her naval strength must be based on her national needs and that therefore any possible agreement would involve an increase rather than a decrease in naval strength, it was up to us to quit marking time with our Navy and decide on its future building policy. The Navy Department accordingly, with the consent and approval of the President, presented to Congress a building program based on our national needs, which would have rounded out our Navy in certain classes of ships wherein we are not up to the mark, by replacing old and obsolete ships with modern up-to-date ships and by adding certain vessels in categories where we are lacking.

The House has greatly cut down the program and the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs recommends the acceptance of the amended building program as adopted by the House. The present bill authorizes the construction of 15 cruisers at a cost of $17,000,000 each. These cruisers are to be treaty cruisers, carrying 8-inch guns.

When these ships shall have been completed we will have 305,000 tons of cruisers, as against Great Britain's 337.410 tons plus any additions thereto that she may make in the meanwhile; and as against 196,205 tons for Japan with any additions that she may make.

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Obviously the addition of these ships will not bring us up anywhere near to the ratio of 5-5 of the Washington conference as applied to Great Britain or to the ratio of 5-3 as applied to Japan, nor will it reach in cruiser tonnage any conceivable limitation that from past indications we may reasonably hope to bring about in the future with Great Britain.

Neither, as I have said before, will it meet our naval needs as indicated to us by the experts of the Navy Department. It will, however, make up to a certain extent for our deplorable lack of vessels of this class.

In addition, the bill provides for the construction of one aircraft carrier, at a cost of $19,000,000, as a first step in taking care of a serious shortage.

Under the Washington treaty we are allowed 135.000 tons of aircraft carriers. We have at the present time the Lexington and Saratoga, with a tonnage of 33,000 tons each, and the Langley, which is an experimental vessel of very slow speed, and which will probably be scrapped as soon as she can be replaced.

The tonnage of the new carrier is to be approximately 13,800 tons. When built we shall have an aggregate carrier tonnage of 79,800 tons, or 92,500 tons if the Langley is still kept in commission.

The British have an aggregate tonnage of 107,550 tons, and Japan of 63,309 tous. The building of this vessel will not bring us up to our ratio strength with either nation, as determined by the Washington treaty for vessels of this class.

The bill provides for no authorization for the destroyer leaders that were recommended in the original program. The House Committee on Naval Affairs in its report makes the following statement

Your committee makes no recommendations that additional vessels of the destroyer type be authorized, because the act of August 29, 1916, authorized 12 such vessels "to have the highest practicable speed and the greatest desirable radius of action," for the construction of which no appropriations have yet been made. Your committee regards this authorization as sufficient authority for the appropriation of funds to build the needed destroyer leaders. Neither does it provide for any of the submarines called for in the original program. The House committee report goes on to say

The act of August 29, 1916, likewise authorized three "fleet submarines " for the construction of which no appropriations have yet been made. Your committee believes this authorization sufficient to justify appropriations for three submarines of a smaller type, between the S and V classes, of which we have none in commission at the present time.

It seems to me that the position taken by the House Committee on Naval Affairs is sound. Undoubtedly vessels of these two classes should be laid down in the near future.

Since the Washington conference we have started no new ships for our Navy with the exception of the eight 10,000-ton treaty cruisers now appropriated for and building, six small river gunboats, and three submarines already authorized in the 1916 program. In addition we have under the terms of the treaty completed two aircraft carriers of 33,000 tons each that had been previously laid down as battle cruisers.

In other words, we have started very little modern construction since the Washington conference. Great Britain, on the other hand, has built 2 new battleships, which she had the right to do under the Washington treaty, and has built, is building, or has appropriated for thirteen 10.000-ton and two 8,300-ton treaty cruisers and has authorized 5 more, one of 10,000 tons and 4 of 8,000 tons; 1 destroyer leader, 10 destroyers, 15 submarines and certain auxiliary vessels.

Japan has built, is building, or has appropriated for 16 firstline cruisers, included in which are eight 10,000-ton treaty cruisers, also 24 destroyer leaders, 27 destroyers, 33 submarines, and certain auxiliary vessels. Japan has also converted two battle cruisers into aircraft carriers.

France has built, is building, or has appropriated for 8 cruisers, 3 of 7,234 tons, 2 of 9.941 tons, and 3 of 10.000 tons; 18 destroyer leaders, 26 destroyers, 57 submarines, and certain auxiliary vessels.

Italy has built, is building, or has appropriated for 6 cruisers, 2 of 10,000 tons and 4 of 5,000 tons, 12 destroyer leaders, 16 destroyers, 21 submarines, and certain auxiliary vessels.

