it was held that the company was liable for the negligence of a contractor in constructing the bridge so as to cause a longer detention (b). So, too, a person who was authorised by the Metropolis Local Management Act to make a drain and cut a trench across a highway, but was bound to fill up the trench as soon as the drain was made, was held liable for the negligence of a contractor (c). authority may be The authority of statutes may be enforced either How the directly or indirectly. It is enforced directly when of statutes civil or criminal proceedings are taken against a enforced. person who violates the provisions of a statute. It is enforced indirectly when the Courts refuse to give effect to contracts or other dealings which violate the provisions of a statute, or declare such contracts or dealings invalid. ' ment. The general rule as to the way in which the 1. Dir.ctly. authority of statutes may be enforced directly is that whenever a statute orders anything to be By indictdone, or forbids the doing of anything, an indictment lies for the omission of the one or the commission of the other, and an action also lies at the suit of any person who has sustained injury from such omission or commission. "What the law says shall not be done it becomes illegal to do, and is therefore the subject matter of an indictment without the addition of any corrupt motives" (d). "Whenever an Act of Parliament doth prohibit anything the party grieved shall have an action, (b) Hole v. Sittingbourne and Sheerness Rail. Co., 6 H. & N. 488. (c) Gray v. Pullen, 5 B. & S. 970. (d) R. v. Sainsbury, 4 T. R. at p. 457, per Ashhurst, J. By action. and the offender shall be punished at the King's suit" (e). "In every case where a statute prohibits anything and doth not limit a penalty, the party offending therein may be indicted as for a contempt against the statute" (ƒ). It is therefore an offence punishable by indictment for a father not to give particulars of the birth of his child to the Registrar of Births upon being required to do so, as the registrar is empowered by statute to require such particulars from a parent (g); for a person to obstruct the making of a towpath which has been expressly authorised by statute (h); for a person to disobey an order as to quarantine made by the Crown in council under the authority of a statute (i), or an order made by the Court of Quarter Sessions (k), or by commissioners (1), under the same authority. It has, however, been held that an indictment does not lie for a nonfeasance which does not affect the public, but merely causes damage to one or two persons (m). The right of action of a party grieved by another's non-compliance with a statute is established by a long series of authorities. "When an Act prohibits any wrong," says Lord Coke, "an action lies upon it though no form is mentioned (n). (e) 2 Inst. 163. (f) Crowther's Case, Cro. Eliz. at p. 655. (g) R. v. Price, 11 A. & E. 727. (h) R. v. Smith, 2 Doug. 441. (i) R. v. Harris, 4 T. R. 202. (k) R. v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799. (1) R. v. Walker, L. R. 10 Q. B. 355. (m) R. v. Pawlyn, 1 Sid. at p. 209. (n) 2 Inst. 117; Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Rep. 75b; Privilege of Priests, 12 Rep. 100. See, too, Welden v. Vesey, Poph. at p. 175. Lord Holt expresses himself thus:-"Where a statute gives a man a right he shall have an action to recover it of consequence, because his right is created by Act of Parliament; and where an Act of Parliament creates a right, or forbids a thing to be done, an action lies ex consequenti on the statute for the party grieved" (o). In the report of the House of Lords upon the celebrated case of Ashby v. White, we find this passage, based upon Lord Coke's Reports, upon his Institutes and upon Magna Charta: "When any statute requires an act to be done for the benefit of another, or to forbear the doing of an act which may be to his injury, though no action be given in express terms by the statute for the omission or commission, the general rule in all such cases is that the party injured shall have an action" (p). Therefore where a statute imposes a duty or obligation upon any one to pay money, an action will lie against him for its recovery (q). If a statute directs that the expenses of obtaining an Act of Parliament are to be paid, an action of debt lies against the persons who obtained it (). Where a statute requires a railway company to issue a warrant to the sheriff for the purpose of his summoning a jury to assess the value of land which the company had agreed to purchase, an action for a mandamus lies against the company (s). The Ballot Act, 1872 (35 & 36 (0) Ewer v. Jones, 2 Ld. Raym. 737. (p) Ashby v. White, 14 State Trials, at p. 785. (q) Shepherd v. Hills, 11 Ex. at p. 67, per Parke, B. Vict. c. 33), imposed certain ministerial duties on the presiding officer at a polling station. It was held that a candidate who lost his election by reason of the failure of the presiding officer to perform such duties, might bring an action against the presiding officer for not following the directions of the Ballot Act (t). All these decisions rest upon the principle stated by Erle, C.J., in a case already cited :—“Wherever a statute gives a right to one person to have an act fulfilled by another, and that other does not fulfil it, a cause of action arises " (u). This rule, however, is subject to a material excepwhere the' tion. Where a statute creates a new offence or a which con- new liability, and at the same time provides a creates the special and particular remedy, that remedy must remedy. be adopted, to the exclusion of the Common Law Exception to the rule, statute fers a right remedies of indictment and action (x). Thus an indictment will not lie against one who takes upon himself the office of justice of the peace without having a property qualification, because the statute which created this offence appointed a penalty to be recovered by bill, plaint, or information, and "when a statute appoints a penalty for the doing of a thing which was no offence before, and appoints how it shall be recovered, it shall be punishable by that means, and not by indictment" (y). Nor does an indictment lie for the killing of a hare (z), for the (t) Pickering v. James, L. R. 8 C. P. 489. (u) Fotherby v. Metropolitan Rail. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. at p. 194. (x) Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, 6 C. B. N. S. at p. 356, per Willes, J.; Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges, 1 B. & Ad. at p. 859. (y) Castle's Case, Cro. Jac. 644. (*) R. v. Buck, 2 Strange, 679. keeping of an alehouse without a licence (a), for the burning of place and stock bricks together (b), for the erection of buildings without the sanction of the Metropolitan Board of Works (c), as in each of these cases the Act which created the offence provided a summary remedy. Nor will an action. lie for the poor rate, as the statutory remedy is by distress (d), nor for the composition money assessed in lieu of statute duty for which the surveyors of highways were entitled to distrain (e), nor upon a County Court judgment (f), nor for a breach of the sailing regulations, or of provisions as to fishing boats, both of which were punishable by a penalty (g), nor for a proportion of the cost of paving streets, which was recoverable before two justices (h). On the same ground, it has been decided that where a statute which creates a liability gives exclusive jurisdiction over the subject to one particular Court, no action can be brought in any other (i). Thus a statute provided that every owner of shares in a company should pay a rateable proportion of the calls which were authorised by the same statute, and that if he did not, it should be lawful (a) Stephens v. Watson, 1 Salk. 45, more fully reported as Watson's Case, 3 Salk. 26; R. v. Marriot, 4 Mod. 144. (b) R. v. Malland, 2 Strange, 828. (c) R. v. Lovibond, 24 L. T. N. S. 357. (d) Stevens v. Evans, 2 Burr. at p. 1157. (e) Underhill v. Ellicombe, M'Clel. & Younge, 450. (f) Berkeley v. Elderkin, 1 E. & B. 805. (g) General Steam Nav. Co. v. Morrison, 13 C. B. 581; Stevens v. Jeacocke, 11 Q. B. 731. (h) Vestry of St. Pancras v. Battersbury, 2 C. B. N. S. 477; Mayor of Blackburn v. Parkinson, 1 E. & E. 71. (i) Marshall v. Nicholls, 18 Q. B. 882. |