1. Conveyance to Husband and Wife.-
Survivorship.-Where real estate is
conveyed in fee simple to a man and
his wife, upon the death of the hus-
band he leaves no estate in such
land subject to the payment of his
debts, or that descends to his heirs;
but the widow becomes seized of the
whole estate to her sole use, by vir-
tue of her right of survivorship.
Simpson et al. v. Pearson, Adm'r....1
2. Same. Estoppel.-Where, at the
suit of a widow against the children
and heirs at law of her husband for
partition of land conveyed to the
husband and wife jointly, in accord-
ance with the prayer of the petition
a moiety was set off to the widow
in her own right and the other
moiety was divided between the
widow and children as land de-
scended to them from the husband;
Held, in a suit by the administrator of
the husband's estate, to subject to

sale for the payment of the dece-
dent's debts the land so set apart to
said children and heirs at law, that
the widow and heirs were not cs-
topped by the proceedings in the
partition suit from denying that the
husband died seized in fee of a moi-
ety of the land, or from asserting
the truth in relation to the title. Ibid.

Wife's Separate Real Estate -Con-
tract. In this State, in order to en-
force the contract of a married wo-
man against her separate real estate,
her intent to deal with the property
must appear, and may not be as-
sumed, and the contract must be one
from which benefit results to the
property. Kantrowitz et al. v. Pra-
ther et ux......

....92

Same.-Profits of Real Estate.-So
far as the profits of a married wo-
man's real estate are concerned,
effect will be given to her contract
where she has indicated her purpose
to deal with such profits.........Ibid.
Same.-Protecting Supervision of
Chancery.-It must appear that any
contract relating to the property of
a married woman, which it is sought
to enforce in equity, is conscionable,
and where it relates to the better-
ment of her real estate, that it is
reasonably calculated to promote
that end..........
.........Ibid.

Same. Intent. The fact that
credit for goods sold to a married
woman is given her upon the faith
of her separate property, is not suffi-
cient to create a charge against her
land or its income; she must also
herself intend to contract with re-
gard to her separate estate...... Ibid.

Same.-Wife's Power over her Real
Estate A married woman has, in
this State, whatever power is inci-
dent to a complete holding and full
enjoyment of her separate real es-
tate, with a restriction upon her
power to incumber or alienate the
same. Lindley et al. v. Cross cl

9. Same.-Court's Protecting Control.
The power of a married woman to
make new improvements upon her
real estate, for the purpose of pre-
venting its abuse, is under the con-
trol of the court trying the cause
involving the liability of her sepa-
rate property to answer for the debts
so created...
...Ibid.
10. Same.- Pleading.— Mechanic's
Lien.-A complaint to enforce a
material-man's lien for lumber fur-
nished to erect a dwelling house up-
on the separate real estate of a mar-
ried woman, the portion relating to
the lien showing an insufficient no-
tice, was held bad on demurrer, for
want of averment that the dwelling
house was necessary and proper for
a full and complete enjoyment by
the married woman of the real es-
tate in question..............
...Ibid.

11. Contract. Our statutes do not
change the rule of the common law,
so far as it applies to the contracts
at large of a married woman, that
she is incapable of binding herself
by an executory contract, and that
all such contracts made by her,
whether in writing or by parol, are
absolutely void at law. O' Daily v.
Morris
.111
12. Same.-Promissory Note.-A mar-
ried woman carrying on a business
in her own name and living with
her husband, whom by a written
instrument she had made her agent
to manage her business, borrowed
for her own use a sum of money,
which was delivered to her person-
ally, for which she and her husband
executed a promissory note, the
payee relying on her for its payment.
Held, in a suit on the note, after the
woman had been divorced from her
said husband and while she was still
unmarried, that she was not person-
ally liable on the note............ Ibid.

13.

Wife's Separate Property.-Part-
ner. A married woman cannot bind
herself as the partner of her hus-
band; nor do the facts that she holds
herself out as such partner and that
her property gives credit to the pre-
tended firm, charge her property
with an indebtedness contracted by
such firm in the course of trade.
Montgomery et ux. v. Sprankle et

dence. A married woman carried
on the business of a clothing mer-
chant in her own name, employing
her husband as a clerk, the money
invested in the business having been
received by her during coverture,
through a trustee, as a gift from her
brother, to be invested in such busi-
ness, and when so invested to be
under her sole control, the business
to be carried on in her name and for
her sole use and benefit, and in the
event of her death the money to go
to her children by her said husband.
Held, that personal property purchased
by her with the proceeds of said
business was not subject to the debts
of her said husband.

Held, also, in a suit by such married
woman to recover such personal
property, levied upon under an exe-
cution issued on a judgment against
her said husband, that there was no
error in admitting in evidence a
written agreement between her said
brother and said trustee, under
which the money was advanced to
her, its execution having been
proved. Bellows et al. v. Rosen-
thal......

.116

15. Same.-Rents and Profits.-The
ruling in Kantrowitz v. Prather, an-
te, p. 92, adhered to. Copeland v. Cun-
ningham et ux..
.116

16.

17.

Duress.-Much less force or put-
ting in fear by a husband will amount
to coercion which will avoid the
deed of his wife than would be nec-
essary coming from a stranger. Rich-
ardson v. Hittle.........
119

Same.- Wife's Separate Property.
Mortgage.-Suit upon a note paya-
ble in bank and a mortgage to secure
the same, executed by husband and
wife and assigned to the plaintiff.
Answer by the wife, showing that
the note and mortgage were given
for the debt of the husband, and
that the land mortgaged was the
separate property of the wife, and
averring, "that she was induced by
the persuasions of said payee and
the coercion of her said husband to
execute said note and mortgage."
Held, that the answer was bad on de-
Ibid.

murrer.........

