no good reason can be assigned for their exclusion (s). "I cannot concede," says Coleridge, J., "that we are at liberty upon any ground whatever to add a new term to the statute. In saying this I am not unmindful of the dicta to be found in our books, nor of decisions upon old statutes which seem to warrant a more free dealing with the written law; and whenever Acts of Parliament shall again be framed with the generality and conciseness with which the Legislature spoke some centuries since, it may be fit to consider the soundness of that principle of interpretation which they involve; but it is enough to say that it is wholly inapplicable to a modern statute, in which the Legislature is careful to express all it intends in so many words that to go beyond their necessary implication is to make, not to interpret, law. The principle, then, on which I rely will not let in the consideration of particular circumstances in each case, or a regard to a greater or less degree of convenience, a more or less complete effect to be given to the presumed intent of the Legislature. Nothing, in short, which is founded on what the Legislature might better have done, or simply even what the Legislature intended; the sole legitimate inquiry is, I conceive, what intention is to be found in the words of the Act, expressed or implied; unless by words written, or words necessarily implied, and therefore virtually written, the intention has been declared, we cannot give effect to it” (t). Acting upon the principle thus stated, the Courts (s) Denn v. Reid, 10 Peters, 524; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584. (t) Gwynne v. Burnell, 7 Cl. & Fin. at p. 607. have felt constrained to give the words of statutes their natural meaning, even when there was the strongest ground for supposing that such a construction was not consonant with the intention of the Legislature (u). In one case it was indeed suggested that if the words of an Act were ungrammatical and insensible, the Court might put such a meaning upon them as it conjectured they were originally intended to bear (x). But at other times a stricter rule has prevailed, and it has been held that where the words of an Act are useless and incapable of a meaning, and an alteration of those words would probably express what the Legislature intended, the Court cannot alter the words or supply the meaning (y). "We cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the Act," said Lord Brougham, in words similar to those which had been used by Lord Eldon (2); "we cannot add and mend and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there" (a). inferred For the same reason the intention of the Legis- Not to be lature is not to be inferred from any external evi- from dence. If a statute is not clearly worded, its Par- external liamentary history is "wisely inadmissible" to explain it (b). The Court cannot consider what (u) R. v. Commissioners of Thames and Isis Navigation, 5 A. & E. at p. 816, per Lord Denman, C.J.; Nowell v. Mayor of Worcester, 9 Ex. at p. 465, per Pollock, C.B. (x) Doe d. Davenish v. Moffatt, 15 Q. B. at pp. 263, 261. (y) Green v. Wood, 7 Q. B. at p. 185, per Lord Denman, C.J. p. 371. (a) Crawford v. Spooner, 6 Moore, P. C. at p. 9. See, too, R. v. Mabe, Inhabitants, 3 A. & E. at p. 534, per Lord Denman, C.J. (b) R. v. Hertford College, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. at p. 707. evidence. was the intention of the member of Parliament by whom any measure was introduced (c). It cannot look at the reports of commissions which preceded the passing of statutes, and upon which those statutes were founded. Thus it was held that the reports and recommendations of the Real Property Commissioners (d), of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners (e), of the Common Law (f) and of the Chancery (g) Commissioners, were not legitimate guides to the construction of statutes. So, too, the plans and sections of intended lines of railway, or of other works which are exhibited during the passage of bills through Parliament, are not, unless they are incorporated by reference in the Acts when passed, to be regarded in their construction (). The Court cannot look at the history of a clause, or of the introduction of a proviso (), nor at debates in Parliament (), nor at amendments (c) See M'Master v. Lomax, 2 Myl. & Keen, 32; Cameron v. Cameron, ibid. 289. (d) Salkeld v. Johnson, 2 C. B. at p. 756, per Tindal, C.J.; Farley v. Bonham, 2 J. & H. 177; 30 L. J. C. 239. (e) Matter of Dean of York, 2 Q. B. at p. 34. (f) Martin v. Hemming, 24 L. J. Ex. at p. 5; 18 Jur. at p. 1004 ; Arding v. Bonner, 2 Jur. N. S. at p. 764. (g) Ewart v. Williams, 3 Drew. 21, 24. (h) North British Rail. Co. v. Tod, 12 Cl. & Fin. 722; R. v. Caledonian Rail. Co., 16 Q. B. 19; Beardmer v. L. and N. W. Rail. Co., 1 Maen. & G. 112, 1 Hall & Twells, 161; Att.-Gen. v. G. E. Rail. Co., L. R. 7 Ch. 475, 6 H. L. 367; Edinburgh Street Tramways Co. v. Black, L. R. 2 Scotch Ap. 336; Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., 3 De G. & J. 212, 28 L. J. C. 153; R. v. Wycombe Rail. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. at pp. 321, 322. (i) Barbat v. Allen, 7 Ex. at p. 616; R. v. Capel, 12 A. & E. 382, 411. (k) R. v. Whittaker, 2 C. & K. at p. 640; Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter, 5 Ex. at p. 667. and alterations made in Committee (), nor at the principles which govern the Houses of Parliament in passing private bills (m), nor at the policy of the Government with reference to any particular legislation (n). previous law to be and remem bered. While, however, this rule is followed, a broad But the distinction must be made between the history of state of the any particular measure, or part of any measure, the general history of law and legislation. As it is the duty of the judges to construe every statute "in conformity with the Common Law rather than against it, except so far as the statute is plainly intended to alter the course of the Common Law" (0), it is necessary for them to consider what was the course of the Common Law at the time when any statute was passed. "To know what the Common Law was before the making of any statute (whereby it may be known whether the Act be introductory of a new law or affirmatory of the old) is the very lock and key to set open the windows of the statute" (p). " Although the Court is not at liberty to construe an Act of Parliament by the motives which influenced the Legislature, yet when the history of law and legislation tells (1) Donegall v. Layard, 8 H. L. C. at pp. 465, 472, 473; Att.-Gen. v. Sillem, 2 H. & C. at pp. 521, 522. (m) R. v. London Dock Co., 5 A. & E. at p. 175. (n) Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wallace, 107. (0) R. v. Morris, L. R. 1 C. C. R. at p. 95, per Byles, J. See also Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. at p. 150, per Trevor, C.J. (p) 2 Inst. 307; see also Giles v. Grover, 1 Cl. & Fin. at p. 220, per Lord Tenterden, C.J.; Fellowes v. Clay, 4 Q. B. at p. 326, per Williams, J.; Att.-Gen. v. Earl Powis, Kay, at p. 207, per Wood, V.-C.; Swanton v. Goold, 9 Ir. C. L. R. at p. 237, per Lefroy, C.J. Rules in Heydon's Case. The whole Act to be considered. the Court, and prior judgments tell this present Court, what the object of the Legislature was, the Court is to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairly to carry out that object and no other, and to read the section with a view of finding out what it means, and not with a view of extending it to something that was not intended" (q). The rule on this subject was laid down long ago in words which have been often quoted, and have received the sanction of the greatest authorities. "It was resolved by the Barons of the Exchequer," says Lord Coke, "that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the Common Law) four things are to be discussed and considered: 1st. What was the Common Law before the making of the Act; 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the Common Law did not provide; 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth; and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico" (r). The next branch of the general rule for the construction of statutes is that the whole of each Act (q) Holme v. Guy, L. R. 5 Ch. D. at p. 905, per Jessel, M. R. (r) Heydon's Case, 3 Rep. at p. 7 b. |