The members of the bar practicing in the Court of Appeals have adopted a resolution, that on the entrance of the judges the fact shall be announced by the crier, and the lawyers present shall rise and remain standing until the judges are seated. This is intended as a mark of respect to the judges and of veneration for justice. This is an excellent step, and commends itself to all who desire to invest the administration of justice in this country with due dignity. The judges of the Supreme Court of the United States are announced by the crier, and the lawyers, officers and spectators rise and remain standing until the judges are seated. The judges of this court also wear robes of black silk while discharging their duties. It would not be unbecoming for the judges of the Court of Appeals to adopt a similar custom in respect to their habiliments. There is, of course, a prejudice in this country against any thing approaching the pomp and ceremony of foreign tribunals. But there is no place in the world where ceremonial dignity should be observed more than in the halls of justice; and this irrespective of country or form of government.

A question which does not often arise is involved in the case of Youngs v. Youngs, which came before Judge Van Vorst in New York recently. Mr. Youngs, the defendant, owning real estate valued at $150,000, became engaged to plaintiff, he informing her of the amount of his property. He was 52 and she 23 years of age, and he had two daughters of about the same age as his intended wife, who are joined with him as defendants. Four days before the marriage Mr. Youngs secretly conveyed a portion of his property to his daughters in consideration of natural love and affection. Plaintiff did not learn of this until after the marriage, when she brought this suit to set aside the conveyance, as being in fraud of her right of dower. Judge Van Vorst holds that the deed deprives the wife of her inchoate right of dower, and of the possibility of her title to dower becoming consummate, and is, therefore, invalid as to her. In respect to the question whether the wife could maintain the action before the death of the husband had made her right of dower consummate, the judge holds that the inchoate right of dower is entitled to the protection of the courts.

The case of The United States v. Cruikshank and others came before the United States Supreme Court this week, and its argument will probably consume several days. The defendants are charged with a violation of the Enforcement Act in Grant Parish, La., and the case comes to this court by a certificate of division from the Circuit Court of Louisiana. Judge Bradley was of the opinion that the act of 1870, under which the indictment against defend

ants was framed, is unconstitutional, and his associate on the circuit bench was of the opposite opinion. The defendants have an imposing array of counsel, including Reverdy Johnson and David Dudley Field. The questions involved are of great importance to the administration of affairs in the southern States.

The subject of "Suits for Breach of Promise" has recently been well treated by the New York Times, which significantly remarks in the very first sentence that these suits have "not yet disappeared from the records of our courts." The fact that actions for breach of promise of marriage are almost invariably brought by women, is considered remarkable, since the ground of the action is a breach of the contract, and the man has as good right to sue in a proper case as the woman. The position and characteristics, the abilities and resources of the man are different from those of the woman, and hence the courts tolerate actions by women for breach of promise with better grace than actions by men. But these suits, even when brought by women, are falling more and more into discredit, and our contemporary appears to be as delighted with this as are ourselves. The Times also refers to the language of Helps in his last book, where he says: "There ought to be no such cases. It is perfectly monstrous that any person should be compelled to marry by any such pecuniary consideration * *If there is reluctance on either side the project should fall to the ground." And so specific performance is not decreed. Why, then, should there be damages as for breach of contract? The Times concludes its remarks by suggesting that it is only in aggravated cases of wrong that this suit is justifiable.

*

Mr. Charles S. May, of Kalamazoo, Mich., delivered an address on "Trial by Jury" at the last commencement of the law department of Michigan University. He sketched the history of jury trials, stating that their origin was Anglo-Saxon, although somewhat like trials by the Grecian dicasts, the Roman judices and the Saxon compurgators. Since the Grand Assize of 1176 trial by jury has been one of the sacred muniments of English liberty. Mr. May discussed the qualifications and functions of the jury, the judge and the advocate; but the most remarkable portion of the address is that relating to the improvements and modifications needed in the jury system. The frequent disagreements of juries is one of the just complaints against the present rule of unanimity, and legislation should be immediately adopted providing that a number less than the whole jury should be competent to render a verdict in civil cases. Mr. May believes, however, that in criminal cases the unanimity of the jury is a requisite safeguard to human liberty.

Other reforms are discussed (notably a modification of the old rule of challenges) so as not to exclude jurors who have had an opinion. This reform has been effected in some States, but a general reform throughout the country is demanded.

