must be considered. This principle was most distinctly stated in the early authorities, and in more modern times it has been as fully recognised, and has formed the basis of what is called "the golden rule for the construction of statutes" (s). We find Lord Coke using these words :-" Every Act of Parliament upon consideration had of all the parts thereof together is the best expositor of itself" (t). Again"It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of the statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresses the meaning of the makers" (u). "The office of a good expositor of an Act of Parliament is to make construction on all the parts together, and not of one part only by itself; nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlegit" (x). "The best expositors of all Acts of Parliament are the Acts of Parliament themselves by construction and conferring all the parts of them together, optima statuti interpretatrix est (omnibus particulis ejusdem inspectis) ipsum statutum" (y). Very similar expressions are to be found in later cases both in England and the United States. Thus it is said by Best, C.J.:

(8) Woodward v. Watts, 2 E. & B. at p. 454, per Crompton, J.; in whose opinion, however, "the golden rule is not of much practical use;" Mattison v. Hart, 14 C. B. at p. 385, per Jervis, C.J.; Eastern Counties Rail. Co. v. Marriage, 9 H. L. C. at p. 40, per Blackburn, J. ; Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, L. R. 2 App. Cas. at p. 764, per Lord Blackburn.

(t) 4 Inst. 325.

(u) Co. Litt. 381 a.

(x) Lincoln College Case, 3 Rep. 59 b.

(y) Bonham's Case, 8 Rep. 117 a, b.

"The intent of the Legislature is not to be collected from any particular expression, but from a general view of the whole of an Act of Parliament" (*). Erle, J.: "According to the general rule the words of a statute should be construed in their ordinary sense, so as to give effect to all its parts" (a). Coleridge, J.: "We must look to the whole scope of the Act in order to understand it" (b). Lord Tenterden, C.J.: "In construing Acts of Parliament we are to look not only at the language of the preamble, or of any particular clause, but at the language of the whole Act. And if we find in the preamble, or in any particular clause, an expression not so large or extensive in its import as those used in other parts of the Act, and upon a view of the whole Act we can collect, from the more large and extensive expressions used in other parts, the real intention of the Legislature, it is our duty to give effect to the larger expressions, notwithstanding the phrases of less extensive import in the preamble, or in any particular clause" (c). In the United States it has been said: "In construing any part of a law the whole must be considered: the different parts reflect light on each other; and, if possible, such a construction is to be made as will avoid any contradiction or inconsistency" (d). "In putting a construction upon any statute every part shall be

(z) East India Interest, 3 Bing. at p. 196.

(a) R. v. Abp. Canterbury, 11 Q. B. at p. 566. See also Newton v. Nancarrow, 15 Q. B. at p. 152.

(b) R. v. Combe, 13 Q. B. at p. 183.

(c) Doe d. Bywater v. Brandling, 7 B. & C. at p. 660.

(d) Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney, at pp. 607, 608.

regarded, and it shall be so expounded, if practicable, as to give some effect to every part of it" (e). "Every part is to be viewed in connection with the whole, so as to make all the parts harmonise, if practicable, and give a sensible and intelligible effect to each " (f). This rule applies most forcibly when there is any ambiguity in the language employed by the Legislature. In that case we are more especially bound to consider what is the object of the whole Act, and what is the light thrown upon that object by every part of the statute. We may look chiefly at the preamble as stating "the ground and cause of making the statute," and as being "a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischief which they intended to redress" (g). But we must also examine the context, and the other clauses of the Act, for words which are obscure and ambiguous in one sentence may have a definite meaning in another (h).

den rule"

When we examine what is called the "golden The "golrule," we see that its main significance lies in the for the effect it gives to this principle. The rule itself construcis stated by Parke, B.: "It is a very useful rule statutes. in the construction of a statute to adhere to

(e) Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cushing, at p. 89. (f) Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, at p. 587.

