be reached by judicial means ascertaining the rights and duties of the contending parties.

As in the case of the commission, it is not necessary to enforce the decision as execution of an arbitral award depends upon the good faith of the parties, and good faith has hitherto been found sufficient. If we would frankly admit that the duty of the judge is to decide and not to execute, we could by this simple device secure a judicial decision of every justiciable dispute when and as it arises, upon the initiative of the party in interest, and leave public opinion to do the rest.

By this method a special agreement for each case would not need to be negotiated and any nation could as plaintiff carry its difference to the court and set it in motion. If each party were left free to accept and to comply with the holding, according to its standard of honor and conception of its duty in the premises, there could be no greater objection to a treaty creating a permanent international court of justice. instead of or in addition to a permanent international commission of inquiry, and, as far as the United States is concerned, there would be thirty precedents for signing, twenty-nine precedents for ratifying, and twenty precedents for proclaiming such an agreement.

We are so accustomed to associate execution with judgment that we find it hard, if not impossible, to separate the two and think of one without the other. Yet it is a fact that the two grew up separately, that the judgment antedated the execution and that it is only in fully developed systems of jurisprudence that the two are combined. They are concomitants in suits between private suitors, they are not inseparable companions in litigation to which nations are parties. It is therefore well to let experience decide whether execution is necessary, and to suggest the terms of an agreement on this subject, if one should prove to be advisable and practicable.

The absence of the sheriff does not prevent the negotiation of treaties of arbitration, the absence of the marshal should not delay the negotiation of a treaty for judicial settlement. The experience had with the one suggests the feasibility of the other, and a permanent nucleus of judges, chosen by the nations, to pass upon their justiciable disputes, would assure a judgment by disinterested parties, in accordance with a treaty creating the obligation for all of the high contracting parties to submit. their controversies to the same body and number of indifferent judges, preserving to each equality of representation upon the bench during the trial and disposition of the case.

This equality would not be affected by the fact that a member of the court happened to belong to one of the litigating nations, inasmuch as the other litigant could exercise its right of appointment for the case and have its views presented by a judge of its own choice, who would, it is to be presumed, be equally well informed and vigilant as the judge of the other litigant.

By this method we would thus have one obligation for all, and an equality of representation for each at the very moment when it is desired and supposed to be of prime importance.

Possessed of the experience which would necessarily result from such an institution, the nations could then in the light of this experience and of its lessons establish a more perfect tribunal, just as the framers of the Constitution of the United States created a more perfect Union because of the experience and the lessons of the Confederation.

To the modern man with the medieval mind, these treaties will seem but sorry stuff, for they decide nothing, leaving the nations free to adopt or to reject the report of the commitee of inquiry. To others they will seem unheroic, as physical force is neither invoked to compel the contracting parties to submit the dispute to the commission nor to enforce its findings.

To those who believe in good faith and that it can only be educated, not coerced into action in conformity with the given word, as well as to those who regard public opinion as the universal and supreme sanction before which in the long run crowns are humbled and against which the mailed fist strikes in vain, these harmless agreements, for they can neither injure man nor nation, will be a comfort and a hope: a comfort that the persuasion of public opinion is relied upon instead of physical coercion, and a hope that other advocates of justice between nations will regard these treaties as precedents for further progress.

Any dispute that can be talked about can be settled; and dispute that is talked about must and will be settled in accordance with the dictates of an insistent and enlightened public opinion.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 9, 1918.

Letter of Secretary of State Bryan to the Honorable W. J. Stone, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, August 1, 19141

MY DEAR SENATOR:

August 1, 1914.

In compliance with your request, I am sending you a comparison of the twenty treaties showing wherein they are identical and wherein they differ. The treaty with Salvador, signed August 7, 1913, is the first of this series, and the text of this treaty will be used as the basis for comparison.

The first clause of Article 1 of the Salvador treaty reads:

The High Contracting Parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust, shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding article;

This clause in the treaties with Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua and Persia is identical with Article 1 of the Salvador treaty, and in the treaties with Denmark, the United States of Venezuela, Norway, the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile is substantially the same, the difference being merely in the use of other words of the same meaning.

