person or property should be affected without his
being heard, this natural right cannot be taken
away without express words, and an Act which
empowered a district board to pull down certain
buildings did not authorise it so to act without
first hearing the person aggrieved (9). And as
each person's right to the enjoyment of his own
property is guarded in like manner, it has been
held that the Metropolitan Building Act, giving
the owner of a house the right to raise any party
structure upon condition of his making good all
damage occasioned thereby to the adjoining premises,
did not authorise him to obstruct the ancient
lights of his neighbour (r). An attempt was once
made to extend to the Divorce Act, 20 & 21 Vict.
c. 85, the rule which has now been discussed, and
to suggest that marriage could not be dissolved
without express words.
words. It was argued with some
courage that, as the words of the Act were only,
upon the petitioner's case being established "the
Court shall pronounce a decree declaring such
marriage to be dissolved," and there was no pro-
vision that "thereupon the marriage shall be dis-
solved accordingly," the decree was ineffectual, and
there was no dissolution of the marriage. But the
Vice-Chancellor to whom this argument was ad-
dressed declined to accede to it, or to deprive the
Act of Parliament of all effect and meaning (s).

Where the rule which requires express words When audoes not apply, the authority of statutes is often statutes is

(q) Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, 14 C. B. N. S. 180. (r) Crofts v. Haldane, L. R. 2 Q. B. 194.

(s) Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. R. 4 Eq. 162.

thority of

E

by implication.

extended extended by implication. A power may be given or a duty imposed by inference where it is clear that a full effect could not otherwise be given to the provisions of the statute. Quando lex aliquid concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (t). "In statutes incidents are ever supplied by intendment" (u). Thus where an act is made felony by statute, all the Common Law incidents of felony attach to it without being particularly specified (x). The Statute of Gloucester, c. 5, which gives an action of waste against tenant for life and tenant for years, gives an implied authority to the reversioner to enter and see if any waste has been done (y). A statute which gives a justice of the peace jurisdiction over an offence, gives him also an implied power to issue a warrant against a person accused of its commission (). On the same principle, when authority is given to the Superior Courts they receive by implication all the powers which are necessary for its exercise. Thus a power given to one of the Superior Courts may be exercised by a judge at Chambers (a), and a power which is to be exercised by a judge of the Court in which an action is brought may be exercised by a judge of another Court sitting at Chambers for all the Courts (b). So, too, when the Act, 53 Geo. III.

(t) Oath before Justices, 12 Rep. 131.

(u) 2 Inst. 222.

() R. v. Sadi, 1 Leach, C. C. at p. 472, 2 East, P. C. at p. 743, per Gould and Ashhurst, JJ.

(y) 2 Inst. 306.

(2) Bane v. Methuen, 2 Bing. 63.

(a) Smecton v. Collier, 1 Ex. 457.

(b) Owens v. Woosman, L. R. 3 Q. B. 469; 9 B. & S. 243.

c. 24, empowered a Vice-Chancellor to do all that might be done by the Lord Chancellor, and afterwards certain powers were conferred on the Lord Chancellor by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54, it was held that these powers might be exercised by a Vice-Chancellor (c). If, however, a special power is given to one Court by name that power will not be extended to another (d). In some cases an implied authority has been given to justices of the peace either to hear a complaint or to inflict a penalty. Thus an Act for the relief of the poor provided that any person who was aggrieved by certain rates or assessments might apply to two justices, and if not relieved should be obliged to pay, but might afterwards appeal to the Quarter Sessions. It was held that this clause by implication gave two justices power to hear any such complaint by a person aggrieved, and to relieve the complainant (e). So it was held that the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1870, gave justices an implied authority to punish the offences which that Act created. One section provided that a person guilty of an offence against the Act should be liable to a penalty. A second section enacted that a person should be deemed guilty of an offence unless he showed, to the satisfaction of the justices before whom he was charged, that he did not know of the animal being diseased. A third section gave an appeal from justices (f). Other instances of implied powers or

(c) Re Taylor, 10 Simons, 291.

(d) 2 Inst. 114.

(e) R. v. St. James's, Westminster, 2 A. & E. 241.

(f) Cullen v. Trimble, L. R. 7 Q. B. 416.

When not.

duties

may be found in the cases which decide that a right to compensation may be inferred in the absence of express words (g), that pilotage may be rendered compulsory by words which impose a penalty if a vessel sails without a pilot (h), that where power was given to the governor of a colony to forward passengers to their original destination, if the master of the ship in which they had taken their passage declined or omitted to forward them, the duty of forwarding such passengers was imposed on the master (i).

Yet the authority of statutes is not extended by implication to all things which might possibly have been contemplated by the Legislature, and which may even be considered the fair and logical consequences of an enactment. The object of such extension is to give full effect to the statute, but this must be done in conformity with the general rules of construction, and new words must not be added, nor must existing words be strained, for the purpose of carrying out a supposed intention. If effect can be given to the actual words of the statute the Court can go no further, although a wider and more sensible effect could be given to the statute by the addition of a single sentence, and although in all probability that sentence would have been added if it had been suggested to the Legislature. Acting on this principle, the Courts have, in several cases, declined to extend the authority of statutes beyond the language used by their framers. Thus

(g) R. v. St. Luke's, Chelsea, L. R. 6 Q. B. 572, 7 Q. B. 148.
(h) Redpath v. Allen, L. R. 4 P. C. 511.

(i) Gibson v. Bradford, 4 E. & B. 586.

where 5 Eliz. c. 4, s. 35, empowered justices to discharge an apprentice of his apprenticehood, it was held that the justices could not order his master to return any part of the premium (k). The Bankruptcy Act, 1861, provided that it should be sufficient if a debtor obtained a certain number of assents to a composition deed, and gave a form of deed in the schedule which, however, did not contain a release. It was held that such deed could not be pleaded in bar, even to an action brought by an assenting creditor (1). An Act authorised the Bradford Navigation Company to take the water of the Bradford Beck for their canal. The water was so foul that the canal became a public nuisance. It was held that the Navigation Company was indictable (m). The 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18, enacted that all rules of Court by which money should be payable to any person should have the effect of judgments. The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, gave creditors who had obtained a judgment the right to attach money in the hands of a garnishee. It was held that this remedy was not given to a person who had obtained a rule for the payment of money, as such a rule was not a judgment, but only had the effect of a judgment (n).

The reluctance shown by the Courts to extend the authority of statutes by implication is more strongly marked when any principle of the Common

(k) East v. Pell, 4 M. & W. 665, following R. v. Vandeleer, 1 Str. 69.

(1) Eyre v. Archer, 16 C. B. N. S. 638; Jones v. Morris, 6 B. & S. 198.

(m) R. v. Bradford Navigation Co., 6 B. & S. 631. (n) Re Frankland, L. R. 8 Q. B. 18.