18. Wife's Separate Real Estate.-
Contract. In this State, a married
woman can charge her real estate
by such contracts only as are rea-

sonably calculated to make the cs-
tate profitable to her, or to preserve
it, or to protect her title thereto.
Smith v. Howe et ux.................

.233
19. Same.-A married woman who
owns real estate in her own sepa-
rate right and is in the habit of mak-
ing contracts in her own name
without the co-operation of her hus-
band, who has abandoned her and
is residing in another state, cannot
charge such real estate by her writ-
ten agreement to pay a certain sum
to a third person if he will tell her
the whereabouts of her husband so
that she can find him.......... Ibid.
20. Agency of Husband.-A man
loaned money belonging to his wife,
taking notes therefor in his own
name, but declaring at the time, that
it was his wife's money, and after-
wards kept the notes distinct from
those received on the loan of other
funds. The administrator of the
husband's estate took possession of
such notes as a part of the estate,
with notice of the wife's claim there-
to, and collected the money thereon.
Held, that the administrator was liable
to the wife for the money so collect-
cd.
Fowler v. Rice........ .258

I

IMPRISONMENT.

Term of. See CRIMINAL LAW, 23.

IMPROVEMENTS.

See MORTGAGE, 1.
INCOHATE RIGHTS.
See REPEAL OF Laws, 1, 2.

INCUMBRANCE.

See PRACTICE, 3; VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER, 2.

INDEMNITY.

See CONTRACT, 8.

INDIAN TREATY.

1. Grant.-Relation.-A section of land,
to be located under the direction of
the President, was granted to a cer-

tain person by an Indian treaty;
and after the death of the grantee
the proper court, upon petition of the
guardian of the grantee's heirs at
law, ordered the sale of the unloca-
ted section; and, the land having
been located by the assignee of the
purchaser at such guardian's sale,
the proper court ordered a convey-
ance of the specific land to such
assignee, which was made, but never
approved by the President.
Held, that, by the doctrine of relation,
the treaty operated instantly in law
as a grant, the subsequent location
of the land merely ascertaining the
specific thing which was granted.
Held, also, that the approval of the
President was not necessary to the
validity of the guardian's deed of
conveyance. Dequindre et al. v. Wi-

2.

Same.-Case Stated.-Suit by the
heirs at law of A. against B., to re-
cover certain real estate. Trial upon
the following agreed statement of
facts: A section of land was granted
by treaty with the Potawatamies, of
October 16th, 1826, to A., to be lo-
cated under the direction of the
President. It was located, in 1837,
in Allen county, without the terri-
tory ceded by the Indians under
said treaty, the premises in contro-
versy being a part of that section.
In 1828, A. died, in Illinois, where
he then resided, leaving a widow
and children surviving him, who
continued to reside in Illinois until
1831, when they removed to Knox
county, in this State, prior to which
they had no property in Indiana,
except the unlocated land. It ap-
peared by the record of certain pro-
ceedings in Knox county, that on
the 10th of August, 1829, the court
doing probate business, held by the
Associate Judges, appointed a guar-
dian of A.'s children, the plaintiffs
in this action, and that "there being
no property," no bond was required.
The bond required by law was to be
in double the value of the personal
property. On the following day, the
guardian presented his petition to
sell the unlocated section, and, after
an appraisement at $800, the sale
was ordered, the guardian to give
bond with suretics approved, within
thirty days, but no such bond ap-

INJURIA SINE DAMNO.

See RESCISSION, G.
INSANITY.

1. Criminal Law.-Where a person is
moved to the commission of an un-
lawful act by an insane impulse, con-
trolling his will and his judgment,!
he is not guilty of a crime; and if
he is a monomaniac on any subject,
it is wholly immaterial upon what
subject, so that the insane impulse
leads to the commission of the act.
Stevens v. The State.................485
2. Same. Knowledge of Right and
Wrong. On the trial of an indict-
ment for murder in the first degree,
the court instructed the jury, that if
they believed from the evidence
"that the defendant knew the dif-
ference between right and wrong in
respect to the act in question, if he
was conscious that such act was one
which he ought not to do, and if
that act was at the same time con-
trary to the law of the State, then
he is responsible for his acts."
Held, that this is not law........... Ibid.
3. Same. So far as a person acts
under the influence of mental dis-
case, he is not criminally account-
able; and the jury in a criminal
case must be satisfied beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the defendant's
mental capacity to commit the crime
charged.

4. Sumc.-Evidence.-The defendant
in a criminal case is not required to
prove his insanity in order to avail
himself of that defense, but merely
to create a reasonable doubt on this
point, whereupon the burden of
proving his sanity falls upon the
state. Bradley v. The State......492

1.

2.

Rate of upon Judgments.—The act
of 1867, increasing the maximum
rate of interest to ten per cent., when
that rate is provided for by contract
in writing, does not affect the third
section of the act of 1861, enacting,
that "interest on a judgment, or
decree for money, shall be from the
date of signing until the same be
satisfied, at the rate per cent. agreed
upon by the parties in the original
contract, not exceeding six per cent.,
and if there was no contract by the
parties as to interest, then at the
rate of six dollars a year on one
hundred dollars." Smith v. Thom-
.........280

as..

Same.-Suit on a promissory note,
dated April 8th, 1868, and provid-
ing for the payment of interest at