same manner as if it had been originally commenced in the said Circuit Court; and if in any action commenced in a State court the title of land be concerned, and the parties are citizens of the same State, and the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $500, exclusive of costs, the sum or value being made to appear, one or more plaintiffs or defendants, before the trial, may state to the court and make affidavit, if the court require it, that he or they claim and shall rely upon a right or title to the land under grant from a State, and produce the original grant, or an exemplification of it, except where the loss of public records shall put it out of his or their power, and shall move that any one or more of the adverse party inform the court whether he or they claim a right or title to the land under a grant from some other State, the party or parties so required shall give such information, or otherwise not be allowed to plead such grant, or give it in evidence upon the trial; and if he or they inform that he or they do claim under such grant, any one or more of the party moving for such information may then, on petition and bond as herein before mentioned in this act, remove the cause for trial to the Circuit Court of the United States next to be holden in such district; and any one of either party removing the cause shall not be allowed to plead or give evidence of any other title than that by him or them stated as aforesaid as the ground of his or their claim; and trial of issues of fact in the Circuit Courts shall in all suits, except those of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, be by jury.

SEC. 4. That when any suit shall be removed from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States, any attachment or sequestration of the goods or estate of the defendant had in such suit in the State court shall hold the goods or estate so attached or sequestered to answer the final judgment or decree, in the same manner as by law they would have been held to answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by the court in which such suit was commenced; and all bonds, undertakings, or security given by either party in such suit prior to its removal, shall remain valid and effectual, notwithstanding said removal; and all injunctions, orders and other proceedings had in such suits prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the court to which such suit shall be removed.

SEC. 5. That if, in any suit commenced in a Circuit Court or removed from a State court to a Circuit Court of the United States it shall appear to the satisfaction of said Circuit Court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said Circuit Court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable under this act, the said Circuit Court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just; but the order of said Circuit Court dismissing or remanding said cause to the State court shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal, as the case may be. SEC. 6. That the Circuit Court of the United States shall, in all suits removed under the provisions of this act, proceed therein as if the suit had been originally commenced in said Circuit Court, and the same pro

ceedings had been taken in such suit in said Circuit Court as shall have been had therein in said State court prior to its removal.

SEC. 7. That in all causes removable under this act, if the term of the Circuit Court to which the same is removable then next to be holden shall commence within twenty days after filing the petition and bond in the State court for its removal, then he or they who apply to remove the same shall have twenty days from such application to file said copy of record in said Circuit Court and enter appearance therein; and if done within said twenty days, such filing and appearance shall be taken to satisfy the said bond in that behalf; that if the clerk of the State court in which any such cause shall be pending shall refuse to any one or more of the parties or persons applying to remove the same a copy of the record therein, after tender of legal fees for such copy, said clerk so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof in the Circuit Court of the United States, to which said action or proceeding was removed, shall be punished by imprisonment not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding $1,000, or both, in the discretion of the court. And the Circuit Court to which any cause shall be removable under this act shall have power to issue a writ of certiorari to said State court commanding said State court to make return of the record in any such causes removed as aforesaid, or in which any one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants have complied with the provisions of this act for the removal of the same, and enforce said writ according to law; and if it shall be impossible for the parties or persons removing any cause under this act, or complying with the provisions for the removal thereof, to obtain such copy, for the reason that the clerk of said State court refuses to furnish a copy, on payment of legal fees, or for any other reason, the Circuit Court shall make an order requiring the prosecutor in any such action or proceeding to enforce forfeiture or rocover penalty as aforesaid, to file a copy of the paper or proceeding by which the same was commenced, within such time as the court may determine, and in default thereof the court shall dismiss the said action or proceeding; but if the order shall be complied with, then said Circuit Court shall require the other party to plead, and said action or proceeding shall proceed to final judgment; and the said Circuit Court may make an order requiring the parties thereto to plead de novo; and the bond given, conditioned as aforesaid, shall be discharged, so far as it requires a copy of the record to be filed as aforesaid.

