Unless technical a known article of commerce not usually passing under the name of spirits, although spirits entered largely into its composition, was not liable to the duty (f). Thus, too, "gold and silver" does not mean pure gold or silver (g), a "square" of plate glass means any rectangular figure (h), worsted, though made from wool by combing, is not liable to a duty as a manufacture of which wool is a component part, because it has become "a distinct article known in commerce under the denomination of worsted" (i); bohea tea is "that article which in the known usage of trade has acquired that distinctive appellation" (k); and the word " purchaser" in the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, a special code of law, laying down general rules for commercial men, is to be taken in the ordinary commercial sense of buyer, and not in the technical meaning which the law has ascribed to it (1). Although in the case last cited the popular meaning prevailed over the technical sense, it is a general acquired. rule that "when the Legislature uses technical has been language in its statutes, it is supposed to attach to (f) Att.-Gen. v. Bailey, 1 Ex. 281. (g) Young v. Cook, L. R. 3 Ex. D. 101. (h) Att.-Gen. v. Cast Plate Glass Co., 1 Anstr. 39. (i) Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137. (k) Two Hundred Chests of Tea, 9 Wheaton, at p. 439, per Story, J. (1) Ex parte Hillman, re Pumfrey, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 622. (m) Burton v. Reevell, 16 M. & W. at p. 309, per Parke, B.; 1 Kent's Com. 462. in regard to matters precise and technical in their nature, such as the title to land or the vesting of estates (n) or other legal subjects. Thus, in applying the Statutes of Limitations to India, the Court construed the words "beyond the seas as equivalent to "out of the realm," instead of giving them their literal meaning (o). In construing the Public Health Act, 1848, which defines the "owner" of premises as the person who receives the rack-rent, or would receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent, the Court held that the trustee of premises used as a school came within the definition of owner as supplied by the Act (p). So, too, the phrase "taxed cart" in a Turnpike Act does not mean a cart upon which a tax has been paid, but a cart to which that technical name had been given (q). The word "sue" refers to a proceeding by action, and does not include a bankruptcy petition (r). In some cases it seems doubtful whether the Courts have treated technical language as if it were popular, or have sacrificed the popular meaning of words to an extreme technicality. In dealing with bankruptcy law one Court decided that a judgment in an action of tort was a "debt bond fide contracted" (s), while another held that the words "a debt contracted" referred only to debts arising ex contractu (t). (n) Deptford Churchwardens v. Sketchley, 8 Q. B. at p. 408. (r) Guthrie v. Fisk, 3 B & C. 178. Unless popular variance proper meaning. Another exception to the rule which requires the meaning at Words of statutes to be read according to their with popular meaning is to be found where the popular meaning is a corruption of the genuine sense of the word. In such a case it is often necessary to trace the history of some particular word, and to show what it meant from the earliest ages down to the time of the passing of a statute, for this, "both on legal principles of interpretation and according to the plain common sense of mankind, is a proper mode of arriving at its true meaning" (u). Where the true meaning of the word has survived any popular corruption, and can be ascertained in a legitimate manner, it must be adopted in the construction of statutes. Thus where an inclosure Act reserved to the lord of the manor the right to "minerals," it was held that this word, "though more frequently applied to substances containing metals, in its proper sense includes all fossil bodies or matters dug out of mines," and, therefore, extended to beds of stone instead of being restricted to metallic minerals (x). In like manner when the Mutiny Act, 1864, exempted soldiers on their march from tolls payable upon the passage over any bridge, it was held that soldiers on their march were liable to tolls for the use of a structure which was called a floating bridge, but was really in the nature of a steam ferry (y). Again, it was provided by 4 & 5 Wm. IV. c. 76, that any relief given to or on account of any child or children, under the (u) R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 11 Q. B. at p. 580, per Coleridge, J. (x) Earl of Rosse v. Wainman, 14 M. & W. 859; 2 Ex. 800. age reasonable meaning. In all cases, however, it is essential to bear in Words mind that the words used in statutes must have a receive a always to reasonable meaning (e). It is said in one of the early decisions that "when laws or statutes are made, yet there are certain things which are exempted and excepted out of the provisions of the same by the law of reason, although they are not expressly excepted. As the breaking of prison is felony in the prisoner himself by the statute de (2) R. v. Shavington-cum-Gresty, Inhabitants, 17 Q. B. 48; 20 L. J. M. C. 194. (a) Davys v. Douglas, 4 H. & N. 180; 28 L. J. M. C. 193. (e) Churchwardens of Birmingham v. Shaw, 10 Q. B. at p. 878. "If words are susceptible of a reasonable and also of an unreasonable meaning, the former must prevail." Boon v. Howard, L. R. 9 C. P. at p. 308, per Keating, J. frangentibus prisonam (1 Ed. II., stat. 2), yet if the prison be on fire, and they who are in it break the prison to save their lives, this shall be excused by the law of reason, and yet the words of the statute are against it" (f). Another case in the same volume lays down "that which law and reason allows shall be taken to be in force against the words of statutes" (g). Elsewhere we meet with similar expressions. "The words of a statute ought not to be expounded to destroy natural justice" (h). "Acts of Parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent or free from injury or wrong be by a literal construction punished or endamaged" (i). "The words of an Act of Parliament must be taken in a lawful and rightful sense" (k). The rule thus laid down has been in more recent times followed in the United States, where it was held that a sheriff, who arrested the carrier of a mail under a bench warrant on a charge of murder, was not liable to be indicted for knowingly and wilfully obstructing and retarding the passage of the mail or its carrier (1). In deciding this case, the American judges referred to the case of the prisoner breaking prison, and to a passage in Puffendorff upon the law of Bologna, which enacted that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity, but which was held not to extend (f) Reniger v. Fogassa, Plowd. 13. (g) Partridge v. Strange, Plowd. 77, 88. (i) Co. Litt. 360a. (k) Co. Litt. 381 b. (1) U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wallace, 482. |