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Senator Mccumber. At the time of the passage of the act, there was considerable opposition to it?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Mccumber. And ill-feeling?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Mccumber. But you think that has gradually worn away?

Prof. Williams. Yes. I think that the people generally in China are very friendly in their feeling toward the United States, because they are trying to establish a republic and they feel that we are a sort of model for them.

Senator Williams. Prof. Williams, can you make any offhand approximate estimate of the value of the general concessions at Kiaochow and Shantung which were demanded of China, under this treaty?

Prof. Williams. You mean the value of the real estate there?

Senator Williams. The value of the property of every description.

Prof. Williams. No; I could not give that.

Senator Williams. The value mainly consists of a return of political jurisdiction.

Prof. Williams. That is right.

Senator Williams. Do you know what the value is of the German ships which were seized in Chinese waters %

Prof. Williams. No; they seized six or eight German and several Austrian vessels, but I do not remember what the values are.

Senator Williams. You do not know that?

Prof. Williams. No.

Senator Williams. You think that the balance due on the Boxer fund, due to Germany, which is released to China, comes to about $60,000,000?

Prof. Williams. That is simply a guess.

Senator Williams. I understand that is only an approximate estimate, as well as you can make it offhand.

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Williams. I notice the phrase here, "international residence." I suppose that means a place of residence of nationals of all the various parties to the treaty. It uses the phrase, "international residence."

Prof. Williams. That means that any foreigners who come to China may reside there.

Senator Williams. Yes. It is a rather peculiar phrase—"international residence." I suppose of course that is what it means.

Senator Moses. Do you regard, Dr. Williams, that these provisions in article 128, were inserted as a quid pro quo for the cession of the Shantung Province to Japan?

Prof. Williams. No.

Senator Moses. They were merely settlements growing out of the war, were they not?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Moses. There was no other country to which these proposed concessions could be returned except China, was there?

Prof. Williams. No; and in the early draft of the clause we included all German property in China.

Senator Moses. Including Kiaochow?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Moses. When you say "we," whom do you mean?

Prof. Williams. The American experts.

Senator Moses. And at the instance of Japan, Kiaochow was segregated from the others?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions?

Senator Johnson of California. Before you conclude let me ask what were your particular duties as expert at Paris?

Prof. Williams. My duties were of two sorts. As an expert on far eastern affairs, I prepared memoranda for the American commission on any question that they might refer to us or on questions that came up in the correspondence with the commission. And secondly, I was there largely as a chief of the far eastern section of the Secretary of State, because a great deal of correspondence that came to the Department of State here with regard to the Far East was referred to Secretary Lansing in Paris, and all that correspondence had to pass through my hands, and I would bring the matter to his attention and draft replies and consult with him about the disposition of these questions. They were entirely independent of the commission.

Senator Johnson of California. You were to advise as to what disposition should be made of various matters in the Far East?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Johnson of California. And the most important matter that came to you was the Shantung matter?

Prof. Williams. Quite so.

Senator Johnson of California. And on that your advice was not taken?

Prof. Williams. Quite so.

Senator Johnson of California. Was there any other matter of any consequence there upon which your advice was asked?

Prof. Williams. Oh, yes; with regard to the settlement of the opium question and with regard to the disposition of German properties elsewhere, outside of Shantung.

Senator Johnson of California. Do you mean the islands of the Pacific?

Prof. Williams. The islands of the Pacific also.

Senator Johnson of California. They were divided in accordance with a secret treaty, were they not?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Johnson of California. So far as your duties were concerned, they were superseded by the treaties that had been made prior to the peace conference?

Prof. Williams. Not entirely, but practically so.

Senator Williams. With regard to the islands?

Senator Johnson of California. Not only the islands but Shantung.

Senator Williams. Kiaochow.

Prof. Williams. But it is Shantung, Senator.

Senator Williams. It is a comprehensive term.

Senator Johnson of California. The treaty says "Shantung," too.

So far as the settlement of the Far East was concerned, on which you were the adviser and expert, the settlements were made substantially in accordance with secret treaties that had been made during the progress of the war, and before our entrance into the war.

Prof. Williams. Yes; quite so. The islands south of the Equator were not ceded to Japan, but she has been made mandatory.

Senator Johnson of California. Which gives her control over the islands?

Prof. Williams. Quite so.

Senator Moses. You say she has been made mandatory?

Prof. Williams. Yes.

Senator Moses. I have been informed somewhere that no mandatories have yet been issued.

Prof. Williams. I am subject to correction, but I read a statement in the Paris papers in April that Japan was made mandatory temporarily.

Senator Johnson of California. The statement has been made that Britain has those north of the Equator and Japan those south of the Equator.

The Chairman. That is stated in the dispatch of the British ambassador at Tokyo.

Senator Williams. The Senator is technically wrong. Since then it has been turned over to Australia and New Zealand.

Prof. Williams. You are right.

Senator Brandegee. May I ask you a question? Have you any knowledge to what extent the opium traffic has increased, if it has increased at all, since Japan has had the Shantung concession?

Prof. Williams. According to the statement of the Chinese who were at the peace conference, it increased tremendously during the three or four years of Japanese occupation of Tsingtao. I have a statement made by Liang Chi Chao, if you would care to hear it.

Senator Brandegee. I would like to have it put into the record. Is he a competent authority?