The first clause of Article 1 of the Netherland treaty reads:

The High Contracting Parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, to the settlement of which previous arbitration treaties or agreements do not apply in their terms or are not applied in fact, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding article;

and this language is followed substantially in the treaties with Bolivia, the Portuguese Republic, Switzerland, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic (see first sentence in Article III), Italy, Uruguay, and Brazil -the treaty with the United States of Brazil limits questions of an

1 MS. Department of State.

international character and this limitation is, of course, understood in the others. The exception in regard to arbitration to be found in the treaty with the Netherlands and in those that contain similar language is also understood. These treaties are intended to supplement other treaties, not abrogate them.

The last clause of Article I of the Salvador treaty will be found in all the treaties; where there is any change in the wording, the change does not affect the meaning. This clause embodies one of the essential principles of the plan, namely, that there shall be no declaration of war or commencement of hostilities until the investigation is concluded and the report prepared. The treaty with the Republic of Chile adds:

Nor before all resources stipulated in this treaty have proved unsuccessful.

The first paragraph of Article II of the Salvador treaty reads:

The International Commission shall be composed of five members, to be appointed as follows: One member shall be chosen from each country, by the Government thereof; one member shall be chosen by each Government from some third country; the fifth member shall be chosen by common agreement between the two Governments. The expenses of the Commission shall be paid by the two Governments in equal proportion.

This method of selection is followed in all the other treaties, but in three treaties, namely, those with Norway, the Argentine Republic, and the Republic of Chile, provision is made for the selection of the fifth member in case the two countries can not agree. In the treaty with the Argentine Republic the fifth member, in case of disagreement between the two countries, is to be chosen by the president of the Swiss Confederation. The treaty with Norway provides that, in case of disagreement, the fifth member shall be chosen according to Article 87 of the Hague Convention of 1907. The treaty with the United States of Venezuela provides that the selection of the fifth member may be submitted to the other four.

The treaties with the Netherlands, Bolivia, the Portuguese Republic, Denmark, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, the United States of Venezuela, Italy, Norway, Uruguay, and the Argentine Republic provide that the fifth member of the Commission shall not be a citizen of either of the contracting nations, and the treaties with the United States of Brazil and the Republic of Chile provide that the fifth

member shall not be a citizen of any of the countries represented by the other four commissioners. The treaties with the United States of Brazil and the Republic of Chile provide that the fifth member shall preside.

All the treaties provide that the expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the two countries.

In the treaties with Bolivia, Switzerland, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Italy, and Uruguay it is provided that the Commissioners are to receive compensation only when actually employed. While this is not stated in the other treaties, we may assume that the same is intended.

All the treaties provide that vacancies are to be filled in the same manner as the original appointments are made.

The treaties with Bolivia, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Italy, Uruguay, the United States of Brazil, the Argentine Republic, and the Republic of Chile provide that each party, before investigation begins, may withdraw any Commissioner appointed by it and substitute another of its choice. These treaties provide that, before investigation begins, either party may withdraw its consent to the fifth member, in which case the parties are to agree upon a substitute. The treaties with the United States of Brazil, the Argentine Republic, and the Republic of Chile provide that the Swiss Confederation shall select the fifth member if, before investigation begins, one of the two parties withdraws its consent to the fifth member and the two countries cannot agree upon his successor.

Nine of the treaties provide that the Commission shall be organized within four months after exchange of ratifications; seven of the treaties fix the time at six months and four provide that it shall be as soon as possible.

The treaty with Switzerland provides that the Commission shall make its own rules. The treaties with Denmark and Norway provide that the Hague Convention (1907) rules shall govern the Commission unless other rules are agreed upon by the parties.

The first paragraph of Article III of the Salvador treaty reads:

In case the High Contracting Parties shall have failed to adjust a dispute by diplomatic methods, they shall at once refer it to the International Commission for investigation and report. The International Commission may, however, act upon its own initiative, and in such case it shall notify both Governments and request their cooperation in the investigation.