SEC. 8. That when in any suit, commenced in any Circuit Court of the United States, to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to "al or personal property within the district where such suit is brought, one or more of the defendants therein shall not be an inhabitant of or found within the said district, or shall not voluntarily appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to make an order directing such absent defendant or defendants to appear, plead, answer or demur, by a day certain to be designated, which order shall be served on such absent defendant or defendants, if practicable, wherever found, and also upon the person or persons in possession or charge of said property, if any there be, or where such personal service upon such absent defendant or defendants is not practicable, such order shall be published in such manner as the court may direct, not less than once a week

for six consecutive weeks; and in case such absent defendant shall not appear, plead, answer, or demur within the time so limited, or within some further time, to be allowed by the court, in its discretion, and upon proof of the service or publication of said order, and of the performance of the directions contained in the same, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain jurisdiction, and proceed to the hearing and adjudication of such suit in the same manner as if such absent defendant had been served with process within the said district; but said adjudication shall, as regards said absent defendant or defendants, without appearance, affect only the property which shall have been the subject of the suit and under the jurisdiction of the court therein, within such district. And when a part of the said real or personal property against which such proceeding shall be taken, shall be within another district, but within the same State, said suit may be brought in either district in said State; provided, however, that any defendant or defendants not actually personally notified as above provided, may, at any time within one year after final judgment in any suit mentioned in this section, enter his appearance in said suit in said Circuit Court, and thereupon the said court shall make an order setting aside the judgment therein, and permitting said defendant or defendants to plead therein, on payment by him or them of such costs as the court shall deem just; and thereupon said suit shall be proceeded with to final judgment according to law.

SEC. 9. That whenever either party to a final judgment or decree, which has been or shall be rendered in any Circuit Court, has died or shall die before the time allowed for taking an appeal or bringing a writ of error has expired, it shall not be necessary to revive the suit by any formal proceedings aforesaid.The representative of such deceased party may file in the office of the Clerk of such Circuit Court a duly certified copy of his appointment, and thereupon may enter an appeal or bring writ of error, as the party he represents might have done. If the party in whose favor such judgment or decree is rendered, has died before appeal taken or writ of error brought, notice to his representatives shall be given from the Supreme Court, as provided in case of the death of a party after appeal taken or writ of error brought.

SEC. 10. That all acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed. APPROVED March 3, 1875.

INS

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.*

SET-OFF.

[NSURANCE premium: mortgage foreclosure. Fogerty made a mortgage which was assigned to an insurance company; he insured in the company, a condition in the policy being that he might receive his premium back three days after demand; he assigned the policy to the company as collateral, sold the insured property, and assigned the policy subject to the collateral assignment to the purchaser. The company assigned for the benefit of creditors, no demand having been made for the return of the premium. The terretenant demanded a return of the premium from the company's assignee. Held, that the premium could not be set off against the mortgage-debt in a scire

* From advanced sheets of P. F. Smith's forthcoming volume of Pennsylvania reports. 75 Penn. St. (25 P. F. Smith.)

1. Jurisdiction.-A testator, residing in New Jersey, gave all his estate to trustees for the sole use and benefit of his children, the trustees to invest the proceeds "for the benefit of my said heirs," the income during minority to be applied to their education, etc., and the surplus to accumulate for their benefit. The portions of Isabella, who was unmarried, and other daughters, married and unmarried, to be held in trust for their sole use, and not to be in the power or subject to the debts of their husbands. In case of the death of any of his children without issue, their shares "to be merged in the general fund, and divided as above directed among my said heirs." Isabella married after testator's death, and died residing in Pennsylvania. The New Jersey court decreed her share to the ancillary administrator there (her husband), who was also administrator in Pennsylvania. Held, that the Orphans' Court in Pennsylvania had jurisdiction of her estate. Page's Estate, p. 87.

2. Conversion.-The testator, in case it should be deemed advisable, at any time, by his trustees to sell any part of his real estate, authorized them to sell, the proceeds to be held upon the same trusts as thereinbefore expressed and set forth. He left personal estate which could meet the previous provisions of his will. Held, that under the whole will the direction to sell was not a conversion. A conversion may arise without express words, when the testator clearly intends to create a fund out of both real and personal estate, and bequeath in money alone. lb.

3. Domicile.- In distributing the testator's estate in New Jersey, it was there decreed that Isabella's share should be paid to her husband as her "administrator absolutely." Held, that this left the question of distribution of her estate to be settled by the forum of her domicile. Ib.

IT

ALLOWANCES FOR MAINTENANCE OF INFANTS.

