lished international practice. Some of the President's "preparedness" speeches, however, were by no means consistent with that principle.

It is impossible to trace in detail the bewildering changes that followed the murder of Madero in February 1913. The three outstanding events were the occupation of Vera Cruz by America in April 1914, the resignation and abdication of Huerta in July of the same year, and the formal recognition of Carranza at the end of 1915. Mr. Wilson, having resolved under no circumstances to recognize Huerta, settled down, from the moment of taking office, to his policy of watchful waiting-hoping, while taking no active steps to give effect to the hope, for the defeat of the selfappointed President by the forces of Carranza and Villa, who claimed to represent constitutional government in Mexico. Events, however, gave no sign of moving in that direction, and the situation was rendered the more embarrassing by the studied correctness of Huerta's diplomatic attitude and the truculence of Carranza.

In an address to Congress at the end of August Mr. Wilson stood by his policy, but admitted that

• "To President Wilson's administration the country owes its thorough committal to two policies which nearly concern its righteousness and its dignity. The first of these policies is--no war with Mexico. The second is-no intervention by force of arms to protect on foreign soil American commercial and manufacturing adventurers who of their own free will have invested their money or risked their lives in foreign parts under alien jurisdiction. America has now turned her back on the familiar policy of Rome and Great Britain of protecting or avenging their wandering citizens by force of arms, and has set up quite a different policy of her own" (Dr. C. W. Eliot, Atlantic Monthly, October 1916).

He

so far it had had no satisfactory results. had sent a personal intermediary, ex-Governor Lind, of Minnesota, to urge Huerta to abandon his usurped position and arrange for the holding of a constitutional election at which he himself would not be a candidate. The proposal was declined. The President reaffirmed the neutrality of the United States, spoke hopefully of the ultimate effect of moral force, and declared an embargo on the export of arms from Union territory to Mexico. The embargo was destined to be raised and reimposed for different reasons several times in the next two years.

Huerta himself forced the next declaration by the President, his seizure of over a hundred deputies and the proclamation of an election to be held practically under duress evoking an announcement that no election held under such conditions could be recognized by Washington as valid. Anarchy continued, the undisciplined forces of Huerta, Carranza, Villa, and Zapata holding different parts of the country in subjection. In February 1914 the arms embargo was withdrawn, since it seemed to be injuring the Carranzists rather than Huerta. In April an unexpected incident precipitated a crisis. Early in that month a party of United States sailors who had landed at Tampico, the port of the Mexican oilfields, to obtain petrol, were put under arrest by a Huertist colonel. They were subsequently released with an apology, but Huerta, faced with a demand that the Mexican authorities should salute the American flag as an apology, pre

varicated and offered an unacceptable compromise. An ultimatum was dispatched by Mr. Bryan, as Secretary of State, and the President appealed to Congress to invest him with power to take such armed action as the situation might demand.

The House at once complied, but before the Senate could pass the necessary resolution orders were sent to the Admiral in command of the squadron off Mexico to seize the custom-house at Vera Cruz. Vigorous protests against the President's cavalier treatment of the Senate were entered by Senator Root, Senator Lodge, and others, but the explanation that immediate action was necessary in order to prevent the expected landing of a cargo of arms for Huerta was generally accepted as satisfactory. Incidentally a nice constitutional point had been raised, for while the President of the United States has unlimited authority over the armed forces of the Union, it is not he but Congress that declares war. If the landing at Vera Cruz was an act of war, the President had gone beyond his powers. Americans, however, were too anxious to know whether they were committed to a Mexican war to split hairs over the Constitution, and Mr. Wilson could count on the full support of the nation in any action he might find it necessary to take.

So far, however, all that was involved was a local and limited measure of intervention-intervention both uncontemplated and undesired by the interveners. To make matters worse, the Vera

Cruz landing was resented by Carranza, equally with Huerta, as an invasion of the sovereign rights of Mexico. But the possible dangers of the situation were averted, and though the American landing-party came in for some sharp fighting, though not merely the custom-house but the whole port was seized, and though the Occupation was maintained for nearly eight months, the feared breach between the United States and Mexico as a whole did not take place. President Wilson attended the funeral of seventeen American sailors killed at Vera Cruz, and declared that they had died in "a war of service." I

Meanwhile events had taken a new turn with the proposal of the so-called A. B. C. Powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, to mediate in the Mexican quarrel. This association of the South American Powers with the United States opened up large questions, on which something more must be said in another chapter.2 Their action was warmly welcomed by Mr. Wilson, and a

"We have gone down to Mexico to serve mankind if we can find a way. We do not want to fight the Mexicans; we want to serve them if we can. A war of aggression is not a war in which it is a proud thing to die, but a war of service is one in which it is a grand thing to die.

"I never was under fire, but I fancy there are some things just as hard to do as to go under fire. I fancy it is just as hard to do your duty when men are sneering at you as when they are shooting at you. When they shoot at you they can only take your natural life. When they sneer at you they can wound your heart. The cheers of the moment are not what a man ought to think about, but the verdict of his conscience and the conscience of mankind." (Speech at funeral at Brooklyn Navy Yard.)

2 P. 138, infra.

Mediation Conference, attended by representatives of all four Powers, met on Canadian soil at Niagara Falls in May 1914. Huertist delegates were present. Carranza, after temporizing and refusing, finally sent representatives, who were, however, excluded from the Conference because the leader for whom they professed to speak declined to assent to an armistice while deliberations were in progress.

The Niagara Falls Conference had no direct result, and fierce fighting continued in Mexico. The complications of the situation were increased by a quarrel between Carranza and Villa; but in the meantime Huerta's position was becoming more and more untenable, and his determination to resign was rumoured. In the middle of July he left Mexico City, and within a week he had set sail for Europe, having first nominated his Foreign Secretary, Francisco Carbajal, as Provisional President.

Huerta's elimination closed one chapter in the diplomatic contest with Mexico. Mr. Wilson had never consented to recognize him, though most of the European Powers had done so within a month of his usurpation, taking the view that he was at least the de facto ruler of Mexico and that to sustain his authority was the most effective way to secure the pacification of the country and the protection of foreign interests. The President was justified in claiming that his policy of watchful abstention had had its reward; but the question remained whether the result achieved had involved an undue sacrifice of American in