mentioned the sum of money to be paid by way of compensation for the damage occasioned to any lands, the Court of Queen's Bench supplied the words "to the owner or party interested," as having been omitted by accident (b). So where the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103, provided that "all the costs and expenses incurred . . . in and about the obtaining any order of justices for the removal and maintenance of a lunatic pauper" should be borne by the common fund of the union, the Court repeated the words "in and about the" before the word "maintenance," so that the expense of maintaining the pauper lunatic might also be defrayed by the union (c). Again, the Fines and Recoveries Act (3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74, s. 33) enacted that if any protector of a settlement was convicted of treason or felony, or was an infant, or if it was uncertain whether he were living or dead, the Court of Chancery should be protector of the settlement "in lieu of the person who shall be an infant, or whose existence cannot be ascertained." It was held that the Court of Chancery was also protector in the place of any one convicted of treason or felony, as any other construction would give no effect to those words (d). A similar construction was placed upon the Highway Act, 1835 (6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 50). Section 78 of that Act provided, "if any person riding any horse or beast, or driving any sort of carriage, shall ride or drive the same furiously. every person so offending . . (b) Jubb v. Hull Dock Co., 9 Q. B. at p. 455. (c) Wigton Overseers v. Snaith Overseers, 16 Q. B. 496. shall .. for every such offence forfeit any sum not exceeding £5 in case such driver shall not be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage, and in case the offender be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage, then any sum not exceeding £10." It was held that a person riding furiously was liable to the smaller penalty, as, if he were not, no effect would be given to the words "ride" and "riding" (e). But the Court refused to extend in the same manner the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 108, which enacted that if any loss of life occurred by reason of any accident in a coal mine, or if any serious personal injury arose from explosion therein, the owner or agent of such mine should "within twenty-four hours next after such loss of life," send notice of such accident to the inspector of the district. It was held that no such notice need be sent within twenty-four hours after an explosion which caused serious personal injury (f). It is clear that the effect of this last decision is to omit altogether from the Act the words which deal with serious personal injury. But the effect of the two former decisions was to insert, or to repeat in the latter part of the two sections, the words referring to a conviction for treason or felony, and to furious riding. Perhaps in all these cases it may be said that "the Court will rather strain words in order to arrive at a construction which is evidently intended by the policy of the Legislature than omit them, or declare the state of facts which has occurred a (e) Williams v. Evans, L. R. 1 Ex. D. 277. in which have been casus omissus" (g). Acting on this principle the Instances Courts have sometimes corrected obvious mistakes mistakes in the words of statutes rather than deprive corrected. those words of all meaning. Thus, where an Act stated correctly the title of another Act, but made a mistake in giving its date (h), where the recital of the title of another Act made some changes in its language (i), where chapter eight was referred to instead of chapter eighteen (k), it was held that these errors were immaterial (7). Again, where a statute provided that any person who "shall" do a certain act "and shall be thereof convicted" was to be liable to indictment, and upon conviction to a certain punishment, the words "and shall be thereof convicted" were rejected as surplusage, because they implied that an offender must be convicted before he could be indicted (m). We may apply to such cases the words used by Coleridge, J.: "It is utterly impossible to construe a statute worded as this is so as to give a meaning to every word. If we attempted to do so we should make the Act insensible. We must construe this section not literally, but so as to give it a reasonable meaning " (n). We have now to consider what is the full and Meaning (g) R. v. Sugden, 1 Ir. Jur. (O.S.) 58. (h) Re Boothroyd, 15 M. & W. 1; R. v. Willcock, 7 Q. B. 317; 14 L. J. M. C. 104. (i) R. v. Longmead, 2 Leach, C. C. 694. (k) Watervliet Turnpike Co. v. M‘Kean, 6 Hill, 616. (1) See, however, Keene v. U. S., 5 Cranch Sup. Court, 304, and Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumner, 279. (m) U. S. v. Stern, 5 Blatchford's Circuit Court Rep. 512. (n) R. v. East Ardsley, Inh., 14 Q. B. at p. 801. of words. gramma proper meaning which is to be given to the words Ordinary in a statute. The first rule on this subject is that tical mean- words are to have their ordinary grammatical ing. meaning (o), that which naturally and obviously Popular belongs to them (p), and has been given them by common usage, in the common language of mankind (q). They are to be read in their largest ordinary sense unless there is anything to restrict them either in the occasion on which they are used or in the context (r). Many instances may be given to show that the popular sense of words is the one generally adopted in the construction of statutes. A popular meaning has been assigned to the words "town" (s), "hospital" (t), “insolvent circumstances" (u), “exported from a port" (x), "afternoon Divine service" (y). An Act requiring a person to sign his (0) Bodenham Overseers v. St. Andrew's Overseers, 1 E. & B. at p. 469, per Coleridge, J.; Cull v. Austin, L. R. 7 C. P. at p. 234, per Brett, J. (p) Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 326, per Story, J. (q) Per Lord Tenterden, C.J. R. v. Winstanley, 1 Cr. & J. at p. 444; Att.-Gen. v. Winstanley, 2 Dow. & Cl. at p. 310. (r) Hughes v. Overseers of Chatham, 5 M. & G. at p. 80, per Tindal, C.J. It is the duty of the Court to restrain the operation of a statute within narrower limits than the words import, if it is satisfied that the literal meaning of the words would extend to cases which the Legislature never intended to include. Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 14 Peters, 178, 198. (8) Elliott v. South Devon Rail. Co., 2 Ex. 725; R. v. Cottle, 16 Q. B. 412; L. & S. W. Rail. Co. v. Blackmore, L. R. 4 H. L. 610, 615. (t) Lord Colchester v. Kewney, 4 H. & C. 445. (u) Teale v. Younge, M'Clel. & Y. 497 ; Bayly v. Schofield, 1 M. & S. at p. 350; see Re Birmingham Benefit Society, 3 Sim. 421, for different words which have received a technical meaning. (x) Muller v. Baldwin, L. R. 9 Q. B. 457. See Att.-Gen. v. Pougett, 2 Price, 381. (y) R. v. Knapp, 2 E. & B. 447. name is obeyed if he employs his usual signature, denoting his Christian name by an initial (z), or if he uses a stamp (a). An Act which avoids any contract made by a bankrupt after filing his petition, extends to a bond given by him after that time, and is not confined to simple contracts (b). The Succession Duty Act is to be construed not according to the technicalities of the law of real property, but according to the popular use of the language employed (c), and, as it extends to the United Kingdom, the technicalities of both Scotch and English law are to be disregarded (d). The Representation of the People Act, 1867, giving the franchise to every "man" possessed of a certain qualification, does not enfranchise women, because although (by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21) "in all Acts words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females," the word "man" in the ordinary and popular sense of words is used in contradistinction to the word "woman" (e). For the same reason words which are chiefly used in certain branches of commerce, and have acquired a popular meaning by reason of such use, will in general be so construed when they occur in statutes. Thus where a duty was imposed on "spirits," it was held that "sweet spirits of nitre," (z) R. v. Avery, 18 Q. B. 576. (a) Bennett v. Brumfitt, L. R. 3 C. P. 28. (b) Kidson v. Turner, 3 H. & N. 581. (c) Lord Braybrooke v. Att.-Gen., 9 H. L. C. at p. 165. (d) Lord Saltoun v. Adv.-Gen., 3 Macq. Sc. Ap. 659, 671. (e) Chorlton v. Lings, L. R. 4 C. P. 374. It is true this was not the only ground of the decision. |