To take away right Where the 42 Geo. III. c. 73, which limited the hours of work for children in factories, imposed certain penalties, and provided that no conviction under the Act should be removed by certiorari, and the 6 Geo. IV. c. 63, referring to that Act, provided that all the powers, provisions, &c., contained in it should be "as good, valid, and effectual for carrying this Act into execution" as if the same had been repeated and re-enacted, it was held that a conviction under the later Act could not be removed by certiorari (q). For the same reasons which led the judges of an of chang earlier time to say, "we will not suffer this Court ing venue. to be excluded from its jurisdiction by obscure words in the statute" (r), it has been held that very strong words were needed to take away the Common Law rights of the Superior Courts to change a venue. Words which were not sufficient for that purpose were contained in the Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63); section 139 of which provided that certain actions should "be laid and tried in the county or place where the cause of action occurred, and not elsewhere" (s). A very sound and excellent rule on this subject is laid down by Lord Cranworth: "Whenever the Legislature imposes restrictions or regulations on the action of the Superior Courts, it is not unreasonable to say that its language must be looked to with a strong inclination to construe it in (q) R. v. Fell, 1 B. & Ad. 380. (r) Hill and Dechair, Styles at p. 382. (8) Southampton Bridge Co. v. Local Board of Southampton, 8 E. & B. at p. 804. the mode best calculated to promote obvious justice" (t). as to the exclusive Differences of opinion have existed with regard Decisions to statutes which confer jurisdiction upon justices creation of of the peace or arbitrators, and the question has jurisdicmore than once arisen whether such jurisdiction is tions. concurrent with that of the Superior Courts or exclusive. It was held that the Act, 43 Geo. III. c. 99, providing that any question or difference which arose upon taking any distress should be determined by the Commissioners of Taxes, did not affect the right to bring an action in one of the Superior Courts for a wrongful distress (u). But where an Act which imposed penalties of £50 and £10 enacted that the former penalty might be sued for in any of the Courts at Westminster, while as to the latter it should be lawful for any justice of the peace to impose it or to mitigate it, the Court held that its jurisdiction was ousted in the case of the smaller penalty (x). It would be more correct to say in this case, as was said by Patteson, J., in another, "not that the jurisdiction of the Superior Court is thus taken away; that jurisdiction never arises" (y). As the Act which created the offence provided also the penalty, the only method by which it could be exacted was that prescribed by the statute. The case of the Savings Banks Act, 9 Geo. IV. c. 92, affords a better illustration. Section 45 of that Act, providing that if (t) Ralston v. Hamilton, 4 Macqueen, at p. 408. (y) Timms v. Williams, 3 Q. B. at p. 423. any dispute arose the matter should be referred to arbitrators, was held sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts (2). "Looking at the object and intention of the Legislature," says Tindal, C.J., in that case (a), "we think it clear that the remedy by action is taken away, and that by arbitration substituted in its place. The Legislature contemplated the cheap, simple, speedy, and equitable adjustment of all disputes by a reference in the mode pointed out in the Act instead of a more expensive, dilatory, and uncertain remedy by action at law." The same principle was applied to the case of building societies (b). In like manner it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts was incidentally taken away by a proviso in the 53 Geo. III. c. 127, s. 7. That Act gave two justices power to order payment of a rate not exceeding £10, the validity of which had not been questioned in any Ecclesiastical Court: "provided that nothing herein contained shall extend to alter or interfere with the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts to hear and determine causes touching the validity of any church rate or chapel rate, or from proceeding to enforce the payment of any such rate if the same shall exceed the sum of £10." It was considered that the effect of this proviso, coupled with the words which gave jurisdiction to justices of the peace in one particular case, was to deprive the Ecclesiastical Courts of the power of (*) Crisp v. Bunbury, 8 Bing. 394. (a) At pp. 400, 401. (b) Reeves v. White, 17 Q. B. 995. enforcing an undisputed rate for a sum not exceeding £10 (c). The Act of the 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 23, for the establishment of loan societies, gave rise to a serious difference of opinion between the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas. The eighth section of the Act empowered and required a justice of the peace to hear and determine any complaint made of a failure in the repayment of any loan. The Queen's Bench held that this remedy was exclusive, and that no action could be brought by the treasurer of such a society (d). The Common Pleas held that the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts was not ousted, and that an action might be brought by the trustees of such a society (e). In the first case Lord Denman, C.J., said (ƒ): "The Legislature has thought it useful to withhold the power of instituting expensive suits in the Superior Courts, and to appoint a domestic power to settle those small disputes which a society of this kind is likely to be engaged in.' We turn to the second case, and there we find very different words used by Tindal, C.J.: "There are no exclusive words in the statute under consideration, and it is perfectly clear, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts is not taken away" (g). words Public or private rights cannot be affected in Express the absence of express words or necessary implica- needed (c) Richards v. Dyke, 3 Q. B. 256. (f) Timms v. Williams, 3 Q. B. at p. 422. to affect public or private rights. tion. A public right of way may indeed be extinguished by an Act of Parliament, but only "when the Legislature clearly and distinctly authorise the doing of a thing which is physically inconsistent with the continuance" of such a right (h). It was held in the United States that an authority to construct a railway between certain points did not warrant the appropriation of an existing public highway for that purpose. The authority to lay the railroad along the highway could only be granted by express words or necessary implication; but there would be sufficient ground for such an implication if the railroad could not reasonably be laid in any other line (i). So, too, express words or necessary implication are needed to take away vested rights (k), or a benefit that has vested (1), or to devest an estate (m), or interfere with the rights of individuals (n), or trench upon the Common Law rights of an owner in respect of his enjoyment of his property (0), or to cut down, abridge, restrain, or avoid any written instrument (p). As it is an essential principle of natural justice that no man's (h) Corporation of Yarmouth v. Simmons, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 518, 527, per Fry, J. (i) Springfield Inhabitants v. Connecticut River Railroad Co., 4 Cushing, 63. (k) Randolph v. Milman, L. R. 4 C. P. 107, 113; Farran v. Ottiwell, 2 Jebb & Symes, Irish Q. B. at p. 109. (1) R. v. Birmingham Cunal Co., 2 B. & Ald. 570, 579. (m) Churchwardens of Deptford v. Sketchley, 8 Q. B. 394. (n) Harrod v. Worship, 1 B. & S. 381. (0) R. v. Mallow Union, 12 Ir. C. L. R. 35; Shaw v. Ruddin, 9 Ir. C. L. R. 214. (p) Morris v. Mellin, 6 B. & C. at p. 449, per Lord Tenterden, C.J.; at p. 450, per Bayley, J. |