be divided into Public and General and Local and Personal in 1798 (t). "On the 1st of May, 1797," says Parke, B., delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, "the House of Lords resolved that the King's printer should class the general statutes and special, the public local, and private, in separate volumes; and on the 8th of May, 1801, there was a resolution of the House of Commons, agreed to by the House of Lords, that the general statutes, and the 'public local and personal' in each session, should be classed in separate volumes" (u).

This classification of statutes was important, as it affected the mode in which they were treated by the Courts. Public Acts were judicially noticed, and copies printed by the authorised printer were received as conclusive evidence (c). Private Acts, however, had to be proved by examined copies, and with a view of remedying the inconvenience thus caused, a clause was often inserted in private Acts declaring them to be public. Subsequently the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 7, enacted that "every Act made after the commencement of this Act shall be deemed and taken to be a public Act, and shall be judicially taken notice of as such, unless the contrary be expressly provided and declared by such Act." But the effect of this provision, as of the similar clauses in private Acts of earlier date, was simply to indicate the way in which such Acts were to be noticed by the Court, and their operation is

(t) Evidence before Select Committee of 1875 on Acts of Parliament.

(u) Richards v Easto, 15 M. & W. at p. 251. (x) 41 Geo. III. c. 90, s. 9.

in no way affected by it (y).

Real distinction

general

statutes.

66

Acts which are local and personal in their nature are not removed from that category by a clause declaring them to be public (2). Whether an Act is public or private does not depend upon any technical considerations, (such as having a clause or declaration that the Act shall be deemed a public Act), but upon the nature and substance of the case" (a). Thus, though the formal distinction between public and private Acts has been taken away, the substantial distinction between general and special Acts still remains.

The broad distinction between general and between special statutes is that everybody is considered as and special assenting to the former (b), and they consequently bind the whole community, while the latter, as a rule, bind only those who are parties to them, or are interested in their subject-matter, unless it appears by express words or necessary implication that it was the intention of the Legislature to affect the rights of strangers (c).

What are

general statutes.

It will be well in the first instance to consider what Acts have been included in these two classes. Statutes relating to the sovereign (d), or heir

(y) R. v. Hicks, 4 E. & B. at p. 643; Beaumont v. Mountain, 10 Bing. 404; Woodward v. Cotton, 1 C. M. & R. 44; Brett v. Beales, M. & M. 421.

(z) Richards v. Easto, 15 M. & W. 244; Moore v. Shepherd, 10 Ex. 424; Shepherd v. Sharp, 1 H. & N. 115. See, however, Barnett v. Cox, 9 Q. B. 617.

(a) Dawson v. Paver, 5 Hare, at p. 434, per Wigram, V.-C.

(b) Hornby v. Houlditch, 1 T. R. at p. 93, per Lord Hardwicke, C.J.

(c) Dawson v. Paver, 5 Hare, at p. 434, per Wigram, V.-C.

(d) R. v. Buggs, Skinner, at p. 429.

apparent (e), the whole spirituality, or all those who have any spiritual or ecclesiastical benefice (ƒ), all sheriffs and other officers (g), the election of members of Parliament, though for one borough only (h), the relief of the poor, though only in one county (i), the relief of insolvent debtors (k), have been considered general. In one case it was held that an Act relating to all trades was general, while, if it related to one trade only, it was special (); but it has also been laid down that an Act concerning tanners and shoemakers was general (m). The Watching and Lighting Act, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 90 (n), and the Acts relating to the Metropolitan Police (o), were regarded as general, and in the United States, the same effect was given to statutes affecting banks, as their bills were made a legal tender, and their charters concerned the currency of the country (p).

statutes.

On the other hand, it has been held that statutes What are special referring to leases made by bishops, to the nobility or the Lords of Parliament, or the corporations created by one King (q), or extending only to

(e) The Prince's Case, 8 Rep. 28 a.

(f) Holland's Case, 4 Rep. 76; Jennings v. Haithwait, 1 Brownlow, 208.