The grand jury of the General Sessions in New York was recently discharged, having concluded a session which is exceedingly remarkable, on account of the amount of work performed. During its term this grand jury acted upon 504 complaints; out of this number 370 indictments were found and 134 complaints were dismissed. District Attorney Phelps, in commenting on the custom of discharging grand juries with the thanks of the court, said that, in this particular instance, special commendation was due, for this grand jury had transacted, in an able manner, the largest amount of business ever performed by any grand inquest in the history of criminal courts. Judge Sutherland was of the same opinion and said, that he had determined, even without the motion of the district attorney, to pay the grand jury more than the usual compliments.

NOTES OF CASES.

THE case of Burke v. Child, to which we referred

briefly last week, was decided in the United States Supreme Court, and involves the validity of the claims of lobbyists. The facts of this interesting case are as follows: Nicholas P. Trist had a claim against the United States for his services touching the treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo. After a delay of nearly twenty years he concluded to submit it to congress and ask its payment. He made an agreement with Linus Child that Child should take charge of the claim and prosecute it as his agent and attorney. As a compensation for the services of Child, it was agreed that he should receive twenty-five per cent of whatever sum congress might allow in payment of the claim. If nothing was allowed, he was to receive nothing. His compensation depended wholly upon the contingency of success. Child prepared a petition and presented the claim to congress. Before final action was taken upon it by that body Child died. The appellee, his son and personal representative, who was his partner when the agreement between him and Trist was entered into and down to the time of his death, continued the prosecution of the claim. This claim was held to be void. The following cases were referred to as sustaining the position of the court. Clippinger v. Lebaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315; Harris v. Roof's Executor, 10 Barb. 489; Rose & Hawley v. Truax, 21 id. 316; Marshall v. B. & O. R. R., 16 How. 98. Swayne, J., who delivered the opinion, also referred to the following cases where agreements were held void: An agreement to pay for supporting for election a candidate

for sheriff (3 Hals. 54); to pay for resigning a public position to make room for another (4 R. I. 395; 1 H. Blackst. 322); to pay for not bidding at a sheriff's sale of real property (3 Johnson's Cases, 29); to pay for not bidding for articles to be sold by the government at auction (6 Johns. 194); to pay for not bidding for a contract to carry the mail on a specified route (5 Hals. 87); to pay a person for his aid and influence in procuring an office, and for not being a candidate himself (4 Comst. 449); to pay for procuring a contract from the government (2 Wall. 45); to pay for procuring signatures to a petition to the governor for a pardon (7 Watts, 152); to sell land to a particular person when the surrogate's order to sell should have been obtained (3 Cowan, 299); to pay for suppressing evidence and compounding a felony (2 Wilson, 347); to convey and assign a part of what should come from an ancestor by descent, devise, or distribution (7 Mass. 112); to pay for promoting a marriage (4 Bro. P. C. 144; 1 Chy. Rep. 47); to influence the disposition of property by will in a particular way (1 Vesey, Sr., 276). See also Addison on Contracts, 91; 1 Story's Eq. Ch. 7; Collins v. Blantern, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 676, American note.

In State ex rel. Newell v. Purdy, 14 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 90, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a promise by a candidate to the voters at large to perform the duties of the office for less than the salary fixed by law is within the spirit of the laws against bribery, and all votes obtained by means thereof will be rejected by the courts. It appeared that, previous to an election for county judge, the relator issued a communication, which he caused to be extensively circulated, addressed to the voters and tax payers of the county. The salary of county judge was $1,000, but the relator, in his communication, announced himself as a candidate, and promised if elected to perform all the duties of the office for $700, which sum he asserted was all the office was worth. Defendant, who was a candidate, received less votes than the relator, but claimed and obtained possession of the office, to the exclusion of the relator. This was an action in the nature of a quo warranto to oust defendant and place the relator in the office. In vain did the attorney-general urge that the proposition made by the relator to the voters of the county was merely a protest against high salaries, and a movement in the direction of reform and economy in public expenditures. The court referred to a large number of authorities, ancient and modern, and decided that if the defendant could show that a number of electors, exceeding the majority of the relator, were influenced to vote for the relator by reason of his offers or propositions, the votes so obtained should be rejected, and defendant be adjudged entitled to the office.

