may adjudge an infant or minor to be of full age, may bastard a child that by law is legitimate, and may legitimate one that is illegitimate (d). So an Act of Parliament "may capacitate a man to have an heir or to be an heir that otherwise could not have or be an heir" (e), may abrogate a custom (ƒ), may make a woman mayor or justice of the peace (y), may enable one who is not a party to a deed to sue upon it (h), may rescind a covenant in a deed or discharge an obligation under a bond (i), may take away those rights which exist at Common Law, and may injure private property without giving any compensation (k), may confirin and render valid that which of itself is void (), and may even give it such validity as will enable it to prevail over its competitors, or to avoid titles which had been acquired before the time of its confirma

(d) 4 Inst. 36.

(e) Wheatley v. Thomas, 1 Lev. at p. 75.

(f) Truscott v. Merchant Tailors' Company, 11 Ex. 855; Noble v. Durell, 3 T. R. 271.

(g) Crow v. Ramsey, Sir T. Jones, at p. 12.

(h) Gresty v. Gibson, L. R. 1 Ex. 112; Reeves v. Watts, L.. R. 1 Q. B. 412; 7 B. & S. 523.

(i) Brewster v. Kitchell, 1 Salk. 198; Bailey v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180; Wynn v. Shropshire Union Railway and Canal Co., 5 Ex. 420; Brown v. Mayor of London, 9 C. B. N. S. 726; 13 C. B. N. S. 828; Newington Local Board v. Cottingham Local Board, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 725.

(k) Boulton v. Crowther, 2 B. & C. 703; Sewers of London, L. R. 4 Ex. 1, 227.

Ferrar v.

Commissioners of

(1) 1 Rolle's Abr. 483; Earl of Leicester v. Heydon, Plowd. at p. 399 ; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, at p. 662, per Story, J.

Such con

firmation, however, if conveyed in general words, does not give effect to anything unlawful. R. v. Mayor of London, 9 B. & C. at p. 30; Smith v. Goldsworthy, Q. B. at p. 466; Earl of Le cester

v. Heydon, supra.

Authority extends

over the

whole realm,

and to

presumed

Statute

Law.

tion (m). To use the words of Blackstone, "Parliament can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is, that what the Parliament doth no authority on earth can undo" (n).

The authority of statutes extends over the whole realm, and affects all who are within it. "As soon as the Parliament hath concluded anything, the everybody law intends that every person hath notice thereof, within it. for the Parliament represents the body of the Everybody realm" (o). For the same reason, it has been laid to know down in modern times that every man is presumed to know the statute law of the realm (p), and that all the subjects of this country are bound to construe that law rightly (q). A testator is presumed to know the provisions of the Wills' Act, and to make his will in accordance with them (). But this principle is not carried to its full extent in cases where that would work injustice. Thus a solicitor is not liable to an action for negligence if he has misconstrued a doubtful Act of Parliament (s), or if, looking to the express words of a statute, he has supposed that they would be literally followed in a case where the

(m) Stead v. Carey, 1 C. B. 496.

(n) 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 161; 2 Stephen, 7th edit. 336. (0) 4 Inst. 26.

(p) Carter v. M'Laren, L. R. 2 Sc. Ap. at p. 125, per Lord Chelmsford.

(q) The Charlotta, 1 Dods. Adm. at p. 392, per Sir W. Scott.

(r) Stokes v. Salomons, 9 Hare, at p. 79.

(8) Elkington v. Holland, 9 M. & W.659.

Court has afterwards adopted a liberal construction (t).

scription

statute.

cannot

relieve

statute.

The absolute authority of statutes is further No preillustrated by the principles that there can be no against a prescription against a statute (u), and that equity Equity cannot relieve against its express provisions (x). Equity may, indeed, restrain persons from making against a an application to Parliament, unless such an application is made on public grounds (y); but it is difficult to imagine a case in which equity will thus interfere (2), and, though the power of a Court of Equity to restrain an application to Parliament is clear, the propriety of its exercising this power is considered doubtful (a).

rity of

confined

province.

Wide, however, as is the authority of statutes, But authoit is of necessity confined within its own province. statutes is That an Act of Parliament cannot alter the course to its own of nature (b) is so obvious as to amount to a truism. Cannot "It is beyond even the power of the Legislature alter the to make that a party wall which is not a party nature. wall. No doubt they might have made provisions to the effect that that which is not a party wall

(t) Kemp v. Burt, 4 B. & Ad. at pp. 431-2, per Littledale J. (u) 2 Inst. 20.

