Therefore in case of Congress failing to act in the future, if this bill becomes a law, the certificate from the Secretary of Commerce will make the apportionment of the Representatives among the people. If Congress does not act, as it may not in that future decade, as it has not in this decade, the certificate of the Secretary is final and can not be challenged, even for error or mistakes, because the bill says "each State shall be entitled," and so forth.

It is my honest and deliberate judgment, gentlemen, that among those who support this bill to-day, should it become a law, will be men who will live to see the time in which they will give serious consideration to the errors of this legislation. If Congress will not act on the matter before the passage, time will some day prove it will not act after its passage. Then what will you have? Why, sirs, you will have instead of Democratic and Republican Representatives of the people, jointly apportioning among the people of the various States the number of Representatives to which they are entitled-you will have one man doing it, a member of the President's Cabinet, more or less under presidential influence and guidance.

If this bill should pass and become a law, it would be an effort on the part of the present Congress laying down a regulation to govern, bind, and hamper the action of future Congresses. It is said by some who favor this legislation that if a future Congress does not wish to abide by and follow the directions and restrictions of this bill, if it should become a law, the future Congress could repeal it. That is true. It could be repealed, but as the present Congress will not be bound or required to act under this law, if it becomes such, why should we force its provisions upon a future Congress? Future Congresses can meet the question when it gets to them, and besides it is considerably more difficult to repeal a law once it is written into the statutes than it is to enact a law in the first instance.

The Constitution in its present form has vested in the Congress of the United States to make the apportionment of the people's representatives among the various States, and I believe it is much better that Congress should function under the present condition of the Constitution than it is to vest even a conditional power in one man. I do not believe the different States of this Union and the people therein are willing to leave it to one man to say how many Congressmen they should have from their State, and especially when that one man is a member of the President's Cabinet.

If this bill should become a law, we might in the future find ourselves in a position after complications had arisen as I have heretofore pointed out, in which the election of the President of the United States might be contested so closely that it would be thrown into the House of Representatives to be settled and decided. Then if it devolved upon the Secretary of Commerce, a member of the President's Cabinet, to fix the number of Representatives each State should have, there is even a possibility that that representation might be so handled that the Secretary of Commerce could by his certificate increase the power of representation in some States or diminish it in others, whereby even the election of the President succeeding might devolve upon the action of the Secretary of Commerce.

That is putting the power too far away from the people and too close to the head of the Government. In these days we have greater difficulty in preserving the rights of the individual citizen and we should always be slow in taking the power away from the people and transferring it into the bureaus and into individual hands.

It is apparent to anyone conversant with the present conditions existing in this country that there is a very rapid drifting of power and population into the large cities of our country and away from the rural sections and agricultural people. The rural sections of the country already have too little power and influence and too small a number of Representatives for the most efficient work of the Federal Government as compared to the large cities and big industrial centers.

Thomas Jefferson, in my opinion the greatest statesman and most farseeing statesman the world has ever produced, never ceased to praise the rural sections of our country, and that particularly devoted to agriculture, as the one the most moral and ennobling. On one occasion he expressed himself to Mr. Madison by saying:

I think our Government will remain virtuous for many centuries as long as the people are chiefly agricultural, and this will be as long as there shall be vacant land in America. When they (meaning the people) get piled up on one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe.

I wish to call your attention to this fact, that the Constitution in its present form in providing for the apportionment

of Representatives in Congress to the several States takes into consideration the whole and entire population of the United States, excluding Indians not taxed; and that, without regard to whether the population consists of American citizens or people of foreign birth who are not yet naturalized.

In some of the large industrial sections, and particularly in the East, there are now in some localities as many, and in some instances more, people of foreign birth than there are nativeborn American citizens. And this bill, if permitted to become a law, is transferring more power by providing for an increased membership in many of these localities, and correspondingly it is lessening the comparative strength of many sections of the country where 90 or more per cent of the people are nativeborn Americans. So, in effect, the bill, if enacted into law, would have a tendency to take away from some States that are populated with a highly American citizenship and add to the States more power and strength in which there are a much higher percentage of people of foreign birth.

But while the Constitution fixes the basis of representation upon population, nevertheless this is the way the present bill would work if enacted into law.

