To what extent it prevails. tion of a sentence may be, if it be perfectly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which upon the whole is the true meaning shall prevail in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it" (b). And in addition to these instances of judicial agreement with the various parts of the rule laid down by Parke, B., we find the whole of that rule approved by Lord Blackburn: "I believe it is not disputed that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the golden rule is right; viz., that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together, giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity, or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification, and to justify the Court in putting on them some other signification which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear" (c). Although the language used both by Parke, B., and by many of the other judges, is very wide, a careful consideration will show that it does not go beyond the fair limits of judicial construction. It is plain that the absurdity, injustice, inconsistency, inconvenience, and incongruity which are, if possi (b) Waugh v. Middleton, 8 Ex. at p. 357. See also U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch Sup. Court, at p. 399, per Washington, J. (c) Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, L. R. 2 Ap. Cas. at pp. 764, 765. See also Eastern Counties Rail. Co. v. Marriage, 9 H. L. C. at p. 40, per Blackburn, J. ble, to be avoided, must be such as an examination of the statute itself and a comparison of all its parts would disclose. In an early case it had been stated that "upon all Acts of Parliament there must be such a construction made as that one clause may not destroy and frustrate another" (d). And a similar principle is laid down by Willes, J., when he says that such words as repugnance or absurdity are used "in the sense of being contrary to the mind and intention of the framers of the Act" (e). There must be, says the same judge, a repugnance between the words of the section to be construed and those of some other section in the same Act, or in some other Act which is in pari materiâ (f). On the same ground Crompton, J., in commenting on what is called the golden rule, observes: "I do not understand it to go so far as to authorise us, where the Legislature have enacted something which leads to an absurdity, to repeal that enactment and make another for them if there are no words to express that intention" (g). Inconsistency is, in another case (h), explained by Parke, B., as meaning an inconsistency apparent on the face of the statute, and not one that arises from local circumstances, which may never have been known to the Legislature. Thus restricted the rule is most valuable as a guide to the construction (d) Stevens v. Duckworth, Hardres, at p. 344, per Atkyns, B. (e) Motteram v. Eastern Counties Rail. Co., 7 C. B. N. S. at p. 80. (f) Abel v. Lee, L. R. 6 C. P. p. 371. See also Wilson v. Wilson, L. R. 2 P. & D. at p. 347, per Bramwell, B. (9) Woodward v. Watts, 2 E. & B. at p. 458. (h) Smith v. Bell, 10 M. & W. 378. Conse quences be re garded. of statutes. It gives no scope for general considerations of policy or convenience, which would unsettle all the established principles of judicial interpretation. If the Courts were at liberty to travel out of the are not to words of any particular Act of Parliament, and to consider what would in any case be the consequence of giving those words their natural meaning, they would become legislators and not interpreters. It has therefore been distinctly stated from early times down to the present day that judges are not to mould the language of statutes in order to meet an alleged convenience or an alleged equity (i); are not to be influenced by any notions of hardship (k), or of what in their view is right and reasonable (1) or is prejudicial to society (m); are not to alter clear words, though the Legislature may not have contemplated the consequences of using them (n); are not to tamper with words for the purpose of giving them a construction which is "supposed to be more consonant with justice" than their ordinary meaning (0). "Where the language of an Act of Parliament is clear and explicit, effect must be given to it whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legisla (i) R. v. Poor Law Commissioners, 6 A. & E. at p. 7, per Coleridge, J. (0) Ornamental Woodwork Co. v. Brown, 2 H. & C. at p. 69, per Martin, B. ture" (p). to be read tically. Our next proposition is that all the sentences of Sentences an Act are to be read grammatically in the order grainmawhich has been adopted by its framers, and that every word is to have its full and proper meaning. This branch of the general rule, which was stated at the beginning of this chapter, has been already illustrated by several of the passages cited in support of another principle (s). We need not do more than refer to one or two additional cases, dealing with the course which is to be adopted as to the collocation of words and the order of sentences (t). be given The necessity of giving effect to all the words of Effect to a statute (u), “nothing adding thereto, nothing to all the (p) Warburton v. Loveland, 2 Dow. & Clark, at p. 489, per Tindal, the statute. C.J. (q) Dixon v. Harrison, Vaughan, 37. See also R. v. Skeen, Bell's C. C. at p. 115, per Lord Campbell, C.J.; Abley v. Dale, 11 C. B. at p. 391, per Jervis, C.J. (r) Craw v. Ramsey, Vaughan, 285, reported as Crow v. Ramsey, T. Jones, 10. (s) Ante, pp. 111–114. (t) R. v. Ramsgate, Inhabitants, 6 B. & C. at p. 715, per Bayley, J.; Rein v. Lane, L. R. 2 Q. B. at p. 151, 8 B. & S. p. 90, per Blackburn, J.; Newell v. People, 3 Selden, at p. 97, per Johnson, J.; Cull v. Austin, L. R. 7 C. P. at p. 234, per Brett, J. (u) Isberg v. Bowden, 8 Ex. at p. 860. words of Instances in which words have been inserted. diminishing" (x), which has been often recognised, gives rise to some further considerations. It is clearly and distinctly laid down as "a settled canon of construction that a statute ought to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant" (y). But when this principle has to be acted upon it is sometimes necessary for the judges to choose between inserting and omitting words, between giving no effect to one part of an Act and giving another part an effect which its language does not warrant. In one instance it was held that words could not be omitted, although they had the extraordinary result of giving an appeal from one quarter sessions to another (z). More than one case has decided that words cannot be inserted, unless their introduction is absolutely necessary to make an Act consistent with itself, and to avoid something manifestly absurd or repugnant (a). We may assume that the Courts have acted upon this principle in the following instances in which words have been inserted. Where an Act (x) Everett v. Wells, 2 Scott, N. R. at p. 531, per Tindal, C.J. (y) R. v. Bishop of Oxford, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. at p. 261. It is worthy of remark that these words, which now rest upon the authority of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, are cited by Bacon in his Abridgment, and by Sir F. Dwarris in his work on Statutes, not from any judgment, but from the "intended argument" of Sir B. Shower, in a case where judgment was given against a demurrer because no one appeared to support it. See R. v. Berchet, 1 Show. 108; Bac. Abr. Statute, I. 2; Dwarris, p. 508. (2) R. v. West Riding Justices, 1 Q. B. at p. 329. (a) King v. Burrell, 12 A. & E. 460, 468; Williams v. Roberts, 1 C. M. & R. at p. 680, per Parke, B.; Ellis v. O'Neill, 4 Ir. C. L. R. at p. 478. |