(g) Holland's Case, 4 Rep. 76; 2 Inst. 31.

(h) Morris v. Hunt, 1 Chit. 453.

(i) R. v. Pawlyn, 1 Sid. 208.

(k) Jones v. Axen, 1 Ld. Raym. 119.

(1) Kirk v. Nowell, 1 T. R. 125.

(m) Jaques v. Chandler, Lutw. 1410.

(n) Pilkington v. Riley, 3 Ex. 739.

(0) Barnett v. Cox, 9 Q. B. 617.

(p) Bank of Utica v. Smedes, 3 Cowen, 662. (q) Holland's Case, 4 Rep. 76.

Acts giving

companies.

Cambridge, Oxford, Winchester and Eton (), were special. If, however, the words of an Act are special while its object is general, a general effect must be given to it, as was the case when the 5 Hen. IV. c. 10, providing that none be imprisoned by any justice of the peace but in the common gaol for trial at the next gaol delivery or sessions of the peace, was extended to all other judges (s).

Acts which have been passed at the instance of powers to companies, companies, or their promoters, for the purpose of enabling them to execute works, levy tolls, or interfere with private property, are special Acts, and have always been looked upon as contracts between the persons obtaining such Acts and the public (). In such Acts, it has been said, the Legislature merely lends its aid to the agreement of the parties in order to render it effectual when any public reason stands in the way (u). Such Acts are to be construed strictly against the persons obtaining them, but liberally in favour of the public (x), and as the language used in the Acts is considered the language of the promoters, any ambiguity which occurs in it must operate against

(r) Carter and Claycole's Case, 1 Leonard, 306.

(s) 2 Inst. 43, citing the maxim, ubi lex est specialis et ratio ejus generalis, generaliter accipienda est.

(t) Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co., 1 Myl. & K. 162, per Lord Eldon, C.; 2 C. M. & R. at p. 141, per Parke, B.

(u) R. v. Toms, 1 Dougl. at p. 406, per Lord Mansfield, C.J. (x) Priestley v. Foulds, 2 M. & G. at p. 194; Barrett v. Stockton and Darlington Rail. Co., 2 M. & G. 134; 3 M. & G. 956; 11 Cl. & Fin. 590; Parker v. G. W. Rail. Co., 7 M. & G. at p. 288: Walker v. London and Blackwall Rail. Co., 3 Q. B. 744; Webb v. Manchester and Leeds Rail. Co., 4 Myl. & Cr. 116; Tawney v. Lynn and Ely Rail. Co., 16 L. J. Ch. 282.

them (y). The powers given by such Acts to levy rates or tolls (z), or to interfere with private property, must be conferred by clear words, and "extend no farther than is expressly stated in the Act, or is necessarily and properly required for carrying into effect the undertaking and works which the Act has expressly sanctioned" (a). An instance of the strict construction given to special Acts passed for the benefit of companies may be found in a case decided upon a statute which empowered the Norwich Union Society to sue and be sued, and to commence all actions and suits in the name of its secretary. It was held that this provision did not authorise the secretary to present a bankruptcy petition against a person who was indebted to the society (b).

special

strangers.

In some of the early cases it was declared that How far a special Act did not take away the rights or inte- Acts affect rests of strangers. Thus, an Act which was in effect a bargain between foresters and proprietors of the soil did not affect the rights of commoners (c). On similar grounds it has been lately held that an Act passed for the purpose of collecting together the clauses usually inserted in private bills which authorised the construction of piers and docks, could not be understood as creating a new

(y) Stourbridge Canal Co. v. Wheeley, 2 B. & Ad. 792.

(*) Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. at pp. 58, 59, per Lord Tenterden, C.J.

(a) Colman v. E. C. Rail. Co., 10 Beav. at p. 14, per Lord Langdale, M.R.

(b) Guthrie v. Fisk, 3 B. & C. 178.

(c) Barrington's Case, 8 Rep. at p. 138 a; Lucy v. Levington, 1 Ventr. at p. 176, per Lord Hale.