It must be remembered that the census that was taken in 1920 was probably the most unfair and incomplete census that has ever been taken in the United States. It has been the custom of the Government in taking its census or enumeration of the population of the United States every 10 years, from the foundation of the Government to the present time, to take the census in the summer months, usually along about June, but the census of 1920, for some reason, departed from that praetice and the census was taken for the first time in the month of January. This gave the large centers of population a great advantage over the rural sections of the country in ascertaining the number of people in the particular localities.

In the month of January the weather was extremely cold in 1920. The roads were exceedingly bad and where census enumerators in the more thinly settled States had to go over rough roads in cold weather to enumerate the population there was much less likelihood of getting an accurate and full list of all the people in such sections than there was in the cities and larger centers of population.

During the World War a great many people left the rural sections and went into the industrial sections to work, and while the war had ended when the last census was taken, a great many of these people who were really only temporarily away from their former homes had not yet returned, as they have since that time, to their former and real home residence.

The entire country will be more settled in 1930 and it is only reasonable to expect that a more complete census will be had. And a striking and remarkable fact is disclosed by the operation of the provision in this bill, which is expected to work out under the major-fraction proposition, while in the State of Arkansas under the equal-proportion proposition would give that State seven delegates, the major-fraction proposition contemplated by this legislation would give Arkansas only six. At the same time the equal-proportion proposition would give the State of New York 42 Members and the major-fraction proposition would give this same State 43, and this is also true, as it is admitted by some who advocate the passage of this bill as between other large and small States; that is, that the majorfraction proposition would increase proportionately membership in the large States and decrease it in the small ones.

By the major-fraction proposition my own State of Missouri would lose 4 Members of Congress from that State, and while the bill provides for the membership of the House to remain at the same number, to wit, 435, if this bill should pass it would mean that Missouri would have 4 less Representatives in Congress and those 4 Representatives would be placed to the credit of some other States.

I am confident a more complete census will be had in 1930, and in my judgment it will show that Missouri is not entitled to lose that membership to some other States. Certainly I think it would not lose that many. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. FENN. Mr. Chairman, I yield three minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. FREE].

Mr. FREE. Mr. Chairman, Article VI, clause 3, of the Constitution of the United States provides:

The Senators and Representatives shall be bound by oath or affirination to support this Constitution.

We have all taken such an oath.

Section 2 of amendment 14 to the Constitution of the United States provides:

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons

in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States. Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being 21 years of age, and citizens of the United States or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the whole number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 21 years of age in such State.

Article I, section 2, clause 3, of our Constitution provides: The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of 10 years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. Unless we observe our oath by carrying out the provisions of our Constitution, we not only violate our oath but in reality become violators of our fundamental law.

Our system of government is based on the principle of proportionate representation in the House of Representatives. Unless we conform to the dictates of our Constitution, we are in reality breaking down our system of government.

It is not right to deny any State the representation to which it is entitled.

Nearly 18 years have passed since we have had reapportionment. This means that several States have for nearly 8 years been denied the representation to which they are entitled. My State, California, is an example.

Under the Constitution, California has been entitled to at least three more Representatives than it has had.

Not only has our State been denied representation to which it is entitled, but an additional burden has been put upon the Representatives from that and other States similarly affected.

Some Members from our State represent over 1,000,000 people, and nearly every Member is representing many more people than they should on any basis of reapportionment.

Industries requiring legislative attention increase with population. as do also the problems of internal development, such as river and harbor development.

The mere matter of answering communications from constituents adds greatly to the work of a Member as population in his district increases.

It is not fair to the Members in districts where population has materially increased to place these additional burdens upon them merely because other districts have not had such increases, nor is it fair for States lacking population to deny to States with increased population the representatives to which entitled and which means in reality denying several States votes on legislation to which they are entitled.

The Fourteenth Census of population was taken as of January 1. 1920, and the Director of the Census submitted the figures of the total population of the United States to Congress on October 7, 1920.

During the Sixty-sixth Congress, third session, the Committee on the Census reported H. R. 14498, a bill providing that after the 3d day of March, 1923, the House of Representatives shall be composed of 483 Members. Under this appor

tionment no State would have lost a Member.

This bill as amended, providing for a House of 435 Members, passed the House on January 19, 1921, but the Senate failed to act upon it before the close of the session.

During the Sixty-seventh Congress, first session, the Committee on the Census reported H. R. 7882, a bill providing that after the 3d day of March, 1923, the House of Representatives shall be composed of 460 Members. Under this bill Maine and Missouri each would have lost a Member. An effort to amend this bill to read 435 failed. A motion to recommit this bill to the committee was agreed to by a margin of four votes, and no further action was taken by the committee.

