words, for master and mistress are the same thing in effect (a). Turning from these early cases we find it has been decided in Ireland that where a company was authorised to levy a toll upon every ship "drawing more than five feet of water" which entered a certain harbour, that toll was payable by any ship if its ordinary draught of water exceeded five feet, although at the time of its entering the harbour it drew less than five feet (b). In the United States it has been held that a statute which rendered it penal for the master of a ship to beat or imprison any of the crew, included under the word "crew any of the officers (c). A ship on its outward voyage to the coast of Africa, where it was intended that a cargo of slaves should be taken on board, was held to be "employed or made use of in the transportation of slaves" (d). A statute provided that any person who should dig up any human body, without being authorised by the Board of Health, or the selectmen of any town in the Commonwealth, should be liable to imprisonment. It was held that it was sufficient to aver in an indictment that the person accused of digging up a human body was not authorised by the selectmen of the town where the body was buried. "Taken strictly," says Parker, C.J., " without reference to the subject matter and the manifest intention and object of the Legislature, it would appear that in (a) Partridge v. Strange, Plowd. at p. 86. (b) Hibernian Mine Co. v. Tuke, 8 Ir. C. L. R. 321. order to sustain an indictment on the statute, it must be averred and proved that the Board of Health or selectmen of no town in the Commonwealth had given licence to the act complained of. The rule (which requires a strict construction of penal statutes) does not exclude the application of common sense to the terms made use of in the Act, in order to avoid an absurdity which the Legislature ought not to be presumed to have intended" (e). STATUTES IN PARI MATERIÂ. Another kind or class of statutes has now to be considered. It consists of such statutes as relate to the same subject (f), to the same persons or things (g), and are generally described as Acts in pari materia. Such statutes are to be construed so that each of them may explain, interpret, and enforce the others, and although they may have been passed at different times, although some of them may have expired, or have been repealed (h), although there may be no actual reference in one of them to the others, or any clause directing the several Acts to be read as one (i), they must be regarded as forming one harmonious system, or as so many parts of the same statute (k). This rule (e) Commonwealth v. Loring, 8 Pickering, at p. 373. (ƒ) M'William v. Adams, 1 Macq. Sc. Ap. at p. 141, per Lord Truro. (g) United Society v. Eagle Bank, 7 Connecticut, at p. 469. (h) Ex parte Copeland, 2 De G., M. & G. 914, 919, citing R. v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. at p. 447, per Lord Mansfield, C.J. (i) Waterlow v. Dobson, 27 L. J. Q. B. at p. 55, per Lord Campbell, C.J. (k) R. v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. at p. 447; Palmer's Case, 1 Leach, C. C. has been applied to the Stamp Acts (7), to the Revenue Laws (m), to the Statute of Limitations (n), and is most appropriate in the case of ancient statutes (o). If an Act is passed which prohibits the doing of a certain thing, and afterwards another Act imposes a penalty on any one who does it, the two Acts are to be taken as one (p). The Act 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, giving costs upon judgment in a demurrer, is to be read as one Act with the 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 39, which, while giving costs to the successful party in quare impedit, enables the Court or judge to relieve from payment of costs a bishop who has had good cause for defending an action (7). As the Lands Clauses Act was passed "to make a general code regulating the manner in which lands might be taken under the authority of Parliament, and compensation made for injury occasioned by what was thus legalised," it may be presumed that in passing subsequent Acts the Legislature intended to follow that general code, unless a contrary intention has been clearly manifested ('). or judicial One of the chief results of the practice of read- Legislative ing Acts in pari materia as if they formed parts interpreta 355; MWilliam v. Adams, 1 Macq. Sc. Ap. at p. 141; Patterson v. (1) Crosley v. Arkwright, 2 T. R. at p. 609, per Buller, J. (p) Stradling v. Morgan, Plowd. at p. 206. (1) Edwards v. Bishop of Exeter, 6 Bing. N. C. 146. (r) R. v. Lord Mayor of London, L. R. 2 Q. B. at pp. 295, 296, per Blackburn, J. tion of one of the same statute, is that the legislative or Act to be another. adopted in another. 66 followed in judicial interpretation which has been given to words in one of such Acts will generally be "Whatever has been determined the construction of one statute," says upon Buller, J., "is a sound rule of construction for another which is in pari materia" (s). This principle was followed with regard to the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, which enacted that when justices should adjudge a defendant to be imprisoned, and he should then be in prison undergoing imprisonment upon a conviction for any other offence," they might order the imprisonment for the subsequent offence to commence at the expiration of that to which he had been previously sentenced. Similar words to these were used in the 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28, and under those words the judges had been in the habit of passing consecutive sentences upon persons convicted at the same time of two separate offences, so that the sentence for one offence might commence at the expiration of the sentence for the other. It was held that the same construction was to be given to the words of the later statute (t). In another case, Martin, B., questions the propriety of the rule which is now under consideration. "I protest," says he, "against the idea that when an Act of Parliament is made as clear as words can make it, you are to cite as authorities as to its construction and as a guide to us in its interpretation, (s) R. v. Mason, 2 T. R. at p. 586. (t) R. v. Cutbush, L. R. 2 Q. B. 379, reported as Re Paine, 8 B. & S. cases decided years and years before upon another statute" (u). Of legislative interpretation it is said that where the same words occur in two Acts in pari materiâ, and in the first Act the Legislature has over and over again explained the meaning of those words, they ought to have the same sense in the second Act (x). So, too," where in two statutes in pari materia the same words occur, and in one of them the meaning is clear and in the other doubtful, I think," says Littledale, J., "we ought to call in aid the meaning put upon those words by the Legislature in the statute where they are not ambiguous, and give them the same meaning in the other statute "(y). Therefore, it was held that 48 Geo. III. c. 111, which provided that no ballot, enrolment, and service under that Act should make void any indenture of apprenticeship or contract of service, applied only to indentures or contracts existing at the time of such ballot, as similar words were so restricted in the 52 Geo. III. c. 68, which was in pari materia (z). Again, the Bankruptcy Act, 5 Geo. II. c. 30, provided that a bankrupt's certificate might be refused if within a year before his bankruptcy he had lost the sum of £100 by contracts for the purchase of "any stock of any company whatsoever, or any parts or shares of any Government or public funds or securities." The Bankruptcy Act, 1849, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, which contained (u) R. v. Moah, Dearsley's C. C. at p. 639. (x) Glennon's Case, Alcock's Registry Cases, at p. 85. |