A

LAWYERS AND OTHER MEN. DISTINGUISHED lawyer of this State once said to us that he thought there was the same difference between lawyers and other men, in an intellectual view, that there was between the tiger and the zebra, in a physical sense; both these wild animals were striped, but that was their only point in common; the one had claws and was aggressive, the other had hoofs and was timid; the one was remarkable for his spring and his grip, the other only for his agility in getting away. There is no doubt that our intellectual training and pursuits give us an advantage in affairs over other men. That very sensible and witty writer, Oliver Wendell Holmes, himself a distinguished physician, in a review of the comparative merits and capacities of the members of the three learned professions, stated his opinion that the lawyers were the "cleverest" class of men in the world — using the word "clever," of course, in the English sense, which is equivalent to the Yankee "smart."

It is no particular credit to our profession if this is true, because, by nature, lawyers cannot claim any superiority over other members of the human race; every thing is due to our training and pursuits. That other very distinguished and excellent author, Sir Arthur Helps, in whose recent death literature and civic affairs have sustained a serious loss, paid our profession a great and standing compliment in his works. We have had something to say of Mr. Helps as a historian, and of his praise of the early Spanish settlers in this country, on account of their ostracism of lawyers (9 A. L. J., p. 19), but Mr. Helps as a historian is one thing, and Mr. Helps as an essayist is quite another. This compliment of which we speak was not exactly an avowed one, but rather an implied one. It consisted in representing the most original, witty, persuasive, and interesting character among the supporters of the dialogue in his "Friends in Council," Sir John Ellesmere, as a lawyer. His characterization of Sir John is the best we have ever read of an ideal lawyer. He is indomitable in argument; like a cat he always falls on his legs; and he has the common sense for which we think we may, without vanity, say our profession is remarkable. We recommend all lawyers to read Sir Arthur's posthumous book, "Social Pressure," in which the imaginary Sir John shines with great brilliance. We can thus "see ourselves as others see us."

Those who have not read these wise and charming books, must be informed that they consist of an account of the sayings of an imaginary circle of friends, on a variety of social, religious, political, literary, and esthetic topics, each character reading now and then a short essay, and the others criticising and commenting on it. One of the best is an essay in which Sir John undertook, in a dozen sentences, to say all that needs to be said on the sub

ject of "Hospitality," and as we think, succeeded. We speak of this because it leads up to another of his essays, entitled "On the Art of Leaving Off," from which we think lawyers may derive some valuable hints. In the remarks called out by this essay is the following:

"Sir Arthur.-Touching the great question of Leaving Off, might one not say, Ellesmere, that some of the eminent men in your profession would do well to leave off, occasionally, a little earlier than they do?

Ellesmere. No, no. If you jurymen were wiser, or at least sharper than you are, advocates might be more succinct and reticent; but not otherwise."

Now may be Sir John is right about jurymen, although we think there is some doubt of it, but if he is, we hope and pray that the counsel in the everlasting scandal case in Brooklyn will not get hold of this book, and become confirmed by Sir John's opinion in their own long-winded proclivities. We are inclined to believe, as a rule, that lawyers' addresses are much too long. We often wonder at the patience of judges, who sit listening for hours to the enunciation of principles which they are perfectly familiar with, before counsel get at the meat of the case. We know of only one parallel, and that is the patience of the Judge of all the earth, in listening to the interesting information which our average clergymen afford Him in their public Sunday prayers. It is really surprising how little time it takes to argue a case if counsel are in a hurry to take the train, and how much more effectively they generally do it than when they have plenty of time. These remarks are mainly applicable to arguments addressed to judges. In respect to arguments before juries, greater latitude is allowable, but even here we often suspect that counsel have not acquired the Art of Leaving Off. Lawyers are apt to believe that the average juryman requires to have an idea hammered into his brain by repeated concussion, and so indulge largely in what Falstaff called "damnable iteration." Now if a hand-organ comes before the dwelling of one of the same jurors, and plays a sweet air once or twice, the juryman will very likely give the itinerant a modest coin by way of recompense for the pleasure bestowed; but if the organist is too persistent, and repeats the tune a dozen times, the hearer becomes weary and disgusted, refuses the extended and up-turned hat, and perhaps sets the dog on the musician. So we think there is such a thing as overdoing this matter of enlightening the average juryman and raising a disgust and prejudice in his mind. Sir John Ellesmere is made to say: "Now, as regards speeches in parliament, I have generally found that even very able speeches contain no more than three or four arguments. Take away the padding, and there remain about four telling sentences to answer. Something of this is true of forensic arguments. In