(x) Cavendish v. Worsley, Hobart, 203; Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Vesey, at p. 627, per Lord Eldon, C.; Edwards v. Edwards, L. R. 2 Ch. D. at p. 297, per Mellish, L.J.

(y) Lancaster & Carlisle Rail. Co. v. N. W. R. Co., 2 Kay & J. 293. (z) Steele v. North Met. Rail. Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 237; Re L. C. & D. Rail. Co. Arrangement Act, L. R. 5 Ch. 671.

(a) Ware v. Grand Junction Waterworks Co., 2 Russ. & Mylne, 470; Att.-Gen. v. Manchester and Leeds Rail. Co., 1 Railw. Cas. 436; Stockton & Hartlepool Rail. Co. v. Leeds, Thirsk, &c., Rail. Co., 2 Ph. 670; Heathcote v. North Staffordshire Rail. Co., 2 Macn. & Gordon, 100.

(b) Crow v. Ramsey, Sir T. Jones, at p. 12.

course of

Does not extend be

shall, for the purpose of a particular Act of Parliament, be deemed to be a party wall; but they cannot make what is not a party wall a party wall any more than they can make a square a circle" (c). The true rule upon this subject is, that if Acts of Parliament were to attempt to alter the law of nature they would be inoperative. There can be no conflict between the laws of nature and the laws made by Parliament-no question whether one or the other should yield, for they are wholly independent of each other.

Nor does the authority of statutes extend beyond yond limits the limits of this country. "The statutes of this country. realm Lave no power, are of no force, beyond the

of this

dominions of Her Majesty, not even to bind the subjects of the realm unless they are expressly mentioned or can be necessarily implied" (d). "Prima facie," says Lord Cranworth in the same case (e), “the Legislature of this country must be taken to make laws for its own subjects exclusively, including under the word subjects all persons who are within the Queen's dominions, and who thus owe to her a temporary allegiance." One instance in which an Act of Parliament extends to British subjects out of the dominions is to be found in the statute making marriage with a deceased wife's sister illegal, which extends to marriages solemnised

(c) Weston v. Arnold, L. R. 8 Ch. at p. 1089, per James, L.J. (d) Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. at p. 939, per Pollock, C.B. Dr. Lushington says, indeed, "the laws of Great Britain affect her own subjects everywhere-foreigners when within her own jurisdiction.” The Zollverein, 1 Swab. 96.

(e) Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. at p. 955.

extend to

things.

abroad between British subjects (f). But in most other cases it has been held that the authority of English Acts of Parliament "stops with the shore," or is even confined to persons and things of purely English nationality. Thus, the Acts relating to Does not wills and legacies have been confined to wills foreign made and legacies left by persons domiciled in England (g). Thus, the Succession Duty Act applies to England alone (h); the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, does not authorise an adjudication against a foreigner who has never resided in England (i); the Companies' Act, 1862, does not extend to a company formed in a foreign dependency of the English Crown (k); the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, refers to British ships only, unless foreign ships are expressly mentioned (). It was held that the copyright conferred by the earlier Acts was confined to British authors, and did not extend to foreigners publishing abroad (m); but the words of a later Act were held to include all persons whose works were published for the first time in the United Kingdom, whether they were British subjects or foreigners (n). Turning from persons to

(f) Brook v. Brook, 3 Smale & Giff. 481; 9 H. L. C. 193.

(g) Arnold v. Arnold, 2 Mylne & Craig, 256; Thomson v. Adv.Gen., 12 Cl. & Fin. 1; Att.-Gen. v. Forbes, 2 Cl. & Fin. 48, cited by Parke, B., in Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. at p. 926.

(h) Wallace v. Att.-Gen., L. R. 1 Ch. 1; see Att.-Gen. v. Campbell, L. R. 5 H. L. 524.

(i) Ex parte Blain, Re Sawers, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 522.

(k) Bulkeley v. Schutz, L. R. 3 P. C. 764.

(1) Cope v. Doherty, 4 K. & J. 367; 2 De G. & J. 614.

(m) Clementi v. Walker, 2 B. & C. 861; Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L.

C. 815.

(n) Routledge v. Low, L. R. 3 H. L. 100.

D