justices was not sufficient (i). The Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 149), enacted, that whenever the sanction of the Local Board of Health was required, it should be given in writing under the seal of the Local Board and the hands of five of its members. It was held that a rate made and published without any such seal or signatures was invalid (k). The rule extends to contracts made by persons in a representative capacity. The Public Health Act, 1848, required all contracts entered into by a local board to be in writing and sealed with the seal of the board, and the Court refused to enforce a contract which did not comply with these conditions (7). Where a railway company was authorised by a special Act to raise money by mortgage, it was not entitled to borrow in any other way, and therefore a Lloyd's bond given by it was void (m). An Act authorised incumbents to grant leases at a quarterly rent. This provision was considered imperative, and the Court refused its sanction to a lease of glebe land, the rent of which was made payable half-yearly (n). statute an interfer Where a statute authorises an interference with Where private rights of property, its provisions are jeal- authorises ously watched, and must be followed with preci- ence with sion. Persons who interfere with private property, property. under the authority of an Act for public purposes, are strictly tied down to the powers and limits (i) R. v. Stoke Damerel, 7 B. & C. 563. (k) R. v. Worksop Local Board, 5 B. & S. 95. (1) Frend v. Dennett, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 576; Hunt v. Wimbledon Local Board, L. R. 3 C. P. D. 208; 4 C. P. D. 48. (m) Chambers v. Manchester and Milford Ry. Co., 5 B. & S. 588. (n) Jenkins v. Green, 27 Beav. 440. private prescribed by the Act (o), and are not to be guided by any fancied view of the spirit of the Act which enforces such powers (p). Thus, where searchers of leather were authorised to seize all leather insufficiently dried, it was held that they could only seize such leather as actually came under that denomination, and not such as, in their judgment, was liable to seizure (q). Where a statute provided that a messenger in bankruptcy should not be liable to an action for anything done by him in obedience to any warrant of the Court, it was held necessary for him to obey that warrant literally; and a messenger who had a warrant authorising him to seize the goods of A., and who seized the goods of B., in the bona fide belief that they were the goods of A., was not protected (). So, where companies are incorporated for certain purposes, and are empowered to take lands compulsorily, or otherwise to interfere with private property, the powers which are so conferred upon them cannot be used for any purposes except those sanctioned by the Legislature (s). On this ground, a company, which had been incorporated for the purpose of carrying on the business of a carrier by rail, was restrained by injunction from dealing as a coal (0) Oldaker v. Hunt, 19 Beav. at pp. 489, 490, per Romilly, M.R. (p) Tinkler v. Wandsworth District Board of Works, 2 De Gex & Jones, at p. 274, per Turner, L.J. (q) Warne v. Varley, 6 T. R. 443. (s) Galloway v. Lord Mayor of London, L. R. 1 H. L. at p. 43, per Lord Cranworth, L.C.; Taylor v. Chichester and Midhurst Rail. Co., L. R. 2 Ex. 356, 373, citing Eastern Counties Rail. Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H. L. C. 331, 348. merchant (t); a company, incorporated for the purpose of making an inland navigation, was restrained from letting boats on hire (u); and a railway company was restrained from guaranteeing the profits. and securing the capital of a steam packet company (). So, too, where trustees were authorised to borrow a certain sum of money and to levy a rate for paying interest upon it, it was held that they could not borrow a larger sum, and a rate which they levied for the payment of interest upon a larger sum was declared invalid (x). laws are pursuance Again, the authority of statutes which give When byepower to certain persons or bodies to make bye- made in laws that may be enforced by penalties, or to grant of statutes. certificates that may be conclusive on others, must be strictly followed. Where it was provided by a statute that it should be an offence for any passenger to travel on a railway without having paid his fare, if he did so with intent to evade payment, a bye-law which imposed a fine or penalty on any person travelling without payment of his fare, though he had no intention of evading payment, was held to be void as contrary to the statute (y). Where an Act of Parliament provided that a railway company might make bye-laws and might apprehend persons who committed any offence against the Act, it was held that this authority did not extend (t) Att.-Gen. v Great Northern Rail. Co., 1 Drew & Sm. 154. (u) Bostock v. North Staffordshire Rail. Co., 4 E. & B. 798; 3 Sın. & Giff. 283. (v) Colman v. E. C. Rail. Co., 10 Beav. 1.. (x) Richter v. Hughes, 2 B. & C. 499. (y) Dearden v. Townsend, L. R. 1 Q. B. 10; London and Brighton Rail. Co. v. Watson, L. R. 3 C. P. D. 429; 4 C. P. D. 118. When certificates to the bye-laws made in pursuance of the Act, and that a person who committed an offence against them could not be apprehended (). A railway company was required to carry a certain quantity of luggage for each passenger without extra charge, and was relieved from liability for any luggage beyond that quantity. A bye-law stating that the company would not be responsible for any luggage unless it was booked and paid for was held bad (a). A local board was empowered to make bye-laws relating to such matters as the width of streets, drainage, walls, and to pull down any houses built in contravention of the bye-laws. It was held that the Act did not authorise the Board to make a bye-law to the effect that any building of which they disapproved might be pulled down (b). A statute gave power to a navigation company to make bye-laws for the good government of the company, for the good and orderly using of its navigation, concerning the vessels navigated thereon, and for the well governing of bargemen. It was held that these words did not authorise the company to make a bye-law which provided that the navigation should be closed every Sunday throughout the year (c). Other cases have been decided on the subject are given of certificates. Thus the 9 Geo. IV. c. 22, gave costs to the successful party, if the petition statutes. against the return of a member to Parliament, in pursu ance of (2) Chilton v. London and Croydon Rail. Co., 16 M. & W. 212. (a) Williams v. Great Western Rail. Co., 10 Ex. 15. (b) Brown v. Local Board of Holyhead, 1 H. & C. 601. (c) Calder and Hebble Navigation Co. v. Pilling, 14 M. & W. 76. or the opposition to such petition, was reported to be frivolous and vexatious. It further provided that the Speaker of the House of Commons was to give a certificate of the amount of the costs recoverable, which was to be conclusive evidence of the amount recoverable, and upon the production of which the Court was to enter up judgment. But it was held that the certificate must be given in exact pursuance of the Statute, and therefore where the whole proceedings under an election petition were null and void because the petitioner did not appear, the Speaker's certificate was not considered conclusive. It was necessary that the certificate should be "founded on the report of a committee appointed in conformity with the Act," and as the Act gave no power for the appointment of a committee unless the petitioner appeared, all the proceedings of the committee and the certificate itself, which was based upon them, were wholly invalid (d). A later Act provided that the costs of the petitioners against private bills should be taxed by the taxing officer of the House, on application not later than six months after the report of the committee, and not until one month after the delivery of the bill to the party chargeable. The taxing master's certificate was to be conclusive evidence of the amount due, and the validity of such certificate was not to be questioned in any Court. Yet where an application to tax was made before a month had elapsed from the delivery of the bill, it was held that the taxation. (d) Bruyeres v. Halcomb, 3 A. & E. 381. |