ture which has the power to sanction? Either of these inferences would be based upon a total misapprehension of the effect of that change in the law which is caused by the reversal of a judicial decision. All persons are bound to accept the judgment of a competent tribunal, and no one is entitled to speculate upon the chance of its being overruled. The Legislature is presumed to know the law as it is, not the law as it may be at some future time. An enactment, therefore, which correctly recites the effect of the decisions in force at the time of its passing, is not rendered inoperative by the reversal of those decisions, nor does it serve to keep them alive. An instance of this occurs in the case of R. v. Mayor of Oldham (ƒ). It had been held in some of the earlier cases that corporate property occupied for municipal purposes only was not rateable. An Act of the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 48, referred to the exemption which had been created by these decisions, and enacted that in one particular case that exemption should continue. Afterwards the decisions which conferred the exemption were overruled. It was held, however, that the particular exemption recognised by this Act no longer depended on the former decisions, but had received the express sanction of the Legislature.

presumed

to make

unneces

The presumption that the Legislature knows Legisla what is the existing law at the time when it ture net passes any statute, is a most important element in to the consideration of the changes which such statute sary alte may effect. effect. It would be impossible to form a con- Common sistent or harmonious view of our law if each

(f) L. R. 3 Q. B. 474.

ration in

Law.

sary.

statute were to be regarded as an independent act of legislation, and not as a part of a general system. We are, therefore, bound to assume that in passing a statute the Legislature has before its mind's eye an exact outline of the law affecting the particular subject with which it is dealing. The new statute is intended, as far as possible, to fit into the existing framework. No greater change is to be made in the law than is absolutely neces"Statutes are not presumed to make any alteration in the Common Law further, or otherwise, than the Act does expressly declare; therefore, in all general matters, the law presumes the Act did not intend to make any alteration; for, if the Parliament had that design, they would have expressed it in the Act" (g). "The general words of an Act are not to be so construed as to alter the previous policy of the law, unless no sense or meaning can be applied to those words consistently with the intention of preserving the existing policy untouched" (h). For the same reason, it is presumed that the Legislature does not intend to go against the ordinary rules of law," (i) to create a new and extended liability by general words (k), or to interfere with the principles established by the law of nations (). Where, however,

(g) Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. at p. 150, per Trevor, C.J. (h) Minet v. Leman, 20 Beav. at p. 278, per Romilly, M.R. (i) Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. at p. 554, per Mellish, L.J.

(k) Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 743.

(1) Leroux v. Brown, 22 L. J. C. P. at p. 3, per Maule, J.; General Iron Screw Collier Co. v. Schurmans, 29 L. J. C. at p. 879, per Wood, V.-C.; Murray v. Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch. Sup. Ct. at p. 118.

the provisions of a statute are in direct conflict with any principle of Common Law, and effect cannot be given to the statute unless it is to prevail over the Common Law, we are to presume that "Parliament (in whose power it was so to do) resolved to leap over and waive the rules of law, and to make a particular law for that occasion" (m).

tions in

Law more

An intention on the part of the Legislature Alterato alter the Statute Law is sometimes presumed Statute upon much slighter grounds than would support readily any such inference in the case of the Common Presmed. Law. Such an intention has been presumed from the use of words in one part of an Act differing from those used in another (n). It has also been presumed, and with more reason, from the re-enactment of a former Act or section, in substantially different language (o). Slight change of language, introduced for the purpose of improving the graces of style," is not within the rule (p); nor are we to attach any weight to the omission of words which are superfluous (7), or which merely declare what the law would imply without them (r).

66

(m) Murrey v. Eyton, Sir T. Raymond, at p. 355.

(n) Edrich's case, 5 Rep. at p. 118b; R. v. Great Bolton, 8 B. & C. at p. 74, per Lord Tenterden, C.J. See, however, the remarks of Patteson, J., R. v. Marquis of Downshire, 4 A. & E. at p. 714. Where the word "month" is used in one section, and the words "calendar month" in a later section, the first month has been held to be a lunar month. Crooke v. M'Tavish, 1 Bing. 307.

(0) Fearnley v. Morley, 5 B. & C. at p. 30.

(p) See Hadley v. Perks, L. R. 1 Q. B. at p. 457; 7 B. & S. at p. 839; and Swinford v. Keble, 7 B. & S. at p. 587.

(2) R. v. Buttle, L. R. 1 C. C. R. at p. 252; Re Wood, L. R. 7 Ch. at p. 306.

(r) Horn v. Ion, 4 B. & Ad. 78.

But where an Act which repeals an earlier statute re-enacts some of its provisions, but omits either a whole clause or a material part of a clause, it must be taken that the omission is intentional, and that the new Act is to receive a new meaning (s). Thus, under the Highway Act (5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 50, s. 74), it was an offence if any horse was found lying, or being depastured, on any highway or on the sides thereof without a keeper. This section was repealed by the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 101, and re-enacted in nearly the same language, but with the omission of the words "without a keeper." It was held that the omission of these words must be considered intentional, and that under the new Act a penalty was incurred, although a horse was under the charge of a keeper (t). So where the 8 Geo. II. c. 13, imposed penalties on persons selling pirated engravings knowing them to be pirated, and the 17 Geo. III. c. 57, enabled the owner of the copyright of the original engraving to maintain an action against persons found selling pirated copies, it was held that the omission in the later Act of the ingredient of knowledge was intentional, and that the seller was liable to an action, even if he did not know of the infringement of the copyright (u). So, again, the 35 & 36 Vict. c. 78, imposed a penalty on persons selling wild birds between certain dates, unless they could prove

(8) Moser v. Newman, 6 Bing. 556; R. v. Great Bentley, 10 B. & C. at p. 526.

(t) Lawrence v. King, L. R. 3 Q. B. 345.

(u) West v. Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 737; Gambart v. Sumner, 5 H. & N. 5, 29 L. J. Ex. 98.

that such birds were received from some one residing out of the United Kingdom. The 39 & 40 Vict. c. 29, recited that the protection given by the earlier Act was insufficient, and altered the penalties, the dates and description of the offence, without any reference to the question whether or no the birds were received from any one residing out of the United Kingdom. It was held that it was an offence under the second Act to sell birds which had been received from Holland (x). Where an Act prohibited the appropriation of any ground as a burial-ground nearer than 200 yards to any dwelling-house, and another Act substituted words prohibiting the use of any ground for burials within 100 yards of any dwelling-house, it was held that under the second Act a cemetery might be less than 100 yards from a dwelling-house, but that no bodies might be buried within that distance (y).

functions.

We turn now to the function which the Courts Judicial of Justice are to exercise upon the statutes as they are passed by the Legislature. It was long since laid down that the Courts of Common Law are entrusted with the exposition of Acts of Parliament (z), and that the judges are the proper expounders of statutes (a).

In the exposition of statutes, however, the judges are to be guided not "by the crooked cord of discretion, but by the golden metwand of the

(x) Whitehead v. Smithers, L. R. 2 C. P. D. 553.

(y) Lord Cowley v. Byas, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 944.

(2) Carter v. Crawley, Sir T. Raymond, at p. 497, per Lord Chief Justice North; Horne v. Earl Camden, 2 H. Bl. at p. 536, per Lord Chief Justice Eyre.

(a) 2 Inst. 611, 614, 618.