short the Art of Leaving Off needs to be studied by our profession. We think, too, that the same remarks may be applicable, although to a smaller extent, to the charges of judges. We have a great reverence for the judges, but that does not prevent us from saying that some of their balancing charges remind us of Bunsby's oracular opinion as to the loss of the ship Son and Heir: "Do I believe that this here Son and Heir has gone down, my lads? Mayhap. Do I say so? Which? If a skipper stands out by Sen' George's channel, making for the Downs, what's right ahead of him? The Goodwins. He isn't forced to run upon the Goodwins, but he may. The bearings of this observation lays

in the application of it. That a'n't no part of my duty. Awast then, keep a bright lookout for'ard, and good luck to you!"

Another point in which lawyers may be subjected to a comparison with other men is adverted to by Sir Arthur Helps as follows: "We cannot say, that, without making some great and remarkable exceptions, lawyers have shown themselves to be able statesmen. In the case of these exceptions I think it may almost always be said that there was more in the man of the statesman than of the lawyer." We are well aware that this writer has the powerful authority of Edmund Burke on his side, but even in respect to that great man we have always felt that he would have been a more efficient and practical statesman if he had been more of a lawyer. (He, too, needed to study the Art of Leaving Off.) We know that our author speaks the common sentiment in the remarks quoted above, but we think the idea is ill-founded. It is true to this extent, and no more; some great and brilliant lawyers have failed to realize the expectations of their friends and the public, when transferred from the halls of justice to the senate. Erskine is a remarkable example. But we take issue with the idea that legal training and experience do not fit a man for a statesman. We think, on the contrary, that they are the best school in the world for statesmen. It would be singular if this were not so. Of course, so far as the cultivation of the power of debating is concerned, there is nothing comparable with the forum. But in addition to this, where else can a man so well learn human nature and the principles of justice? Now these three things are the great requisites of the useful statesman; the knowledge of right and wrong, or what he ought to do; the knowledge of human nature, or what he has to deal with; and the power of debating, or the capacity of influencing other minds. When lawyers have failed as statesmen it has generally been because they were not kept at it long enough. Statesmanship is a craft, and must be learned by practice and experience. Now the zebras must have something to say against the tigers-some point of imaginary superiority, and so they say we

can't be statesmen. It is worthy of remark, however, that when they want statesmen they select us in three cases out of four. The annals of America show that her greatest statesmen have generally been lawyers; the Jeffersons, Hamiltons, Clintons, Clays, Websters, Sewards and Sumners of our land, are not exceptions; they are the rule. This is true to a far less extent in England. There the greatest statesmen generally have not been lawyers, Chatham, Burke, Fox. Pitt was trained for the bar, but did not follow our profession for any length of time. On the other hand Canning, Brougham and Romilly were lawyers. But even in England, it is worthy of remark, they cannot construct a durable cabinet without a strong infusion of lawyers. reason of this difference between England and America is that in the former country there is a class who have wealth and leisure to devote themselves to public life without the necessity of following a profession. We infer that although a man may be a statesman without being a lawyer, yet he is apt to be a better statesman for having been a lawyer. That which spoils a lawyer as a statesman, spoils any other man just as surely, and that is party.

The

And now we shall stop, in order to show our readers that we understand the Art of Leaving Off.

SOME LEGAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN.

WOMEN, whether infants, wives, or widows, are

a source of great trouble and perplexity to the legal profession. There is Judge McKean, of Utah, just fallen a victim to his excessive zeal to do the fair thing for the fractional Mrs. Young, who had sued the husband of herself and the other fifty-nine members of the marital unit, for a divorce. Woman "first brought sin into the world, and woe " and a great part of the law, and she has kept it up ever since the first transgression; witness Helen of Troy, and Elizabeth of Brooklyn. Look at the last volume of the reports of our Court of Appeals, and see if we are not right. The two most novel and interesting decisions in the volume are about women; woman is the meritorious cause of action. And see how tenderly the law treats the fair sex in these cases! The first case to which we refer is Loomis v. Ruck, p. 462. This was an action against a married woman on a promissory note made by her, charging her separate estate, and declaring that the consideration was for the benefit of her separate estate. In fact the note was not given for the benefit of her separate estate, nor in the course of any separate business carried on by her, and her signature had been obtained by duress. Held, that the note could not be enforced against her, even in the hands of a bona fide holder, such a note not being governed by the law merchant. The foregoing facts are stated