(g) Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. & Fin. at p. 143, per Tindal, C.J., who cites the words of Chief Justice Dyer, in Stowel v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. at p. 369; see also Warburton v. Loveland, 2 Dow. & Clark, at p. 489; Denn v. Reid, 10 Peters, at p. 527.

(h) Stowel v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. at p. 365; Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. at p. 161, per Trevor, C.J.; R. v. Palmer, 1 Leach, C. C. at p. 355; Paddon v. Bartlett, 3 A. & E. at p. 896, per Lord Abinger, C.B.; Lord Fermoy's claim to vote, 5 H. L. C. at p. 745, per Crowder, J.

tion of

Followed

by most of

the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the Legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further" (). The slight variations in the statement of this rule, to be found in the many other decisions of the same judge which deal with the same subject, leave its effect substantially unaltered. The result of these several statements is that in construing any statute the Court should adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to their grammatical construction, unless the words when so read produce some manifest absurdity or injustice, inconsistency, inconvenience or incongruity (k); or unless the meaning so given be repugnant to the context (1), or at variance with the intention of the Legislature as it is stated expressly or by implication, or as it may be collected from other parts of the same statute (m).

Similar phrases have been used by many other the judges. judges, even when they have not expressly sanctioned the rule to which Parke, B., gave such pro

(i) Becke v. Smith, 2 M. & W. at p. 195.

(k) Perry v. Skinner, 2 M. & W. at p. 476; Lucey v. Ingram, 6 M. & W. at p. 316; Edmonds v. Lawley, 6 M. & W. at p. 289; Brown v. M'Millan, 7 M. & W. at p. 202.

(1) R. v. Ditcheat, Inhabitants, 9 B. & C. at p. 186; R. v. Banbury, Inhabitants, 1 A. & E. at p. 142.

(m) Turner v. Sheffield and Rotherham Ruil. Co., 10 M. & W. at p. 434; Steward v. Greaves, 10 M. & W. at p. 719; Miller v. Salomons, 7 Ex. at p. 546; R. v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. at p. 41.

minence. The necessity of modifying language so as to avoid injustice or absurdity is admitted by Cresswell, J. (n), by Jervis, C.J. (0), by Lord Campbell, C.J. (p), by Alderson, B. (q), by Martin, B. (r), and other judges. Both Maule, J. (s) and Byles, J. (t) state that the general rule "which requires that the words of an Act of Parliament should be read in their natural and ordinary sense, giving them a meaning to their full extent and capacity," need not be strictly followed where it would lead to some inconvenience which could not have been absent from the mind of the framers of the Act. That inconsistency with other parts of the same Act, and repugnance to the intention of the Legislature are, if possible, to be avoided, appears from the words of Littledale, J. (u), of Coleridge, J. (x), of Hill, J. (y), of Willes, J. (2), and of Irish and American judges (a). "The rule as to grammatical construction," says Pollock, B., "is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construc

(n) Wansey v. Perkins, 7 M. & G. at p. 142. (0) Mattison v. Hart, 14 C. B. at p. 385.

(p) R. v. Met. Commissioners of Sewers, 1 E. & B. at p. 701. (q) Att.-Gen. v. Lockwood, 9 M. & W. at p. 398.

(r) Att.-Gen. v. Hallett, 3 H. & N. at p. 374.

(s) Arnold v. Ridge, 13 C. B. at p. 763.

(t) Birks v. Allison, 13 C. B. N. S. at p. 23.

(u) Giles v. Grover, 1 Cl. & Fin. at p. 184.

(x) R. v. Poor Law Commissioners, in the matter of the Parish of St. Pancras, 6 A. & E. at p. 7; Barton v. Bricknell, 13 Q. B. at p. 396.

(y) R. v. Leatham, 3 E. & E. at p. 669.

(z) Motteram v. Eastern Counties Rail. Co., 7 C. B. N. S. at p. 80. (a) Warburton v. Loveland, 1 Hudson & Brooke, at p. 648; Quin v. O'Keeffe, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 393; U. S. v. Bassett, 2 Story, 389.

I