A table showing the total tonnage of vessels (by classes) laid down or appropriated for since February 6, 1922 (date of Washington conference) follows:

Total tonnage of resvels (by classes) laid down or appropriated for, since February 6, 1922 (date of Washington conference)

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1 Designed as battle cruisers, being converted into aircraft carriers. Standard displacement. Does not include weight allowance, under Ch. II, pt. 3, Sec. I, art. (d) o Washington treaty, for providing means against air and submarine attack.

? Designed as cruisers, being converted to aircraft carriers. The Furious, of 22,450 tons included in last year's table has been omitted, as she was originally converted to an aircraft carrier prior to the conference.

One designed as a battleship, the other as a battle cruiser, both being converted into aircraft carriers.

4 Designed as battleship; converted to aircraft carrier.

"O" type. Estimated tonnage.

6 No data.

7 To be combined mine layers and mine sweepers.

Equipped for laying mines.

• Net layers.

Replacement program.

No data.

Does not include tonnage of 1 mine layer, 2 gunboats, 1 heavier-than-air aircraft tender, and 3 auxiliaries, miscellaneous (net layers).

12 Estimated.

13 In addition British Empire has 5 cruisers (42,000 tons), exclusive of those canceled which are to be laid down in 1928 and 1929. Two cruisers appropriated for in 1927 and canceled have been eliminated from table. 14 Contracts let and material assembled but keels not laid.

The argument is often made that if we do not build ships other countries will not. The reverse has proved to be the case. While we have practically stood still the other naval nations have all gone ahead with big programs of modern construction. In my opinion, in no other way than by showing the other nations in no uncertain way that we will not allow them to outbuild us can we force them to give up their race for competitive armament. We have proved once in the Washington conference that we can force a cutting down of armament if we have a force that they can not hope to equal. We can do it again if we will show definitely that however much they may build we do not intend to allow ourselves to be outdistanced.

But by shilly-shallying along and letting our Navy drop behind we cease to be a factor in the situation. With something to offer we put through the Washington conference. With nothing to offer the Geneva conference came to naught.

Our aggregate wealth is greater than that of any other half dozen nations in the world combined. Our foreign commerce is increasing by leaps and bounds. We are the acknowledged money center of the world. By every precept in history we could properly arrogate to ourselves the right to the control of the seas for the protection of our vast possessions and our expanding commerce. No one could gainsay us should we see fit so to do, but we do not see fit so to do. We are a peaceful

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nation, wanting peace and the benefits of peace. All that we desire is a Navy equal to that of any other power in the world, that will give security to our country and protection to our citizens and our interests at home and abroad. Such a Navy will insure protection in war time and in peace time to the American merchant marine. And let me say here that just as you can not maintain a strong merchant marine without an adequate Navy to protect it, so you can not maintain a strong Navy without an adequate merchant marine to administer to the needs of the fleet when operating away from its home bases. The interests and aims of the people of these United States are all for peace. Our every effort in the councils of the world will be to maintain a condition of world peace. Our influence in the councils of the world is based on our financial position, our military strength, and the power that we have to enforce any position that we may take. To doubt the use to which we will put that military strength is to doubt the will for peace of the American people. Let us by all means do everything that lies within our power to encourage treaties and agreements that will prevent war and that will result in a proportionate reduction of armament throughout the world, but until we know beyond peradventure of doubt that wars will not occur, let us keep up to the full measure of our national needs that arm of the service which must bear the first brunt of any hostile attack, and which

is the real life insurance of our country-the United States | everybody know? If they are doing wrong, there is infinitely Navy.

Mr. President, failure to pass this bill, with its moderate program of construction, at this session of Congress will result in real harm to our Navy. It will postpone the bringing up of our Navy, in a class of ships in which we are manifestly deficient, to a condition of efficiency. It will encourage the pacifists and the propagandists within and without the country, whose purpose it is to hamper and destroy our naval It will indicate to the rest of the world that we do not power. purpose to keep up our Navy to the ratio strength of the Washington treaty, and thereby will weaken our position in any future attempt to reduce naval armament.

The parliamentary situation at the close of the session is such that though I have tried my best to bring the bill before the Senate, I have not been able to do so. I do not think there are 20 Senators in the body who are against the passage of the bill. In my opinion this session of Congress should not adjourn until this bill is enacted into law.

TAX REDUCTION

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 1) to reduce and equalize taxation, provide revenue, and for other purposes.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, I shall detain the Senate only a few moments. I desire to speak on the pending amendment offered by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS] providing for publicity of income-tax returns.

