They did so without attempting to overcome their opposition, or, generally speaking, to reject Revelation, at least openly. Thus it came to pass that the thinkers of the seventeenth century found, in their inheritance from the past, three unreconciled conceptions, or groups of conceptions, whose opposing claims they were in no position to settle1— Nature, Reason, Revelation. As might have been expected, some declared for one, some for another. Generally speaking, churchmen and their friends clung to Revelation and authority; while other thinkers tried to make peace between Reason and Nature. In general, the English mind showed a preference for Nature, and tried to explain Reason through it, while the French mind, setting out with Reason, could find no way of arriving at Nature, and so left the dualism unsolved. Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke form a strong contrast to Pascal, Descartes, and Malebranche. Rousseau gen erally follows the former, and especially Hobbes. Hobbes conceived the human race as setting out on its career in a "state of Nature," which to him meant a state of universal war, resulting in a life "solitary, poor, brutish, nasty, and short."2 At the same time he regarded Nature as "the art whereby God hath made and governs the world," getting over the paradox herein involved by maintaining that Nature "is by the art of man imitated that it can make an artificial animal," in other words, that 'art' is 1 Most of the thought of the Western world, for the last three hundred years, has been devoted to effecting this settlement, thus far with very indifferent success. 2 Leviathan, Cap. XIII. 8 Ibid., Introduction. an extension of Nature.1 "Nature," according to Hobbes, "has made men so equal in faculties of the body and mind, as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind, than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he." And not only are men equal, but they have equal rights. "The right of Nature," he says, "which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as well as himself, for the preservation of his own. nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently of doing anything, which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto. By 'liberty' is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments." . . . "A law of Nature,' lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh it may best be preserved." In this "condition of war of every one against every one, every one is governed by his own reason" and 1 Shakespeare, Winter's Tale, Act IV., sc. iii.: "Yet nature is made better by no mean, But nature makes that mean: so over that art, That nature makes. ... This is an art Which does mend nature-change it rather: but 'every man has a right to everything, even to another's body. And, therefore, as long as the natural right of every man to everything endureth, there can be no security to any man.' "And conse quently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it that he may seek, and use, all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule containeth the first, the fundamental law of Nature, which is, to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of Nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves. From this fundamental law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as, for peace, and defence of himself, he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself." . . "The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call 'contract.'" 1 "From the law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as, being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third, which is this, that men perform their covenants made." ... "In this law of Nature consisteth the fountain and original of 'justice.'" "When a covenant is made, then to break it is 'unjust'; and the definition of 'injustice' is no other than the nonperformance of covenant. And whatsoever is not 1 Leviathan, Cap. XIV. men is by covenant only, which is artificial; and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to a common benefit." 2 "The only way to erect such is to confer all their power and ... a common power strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and to acknowledge, himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person made by covenant of every man with every man." 4 "He that carrieth this person is called 'sovereign,' and said to have 'sovereign power'; and every one besides his 'subject."" "The attaining of this sovereign power is by two ways. One is by natural force." 66 The other is, when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against 1 Leviathan, Cap. XV. 2 Cf. Dante, De Monarchia, Bk. III., Cap. XVI. 8 Used here in the sense of the Latin persona, for which see Institutes of Justinian. 4 Cf. the story of Menenius Agrippa, Livy, Bk. II., Cap. 32. all others. The latter may be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by 'institution'; and the former a commonwealth by 'acquisition." "1 "A ‘commonwealth' is said to be 'instituted,' when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the 'right' to 'present' the person of all of them, that is to say, to be their 'representative,' every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall 'authorize' all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably among themselves, and be protected against other men. From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the 'rights' and 'faculties' of him, or them, to whom sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.” 2 Hobbes now goes on to say that the compact, thus once made, can never be either replaced or annulled; that it is binding on all; that the sovereign, once elected, can do no injustice, and hence cannot be put to death, or otherwise punished, by his subjects; that he has the right to prescribe or proscribe opinion, to determine the laws of property, to decide all controversies, to make war and peace, to choose all officials, to reward "with riches or honor," and to punish, "with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject," and to confer titles of honor. Though, theoretically speaking, the sovereign may be 1 Leviathan, Cap. XVII. 2 Leviathan, Cap. XVIII. 8 Leviathan, Cap. XVII. 8 |