Prof. Williams. He is the greatest living Chinese scholar, and he was one of the men, in 1898, who was condemned to death but escaped to Japan, where he has many friends.

The Chairman. You can put that in the record.

(The statement referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)

Contraband opium and morphia became common articles; it has been estimated that no less than 12 tons of morphia and 65 tonB of opium were smuggled into Shantung in 1918 alone.

The Chairman. If there are no further questions, you can be excused, Prof. Williams.

Mr. Millard desires that a three-page memorandum that he has submitted modifying his testimony may be printed as part of his testimonv. If there is no objection, that will be done.

(Mr. Millard's memorandum is here printed in full, as follows:)

Memorandum By Thomas F. Millard, Submitted August 20, 1919.
"regional Understandings" And The Shantung Decision.

Definition of regional understandings.—Article 21 of the proposed covenant of the league of nations validates "regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine" which are in existence at the time the league is organized, and other such understandings made later that are approved by the league.

Another article of the covenant provides that all members of the league must inform all the other members of any and all treaties, agreements, pacts, alliances, and regional understandings (or the article is presumed to have that meaning) that exist among members of the league, or between members of the league and nations not members of the league.

A reading of the various articles of the covenant bearing on this phase of international relations under the league indicates that members of the league will have until a time after the formal organization of the league to make and to declare whatever regional understandings they have, and that such regional understandings thus formally declared to the league within that time shall be recognized as valid.

A point has been advanced that only regional understandings which properly are "like the Monroe doctrine" will be made valid by article 21 of the covenant.

Conditions affecting interpretation of article tl.-—Only the Monroe doctrine is mentioned by name in article 21 as being a valid regional understanding under the terms of the covenant. But the language of the article expresslv indicates that it is the purpose of the article to validate regional understandings other than the Monroe doctrine.

It may be that subsequent to the organization of a league a question may be raised upon the presentation of some regional understanding, as to whether it is "like the Monroe doctrine." If a difference of view develops on that point, it would be a question to be decided by the governing body of the league. The decision of the question in each particular case would depend on the alignment of votes in the governing body of the league.

For the purpose of the argument, let us assume, for instance, that after the American Government signs the treaty of peace and the covenant and an Anglo-French-American alliance in the present form of those treaties, the league is formally notified of a regional understanding covering Asia entered into mutually by the British, French, and Japanese Governments.

Let us further assume that that regional understanding would be regarded by the American Government as not "like the Monroe doctrine," but, on the contrary, as being subversive of the principles of the Monroe doctrine, and as destructive of that counterpart of the Monroe doctrine in Asia, the Hay doctrine. In that case, the American Government probably would enter objection to such an arrangement as being not in conformity with article 21.

In such a case, it is probable that the British and French and Japanese Governments would take an opposite view of the meaning of article 21, whereupon the issue would depend on a vote of the governing body of the league.

The constitution of the governing body of the league is such that it would be almost certain that the American Government would be outvoted on such an issue.

If it was held (and accepted) that the four powers directly involved in the dispute should be excluded from voting on the decision of it, and they were excluded, ana the decision was left to the remaining members of the governing body, it also is practically certain that the American Government would be outvoted, for these reasons:

(a) There are known to exist more than twenty regional understandings about Asia, involving all the great powers except the United States. Also, it is suspected that several other regional understandings exist whose texts never have been disclosed.

(6) Outside of Asia, there are many known and probably also many secret regional understandings in existence, involving all of the great "powers except the Tjnited States, and also involving a majority of the leaser nations that are expected to be members of the league.

(c) That condition establishes a situation whereby almost all the members of the league except the United States have regional understandings which thev may desire to make valid under the league. In that situation it is highly probable, and it certainly is possible, that the members having regional understandings which they want to sustain will combine to define article 21 as meaning to include regional understandings of whatever character that were made before the formal organization of the league.

The application to China and the Hay doctrine.—Even since the Paris conference met, there have been several distinct intimations of the purpose of some of the principal powers to advance certain regional understandings about China as the basis for international action regarding China.

In connection with the newly formed international (four-power) financial group to operate in Chinai it already is reported that the Japanese Government will insist that Manchuria and Shantung will be excepted from the operations of the group, Japan reserving those regions for her exclusive economic exploitation.

If the Japanese Government has developed, or subsequently does develop this attitude, it can be taken for certain that the British, French, and other Governments which have regional understandings about China based on the "sphere of influence" thesis will insist in maintaining their exclusive rights under those regional understandings.

That would array three of the four members of the new financial group in opposition to the American member of the group, and, since the United States has no ''sphere" or any regional understanding regarding China or Asia, giving it any special privileges in any region, such a situation will be tantamount to excluding America, and will ■defeat the announced purposes and objects of the banking group.

Such a situation will effectively prevent any effort to relieve China of the "sphere" condition, and will fasten it upon her more strongly than before.

Note.—The statements of the President at his conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 19 positively demonstrated how the existence of secret regional understandings can compel, or induce, the American Government to yield on important questions.

It, therefore, is possible that the American Government may find, after it has ratified the treaty, the covenant, and the proposed alliance, that new secret regional understandings may thereafter be consummated which can be made valid under the league.

P. S.—By this means, Japan may secure the "better means" to enforce her understanding of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and of her promises to return Shantung.

The Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow at 11 o'clock, when it will meet in the committee room in the Capitol in executive session.

(Thereupon, at 12.05 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, August 23, 1919, at 11 o'clock a. m.)

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