Authority must be strictly followed.

Law would be affected by such an extension. Thus, where an Act of the 7 Jac. I. c. 12, enacted that shop-books should not be evidence above one year before action, it was said by Holt, C.J., that this Act did not make shop-books evidence of themselves within the year (o). So an Act providing that a wife should not be competent to give evidence for her husband in criminal cases did not enable her to give evidence on his behalf in civil cases (p). So, too, a provision that a conveyance made in a certain form should be valid did not cure any defects in the title (q). So where certain Acts prescribed forms of notice to be printed on indentures of apprenticeship, or served upon persons accused of an offence, and such notices stated that certain consequences would follow if the indentures were untruly stated, or if the person accused of receiving stolen goods did not negative guilty knowledge, it was held that the mere statement of these consequences in the notices without enacting words in the body of the Acts, was not sufficient either to avoid a written instrument or shift the burden of proof in a criminal case (r).

The authority of statutes must be strictly followed. Whether a power be granted to the holders of the highest offices of State, to the Superior Courts of Law or Equity, to public bodies, to companies incorporated for special pur

(0) Pitman v. Muddox, 2 Salk. 690.
(p) Barbat v. Allen, 7 Ex. 609.

(q) Ward v. Scott, 3 Camp. 284.

(r) R. v. Harrington, Inhabitants, 4 A. & E. 618; R. v. Davis, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 272.

new juris

conferred.

poses, to trustees, or to private persons, the provi-
sions of the Act which creates the power are im-
perative, and must be implicitly obeyed. How.
ever high the authority may be where a special
statutory power is exercised, the person who acts
must take care to bring himself within the terms
of the statute” (s). This principle is especially Where a
applicable to all cases in which any new jurisdic diction is
tion is conferred upon the Courts of Justice, or a
new procedure is devised, either for the purpose of
enforcing private rights or of punishing offences.
"If a new offence," says Lord Mansfield, " is created
by statute, and a special jurisdiction out of the
course of the Common Law is prescribed, it must
be followed. If not strictly pursued all is a nullity
and coram non judice" (t). A recent case supports
this proposition. The Public Worship Act, 1874
(37 & 38 Vict. c. 85, s. 9), gave power to the Arch-
bishop to refer certain matters to the judge ap-
pointed under that Act, and to require him to hear
those matters at any place within the diocese or
province or London or Westminster. Where the
judge was required by the Archbishop to hear a
matter within the diocese or London or West-
minster, and did hear it within the province, it
was held that the proceedings before him were
invalid (u). So, too, where the Commissioners of
Bankruptcy were empowered by statute to commit
a person to prison " till he submit himself to be by
them examined," and they committed a man "till

(8) Christie v. Unwin, 11 A. & E. at p. 379, per Coleridge, J.
(t) Hartley v. Hooker, 2 Cowp. at p. 524.

(u) Hudson v. Tooth, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 46.

he conform himself to our authority," their warrant was avoided (x). So, too, where an Act provided. that a prisoner under sentence of Court martial should be confined in the prison appointed by the officer commanding the district, and that his prison might be changed by the same authority, it was held that the Commander-in-Chief in England had no power to prescribe the place of confinement of a prisoner, who, in pursuance of the Act, had been first confined in India, and had then been sent to England (y).

These cases may be thought exceptional as relating to the liberty of the subject, but the rule applies to civil as well as to criminal process. Thus where an Act empowered the Court of Chancery to order the payment of money upon petition, it was decided by Lord Eldon that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the order on motion (2). Where the Court was directed to enter up judgment in favour of a plaintiff for the sum specified in a certificate from the Speaker of the House of Commons, it was held that the costs of the rule for entering up judgment could not be added to the amount specified by the certificate (a). The 3 Wm. & Mary, c. 14, made the devisee chargeable jointly with the heir for the debts of the testator in respect of lands devised to him, and enacted that specialty creditors of such testators should have an action of debt

(x) Bracy's Case, 1 Salk. 348.

(y) Re Allen, 3 E. &. E. 338.

(z) Baynes v. Baynes, 9 Vesey, 462. See, too, Taylor v. Taylor, L. R. 1 Ch. D. at p. 431, per Jessel, M.R.

(a) Ranson v. Dundas, 3 Bing. N. C. 556.

upon bonds and specialties. It was held that an action of covenant did not lie under the statute, as the remedy given was specific, and could not be extended to an action for damages for a breach of covenant on the part of the testator (b). The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 50, enabled the Courts to order discovery of the documents in the possession of either party upon an affidavit by the other party. It was held that the authority which was thus given to the Court must be strictly followed, and that discovery could not be ordered upon an affidavit made by the attorney for either party, even when his client was abroad (c).

matters of

concerned.

The same strictness must be observed where the Where authority granted affects matters of public interest public inor the discharge of public duties. Thus, the autho-terest are rity given to a bishop to decide whether the duties of a parish are adequately or inadequately performed must be strictly pursued (d). Where an Act which gives authority to a person describes him by his official name, the enactment applies only within the limits of his office, and the authority given to him is confined to those limits. Thus, where presentment of a highway might be made, upon information given by any surveyor of the highways," it was held that this information could only be given by the surveyor of highways for the parish or place within which the highway was situated (e). Questions affecting the boundaries of (b) Wilson v. Knubley, 7 East, 128.

(c) Christopherson v. Lotinga, 15 C. B. N. S. 809; 33 L. J. C. P.

121.

(d) Capel v. Child, 2 Cr. & Jer. 558.

(e) R. v. Fylingdales, Inhabitants, 7 B. & C. 438, 440.

parishes are governed by the same rule, and a special power given to commissioners to fix and settle these boundaries must be strictly followed. Where commissioners were to advertise the boundaries in a newspaper and insert them in their award, upon which the boundaries so fixed and settled were to be final, binding and conclusive, and the boundaries advertised differed from those specified in the award, it was held that the special power had not been followed, and the award was not final (f). So, too, the power of appointing overseers must be strictly followed, and where the 43 Eliz. c. 2, required the appointment of four, three, or two substantial householders, the appointment of one householder was held to be void, although he was the only one residing in the parish (g). So, too, the special power given by 9 Geo. IV. c. 40, s. 38, for the removal of lunatic paupers from a parish to the county lunatic asylum must be strictly followed. The Act provided that if no county lunatic asylum had been established, lunatics might be removed to some licensed hospital or house. It was held, however, that this power could not be exercised where a county lunatic asylum had been established, although it was too full to hold another inmate (h). So, where the 56 Geo. III. c. 139, s. 11, required indentures of apprenticeship of poor children to be approved by justices under their hands and seals, it was held that the signature of the

(f) R. v. Washbrook, Inhabitants, 4 B. & C. 732.

(g) R. v. Cousins, 4 B. & S. 849.

(h) R. v. Ellis, 6 Q. B. 501.