The Senate may recall that for a number of years several of us have persistently urged the Senate to pass a provision of this kind. I believe the Bureau of Internal Revenue is the only department of our Government whose business is absolutely kept secret. I believe it is the only department of our Government that is hermetically sealed, not only against the public but virtually against the Congress itself. No Senator can get any information about tax returns or anything concerning that particular department of the Government. If a Senator does get any such information, he gets it by grace; he has no right to it. This should not be so.

There was a committee appointed a year or two ago composed of, I believe, five members of the Ways and Means Committee of the House and five members of the Finance Committee of the Senate, to consider the situation, but it did not produce any publicity. We know virtually no more now than we did before the appointment of the committee. Long reports have been filed which it would take days and days to go into to discover anything, but such reports have been of no material benefit.

I call the attention of the Senate to the fact that the income tax business is the only governmental function that is being exercised in any of our governments, State or National, where there is absolute secrecy. If a poor or rich man has to make a mortgage, he has to put it on record and it goes to the public. If a deed of smallest kind, with practically nothing involved, is made it has to be made public. The books and accounts of all other officers, State and National, are open to public inspection. Why should one department of the Federal Government be secret? Why should the actions of this department be secret? These tax returns are not made public because great money transactions are involved.

It is just another exemplification of the expression that we can not convict a million dollars in this country. Are we keeping its business secret because only the rich are concerned in the tax returns? Why should anyone desire to keep this information secret?

Senators, I call attention to the fact that this department has paid out billions of dollars-not hundreds of millions, but billions of dollars-in tax refunds on a basis of secrecy. Substantially no man in the country can say whether that money was rightfully paid back or not. I call attention to the fact that perhaps just as many millions and perhaps billions have been allowed in the way of allowances for depletions, and nobody knows whether they were properly allowed or improperly allowed. A few men in the Treasury Department or rather a few men in the Internal Revenue Bureau pass upon these great questions involving hundreds of millions of dollars, and every step in which is kept in absolute secrecy, and the Congress of the United States sits idly by and permits it to be done in secret, without any publicity whatsoever, because none of us know and none of us can know under the law the facts. The truth is that this bureau of the Government is hermetically sealed, not only against the people themselves, but against the two houses of Congress, whose duty it is to control the Government and its various bureaus and departments. If these agents of the Government are doing right, why should not

more reason why the public should know it. I can not understand how it is that any Senator can vote to seal hermetically one of the great departments of the Government in which not only millions, not only hundred of millions, but billions of dollars in tax refunds and in allowances for depletions are paid out or remitted. Let us have all the Government's business transacted in the open.

Who knows whether there is favoritism? Who knows whether there is inaccuracy? Who knows whether there is even fraud in these refunds or allowances? No man can say. Why should we thus conduct the people's affairs in secret? What is there about this department that the public should not know about? Senators, it is incomprehensible to me how any Senator under his oath of office would be willing to continue the condition of affairs that has existed for the last seven years in regard to secret refunds and secret allowances. Every other tax is public; every other function of government is public; every other Government record is public; but when it comes to the returns of income taxes they are as secret as it is possible for human ingenuity to make them. It is "private" public government, as has been suggested; that is what it is. We ought to put an end to it. I hope that the amendment of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS] will be adopted. I do not believe in secrecy in conducting of government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Mr. ASHURST. Mr. President, I now send to the Secretary's desk a proposed amendment to the tax bill. It is a long amendment and I ask that it be printed in the RECORD. My amendment as now offered is House bill 13039, the World War veterans' bill, as it passed the House of Representatives on the 16th of last April.

I offer this World War veterans' bill as an amendment to the pending tax bill because, as events may unfortunately happen, the bill H. R. 13039 might be lost in the rush of business incident to the closing of a session of Congress, and I desire that the Senate shall have an eligible opportunity to vote upon the World War veterans' bill, H. R. 13039. The learned senior Senator from Montana [Mr. WALSH] on April 2 last pointed out that the decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 5 last, in the case of United States against Sligh, held that the statute of limitations began to run, not from the time when the veterans' claim was rejected by the Veterans' Bureau, but from the time when the claim accrued. My amendment would extend the statute of limitations, and would also carry into effect the other essential demands and reforms proposed in the bill H. R. 13039. I now ask that my amendment be printed in the RECORD, and I also ask that the House report on the bill H. R. 13039 be printed in the RECORD. In the absence of objection,

The PRESIDING OFFICER. that order will be made.

The matter referred to is as follows:

Amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. ASHURST to House bill 1, the tax reduction bill.