[T is intimated by Lord Eldon, in a well-known case, that the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction as guardian over all infants; but that as the court cannot act without means, the jurisdiction can only be actually exercised over minors having property. Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1. It results, as a necessary consequence, from this limitation, not of the jurisdiction itself, but of its exercise, that the supplying of the means out of the property of infants to their proper guardians for support and education is one of the most important functions of a court of equity in the exercise of its supervisory guardianship over infants. These means are provided by what are known as allowances for maintenance.

While it is not absolutely necessary that those having the property of infants in their charge should obtain the sanction of the court before expending any part of the income upon their wards, since if their expenditures appear to have been reasonable, they will be

subsequently approved (Carmichael v. Wilson, 3 Molloy, 80; Chambers' Ch. Jurisd. relating to Infants, 253); yet the statement of the rule, with its qualification, demonstrates the prudence of an early application, except in the case of executors or trustees acting under an instrument which invests them with an absolute discretion.

As a condition precedent to the entertaining of an application, the court requires that the infant or infants, on behalf of whom the application is made, shall have such an absolute right or title to the property, or its income from which an allowance is sought, that the action of the court cannot affect the right of any other person. Ex parte Kebble, 11 Ves. 604. The granting of the allowance must not be in any manner in contravention of the terms of any last will, the court being cautious not to pursue such a course as may be equivalent to making a will for a testator. Lomax v. Lomax, 11 Ves. 48; Errat v. Barlow, 14 id. 202; Turner v. Turner, 4 Sim. 430.

The consent of any person entitled in remainder after the infant must be obtained before an application will be heard for an allowance, the granting of which may lessen the value of the residuary interest. Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. (U. S.) 495. Where, however, maintenance is asked for a class of children entitled in remainder among themselves, their chances of survivorship are regarded as equal, and the application may be entertained. Marshall v. Holloway, 2

Swan. 436.

The facts which render the entertaining of the application proper being shown, the inquiry naturally arises, by what rules the allowance, which will be made, is governed as to amount? The cases on this point, however, afford ample justification for the remark of Yates, J., in Wilkes v. Rogers, 6 Johns. 566, "that the allowances to infants, for their maintenance and education, can only be made according to the circumstances attending each particular case." Ib. 587.

Thus, in the Duke of New Castle's Case, 15 Ves. 447, note, an allowance of £4,000 a year for the maintenance of the infant was approved. It does not appear in the report what the entire income of the infant may have been, it appearing, however, that the allowance was made the larger on account of the circumstances of other members of the family, according to a principle to which we will refer hereafter.

In Ex parte Lord Petre, 7 Ves. 403, where it appeared that the infant, on whose behalf application was made, had an income of nearly £6,000 a year, an annual allowance of £1,600 was ordered, it being intended to provide the infant with a tutor, a man-servant, a coachman and other servants- some of the servants, however, it would seem, being in part for his sisters, for whom £400 a year were allowed.

In Ex parte Peuleaze, 1 Brown's C. C. 387, note, it appeared that the income of an infant was £730 a year, and that he was entitled in remainder to estates of the value of £800 a year. An annual allowance was made of £400.

The question of what allowance should be made for the maintenance of three infants, two sons and a daughter, of an intestate arose in Wilkes v. Rogers, 6 Johns. 566. The intestate's widow had remarried and was yet living. The value of the former's real estate, at the time of his death, was $194,610; at or about the time of suit being brought, it was valued at $247,665, and his personal estate was worth $82,721.45. There had been expended in payment of debts, $41,184.72.

The rents, issues and profits of the real estate received since the intestate's decease were $76,906.59; the share of the estate allowed to the widow, $21,411.23. The entire residue belonged to the three children.

An annual allowance was ordered of $1,000 for the maintenance of each son, commencing at the time of the marriage of the widow to her present husband, and an allowance of $800 a year for the daughter, beginning at the same time.

In a Pennsylvania case (Corbin v. Wilson, 2 Ashm. 178), where it appeared that three infants were entitled to the greater part of $350,000 or $400,000, the sum of $3,000 a year was allowed for their support.

Where application was made by a mother, whose children, it is said, were entitled "to a considerable estate," a yearly allowance of $2,000 was ordered for the support of a daughter, under the circumstances of the case no special provision being made for the maintenance of the sons. Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 DeSaus. S. C. Eq. 445.

