the provisions of the earlier Act, and was liable to the penalty which it inflicted (n). TEMPORARY STATUTES. Temporary Acts are those the duration of which is limited by the Legislature itself, and which expire without the necessity of actual repeal at the end of the time fixed for their continuance. If, however, a temporary Act is made perpetual by another Act, it is in effect perpetual ab initio (0), and though there may be an interval between the expiration of a law and its revival, rights acquired under the original Act are preserved, unless those of others have intervened during the interval (p). Offences against a temporary Act cannot be punished after its expiration without special provision for that purpose (q). But rights conferred by a temporary Act do not necessarily come to an end with its expiration. In this respect, according to Parke, B., "there is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed and the duration of the provisions are matters (n) Ackroyd v. Gill, 5 E. & B. 808. (0) R. v. Swiney, 1 Alcock & Napier, 131. (p) Stephens v. M'Cargo, 9 Wheaton, 502. (q) U. S. v. The Helen, 6 Cranch. 203; The Irresistible, 7 Wheaton, 551. Perpetual statute not by unne continu of construction" ("). Thus the 6 Geo. IV. c. 133, which was to remain in force until August, 1826, provided that persons holding commissions as surgeons or assistant surgeons in the army might practise as apothecaries without passing an examination, upon their receiving the certificate required by another statute. It was decided that persons who held commissions before August, 1826, might practise as apothecaries after that date (s). In like manner, where any statute is repealed by a temporary Act, the Court has to consider whether such repeal is intended to be temporary or perpetual. In one case it was held that such a repeal was intended to be absolute, and that the repealed Act did not revive when the repealing Act expired (t). Where, however, the 46 Geo. III. c. 139, which repealed in part 42 Geo. III. c. 38, was to continue in force until a certain day, it was decided that the provisions of the earlier Act were merely suspended until that day, and came into force again when the later Act expired (u). A statute which is perpetual in the first instance rendered does not become temporary if by a mistake of the temporary Legislature it is treated as needing to be continued. cessary An Act of the 37 Hen. VIII. as to setting prices of wine by retail contained no provision limiting its own duration, and was therefore perpetual. Subsequently in the 5th year of Edw. VI. an Act was passed continuing the former Act till the end ance. (r) Steavenson v. Oliver, 8 M. & W. at p. 241. (s) Steavenson v. Oliver, 8 M. & W. 234. of the next session. It was held that the Act of 37 Hen. VIII. did not expire, and was not repealed at the end of the time to which it was so continued, for "an affirmative continuance of a statute perpetual cannot work an abrogation of the statute" (x). (x) Prices of wine, Hob. 215. CHAPTER VI. What are of a THE SEVERAL PARTS OF A STATUTE. THE several parts of a statute which have to be the parts considered are its title, preamble, clauses or sections, the provisoes, savings, and exceptions contained in such clauses, and the schedules annexed to the Act. statute. Is the title part of a statute? THE TITLE. What effect should be given to the title of a statute has been the subject of much discussion. According to some judges the title is no part of an Act of Parliament; it ought not in strictness to be taken into consideration at all (a); it cannot be resorted to for the purpose of construing the provisions of an Act (b), nor can it cut down enacting words which go beyond it (c). "As to the style or title of the Act," it is said in an early case, "that is no parcel of the Act, and ancient statutes were without any title, and many Acts are of (a) Salkeld v. Johnston, 2 Ex. at pp. 282, 283, per Pollock, C.B. (b) Hunter v. Nockolds, 1 Mac. & G. 640. (c) Hannant v. Foulger, 8 B. & S. at p. 430, per Blackburn, J. "It is greater extent than the titles are" (d). true," says Lord Holt, "the title of an Act of Parliament is no part of the law or enacting part, no more than the title of a book is part of the book; for the title is not the law, but the name or description given to it by the makers" (e). "The title," says Lord Hardwicke, "is no part of the Act, and has often been determined not to be so, nor ought it to be taken into consideration in the construction of an Act, for originally there were no titles to the Acts, but only a petition and the King's answer; and the judges thereupon drew up the Act into form and then added the title; and the title does not pass the same forms as the rest of the Act, only the Speaker after the Act is passed mentions the title and puts the question upon it; therefore the meaning of the Act is not to be inferred from the title" (ƒ). A similar reason for disregarding the title is given by Lord Mansfield, who says that the title is "no part of the law; it does not pass with the same solemnity as the law itself; one reading is often sufficient for it" (g). It has been said by Treby, C.J., that the title of Acts of Parliament was comparatively a new usage, and began about the 11th year of Henry the Seventh (h), while Lord Cranworth states that though the question as to the title of an Act is put from the chair in (d) Powlter's Case, 11 Rep. 33 b. (e) Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; 2 Salkeld, 609. (h) Chance v. Adams, 1 Ld. Raym. 77. T |