Words read in a sense than they usually bear. noon on Saturday and six o'clock on Monday morning, under pain of forfeiting all fish taken between those hours, and "any net used in taking the same," applies to the case of any person who fishes for salmon, though he may be unsuccessful, and a net used for the purpose of taking salmon is liable to forfeiture, though no fish are actually taken (ƒ). Where a duty was imposed on "paper," it was held to extend to an article which could be used as paper, though it was made from animal fibres, and resembled parchment rather than paper, which is usually made from vegetable fibres (g). If in these cases the meaning of words was somenarrower what enlarged, there are others in which it has been restricted. Thus an Act which imposed a penalty on persons piloting any vessel down the Thames without being authorised by the Trinity House, was held only to apply when vessels were piloted down the Thames for the purpose of a regular voyage, not when they were moved from one wharf to another for the purpose of discharging cargo (h). An Act (46 Geo. III. c. 43) provided that "every who shall appraise any estate, real or personal, in expectation of any hire or reward, shall be deemed to be an appraiser." It was held that this Act did not include a person who made one single valuation, but referred only to such as bore the known character of appraisers (i). The Statute of Marlebridge (cap. 4) enacted that none should carry a person (f) Ruther v. Harris, L. R. 1 Ex. D. 97. (i) Atkinson v. Fell, 5 M. & S. 240. distress from one county into another. This did not extend to the case of a tenant who held land of a manor lying in another county, for there the lord might drive a distress from the land holden of the manor into the county where the manor itself lay (). So, too, words are not to be taken literally when the effect of such construction would be to defeat natural justice, as by making a man a judge in his own cause, or by depriving him of a trial. Thus Magna Charta (c. 12), which provides that assizes of novel disseisin and of mort d'ancestor shall not be held except in their proper counties, has been qualified where a literal construction of the words would make the Lord Marcher in Wales a judge in his own cause (). So the Statute of Merton (20 Hen. III. c. 3), which provided that an inquisition should be taken by the first jurors, was held not to apply where there were no jurors, for if the words had then been literally construed the inquisition could not be taken at all (m). Again, if an indictment for not repairing a county bridge could not be renewed by certiorari, the result would be that the indictment must have been tried by the inhabitants of the county who were the persons interested (n). meanings As the literal meaning of words, and even their Various usual meaning, can thus be forsaken, it follows as given to a necessary consequence that the same word may have various meanings not only in different Acts (k) 2 Inst. 106; Reniger v. Fogassa, Plowd. at p. 18. (1) 2 Inst. 25. (m) 2 Inst. 84. (n) R. v. Cumberland Inhabitants, 6 T. R. 154. words. In the same Act. of Parliament but sometimes in the same Act or in the same section. As a general rule the Courts endeavour "to give the same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament" (0), and it is said that "if the Legislature have used an ambiguous word in a definite sense in one passage of a clause in an Act of Parliament, it is in accordance with the rules of sound construction and legitimate inference to hold that the same word is used in the same sense when found in another passage of the same clause" (p). This, however, is not always possible. In one case the Court, in construing the 9th section of 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, found that the word "rent" occurred seven times in that section, and that in three of those instances it must be read in the sense of "rent-charge," in the other four instances in the sense of "rent reserved" (q). So where bigamy was defined in the words "if any person being married shall marry another person," it was held that the word "married" implied a perfect and binding marriage, but the word "marry" had no such meaning (). It has been said that words used in a consolidation Act may have a different meaning from that of the same words when used in any of the Acts comprehended (s). But this applies with even greater force when the same word is used in two Acts differing in subject matter. "The meaning (0) Courtauld v. Legh, L. R. 4 Ex. at p. 130, per Cleasby, B. Crowder, J. (q) Doe d. Angell v. Angell, 9 Q. B. 328, 356. (r) R. v. Allen, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 367, 371. (s) R. v. Justices of Kent, 2 Q. B. at p. 692, per Coleridge, J. be read to subject of the words of an Act of Parliament is to be Words to ascertained," says Best, C.J., "from the subject to according which it refers, so that the same words receive a matter. very different construction in different statutes” (t). "When it is clear from the context of an instrument in what sense words are used in that instrument, the sound rule of construction is to attribute to them that meaning, even though the words are technical and have technically a different meaning” (u). The meaning of particular words in statutes "is to be found not so much in strict etymological propriety of language, or even in popular use, as in the subject or occasion on which they are used and the object that is intended to be attained" (x). The meaning of words varies according to the circumstances with respect to which they are used (y), and it is said that "the same words might mean a very different thing when put in to impose a tax, from what they would mean when exempting from a tax" (z). It is therefore impossible to argue that a word to which a definite meaning has been attached by the Legislature, or which has received a judicial construction, when used in one Act, is to bear the same sense in another. There are several decisions to the effect that cases upon any one class of statutes are inapplicable to an entirely different class. When the (t) East India Interest, 3 Bing. at p. 196. (u) Graham v. Ewart, 1 H. & N. at p. 563, per Coleridge, J. (c) R. v. Hall, 1 B. & C. at p. 136. (y) Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, L. R. 2 App. Cas. at p. 763, per Lord Blackburn. (*) Rein v. Lane, L. R. 2 Q. B. at p. 151; 8 B. & S. at p. 90, per Blackburn, J. Court has to construe the words used in the Registration Acts it can derive little help from cases bearing on settlements, or on the Tenement Acts (a), or on indictments for burglary (b). Nor do the cases decided on the Registration Acts throw any light on the construction of statutes which fix the term of residence or occupation necessary for voting in the University of Oxford (c), or for acquiring a settlement (d). On the same ground it has been decided that the meaning of the word "shop" in other statutes is not of much use when the Fairs and Markets Act has to be construed (e), and that cases about wills are not applicable to the construction of statutes (ƒ). Looking at the instances in which different meanings have been given to the same word, we find that an articled clerk is not an apprentice within the Bankruptcy Act, 6 Geo. IV. c. 16 (g), but is an apprentice within the Settlement Act, 3 & 4 Wm. & Mary, c. 11 (h). A bastard child is not within Lord Campbell's Act, so as to be entitled to damages upon the death of a parent (i), but is within the Marriage Act, 26 Geo. II. c. 33, which requires the consent of the father, guardian, or (a) Dewhurst v. Fielden, 7 M. & G. 187; 8 Scott, N. C. 1073. (b) Jolliffe v. Rice, 6 C. B. at p. 10. See Cook v. Humber, 11 C. B. N. S. at p. 48. (c) R. v. Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, L. R. 7 Q. B. 471. (d) R. v. St. Nicholas, Rochester, Inhabitants, 5 B. & Ad. at p. 226, per Lord Denman, C.J. (e) Piper v. Whalley, 6 B. & S. 303. (f) Doe d. Myatt v. St. Helen's Rail. Co., 2 Q. B. at p. 369. (g) Ex parte Prideaux, 3 Myl. & Cr. 327. (h) St. Pancras v. Clapham, 2 E. & E. 742. (i) Dickinson v. N. E. Rail. Co., 2 H. & C. 735; 33 L. J. Ex. 91. |