The Committee on the Census did not report a bill during the Sixty-eighth Congress.

1

tion, and will give some time for the States to work upon plans for redistricting the several districts.

Let us hope that this will appeal to the fairness and broadmindedness of our Members. May fairness and not selfishness prevail. [Applause. [

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I have but one more speech, and I ask the gentleman from Connecticut to use some of his time.

Mr. FENN. Mr. Chairman, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEA].

Mr. LEA. Mr. Chairman, the basis of representation in the Congress was one of the greatest and most practical of the problems of the Constitutional Convention. The adopted basis of representation was a compromise, which largely contributed · to the ratification of the Constitution. Only by the constitutional assurance of equal representation in the House according to population, were the States induced to become integral parts of the Federal Government. As a distinct concession to the small States, the Constitution provides that each State shall have equal representation in the Senate. Ten large States now have half the population of the United States, with 20 representatives in the Senate: 38 States, having the other half of the population, have 76 representatives in the Senate. Inasmuch as presidential electors are granted the States on the basis of their representation in Congress, the small States, representing half the population, have 56 more electoral votes than the 10 large States having the other half of the population. Representation in the House was provided for by giving each State at least one Representative and representation otherwise in proportion to its population. In other words, for all practical purposes each State is given representation in the House of Representatives by the Constitution of the United States on an exact equality, founded upon a mathematical certainty.

The Constitution provides for the census to be taken within every 10-year period, "in such manner as" the Congress shall by law direct.

These provisions of the Constitution recognized the certainty of the increase of population and the inevitable changes in the distribution of the population. No unchangeable apportionment of representation was possible. without destroying that equality of representation, according to population, that was deemed essential to the success of our representative form of governThe Constitution, therefore, trusted the Congress with the duty of readjusting representation to population for each 10-year period. It left the Congress no discretion, however, as to the basis of what that representation should be. Representation was to be in proportion to the population of the respective States.

ment.

Under these provisions the Congress was in substance given a discretion only as to two matters. The first was that the Congress could determine the number of Members who should constitute the House of Representatives. In the second place the Congress was given the power to determine the manner of taking the census by which the population is determined.

No question is raised here as to the manner of taking the census. Congress can readily agree upon that question.

Disregarding contentious trivialties, this bill presents but one substantial question, and that is whether or not we shall limit the House to a membership of 435, the present number. Members in favor of increasing the membership of the House have a legitimate reason for voting against this bill. In my judgment there is no substantial reason why a man who believes in confining the membership to 435 should not vote for the bill. At the end of each decade, with the exception of the last one, Congress functioned by reapportioning as provided by the Constitution. In each case, with one exception, however, the membership of the House was increased, primarily, perhaps, to avoid reducing the representation of States which would otherwise lose Representatives by reason of their failure to increase population as rapidly as the average of the country. As a result Congress has been a constantly increasing body. From a membership of 65 it has increased to 435. Following the census of 1920, Congress failed to reapportion, partly because of opposibecause of the opposition from States that would lose representation on reapportionment.

On March 3, 1927, a motion was made to suspend the rules and pass H. R. 17378, a bill providing that after the 3d day of March, 1933, the House of Representatives shall be composed of 435 Members, but this motion was defeated by a vote of 187 yeas and 199 nays.

While this legislation will not become effective until after the 1930 census, yet it will be a guarantee that the Congress does not intend to openly violate the provisions of our Constitu

In previous decades this same conflict resulted in a compromise by providing an increased membership of the House. Most of the slow-growing States retained their existing number of Representatives, and increased numbers were given to the more rapidly growing States. The feeling is now general that an increase of the membership of the House would impair the efficiency and usefulness of this body, which is already cumbersomely large. Hence we have stronger opposition to the increase of the membership of the House which was the

means by which former controversies of this kind were settled. The disparity between population and representation between the different States will become more pronounced the longer reapportionment is delayed. Reapportionment in the face of the census of 1930 will probably be more difficult than it would have been 10 years earlier.

Under the periodic plan by specific action of Congress, reapportionment is made under pressure of States which would gain or lose representation by reapportionment and the opposing pressure against enlarged membership of the House. Such a controversy involves the interest of individual Members of Congress rather than the welfare of any State or the country at large. It is of no particular benefit to any State to enlarge its representation if the representation of other States is proportionately enlarged. Any constitutional apportionment will be based on equality according to population. Whether the membership of the House is increased or decreased the relative strength of the State remains the same. Granting that the membership of the House is large enough, the only benefit of an increase of membership accrues to individual Members who would otherwise lose their seats. The relative strength of the State would remain the same. While we all have a friendly regard for the individual welfare of our colleagues that should not be a dominating reason for determining the important question of State representation in Congress.

