CHAPTER III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. rule of tion. THE object of all judicial construction of statutes General is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, and constructhe method of attaining that object is to consider the whole of each statute, reading all its sentences grammatically in the order which has been adopted by its framers, and giving every word its full and proper meaning. Although this rule is not stated exactly in these words in any of the decisions from which it is deduced, every branch of it is supported by abundant authority. tain the of the ture. First, with regard to the intention of the Legis- To ascer lature. It has always been held that this inten- intention tion, when ascertained in a legitimate manner, is Legislato guide and govern the construction of statutes. "The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament," says Tindal, C.J., "is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed them. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such case best declare the intention of the lawgiver" (a). The older authorities are equally emphatic in declaring that the intention of the Legislature is chiefly to be regarded. "Whoever would consider an Act well ought always to have particular regard to the intent of it, and, according as the intent appears, he ought to construe the words" (b). Acts of Parliament "are always construed and expounded according to the intent and meaning of the parties thereto, and not by any strict or strained construction" (c). It is true that when the earlier writers turn from the intention of the Legislature to the manner in which it is to be ascertained, they frequently use expressions which are open to misconception. In several instances they speak of the intention of the Legislature as if it was something separate from the language by means of which it is expressed. Thus Lord Coke says that every Act of Parliament consists of the letter and of the meaning of the makers of the Act (d). Thus, too, it is stated in Plowden: "Everything which is within the intent of the makers of the Act, although it be not within the letter, is as strongly within the Act as that which is within the letter and intent also" (e). And in another case: "The intent of statutes is more to be regarded and pursued than the precise letter of them, for oftentimes things (a) Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. & Fin. at p. 143. (e) Stowel v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. at p. 366. which are within the words of statutes are out of the purview of them, which purview extends no further than the intent of the makers of the Act, and the best way to construe an Act of Parliament is according to the intent rather than according to the words" (f). Again, in a third case in the same reports we read: "The sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite different to the letter in some appearance, which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the Legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the Act, sometimes by comparing one part of the Act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances; so that they have ever been guided by the intent of the Legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant to reason and good discretion" (g). These expressions are not strictly accurate, and if they are taken as they stand they are apt to be misleading. They may indeed be properly considered as drawing a distinction between the letter and the spirit of an Act of Parliament, and as laying down the rule that the manifest object of a statute is not to be defeated by some apparent deficiency in its language (h). Unfortunately these have induced some passages persons to embark in a discussion of the course (f) Eyston v. Studd, Plowd. at p. 464. See also Bac. Abr. Tit. Statute I. 5, People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johnson, at p. 381. (g) Stradling v. Morgan, Plowd. at p. 205. (h) Huxham v. Wheeler, 3 H. & C. at p. 80, per Pullock, C.B. that ought to be pursued when the words of a statute do not agree with the intention of the Legislature. Whether in such a case the words ought to prevail over the intention, or the intention over the words, might be an interesting question, were it not that any such discussion would proceed upon an entire forgetfulness of the leading principle of construction. The intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained by means of the words which it has used, and though these words are often modified, though their literal sense is not always adopted, though they are sometimes strained, transposed, treated as inadequate or as superfluous, they are still the only interpreters of the mind of the Legislature. "All Acts of Parliament," it is said in an early case, "shall be taken by reasonable construction to be collected out of the words of the Acts themselves, according to the true intent and meaning of the makers of the Act" (i). And in another case reported in the same volume it is stated that "the judges said they ought not to make any construction against the express letter of the statute, for nothing can so express the meaning of the makers of the Act as their own direct words, for index animi sermo. And it would be dangerous to give scope to make a construction in any case against the express words when the meaning of the makers doth not appear to the contrary, and when no inconvenience will thereupon follow; and therefore in such cases a verbis legis non recedendum est" (k). Similar (i) Lord Mountjoy's Case, 5 Rep. 5 a, b. (k) Edrich's Case, 5 Rep. at p. 118 b. "In rules are laid down in more modern cases. construing an Act of Parliament our first business, I conceive, is to examine the words themselves which are used; and if in these there be no ambiguity it is seldom desirable to go further; the object is only to ascertain the mind of the Legislature as expressed in words" (1). "The Court knows nothing of the intention of an Act except from the words in which it is expressed, applied to the facts existing at the time" (m). is not to be Thus, the intention of the Legislature is not to Intention be made the subject of guess-work or of specu- guessed at. lation, nor is it to be inferred from any other materials than those which are found within the statute. The Courts are not to "fish out what may possibly have been the intention of the Legislature" (n), or to speculate on the intention of the Legislature when the words it has used are plain (0), or to draw any general inference from the nature of the objects dealt with by a statute (p), or from a consideration of what might have been wise and prudent (q), or of what would have been done if an existing state of things had been contemplated by the Legislature ("), or to extend the language of a statute beyond its natural meaning for the purpose of including cases, simply because (1) Pocock v. Pickering, 18 Q. B. at pp. 797, 798, per Coleridge, J. (m) Logan v. Earl Courtown, 13 Beav. 22; 20 L. J. Ch. 347. (n) Crawford v. Spooner, 6 Moore's P. C. at p. 9, per Lord Brougham. (0) Samuel v. Nettleship, 3 Q. B. at p. 192, per Patteson, J.; Holt v. Miers, 5 M. & W. at p. 173; R. v. Latimer, 15 Q. B. at p. 1080, per Coleridge, J. (p) Fordyce v. Bridges, 1 H. L. C. 1. (q) Humfray v. Scroope, 13 Q. B. pp. 512, 513. (r) R. v. Glamorganshire Canal Co., 3 E. & E. at p. 200. |