Provisions made for one Act adopted in similar provisions, used merely the words, "Government or other stock." These words, however, were taken to be as extensive as those in the earlier statute, and were read by reference to them so as to include railway shares (a). Although an identity of language in Acts in pari materia gives rise to the inference that the meaning of the Acts ought also to be identical, a change of language does not necessarily lead to an opposite conclusion (b). Thus in the case from which these words are taken, it was held that "parochial rates" in 6 Geo. IV. c. 57, had the same meaning as "taxes of the parish" in 3 Will. and Mary, c. 11, and 35 Geo. III. c. 101. In another case, the comparison of two Acts in pari materiâ led the Supreme Court of the United States to the conclusion that in the later Act a word had been accidentally omitted. An Act of Congress provided that suits "against" certain associations might be brought in the district Courts. An earlier Act had made the same provision for suits "by and against" such associations, and it was held that a reference to the earlier Act enabled the word "by" to be supplied in the later (c). We have seen that in construing penal statutes the Court has always restricted the term "this Act," another. according to its literal meaning, to the Act itself in which that term was employed. But in statutes which are in pari materia, and to which the rule (a) Ex parte Copeland, 2 De G., M. & G. 914. (b) R. v. East Teignmouth, Inhabitants, 1 B. & Ad. at p. 249, per Bayley, J. (c) Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wallace, 498. of strict construction does not apply, that term has a much more elastic meaning, and the words "this Act" include not only the Act itself, but earlier or later Acts, which are treated as forming parts of the same statute. Thus it was provided by 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, that "in the construction of this Act" the word parish should include city. The Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, which incorporated the provisions of the Act of William the Fourth, and provided that the two Acts should be construed as one, enacted that no person should be removed from any "parish" in which he had resided for five years. It was held that by the combined operation of the two Acts, no person could be removed from a city in which he had resided for five years (d). By the Sanitary Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 90), the second part of that Act was to be construed as one with the Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121. One of the sections in the second part of the Act of 1866 enacted that "the provisions of this Act" should not extend to certain manufactures. It was held that by the effect of this section the manufactures in question were exempted from the operation of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121 (e). Again, it was provided that the County Courts Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142), and the several Acts in a schedule which comprised the County Courts Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 108), should be construed together as one Act. Section 35 of the Act of 1867 enacted, "the words County Court when used in this Act, or any future Act, shall include the City of London Court." It was (d) R. v. Forncett St. Mary, 12 Q. B. 160. (e) Norris v. Barnes, L. R. 7 Q. B. 537. Does express to one Act extend to another held that by virtue of these words the provisions of the Act of 1856 applied to the City of London Court (f). These cases were not cited to the Common Pleas Division when a similar question arose under the Municipal Elections Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 40). Although by section 13 that Act was to be construed as one with the Municipal Corporations Act (5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76), it was held that the effect of this section was not to incorporate in the later Act the provisions of the earlier. Therefore, where the initial of a Christian name was inserted in a nomination paper at a municipal election, this was considered a fatal objection to the validity of the nomination paper, and it was decided that the provisions of 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 76, which remedied every "misnomer or inaccurate description in any voting paper required by this Act," did not extend to a misnomer or inaccuracy in a paper required by the Act of 1875 (g). Another point in connection with these statutes, reference upon which there have been conflicting decisions, occurs in cases where one Act has been expressly mentioned, and this reference has either been conin pari materia? fined to the Act itself, or extended to amending Acts or Acts in pari materiâ. The Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42) provided that Ireland should not be deemed to be beyond the seas within the meaning of that Act, or of the Act of the twenty-first year of James the First, for the (f) Blades v. Lawrence, L. R. 9 Q. B. 374. limitation of actions. It was held that Ireland was still a place beyond the seas within 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, although that Act was in pari materia as one of the Statutes of Limitations (h). Again, the Act 1 Jac. I. c. 9, rendered an innkeeper, who permitted an inhabitant to tipple, liable to a penalty, if he was convicted upon the oath of two witnesses. This Act having expired was revived and made perpetual by 21 Jac. I. c. 7, but one witness was substituted for two. Then the Act 1 Car. I. c. 4, provided that an alehouse-keeper who permitted a stranger to tipple should incur "the same penalty, and in such manner to be proved as in the former statute of the first year of his late Majesty's reign." It was held that the reference was to the first Act as originally enacted, and not as altered by the intermediate Act, and that, consequently, two witnesses were required under 1 Car. I. c. 4 (i). On the other hand, when it was enacted that the forfeitures and penalties inflicted by 10 Geo. III. c. 44, should be recovered and levied by any justice of the peace, "by such ways and means as the penalties and forfeitures in the said Act of the 9th of Anne are directed to be levied and recovered," it was held that this did not mean that the method of recovery prescribed by the Act of Anne was to be followed, but the method prescribed by subsequent Acts, and especially that which was prescribed by the 10 Geo. III. c. 44 (k). So, too, it is said that when an expiring Act is revived all other Acts which (h) Lane v. Bennett, 1 M. & W. 70. Extension of the by refer ence to others in pari materia. have been passed for the purpose of explaining or amending it are revived also as attendant upon it (7). The following instances will show how the words language of one statute have sometimes been extended by of statutes a reference to another statute which is in pari materia. By the 25 Geo. III. c. 80, a penalty of £50 was imposed on any attorney who took proceedings without having obtained a certificate, and it was provided that this penalty might be sued for by a common informer. The 37 Geo. III. c. 90, inflicted a penalty of the same amount on any attorney who took proceedings without entering his certificate in one of the Courts wherein he was admitted, but made no provision for the recovery of this penalty. It was held that as the Acts were in pari materia, the penalty imposed by the second Act might be sued for by a common informer in the manner which the first Act provided (m). The County Courts Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95), imposed a penalty on "every clerk, treasurer, high bailiff, or other officer of any such Court" who should act as attorney or agent for any party. The County Courts Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 61), empowered the Lord Chancellor to remove the "clerk, high bailiff, or any assistant clerk" from his office. Reading the two Acts together as in pari materia, the Court of Queen's Bench held that the assistant clerk who was described in the later Act was an officer of the County Court within (1) Williams v. Roughedge, 2 Burr. 747. |