The authority of statutes was informal, and that the certificate of the taxing officer might be questioned (e). Moreover, where the certificate of the taxing officer had been obtained improperly in the absence of the parties affected by it and without notice to them, the Court of Chancery restrained an action brought upon it and declined to treat it as conclusive (f). It is impossible to reconcile with these cases and the principle which they establish, a case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. The Bankruptcy Act enacted that if at a meeting of creditors a special resolution was passed for the liquidation by arrangement of the affairs of any debtor, and if a trustee was appointed at that or some subsequent meeting, the Registrar of the Court should inquire whether such resolution had been passed and a trustee appointed, and, if satisfied of these facts, should register the resolutions, and that his certificate of the appointment of the trustee should be conclusive evidence of such appointment. It was held that a certificate by the Registrar was conclusive evidence of the appointment of a trustee, although, at the time when such certificate was given, no such resolution had been passed and no liquidation existed (g). Another important principle with regard to the authority of statutes is that it cannot be evaded. evaded. Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illum (h). "It is a well-known cannot be (e) Williams v. Swansea Canal Navigation Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 158. (h) 2 Inst. 48. principle of law that the provisions of an Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance" (). "Whatever is prohibited by law to be done directly cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance" (k). "There are many instances in which attempts have been made to break through Acts of Parliament by ingenious artifices which at first sight seem rather the acts of the law than the acts of the parties, and therefore appear to be no violation of the Act of Parliament. But when a Court of Law sees that the real intention of the contriver was to violate a statute, and that that intention has been in point of fact effected by using acts of the law to compass what the statute prohibits, the judges have looked through the form at the substance and real nature of the transaction" (7). The passage just quoted is a modern illustration of the principle laid down in a much earlier case, that judges ought to favour such expositions of a statute as prevent its being eluded or frustrated (m). This principle was acted upon in a case where a statute prohibited any partnership of more than six persons which carried on the business of bankers in London, from accepting in the course of its business a bill of exchange payable in less than six months from the time of its acceptance. An agreement between a London Joint Stock Bank, consisting of more than six persons, and a bank in (i) Fox v. Bishop of Chester, 2 B. & C. at p. 655, per Abbott, C.J. (k) Booth v. Bank of England, 7 Cl. & Fin. at p. 540, per Tindal, C.J. (1) Jeffries v. Alexander, 8 H. L. C. at p. 629, per Byles, J. (m) Britton v. Ward, 2 Rolle's Rep. 127. F Agree ments Canada, that the manager of the London Bank should accept bills drawn on him by the Canada Bank and payable in less than six months from acceptance, and that the London Bank should provide funds for the payment of such bills, was held unlawful (n). This principle has also been acted upon in the cases which decide that agreements contrary to to Thus of statutes the policy of certain Acts are void. Thus agree contrary void. But it is difficult to decide ments contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act (o), or to the policy of the Insolvent Act (p), as an agreement that a creditor of an insolvent on withdrawing his opposition to a discharge should be sole assignee of the insolvent's estate and receive a certain sum out of it (q), have all been avoided. The same fate has befallen agreements contrary to the policy of the Winding-up Acts, as an agreement by a shareholder in a company to endeavour to postpone payment of a call or to support the claim of a creditor (r); and those contrary to the policy of the Divorce Act, as an agreement by a petitioner in a suit for dissolution of marriage to withdraw the petition in consideration of a sum of money to be paid by the co-respondent (s). It has indeed been pointed out by one judge that no question in the law is more difficult to be what is an determined than the question what particular acts evasion. (n) Booth v. Bank of England, 7 Cl. & Fin. 509. (0) Staines v. Wainwright, 6 Bing. N. C. 174; Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T. R. 17; Mare v. Sandford, 1 Giff. 288. (p) Rogers v. Kingston, 2 Bing. 441; Hall v. Dyson, 17 Q. B. 785. (q) Murray v. Reeves, 8 B. & C. 421. (1) Elliott v. Richardson, L. R. 5 C. P. 744. (s) Gipps v. Hume, 2 Johnson & Hemming, 517. not expressly prohibited should be deemed void as against the policy of a statute (t). Other judges have said that they do not understand what is meant by the term evading a statute (u), and that unless what is called an evasion of a statute is in reality a clear violation of its provisions it cannot be prevented by any Court of Justice (x). It may happen that a statute has been passed for the purpose of prohibiting some particular act, or of providing against some particular mischief. But if the language of the statute falls short of the intention, if the prohibition is so worded as to extend only to certain methods of doing that act or causing that mischief, other methods may be adopted with impunity. Thus the object of the Bills of Sale Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36), was to secure creditors against frauds which were "frequently committed by secret bills of sale, whereby persons are enabled to keep up the appearance of being in good circumstances and possessed of property, and the grantees or holders of such bills of sale have the power of taking possession of the property of such persons to the exclusion of the rest of their creditors." The remedy provided by the Act was that every bill of sale, unless registered within twenty-one days, should be void as against execution creditors and assignees in bankruptcy so far as regarded any property which was in the apparent possession of the maker of the bill of (t) Alexander v. Brame, 7 De G., M. & G. at p. 539, per Turner, L.J. (u) Edwards v. Hall, 6 De G., M. & G. at p. 89, per Lord Cranworth, L.C. (c) Jeffries v. Alexander, 8 H. L. C. at p. 646, per Lord Campbell, L.C. the popular intended. sale at the time of execution or bankruptcy. But where secret bills of sale were given and were constantly renewed, it was held that if the last of the series was registered it was valid against an Evasion in execution creditor (y). This," said one of the sense is not judges, "is an evasion of the statute in a popular sense; that is to say, it is getting away from the remedial operation of the statute while complying with its words; the mischief the statute intended to remedy has been produced while the words of the statute are complied with" (2). Another instance in which evasion in a popular sense was considered insufficient to constitute any violation of the words of a statute is to be found in two cases decided upon the Turnpike Acts, where it was held that avoiding liability to a toll was not the same thing as evading its payment (a). Responsibility im As the authority of statutes cannot be evaded, posed by so the responsibility which they impose upon one cannot be person cannot be transferred to another. Where statutes shifted. by a statute a duty or obligation is cast upon any man he must discharge it at his peril, and he cannot shift the burden from his own shoulders by employing a substitute. Where a railway company was authorised to construct a bridge over a navigable river, and the Act provided that no vessel navigating the river should be detained for a longer time than was sufficient for the passage of a train, (y) Smale v. Burr, L. R. 8 C. P. 64; Ramsden v. Lupton, L. R. 9 Q. B. 17. (2) Ramsden v. Lupton, L. R. 9 Q. B. at pp. 32, 33, per Grove, J. (a) Veitch v. Trustees of Exeter Road, 8 E. & B. 988; 27 L. J. (M. C.) 116; Harding v. Headington, L. R. 9 Q. B. 157. |