At the proper place at the end of the bill, add the following: "That section 19 of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 445, title 38, of the U. S. C.), be amended by adding the following: "No suit shall be allowed under this section unless the same shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made, or within one year from the date of the approval of this amendatory act, whichever is the later date: Provided, That for the purposes of this section it shall be deemed that the right accrued on the happening of the contingency on which the claim is founded: Provided further, That this limitation is suspended for the period elapsing between the filing in the bureau of the claim sued upon and the denial of said claim by the director. Infants, insane persons, or persons under other legal disability, or persons rated as incompetent or insane by the bureau shall have three years in which to bring suit after the removal of their disabilities. If suit is seasonably begun and fails for defect in process, or for other reasons not affecting the merits, a new action, if one lies, may be brought within a year though the period of limitations has elapsed. Judg. ments heretofore rendered against the person or persons claiming under the contract of war-risk insurance on the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations shall not be a bar to the institution of another suit on the same claim. No State or other statute of limitations shall be applicable to suits filed under this section. This section shall apply to all suits now pending against the United States under the provisions of this section.'

"SEC. 2. That section 21, subdivision (2), of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 450, title 38, of the U. S. C.), be hereby amended to read as follows:

"(2) Whenever it appears that any guardian, curator, conservator, or other person is not, in the opinion of the director, properly executing

the duties of his trust or has collected or is attempting to collect fees, commissions, or allowances that are inequitable or are in excess of those allowed by law for the duties performed or expenses incurred, or has failed to make such payments as may be necessary for the benefit of the ward or the dependents of the ward, then and in that event the director is hereby empowered by his duly authorized attorney to appear in the court which has appointed such fiduciary and make proper presentation of such matters to the court: Provided, That the director, in his discretion, may suspend payments to any such guardian, curator, conservator, or other person who shall neglect or refuse, after reasonable notice, to render an account to the director from time to time showing the application of such payments for the benefit of such minor or incompetent beneficiary.

"Authority is hereby granted for the payment of any court or other expenses incident to any investigation or court proceeding for the appointment of any guardian, curator, conservator, or other person legally vested with the care of the claimant or his estate or the removal of such fiduciary and appointment of another, and of expenses in connection with the administration of such estates by such fiducaries, when such payment is authorized by the director.'

"SEC. 3. That section 28 of the World War veterans' act as amended (sec. 453, title 38, of the U. S. C.) is hereby amended to read as follows: “SEC. 28. There shall be no recovery of payments from any person, who, in the judgment of the director, is without fault on his part, and where, in the judgment of the director, such recovery would defeat the purpose of benefits otherwise authorized or would be against equity and good conscience. No disbursing officer shall be held liable for any amount paid by him to any person where the recovery of such amount is waived under this section.

"When under the provisions of this section the recovery of a payment made from the United States Government life-insurance fund is waived, the United States Government life-insurance fund shall be reimbursed for the amount involved from the current appropriation for military and naval insurance.'

"SEC. 4. That a new section be added to Title I of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (title 38, U. S. C.), to be known as section 34 and to read as follows:

"SEC. 34. The director is hereby authorized to contract for the services of translators without regard to the provisions of the act of August 5, 1882 (secs. 39, 45, 46, 50, title 5, U. S. C.), and the classification act of 1923 (secs. 43, 45, 46, title 5, U. S. C.). This section shall be deemed to be in effect as of June 7, 1924.'

"SEC. 5. That a new section be added to Title I of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (title 38, U. S. C.), to be known as section 35 and to read as follows:

"SEC. 35. The director is hereby authorized to purchase transcripts of the record, including all evidence, of trial of litigated cases. This section shall be deemed to be in effect as of June 7, 1924.'

"SEC. 6. That section 201, subdivisions (1) and (3), of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 472, title 38, U. S. C.), be hereby amended to read as follows:

"(1) If death occur or shall have occurred subsequent to April 6, 1917, and before discharge or resignation from the service, the United States Veterans' Bureau shall pay for burial and funeral expenses and the return of body to his home a sum not to exceed $100, as may be fixed by regulation. Where a veteran of any war, including those women who served as Army nurses under contracts between April 21, 1898, and February 2, 1901, who was not dishonorably discharged, dies after discharge or resignation from the service, the director, in his discretion and with due regard to the circumstances of each case, shall pay for burial and funeral expenses and the transportation of the body (including preparation of the body) to the place of burial, a sum not exceeding $107 to cover such items and to be paid to such person or persons as may be fixed by regulation: Provided, That when such person dies while receiving from the bureau compensation or vocational training the above benefits shall be payable in all cases: Provided further, That where such person, while receiving from the bureau medical, surgical, or hospital treatment, or vocational training, dies away from home and at the place to which he was ordered by the bureau, or while traveling under orders of the bureau, the above benefits shall be payable in all cases and in addition thereto the actual and necessary cost of the transportation of the body of the person (including preparation of the body) to the place of burial, within the continental limits of the United States, its Territories, or possessions, and including also, in the discretion of the director, the actual and necessary cost of transportation of an attendant: Provided further, That no accrued pension, compensation, or insurance due at the time of death shall be deducted from the sum allowed: Provided further, That the director may, in his discretion, make contracts for burial and funeral services within the limits of the amounts allowed herein without regard to the laws prescribing advertisement for proposals for supplies and services for the United States Veterans' Bureau: And provided further, That section 5, title 41, of the United States Code, shall not be applied to contracts for burial and funeral expenses heretofore entered into by the director so as to deny payment for services