In the Matter of Burke, 4 Sandf. Ch. 617, two female infants, on behalf of whom the petition was presented, had a joint income of between $3,500 and $4,000 a year, one at majority would be worth $30,000, the other from $55,000 to $60,000. Their father had remarried, and only possessed means sufficient for the support of other members of his family. An annual allowance of $2,500, to be paid to the father, was ordered for support of both infants.

While it is therefore impossible to lay down a definite rule, founded upon any principle of proportion between the extent of the infant's wealth and the amount of the allowance which will be granted, a few principles and circumstances, by which the court is guided and influenced, may be briefly noticed.

The court recognizes the common-law duty of a father to support his children. If, however, application be made on behalf of infants whose father is living, but without means or in poor circumstances, while the infants are wealthy in their own right, such an allowance will be granted as will enable the latter to be maintained and educated, according to their expectations and prospective position in life. Hoste v. Pratt, 3 Ves. 733; In the Matter of Kane, 2 Barb. Ch. 375; Newport v. Cook, 2 Ashm. 332.

As to the period for which the allowance may be made, it has been long settled contrary to the old rule (Andrews v. Partington, 3 Brown's C. C. 60), that for the past a retrospective allowance may be made for past expenditures, extending to the time when the infant became entitled to his property (Sisson v. Shaw, 9 Ves. 286); but not, it is said, for expenditures made before that period. In re Mary England, 1 Russ. & M. 499. For the future, the allowance is generally made to continue until the infant reaches his majority (Ex parte Peuleaze, supra), and maintenance has been allowed to a female infant after marriage until that period. Chambers v. Goldwin, 11 Ves. 1.

If the infant has brothers or sisters who are without property, such an allowance may be ordered as will enable these less fortunate relatives to be supported, the observation being made in an old case, that the wealthy member is considered as the father of the family. Petre v. Petre, 3 Atk. 511. See note (1) to 1 Brown's C. C. 179. In this manner, means will be provided for the support of an illegitimate brother, the son of the same father and mother, who has been recognized and supported by them. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 1 Jacobs & W. 627.

So, too, according to what should certainly be presumed to be the desire of the infant, if arrived at the earliest age of reason, an allowance will be made for the support of the infant's father or mother if "in distressed circumstances." Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sr. 157. It is evident that this, especially when applied to the father, is a rule requiring a strict construction.

If the infant be possessed of large wealth, the court will sometimes allow a sum out of his income to be expended in charity. As where it appeared that an infant was a large landed proprietor and had been called upon by his clergyman to contribute to certain charitable purposes, the court directed that £20 a year out of the infant's income should be paid to the guardian upon his undertaking to pay over that sum to the clergyman to be expended on the charitable purposes to which the infant had been solicited to contribute. Langton v. Brackenbury, 2 Coll. 446.

The amount which is to be intrusted to the guardian of the person or relative of the infant for the latter's maintenance being determined, no specific account will be required of its expenditure, unless it be shown that there has been fraud or misapplication of the money. In re Oldfield, 2 Molloy, 294.

In regard to the method to be pursued in making application to the court, there has been some conflict in the English decisions as to whether it be necessary, where the property is large, to file a bill as in a suit in equity, or whether it be sufficient in all cases to present a petition. Ex parte Lakin, 4 Russ. 307; In matter of Molesworth, note to S. C.; Ex parte Starkie, 3 Sim. 339; In re Christie, 9 id. 643. In The matter of Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. 100, Chancellor Kent decided in general terms the proceeding by petition to be sufficient, and Rice v. Tormele, 4 Sandf. Ch. 568, is to the same effect, the remark being made that a receiver cannot be appointed on a petition.

It may be thought worthy of remark that although Chancellor Kent deemed the subject settled in England by decisions on the authority of which he proceeded, the question is discussed as will be seen by the above citations in matters occurring many years later than The matter of Bostwick.

While the order entered on petition will furnish ample authority and justification to the person having charge of the infant's property to make payments to the extent which it directs (Ex parte Starkie, supra), such person can only be compelled, should he be unwilling, to make payments through proceedings commenced by suit. MacPherson on Infants, 106, 215. Where the proceeding by petition is resorted to, the petition should contain a full statement of the nature, extent and condition of the infant's estate, showing the need of the allowance sought and the amount desired, and whatever other facts may aid the court in the exercise of its discretion. See Ex parte Lord Petre, supra; Matter of Bostwick, supra.

