To begin with, the Italian states did not develop their system of international relations in the early period as far as did the Greeks. The Italian states were much more elementary. They attempted, it is true, to combine in confederations for defense against attack. Rome herself appears as a member of the Latin League, of some thirty cities, united on a semi-religious basis.1 But these unions were very simple in comparison with the Greek leagues, and they did not succeed in resisting Rome herself for any length of time.2 Athens and Sparta had met greater resistance from rival leagues and confederations. In the end the Italian states were conquered and subjected to Roman dominion. This process was applied, successively, to the Latin League itself, to other coalitions in Italy,3 and to the independent states in the Western Mediterranean outside of Italy. Rome now-in the first half of the second century B.C.5-extended her sway over the remnants of the Macedonian Empire outside of Greece proper. Unable to assist each other in any way, Italy, Spain, Carthage, Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia fell into the new empire. Finally, as we have seen, the Greek states constituted a fitting sacrifice, in 146, to signalize the eclipse of independent national statehood in antiquity and the advent of world empire. For five hundred years the Roman Empire stood fast in its power and majesty, and for that period the state-system was exceedingly simple. One world state had swallowed up the multitude of independent states and blotted out the attempts at international federation. Gaul, Asia Minor, Britain, and many outlying areas were added to the Empire. From Gibraltar to the Syrian desert, from the hot 1 Frank, 4, 13-17; Hart, § 22; Phillipson, II, 33-42. 'Frank, Chaps. II, II. Date: 266 B.C.; Hart, §§ 21, 23; Shepherd, 29. Spain: 205 B.C.; Carthage: 238, 201, 146 B.C.; Pelham, 114-139. 'Syria: 190; Egypt: 181; Macedon: 168 B.C.; Pelham, 140-152; Shepherd, 33. Shepherd, 34-35; 42-43. wastes of the Sahara to the ice and snow of the Baltic there prevailed one system of law and one official religion, there was felt the power of one imperial city.1 Governor and priest and even god, the Emperor had supplanted free consent as the basis of national authority, and there were no more national states, but a world empire.2 World unity had been attained by the suppression of state independence. During this period some measure of authority was delegated to what before had been independent nations. But the basis of authority was merely the discretion of the imperial master,3 and interstate diplomacy became constitutional government, not international practice. Emissaries from the imperial Senate were governmental agents assuming diplomatic guise for tactical reasons. Free interstate life was dead. Likewise, such cosmopolitan unity as was attained under Rome was largely counterfeit. The unity of religion, of speech, of manners, so far as it came about at all, was not altogether a spontaneous growth, gradual and slow, and taking origin in the life of the people itself, but was in large part a servile imitation of the capital city or obedience to imperial commands." Peace and unity obtained, to a large extent; but it was the peace and order of subjection, not of natural repose. It was the peace and order of dishonor. For these very reasons, if for no others, the maintenance of the fabric of empire depended upon control from Rome. When, therefore, the heart and mind of Rome gave way, toward the end of the fourth Christian century, the nations tended to drop out of the picture into their natural places. The stones of the mosaic stood in their places dissevered, as the substance which had bound them dissolved and disappeared. Before this process was completed, however, those Bryce, 5-7; Fowler, 323-331; Hill, I, 1-3, 15. 'Greenidge, 252; Hill, I, 3-7, 12-15; Walker, §§ 36, 37. Bouché-Leclerq, 105, 196, 202. * Hill, I, 18. in power in the Empire made a last attempt to preserve the structure by dividing the government into two parts, Eastern and Western, seated at Rome and Constantinople. What could not be saved as a whole was to be saved in parts. In so far as this step was successful, the condition of the state-system was not changed and the step itself would deserve no special attention. In point of fact, the effort ultimately failed. The Empire was finally divided in 395 A.D., at the death of the Emperor Theodosius, only to fall prey to still greater anarchy. The process was not unlike that which took place in the Alexandrian empire after 323 B.C. And once more, as at that time, it seemed possible that independent national states would regain the stage. After seven centuries of submergence in empire, the nations might reorganize the European state-system on its earlier lines. Such was the situation when the ancient period closed. The political map of Europe showed the result of a thousand years of state practice at least in this, that either independent nations or autocratic empire might then reasonably count upon mastery. CHAPTER III MEDIEVAL STATE-SYSTEMS HE definitive formation of the European state-system was, however, delayed again, after the disintegration of the Roman Empire, for another thousand years. Not until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did the national state regain the center of the stage. For this there were two principal causes. First, powerful attempts were made to renew and to recreate imperial states on the plan of Macedon and Rome, and, second, the political organizations which actually developed in the various parts of Europe were not able to act as free and independent states. The obstacles to the formation of a system of national states were, chiefly, the medieval empire on one hand and the feudal state on the other. As a result, Europe from 395 to 1453 displayed not so much a coherent system of states and a system of international organization and practice as the lack of both. The period is instructive because of the fact that in its records can be studied all of the elements which tend to destroy or render ineffectual international organization. By contrast, it throws light on the character of the state-system of our own day. And out of it actually came, at the end, the modern national state. The break-up of the Roman Empire was attended by two sharply contrasted events. On the one hand, new national forces invaded the Empire from the North, and, on the other, the Church of Rome attempted to uphold the theory of imperial unity throughout Western Europe. The barbarian invasions led to feudalism and the development of the feudal states, and the feudal states developed later into the national states of modern Europe. But before that process could be completed the other force, the imperial idea, the heritage of Rome, had also played its part.1 From the fourth to the fourteenth century the idea of universal empire almost completely dominated formal European political thought.2 There were other elements in the actual experiences of men, but the theory of the state was largely a theory of empire. This is traceable to very definite causes, and the power of the imperial idea in Europe to the time of the Renaissance must be sought in those causes. The prestige of imperial Rome lingered in men's minds. The contemporary situation was felt to be an interruption, a temporary accident in the natural course or condition of things. Five centuries of Roman power dominated men's memories.3 Moreover, the Roman imperial religion, now Christian, remained to perpetuate the idea of world unity. Life had disintegrated and collapsed on the material side, but the spiritual realm was comparatively untroubled. The idea of unity gained power as the physical fact of unity disappeared. At once a consolation for and a bold defiance of the actual world roundabout, the evangel of the unity of the faith was of peculiar power in the troubled times after 395.* Finally, the greatest chaos was felt in the realm of politics and law, and the doctrine of empire attacked this problem on its own ground. The nature of the world's trouble and the source of its distress was felt to be political disorganization. Obviously, the remedy lay in rebuilding the fabric of Augustus and the Cæsars. These forces found several distinct manifestations. 1 Fisher, I, Chap. I; Hartung, entire. Bryce, Chap. V; Carlyle, III, 170-171; Hartung, as cited; for contrary view see Carlyle, III, 178-180; Thorndike, v. 'Bryce, 89-90, 102, 273-274. Bryce, 31, 93-97, 100; Hill, I, 92; Walker, § 42. Bryce, 96-97; Gierke, 95-96. |