The bill presented to Congress, if placed in operation, would largely eliminate the importance of the personal and political considerations that have heretofore embarrassed Congress in making a constitutional reapportionment. The whole history of reapportionment justifies the plan of automatic reapportionment provided by this bill in preference to the periodic plan heretofore followed.

The bill pending before the House does not propose to reapportion on a basis of the census of 1920, but instead proposes a plan under which, should Congress fail to act within a given time after the census of 1930 and subsequent censuses, reapportionment shall take place automatically. In its substantial features the bill does these things:

First. Fixes the House membership at 435 permanently, or until Congress shall provide otherwise.

Second. Prescribes the mathematical rule under which the representation shall be apportioned to the States. This rule is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, based on equality of representation.

Third. Requires the Secretary of Commerce, under whose direction the census is taken, to certify to Congress the number of Representatives to which each State shall be so entitled under that rule of computation that Congress prescribes.

It must be conceded that whatever may have been the duty of Congress following the census of 1920, there is no constitutional duty of Congress at the present time to reapportion on the 1930 census. That does not become a constitutional duty until after the 1930 census is taken. However, Congress has a right that can not be successfully questioned to provide for reapportionment in advance of the census. This bill simply provides a sensible and just means of reapportionment that would be effective if Congress fails to act after the next census is taken.

Since 1920 a number of States have been denied the increased representation to which they were entitled under the Constitution. A number of other States have had a representation in excess of that to which they were entitled. This inequality of representation as between the States is a political inequality and injustice that can not be viewed without just concern. The States that for six years have been denied that representation to which they were entitled would, by the enactment of this bill, be assured that they would not, after the next census, continue to be denied that constitutional representation to which they are entitled.

It has been persistently asserted that this bill is an attempt to confer discretionary powers of Congress upon an administrative body, and that it would therefore be an invasion of the constitutional powers of Congress. This contention is without any substantial foundation. The duties conferred on the administrative department are only ministerial. The duties consist merely of a mathematical calculation based upon a formula that Congress itself adopts in this bill. The duty assigned to the Secretary of Commerce involves no congressional discretion. There are literally a thousand instances in which Congress has conferred comparable duties with its right to do so unquestioned.

This bill gives Congress its opportunity to perform its constitutional function by providing in advance for reapportionment under the census of 1930. Its enactment into law would provide a permanent system for reapportionment on the basis prescribed by the Constitution. Its passage would give assurance to all States in the country that just representation would

not be denied them; enactment of this measure would afford a strong protection against the recurring exercise of that political pressure which heretofore has been almost universally successful in forcing a material increase in the membership of Congress at the end of each decade. The bill offers no injustice or inequity to any State or section. Debate on this bill has made this fact remarkably evident. You have heard many speak in opposition. You have heard no speaker point out where this bill, if it became a law, would work any injustice to his State. It provides adequate representation for every State on the fair basis established by the Constitution. No speaker even asserts that this bill proposes to deprive his State of that equal and just representation to which it is entitled under the Constitution. Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield three minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CoCHRAN].

Mr. COCHRAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I find myself in the same position as the distinguished gentleman from Iowa [Mr. RAMSEYER], that when Congress provides for reapportionment, provided it is on the basis of a membership in this House of 435, there is absolutely no chance for me to be reelected. Despite this, however, I agree with the gentleman from Iowa that the membership should not be increased, and I stand ready to carry out the provisions of the Constitution whenever you see fit to bring in a bill properly reapportioning the Members of Congress among the various States.

I place myself on record now as being opposed to increasing the membership of the House and propose to vote to retain the present membership 435.

I can not agree with my colleague Mr. LOZIER, who tells of the House of Lords and House of Commons and shows that the membership of both of those bodies is nearly double that of the lower branch of the American Congress, and advances his opinion why the American Congress, or at least the House, should increase its membership. Instead of being impressed, this argument to me was rather a good one why the United States Congress should remain as it is. According to the report of the committee, 13,000,000 people are now without fair and equitable representation. Where do these 13,000,000 people reside? You know they are in the cities, and the gentlemen from the rural districts know there will be a decrease in their number if you pass a reapportionment bill leaving the membership of the House as it is to-day.