Where it is thought expedient to proceed by suit or action, it would appear to be sufficient to entitle the summons and complaint in the name of the guardian or relative having personal charge of the infant and to whom the expenditure of any allowance made would be intrusted as plaintiff and in the name of the executor or other person having care or possession of the property as defendant. It is not necessary that the infant be a party. Watts v. Steel, trustee, 19 Ala. (N. S.) 656. The complaint may be drawn in very general terms. It should probably show facts sufficient to

authorize the court to entertain the proceedings. The defendant may interpose a general answer, submitting the matters in controversy to the court, See form in 2 Field & Dunn's Forms to Daniel's Ch. Pr. No. 2125. When the cause is thus at issue, a petition stating the facts much as if the proceedings had been originated thereby may be presented to the court asking for a reference. Aynsworth v. Pratchett, 13 Ves. 321; Heysham v. Heysham, 1 Cox's Ch. C. 179. Upon the report of the referee an order may be entered directing the payment of such allowance as the referee may have reported to be proper. See forms of Orders in Appendix to MacPherson on Infancy, 25 Law Library, N. S.

There does not appear to be any objection to stating the facts in detail in the complaint. See Newport v. Cook, 2 Ashm. 332. As will be seen, however, by Aynsworth v. Pratchett, supra, the method we suggest is more in accordance with the English practice.

So jealous has the Court of Chancery been of its powers in this matter of maintenance that Lord Hardwicke granted an injunction to restrain an action at law against an infant for board. Anonymous, 3 Atk. 618. Whether this decision would or would not be now generally followed, enough may be found in the few cases to which we have referred in this very summary view of the subject to demonstrate at once the wisdom with which this jurisdiction has been exercised, and the great benefits resulting to those who come within its scope.

COMMISSION OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

INJUR

MASTER AND SERVANT.

NJURY to servant.- This action was brought to recover damages for an injury alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff through the negligence of one of defendant's servants. Plaintiff was injured while employed upon a barge which was engaged in lightering one of defendant's steamships. The answer of the defendant admitted that when the accident occurred it owned and had the control and management of the steamship. It appeared that the barge was not owned by defendant, and that plaintiff was employed and paid by its master. The steamship had a cargo of tobacco in bales, the custom of unloading tobacco, as proved upon the trial, is that four bales are hauled up from the hold of the steamer by her hands and thrown down, one at a time, on the deck of the lighter, where they are stowed away by the hands upon the lighter, and it is the duty of the men throwing down the bales to give some warning before letting them go; and this custom was observed in every instance but one, when the accident occurred. The deck of the lighter being almost full, plaintiff was engaged in trying to save a bale from falling overboard, when another bale of a new set of four was thrown down without warning and hit plaintiff and broke his leg. The man who threw it down was standing on the steamship and could have seen plaintiff if he had looked, but was conversing with some one behind him. Held, that the proof, together with the admission in the answer, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the man who caused the injury was a servant of the defendant and working for it at the time, that he and plaintiff were not fellow-servants within the meaning of the rule exempting an employer from liability for an injury to one employee by the act of another, and that said rule, therefore, did not furnish any objection to

the maintenance of the action. Svenson v. At. Mail Steamship Co. Opinion by Earl, C.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

1. Breach of contract to sell real estate. This action was brought for specific performance of a contract to convey a lot of land, and for damages for breach of the contract in case it could not be specifically performed. Defendant, who had a dower right only in the property, the title being in her children, three of whom were minors, which fact was known to plaintiff, contracted to sell and convey the premises to plaintiff for $800. In consequence of a recent rise in value the premises were worth $2,000; they had been sold at a tax sale for a municipal assessment and a lease given. These facts plaintiff knew of, but defendant was ignorant of them when she entered into the contract. The trial court allowed as damages the difference between the value of the land and the contract price. Held, error; that as an order giving authority to convey the land could not be obtained without practicing an imposition on the court, which plaintiff may be presumed to have known, and as defendant was ignorant of the tax title, no blame could be imputed to her for non-performance, and that plaintiff could recover merely nominal damages, together with the sum paid upon the contract. Pumpelly v. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 60, distinguished. Margraf v. Muir. Opinion by Earl, C. 2. Withholding possession of real estate: evidence.This action was brought for the recovery of the possession of certain real estate, with damages for withholding the same. On the trial, evidence was received of the value of the use and occupation, and the court instructed the jury that, in estimating the damages, they might consider such evidence; this was objected to generally. Held, error; that the claim for damages did not include the rents and profits during the time the possession was wrongfully withheld; that is a separate and distinct cause of action (Code, § 16); that a general objection to the evidence was sufficient, as no cause of action was alleged which authorized the introduction of the evidence, and the complaint could not have been amended so as to obviate the objection, as that would have required the inserting of a new and independent cause of action. Larned v. Hudson. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

