Here, again, McKinley showed his force of character and indomitable will-power. He asked the privilege of carrying away these guns, thus saving them from the enemy. It did not, with the exhausted condition of our men, seem practicable, yet he insisted it could be done, and he thought his regiment, the Twentythird, would gladly aid him. Hayes, with a smile, said: 'Well, McKinley, ask them.' Going first to his old company (E), he called for volunteers; all stepped out to a man, and, the infection. spreading, soon the whole regiment took hold of these guns and caissons and hauled them off in triumphal procession. When we went into camp.that night long after dark, this artillery captain was found and the guns were turned over to him. He cried like a baby. "Now this fearful day was over, and in a drizzling rain, dinnerless and supperless, we wound ourselves in our blankets and slept soundly until morning. "Our losses were very heavy. Hayes' little brigade of 1,700 men alone lost one-fourth of its number in killed and wounded, and most of the wounded were left in the enemy's hands. The balance of the command lost in nearly the same proportion. The cause of the disaster was simply that we were outnumbered three to one, and the surprise is that we were not all captured, as General Early anticipated. "Considerable effort was made at that time to impugn the bravery of Crook's Eighth Corps in this disaster, but a noted and unbiased historian has said the following, which I quote with much pleasure: "Crook's troops had campaigned too well at Floyd's Mountain and during Hunter's march to Lynchburg to be disgraced by this encounter; and while some of them, chiefly the recent additions, had proved of little value, it must be remembered that whatever efforts had been made to challenge Early's retreat from Washington were the work of this command. Their defeat was not strange, for the force soon after assembled in the valley as needful to match Early was thrice Crook's at Kernstown.' M CHAPTER VI From Captain to Major cKINLEY'S gallantry at Kernstown was rewarded by his being raised to the rank of captain, his commission dating from July 25th, the day after the battle. On the succeeding day the command began a series of marches and countermarches in the Shenandoah Valley. These were continued until the middle of August, fighting occurring whenever the enemy could be reached. The campaigns in the valley, which were described in the last chapter, were by no means satisfactory to General Grant. They had so far proved a series of misadventures which were far from acceptable to one accustomed, like himself, to rarely interrupted victory. He was now at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, far away to the south, and found communication with Washington far from certain, the lines being often broken. This fact rendered the presence in the valley of some capable leader, who could be trusted to give a good account of himself, indispensable. The politics of the Administration were then directed by Secretary Stanton, whose judgment was influenced by the effect which military operations were likely to have upon the approaching elections, a line of policy which did not appeal to General Grant. Stanton particularly dreaded a defeat of the Union forces in the valley and the possible capture of Washington by the Confed The effect of this mingling of politics with military affairs was to hamper General Hunter to such an extent that he was rendered unable of giving Early a crushing blow should an oppərtunity arise. General Grant, growing more and more dissatisfied, decided during the first week in August to go to Washington himself and see if the state of affairs in the valley could not be radically changed. He was quite tired of the game of retreat and pursuit which Hunter and Early had been so long playing. Since the war began, this region had been the scene of incessant movements by the hostile forces, the Union troops now advancing, now retreating, but the advantage always remaining on the side of the Confederates. No less than four commanders, Banks, Shields, Siegel and Hunter, had succeeded each other in this region, and all had failed in effort to hold the valley and prevent the Confederate raids; and what was equally unsatisfactory was the fact that the fertile fields of the Shenandoah were constantly furnishing food for Lee's army. General Grant saw but one way to put an end to this, which was to put his best fighting general in command of that section. With this view President Lincoln strongly sided. Grant's choice for the position was General Sheridan, who had added greatly to his renown by his performances as chief of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac in the recent campaign. Grant's confidence in Sheridan was not shared by the authorities at Washington, largely on account of his youth, and it may be with some fear that he might be too headstrong for a commander on whom so much depended. His method of driving straight at the enemy was one which would seem to have in it an element of rashness. MCKINLEY SERVES UNDER GENERAL SHERIDAN The result of the conference was that the various military departments around Washington were consolidated into what was known as the Middle Military Division, Sheridan being appointed commander. Hunter retired to make way for the new chief. The advent of Sheridan to command in the valley proved especially happy, and rapidly made a change in the state of affairs. Without hesitation he advanced up the valley, Early at the same time drawing in his scattered commands and concentrating them along Opequan Creek. Here the armies encamped within watching |