in the syllabus. If there were nothing more in the

case than this statement would indicate, the decision would, indeed, be a very serious and embarrassing one, and would deter business men and banks from lending money on the faith of such security, except in those cases where the maker should personally be consulted and affirm the validity of the instrument, which, in many cases, would be impracticable. The court say: "The law merchant, which gives to the bona fide transferee of negotiable paper greater rights than those of the transferer, has no application to this class of obligations. They are not recognized at law, and we have been referred to no authority tending to sustain the position that an obligation of a married woman, obtained from her by fraud and duress, and against which she had a good defense when in the hands of the original holder, can be enforced in equity out of her separate estate, simply because it has passed into the hands of a bona fide transferee." (We take the liberty to strike out the words "the transferee of,” occurring just after the words "position that," in the report, which make nonsense). The court continue: "The rules applicable to negotiable commercial paper cannot govern this case." This would seem a rather robust holding in view of the estoppel created by the admission in the note itself that the note was given for the benefit of the maker's separate estate. But it seems that the plaintiff knew at the time he took the note that this statement was not true. The referee so found, and the court remark that fact, and say: "There can, consequently, be no claim of an estoppel even were the doctrine of estoppel applicable in such a case." And again: "It must be governed by the rules of equity, which, in case of equal equities and in the absence of sufficient grounds of estoppel, gives preference to the equity which is prior in point of time." It thus appears that the plaintiff was not strictly a bona fide holder.

This case, then, must be construed by its peculiar circumstances, and not as laying down quite so broad a doctrine as the syllabus would indicate. We think the syllabus should contain, after the words, "this statement was not true, "-i. c., the statement in the note that it was given for the benefit of the maker's separate estate, the further words, "as the plaintiff knew when he took it." The decision was unanimous.

The other case is Furman v. Van Sise, p. 435, which holds that a mother, after the death of the father, is entitled to the custody, control, and services of her minor children during their minority. This was an action of seduction. The child was seduced while in the employment of another, under an agreement made by the mother, by which the daughter received pay for her services and applied it to her own use. After the seduction, the daughter returned to the mother, who took care of her during her confinement and paid the expenses. It was held that the action would lie, because the re

lation of master and servant constructively existed, the mother having the right of re-calling the daughter into her service at any moment. This question has been much mooted in this country and in England, but has never reached the court of last resort in this State until now. The student will find the best review of the authorities, pro and con., in the opinion of Miller, J., in Gray v. Durland, 50 Barb. 100, and in the dissenting opinion of Hogeboom, J., in the same case, at page 211. The common-law doctrine seems to have been that the mother was not bound to support the infant child, after the death of the father, and, consequently, was not entitled to the custody and earnings of the child. This doctrine, however, did not prevent the mother from maintaining the action of seduction, when the child lived with the mother. There need be no relationship to sustain that action. It may be maintained by a stranger to the blood, provided the conventional relation of master and servant exists. We say the common law imposed no duty on the mother to support the child after the death of the father. We say so with some hesitation, for the prevailing opinion in this case seems to take the contrary view. The fact is, probably, that it is pretty difficult to say what the common law really is, because there are so few decisions on the point. As Judge Grover observes: "To the credit of mothers it may be remarked that little will be found in the books in relation to enforcing the duty of taking care of their infant children after the death of the father, owing, doubtless, to the fact that the strong maternal affection, provided by nature, has been adequate to secure the performance of this duty." We may well be excused for being mistaken, if we are wrong, when two such able jurists as Judge Bronson and Chancellor Walworth differed on the point. It does seem, however, that the implication of the legal duty of the mother to support the children, after the father's death, merely from the fact that the father's obligation to support them whether they have property of their own or not, was not at common law extended to the mother, is not a very conclusive argument in favor of the doctrine of this case. If this were the only ground, the mother's right to maintain the action of seduction might depend on the condition of the child's estate, for the mother could only derive her right to the child's earnings from the correlative duty of support. We judge that the doctrine derives its real strength from the law of nature. We never could exactly understand why the child should be left to chance after the death of the father. Practically, the point has not been of much importance, for the mother, whom the common law regards as an inferior being to the father, and as merged in him, and of very little account in the affairs of the world, has generally done willingly what she may not have been legally compellable to