"The sun will not rise," said Mr. Dorr, " upon any recantation by me of the truths of '76, or of any one of the sound principles of American freedom.

"The servants of a righteous cause may fail or fall in the defence of it. It may go down; but all the truth that it contains is indestructible, and will be treasured up by the great mass of our countrymen.

"If I have erred in this Rhode Island question," said Mr. Dorr, " I have the satisfaction of having erred with the greatest statesmen and the highest authorities, and with the great majority of the people of the United States; and I have the satisfaction also of reflecting that all errors of judgment here will be corrected by the great tribunal of public opinion, which assures to all ultimate and impartial justice."

The following is an extract from the closing argument of Mr. Turner:

After all, gentlemen, who is the prisoner at the bar ? and how came he now before you for trial? Mr. Dorr is an educated gentleman, of the most respectable family and connections. It is also in evidence that he, personally, has stood high in the confidence and esteem of his fellow-citizens. He has represented the city of Providence in the General Assembly. At the time he is charged with having levied war against the state, he was the treasurer of the Rhode Island Historical Society, and had in his hands the funds of that institution to a large amount. He was a commissioner of the Scituate Bank, having control of its funds and securities, under an appointment of the legislature; and he was president of the school committee of the city of Providence. It appears also, that, as administrator or trustee, he had in his hands large amounts of the property of private individuals. During the troubles that followed the affair at the arsenal - the destitution of men,

arms, ammunition, provisions, and money of the Chepatchet campaign - during his protracted exile from the state did Governor Dorr embezzle, divert, or misapply these funds, or a farthing of them? No, gentlemen; as is shown by the testimony of Mr. Burgess, he guarded the whole with the most scrupulous care, guided by the highest sense of honor, and placed them, undiminished, beyond the reach of the perils which environed his own position. With this evidence before you, does he carry about with him any of the marks of that rowdyism of which we have heard so much? Have not his whole course of life, his sentiments, and his actions, been such as to free him from the imputation of having, in any thing, been governed by other motives than a desire and a zeal for the best interests of his fellow-citizens and of the state?

It has been urged by the opening counsel for the state, that the prisoner, taking counsel from his fears at Chepatchet, ran away from the state. It would have been an act, not of wisdom or courage, but of the wildest folly, for Mr. Dorr to have bared his devoted head to the whirlwind of popular fury that then swept over the state; or, under legislative martial law, to have confided his fate to the tender mercies of a drum head court martial. But when the tempest had apparently passed over - when the excitement had become somewhat allayed by time - when martial law no longer fettered the legal tribunals of the state - he came voluntarily back to the state, and submitted himself to its tribunals. He came, (when large rewards failed to bring him,) because this was his native state- his home and because he expected, and had a right to expect, that he should be tried by a jury of his peers of the vicinages amongst whom he had always lived, and for whose benefit alone he had acted. He is now in your hands ; and I repeat, gentlemen, that, in deciding on his case, you may decide upon your own fate and that of your

posterity; your decision may involve the fate of American freedom - nay, of civil liberty itself.

Finally, gentlemen, if the evidence to which I have directed your attention should fail to satisfy your minds fully as to the purity of the prisoner's intentions, and the absence of treasonable design on his part, and doubts remain on the subject, you are bound (and will be so instructed by the court) to throw those doubts into the scale of the prisoner, and return a verdict of acquittal. I now leave him with you, under the conviction that the moment you take his life and liberty into your hands, you, at the same time, commit your characters through life, and your memories after death, to the award and decision of the great tribunal of public opinion; and I hope and trust that at its hands you may receive that justice which, in behalf of the prisoner, I claim at your hands.

bis

When all the arguments for and against the prisoner were finished, Chief Justice Durfee delivered a lengthy charge to the jury, after which they retired, and soon returned and pronounced their verdict of guilty.

On the 25th of June, Mr. Dorr was brought into court for sentence, and when he was asked by the court if he had any thing to say why sentence should not be pronounced against him, replied as follows:

The court have, through their officer, addressed to the defendant the usual question, whether he have any thing to say why sentence should not now be pronounced upon him. I have something to say, which shall be brief and intelligible to the court, though it must be necessarily unavailing. Without seeking to bring myself in controversy with the court, I am desirous to declare to you the plain truth.

I am bound, in duty to myself, to express to you my deep and solemn conviction that I have not received at your hands the fair trial by an impartial jury, to which, by law and justice, I was entitled.

The trial has been permitted to take place in a county where, to say the least, it was doubtful whether the defendant could be tried according to the law of the state; and in a case of doubt like this, he ought to have had the benefit of it, especially as the trial here must be in a county to which the defendant was a stranger, in the midst of his most excited political opponents.

All but one of those freeholders, (one hundred and eight in number,) who were summoned here for the purpose of selecting a jury to try the defendant, were of the opposite party in the state, and were deliberately set against the defendant with the feelings of partisan hostility. The single democratic juror was set aside for having expressed an opinion. Of the drawn jurors, sixteen in number, two only were members of the democratic party; and one of them for cause, and the other for alleged cause, was removed.

Every one of the jury finally selected to try the defendant was, of course, a political opponent. And even as so constituted, the jury were not permitted to have the whole case presented to their consideration. They were not-as in capital, if not in all criminal, cases they are entitled to be - permitted to judge of the law and of the fact. The defendant and his counsel were not permitted to argue to the jury any matter of law.

The court refused to hear the law argued to themselves, except on the question whether treason be an offence against a state or against the United States.

The court refused to permit the defendant to justify himself by proving the constitution, the election, and the authority under which he acted; or to permit him to produce the same proofs, in order to repel the charges of malicious and traitorous motives made in the indict

ment, and zealously urged against him by the counsel

for the state.

By the charge of the judge, the jury were instructed that the only question which they had to try was, whether the defendant intended to do the acts which he performed - a question of capacity rather than of motives and intentions.

It is true that the jury were absent more than two hours; but not for deliberation. One of them was asked, immediately after the verdict was delivered and the jury was discharged, whether they had been detained by any disagreement. He replied, "We had nothing to do. The court had made every thing plain

for us."

On hearing a bill of exceptions to the verdict thus rendered, the court promptly overruled all the points of law.

The court also denied to the defendant an opportunity of showing to them that three of the jurors, before they were empanelled, manifested strong feelings, and had made use of vindictive and hostile expressions against him personally, after the defendant had established by his affidavit the fact that he was not informed of this hostility of feeling and expression before they were empanelled, and, with regard to two of them, before the verdict was rendered. The defendant expected to prove, by twelve witnesses, that one of these jurors had expressed a wish to have the defendant put to death, and had declared, shortly after the verdict, to a person inquiring the result, that "he had convicted the defendant, and that this was what he intended to do;" that another juror had also declared that the defendant ought to be executed; and that the third had frequently made the same declaration, with a wish that he might be permitted to do the work of an executioner, or to shoot him as he would a serpent, and put him to