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proposition, are also presumed to have been accepted by the act of receiving. If the merchant, in delivering the goods, declare that they must be paid for by a certain time, if the depositor designate how the deposit is to be kept, or the mandatary in what manner his commission is to be executed, he who receives and acts is obligated to the performance of all these conditions. ,
ART. 1811. — Silence and inaction are also, under some circumslances, the means of showing an assent that creates an obligation; if, after the termination of a lease, the lessee continue in possession, and the lessor be inactive and silent, a complete mutual obligation for continuing the lease, is created by the act of occupancy of the tenant on the one side, and the inaction and silence of the lessor on the other.
ART. 1812.-Where the law does not create a legal presumption of proposition, acceptance or consent from certain facts, then, as in the case of other simple presumptions, it must be left to the discretion of the judge, whether assent is to be implied from them or not.
S II. What defects of Consent will invalidate a Contract.
ART. 1813.-Consent being the concurrence of intention in two or more persons, with regard to a matter understood by all, reciprocally communicated, and resulting in each party from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it follows that there is no consent, not only where the intent has not been mutually communicated or implied, as is provided in the preceding paragraph, but also where it has been produced by
Error; Fraud; Violence; Threats,
Of Error, its Division and Effects.
ART. 1814.-Error, as applied to contracts, is of two kinds:
1. Error of fact; . 2. Error of law. .
ART. 1815.-That is called error of fact, which proceeds either from ignorance of that which really exists, or from a mistaken belief in the existence of that which has none.
ART. 1816.-He is under an error of law, who is truly informed of the existence of facts, but who draws from them erroneous conclusions of law.
ART. 1817.-Errors may exist as to all the circumstances and facts which relate to a contract, but it is not every error that will invalidate it. To have that effect, the error must be in some point, which was a principal cause for making the contract, and it may be either as to the motive for making the contract, to the person with whom it is made, or to the subject matter of the contract itself.
Of Error in the Motive.
ART. 1818.–The reality of the cause is a kind of precedent condition to the contract, without which the consent would not have been given, because the motive being that which determines the will, if there be no such cause where one was supposed to exist, or if it be falsely represented, there can be no valid consent.
ART. 1819.—The error in the cause of a contract to have the effect of invalidating it, must be on the principal cause, when there are several; this principal cause
is called the motive, and means that consideration without which the contract would not have been made.
ART. 1820.-No error in the molive can invalidate a contract, unless the other party was apprized that it was the principal cause of the agreement, or unless from the nature of the transaction it must be presumed that he knew it.
ART. 1821.-But wherever the motive is apparent, although not made an express condition, if the error bears on that motive, the contract is void. A promise to give a certain sum to bear the expenses of a marriage, which the party supposes to have taken place, is not obligatory, if there be no marriage.
ART. 1822.– Thus too, if a suit be brought on an obligation purporting to have been made by the ancestor of the defendant, and, supposing it to be true, the defendant enters into a compromise or promise to pay, the compromise or promise are void, if it should be afterwards discovered that i he obligation was forged.
ART. 1823.-In the same manner a compromise of a suit, and any obligation made in consequence of il, is void, if, at the time, but unknown to the parties, the suit be finally decided. But if the decision be not final, but subject to appeal or revision, the compromise is valid:
ART. 1824.-A compromise also is void, where one of the parties is ignorant of the existence of a paper, which, being afterwards discovered, shows that the other had no right, and this, whether the other party knew the existence of the paper or not.
ART. 1825.—But if the compromise be of all differences' generally, and there were other subjects of dispute, besides that in which the error existed, of sufficient importance to raise a presumption that, even if the error had been discovered, the compromise would still have been made, then such error shall not invalidate the contract.
ART. 1826.-In all cases, however, when the information, which would have destroyed the error, has been withheld by the other party to the contract, it comes under the head of fraud, and in validates the contract.
ART. 1827.-Error in the motive also is shown in the case either of an insurance on properly or an annuity on lives. If the property be lost, or the life be at an end, at the time of making the contract, there is no obligation, unless, in the case of the insurance, it be expressly stipulated that the insurer takes the risk of those events, from a period prior to the contract. If the same express stipulation take place in the case of the annuily, it then becomes an insurance, and is valid for the same reason.
Error as to the Person.
ART, 1828.-Error as to the person, with whom the contract is made, will invalidate it, if the consideration of the person is the principal or only cause of the contract, as it is always in the contract of marriage.
ART, 1829.-In contracts of beneficence, the consideration of the person is presumed by law to be the principal cause. .
ART. 1830.-In onerous contracis, such as sale, exchange, loan for interest, letting and hiring, the consideration of the person is by law generally presumed to be an incidental cause, not a motive for a contract,
ART. 1831.—There are exceptions to the rule contained in the last preceding article.
If, from the nature of the onerous contract, it results that any particular skill or quality be required in its execution, which the party, with whom the contract is made, is supposed to possess, then the consideration of the person is presumed to be the principal cause, and error as to the person invalidates the contract. Thus, if intending to employ an architect of great eminence, the party addresses himself by mistake to one of the same name, who has little or no skill, the promise made to him for compensation is void; but if any thing be done by the person thus employed, who was ignorant of the mistake, a compensation, proportioned to his service, is due.
ART. 1832.-Error as lo the quality or character in which the party acts, as well as a mistake as to the person himself, invalidates a contract, when such a quality or character is the principal cause of the agreement. Thus, a compromise with one, who is supposed to be the heir of a deceased creditor of the party contracting, is void, if he be not really the heir.
ART. 1833.-—But if the person, who is really entitled to the quality assumed by the one with whom the contract is made, has contributed to the error by his neglect or by design, it will not vitiate the agreement. And in the case above stated, a payment to, or a compromise with one, whom the true heir suffered to remain in possession of the inheritance, and to act as heir, without nolice, would be valid.
ART. 1834.-Contracts, which could only be made by persons possessing cerlain powers, either delegated by contract, given by virtue of any private or public office, or vested by the operation of law, are also void, when there is error as to the character, quality, or office, under colour of which such contract was made. Contracts entered into under forged or void powers or assignments, or with persons without authority assuming to act as public or private officers, are governed by this rule. Contracts, however, made in the name of another, under void powers, will be valid, if ratified by the principal, before the other contracting party has signified his dissent to the agreement.