Since 1790 the Congress has complied with the provisions of the Constitution and provided for reapportionment on the basis of population, with the exception of the 1920 census. In each instance the law was passed either in the year the census was taken or the first or second year thereafter; never later. Members of this House rise in their seats time and again and speak of those who they assert nullify the Constitution. Where are the champions of the Constitution now?

Missouri, part of which I have the honor to represent, is going to lose from one to four Members when you reapportion. No one regrets this more than I do; but as a Member of Congress I have a duty to perform, and when you bring in a real reapportionment bill and not a bill where you "pass the buck" you will find me supporting it, although by so doing I will be voting myself out of a seat in this body.

My colleague Mr. LOZIER speaks of the date upon which the next census will be taken. He advocates the late spring or early summer. Fine for the rural districts, when the farms are covered with labor secured from the cities and the city vacationists are sojourning on the farms. These people, who prop erly should be listed as residents of the cities, will be credited to the rural communities. The census, so far as population is concerned, should be taken January 1, as it was in 1920.

As the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. WILLIAMS] says, no future Congress will be bound by the action you now take. As the report well states, it is anticipatory legislation. Its sole purpose is not to reapportion but to meet an emergency, provided it develops in 1930 after the census has been taken.

Under the terms of this bill you delegate authority vested in Congress by the Constitution to an executive branch of the Government. To this I am opposed.

Every Congress since the 1920 census was taken has shirked its responsibility on this question. If the incoming Congress assumes the same attitude, the responsibility is theirs, and it is not for us to tell them what they should do, but if action is demanded it is for this Congress to do it now. I am opposed to any attempt to permit the executive branch of the Government to assume the duties of the legislative branch. It is for this reason alone I oppose this bill.

The 13,000,000 people in the cities now deprived of proper representation are demanding that a proper reapportionment bill be passed, and when the time comes, if it ever comes during my service, when an opportunity to vote on the direct question is before me, regardless of its effect on me personally I will

support the bill, provided it does not increase the membership of the House. [Applause.]

Mr. FENN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from California [Mr. BARBOUR]. [Applause.] Mr. BARBOUR. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to take much time to discuss this bill. I feel at this time that the House has heard about all of the debate it cares to hear and that further discussion will not change a single vote one way or the other. There are one or two matters in connection with the discussion of the bill that I want to touch upon. A question was raised in the debate yesterday as to who was responsible for our having no apportionment legislation passed prior to this time. The statement was made that when the bill was brought in in the Sixty-seventh Congress providing for reapportionment on the basis of 460 Members a motion to recommit the bill without instructions was supported by Representatives from Michigan, California, and other States, who have since favored reapportionment. Therefore, it was charged that the Representatives from California and from Michigan were responsible for having no apportionment bill passed since that time. I think that charge is immaterial and irrelevant to the question before the House at this time, has no bearing on the question, and is of no importance anyway. The fact of the matter is this: When the bill providing for apportionment on the basis of 460 Members was brought in in the Sixty-seventh Congress those who felt that 435 was a large enough number for this House voted to recommit that bill, and it went back to the committee in the Sixty-seventh Congress. We had a right to assume and did assume that when the House went on record as favoring 435 Members the committee would report back a bill providing for a membership of 435.

Mr. LOZIER rose.

Mr. BARBOUR. No; I can not yield at this time. But it was not done, and even though the recommittal of that bill was responsible for no bill coming out again in the Sixty-seventh Congress we have since had the Sixty-eighth Congress and the Sixty-ninth Congress with no bills reported out, and the Census Committee absolutely refusing to report out apportionment bills in those Congresses. The members of the committee will recall that in the Sixty-ninth Congress several Members of the House of Representatives went before that committee and urged them to report out an apportionment bill. I took the position at that time before the committee that they should report out an apportionment bill of some kind whether it provided for 435 Members or 460 or 500, so that the House could pass upon the question; that the committee had no right to refuse to permit a bill to come before the House and have the House act upon it.

Another question that has been raised in connection with this discussion is whether or not the provisions of the Constitution with regard to apportionment are mandatory. I take the position that the provisions of the Constitution are absolutely mandatory. Article I of the Constitution provides that Representatives and direct taxes "shall" be apportioned among the States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers.

It is also provided that the enumeration "shall" be taken each 10 years.

Representatives "shall" be apportioned among the various

States.