REAL ESTATE.

Tenants in common: construction of deeds. - This action was brought by the plaintiffs, as heirs at law and next of kin of one G. R., against the widow, next of kin and heirs at law of one A. R., to recover certain real estate and the value of certain personal property alleged to have been held in trust by said A. for the benefit of G., his heirs and next of kin. It appeared that three brothers, D., G. and A., were tenants in common of certain real estate. Upon a division, giving D. his portion in severalty, G. and A. executed an instrument under seal, dated April 21, 1835, by which G. agreed that his share should remain with A.'s undivided, and he constituted A. his attorney, to take and receive his portion, A. was to take charge of the two undivided shares, and the "charge, direction, use and income of said estate" to belong to A., "his heirs, executors, or administrators or assigns forever." As a consideration, A. agreed to give G. a house with him and to support him; in case of G.'s marriage or of illusage by A., he reserved the right to have his portion set off and to resume its control; G. agreed that he would not revoke the power of attorney, except for one

of the causes above set forth. He also reserved the right to devise his estate as he chose. Held, that A. took an estate in fee under this instrument, subject to be defeated by a resumption of the estate for one of the causes specified or by a devise, and upon the death of G. intestate, A., having performed his part, would take an absolute title.

On May 7, 1835, A. and G. executed another instrument under seal, modifying the first; it provided that a specified tract of land should be set off as G.'s share, and a sum of money, to be determined by arbitrators, awarded to G., to be paid by A., to make their shares equal, which sum was to remain in A.'s hands, with his share of the personal estate, and out of it A. was to build farm-buildings on said tract, if G. should serve upon him a written notice that he desired to seek a new home. Held, that this instrument did not work a reconveyance by A., and that the former instrument remained in force, except as modified by the latter.

On the 11th of May, G. executed to A. & quitclaim deed of the tracts so set off, to A., "his heirs and assigns forever, to have and to hold ✶ ✶ ✶ in trust for the purpose of securing" to G. a "good, comfortable living under contingencies of sickness, infirmities and old age." Held, that if the habendum clause was intended to cut down the interest of A. to an estate for the life of G., it was repugnant to the premises of the deed and void; that no such trust was created as is authorized by the Revised Statutes (1 R. S. 728, § 55), and that A. received a fee simple of the real estate charged, with or upon the condition that he support G., and that condition having been performed, upon the death of G. the land belonged to A., free from any charge or trust. Also, held, that the three instruments were not so nearly cotemporaneous as to be taken and construed together; but that, if so construed, the result would be the same. The rule that excludes parol evidence, tending to explain, modify or contradict written instruments, applies as well to subsequent as to prior or cotemporaneous oral declarations of the parties. Mott, adm'r, etc., et al. v. Richtmyer et al. Opinions by Earl and Reynolds, CC.

A LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.

THE

HE London Law Journal contains the following remarkable comments on the enactment of a law of intellectual property:

"It is not the business of legislators to march in advance of their age. Their province is limited to understanding and reducing to law the ideas of the general community; not the conceptions of the manythoughted few, for which the times may not be ripe. The study of political economy and the acknowledgment of its chief principles preceded by many years free-trade legislation; the doctrine of free thought flourished at least a generation before complete religious emancipation was effected, and locomotion by steam and rail reckoned its last unbelievers in the houses of parliament.

"When, therefore, we find the lord chancellor repudiating in his scheme for amending the patent laws all notion of protecting invention in the ideal stage, we must not attach too much importance to his declaration, or suppose that it is to be taken as an authority against either the possibility or the expediency of a law of intellectual property. Copyright has not been long admitted upon the face of the statute book. Pro