rendered thereunder, and all suspensions of payment heretofore made in connection with such contracts are hereby removed, and any and all payments which are now or may hereafter become due on such contracts are hereby expressly authorized.

(3) The payment of compensation to or for a child shall continue until such child reaches the age of 18 years or married, or if such child be permanently incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical defect, then during such incapacity: Provided, That the payment of compensation shall be further continued after the age of 18 years and until completion of education or training, to any child who is or may hereafter be pursuing a course of instruction at a school, college, academy, seminary, technical institute, or university. particularly designated by him and approved by the director, which shall have agreed to report to the director the termination of attendance of such child, and if any such institution of learning fails to make such report promptly the approval shall be withdrawn: And provided further, That no compensation shall be paid to or for any child who reaches the age of 21 years.'

"SEC. 7. That the first paragraph of section 202, subdivision (7), of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 480, title 38, U. S. C.), be hereby amended to read as follows:

**(7). Where any disabled person having neither wife, child, nor dependent parent shall, after July 1, 1924, have been maintained by the Government of the United States for a period or periods amounting to six months in an institution or institutions, and shall be deemed by the director to be insane, the compensation for such person shall thereafter be $30 per month so long as he shall thereafter be maintained by the bureau in an institution; and such compensation may, in the discretion of the director, be paid to the chief officer of said institution to be used for the benefit of such person: Provided, however, That if such person shall recover his reason and shall be discharged from such institution as competent, such additional sum shall be paid him as would equal the total sum by which his compensation has been reduced through the provisions of this subsection.'

"SEC. 8. That section 202, subdivision 12, of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 486, title 38, U. S. C.), be hereby amended to read as follows:

"(12) Where the disabled person is a patient in a hospital, or where for any other reason the disabled person and his wife are not living together, or where the children are not in the custody of the disabled person, the amount of the compensation may be apportioned as may be prescribed by regulations.'

SEC. 9. That section 206 of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 495, title 38, U. S. C.), is hereby repealed.

"SEC. 10. That section 209 of the World War veterans' act, as amended (sec. 498, title 38, U. S. C.), is hereby repealed.

"SEC. 11. That section 212 of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 422, title 38, U. S. C.), be amended by adding thereto the following proviso:

"Provided, further, That where the widow, child, or children, of a deceased veteran are entitled to compensation by virtue of an accrued right under the war risk insurance act, as amended, the rates of compensation shall be the same as those provided by section 201 of this act.'

"SEC. 12. That section 300 of the World War veterans' act, 1924, as amended (sec. 511, title 38, U. S. C.), be hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 300. In order to give to every commissioned officer and enlisted man and to every member of the Army Nurse Corps (female) and of the Navy Nurse Corps (female) when employed in active service under the War Department or Navy Department protection for themselves and their dependents, the United States, upon application to the bureau and without medical examination, shall grant United States Government life insurance (converted insurance) against the death or total permanent disability of any such person in any multiple of $500, and not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000 upon the payment of the premiums as hereinafter provided. Such insurance must be applied for within 120 days after enlistment or after entrance into or employment in the active service and before discharge or resignation: Provided, That any member of the reserve forces whose application was accepted at a time when he was in attendance at a military or naval training camp or station, and from whom premiums were collected, and who becomes or has become totally and permanently disabled, or dies or has died, shall be deemed to have made valid application therefor. This proviso shall not authorize the granting of more than $10,000 insurance to any one person: Provided further, That each officer and enlisted man of the Coast Guard who is serving on active duty at the time of the passage of this amendatory act, or who subsequent thereto enters the Coast Guard Service, shall be granted insurance in accordance with the terms of this section upon application within 120 days of the passage of this amendatory act, or date of enlistment or entry into the Coast Guard, whichever is the later date, and before retirement, discharge, or resignation.

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