If those provisions of the Constitution are not mandatory, then they are meaningless. The only purpose of taking the census every 10 years is to determine the population of the country, so that representation can be properly adjusted and based upon the population as it exists at that time. If those provisions of the Constitution are not mandatory, they are meaningless, and all of the authority that we have upon these provisions of the Constitution is to the effect that they are mandatory. We have the positive, direct rulings of two Speakers of this House to the effect that these provisions are mandatory. That is the language used by two Speakers of this House, Speakers Kiefer and Henderson, and concurred in by other Speakers of the House. It is the duty of Congress to apportion within a reasonable time following the taking of the census. For the past eight years Congress has failed to perform that duty. Opponents of apportionment during that period have taken two positions. Some of them have favored an increase in the membership of the House and would not vote for a bill unless it provided for an increase, yet each time that the House of Representatives has gone on record since the census of 1920 it has declared against a House larger than 435 Members. Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BARBOUR. Let me finish, and then if I have time I shall be glad to yield. It has been contended that the census of 1920 was taken during abnormal times, that it was taken immediately following the war, that there had been a drift

from the rural districts to the industrial districts during the war, and that that drift had turned back. Assuming that to be true, this bill proposes to make an apportionment upon the basis of the census of 1930, when times will be normal in this country if they are ever normal. The census will be taken after the 1st day of May, when the conditions complained of by the opponents of this legislation as having existed in 1920 in respect to the rural population will not further exist.

As things stand at the present time, there exists in this country inequalities in representation in this House that are absolutely unfair, unjustified, and unwarranted. We have one State in this Union with a larger population than another State, yet the State with the smaller population sits in this House with five Representatives more than the State with the larger population, based on the census of 1920.

That State with the smaller population has five more members of the Electoral College than the State with the larger population. We have a State with a population, according to the figures of 1920, of 1.000.000 more than each of two other States, and yet each of those two other States sit in this House with the same number of Representatives as the State with a million more population than either of those States. That is a condition that can not be justified for any reason whatsoever. It is absolutely un-American; it is entirely foreign to the provisions of our Constitution. This condition can not continue to exist. Those who are the strongest opponents of apportionment are willing to admit that this condition must be remedied some time. When will it be remedied? This bill simply proposes that if Congress does not act within a reasonable time after the returns from the 1930 census are available, during the first Congress that follows the reporting of the returns of the 1930 census, then the Bureau of the Census, on a basis of 435 Members, shall certify to the Clerk of the House how many Representatives each State is entitled to.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired. All time has expired for general debate, and the Clerk will read the bill.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That as soon as practicable after the fifteenth and each subsequent decennial census the Secretary of Commerce shall transmit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed, as ascertained under such census, and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled under an apportionment of 435 Representatives made in the following manner: By apportioning one Representative to each State (as required by the Constitution) and by apportioning the remainder of the 435 Representatives among the several States according to their respective numbers as shown by such census, by the method known as the method of major fractions.

Mr. TILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Connecticut moves to strike out the last word.

Mr. TILSON. Mr. Chairman, the failure to reapportion according to the population of this country is in effect an attack on representative free government itself. If this refusal to reapportion in accordance with the intent and spirit of the Constitution should be persisted in long enough to produce gross inequalities like those, for instance, in Great Britain, which brought about the revolution resulting in the reform act of 1832, it might be necessary for us also to undergo a revolution that would involve us in sectional strife and possible bloodshed in order to return to the basis which was provided in the Constitution of representative government according to population.

Stripped of all camouflage, opposition to this bill must at last rest upon one of two propositions; either that we do not wish to reapportion at all, or that in case we should reapportion we make the membership of this House large enough so that no State would lose a Representative.

I do not believe that we should agree to either of these propositions, and yet this, in my judgment, is where failure to pass a bill like this will land us.

What does this bill propose to do? It proposes that after the census is taken in 1930 and is reported to Congress the Congress shall proceed in the short session of the Seventy-first Congressthat is, in 1930-31-to make a reapportionment in accordance with the returns of the census. If the Congress then in existence shall do its full duty, then this bill if enacted into law will be of no effect. It will be the duty of that Congress to make the reapportionment without reference to such law. This bill, if enacted into law, in no wise affects that duty. In fact, it would call attention to that duty specifically, because it says in effect that in case that Congress shall fail to perform its duty the population as ascertained by the 1930 census shall then be apportioned upon the basis of 435 Members.