There must be the acts done are authorised. ment that where the servant of a contractor leaves his horse and cart in the street, without any one to look after it, and goes home to his dinner, this is not an "act done in pursuance" of the statute under which the contractor is working (d). An Act requiring a month's notice before the institution of any proceedings against a local board does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, or render such a notice necessary before an application is made for an injunction (e). It has been already stated that the protection an honest of these statutes is given to persons who act in the belief that honest belief that they are doing what the statutes authorise, and it is not necessary that such a belief should be reasonable so long as there are some grounds for its existence. "If a person acts in the honest belief that facts exist which would entitle him to act in pursuance of the statute, he is not to be deprived of its protection because the jury find that there were no grounds on which they think it reasonable that he should entertain that belief. If he acts without any grounds for belief whatever, he acts on mere guess-work or suspicion, and without anything that could be called a belief at all" (ƒ). An honest belief that an offence has been committed against a statute entitles a person acting under the statute to its protection, although no such offence was in fact committed. Thus, a farm (d) Whatman v. Pearson, L. R. 3 C. P. 422. (f) Chamberlain v. King, L. R. 6 C. P. 474. See also the rule laid down in Herman v. Seneschal, 13 C. B. at pp. 402, 403, per Erle, C.J., and in Roberts v. Orchard, 2 H. & C. at p. 774, per Williams, J. reeve who had the care of certain lands and apprehended a man for making a road over them, in the belief that he was doing a malicious injury (g); a highway board which pulled down a gate, in the belief that a public footway was obstructed, though, in fact, no such footway existed (h); an owner of property taking proceedings against persons for lopping his trees (i), or stripping lead off his roof (k), or other acts which he believed to be within the Act against malicious injuries (), were held to be entitled to notice of action. There may also be an honest but mistaken belief as to the persons who are empowered to act, and the limits within which they may act, under some statute. On this ground protection was given to the owner of a fishery who was empowered to apprehend persons unlawfully using his fishery, and who did apprehend a man fishing just beyond its limits (m); to a surveyor of highways, who was not duly appointed, but acted in the belief that he was (n); to a County Court judge, who committed a man to prison for disobedience to an order after the service of a writ of prohibition (o); to a reversioner, who believed that he was justified in exercising the powers given to an "owner of property" by the Malicious Trespass Act (p); to commissioners (g) Wright v. Wales, 5 Bing. 336. (h) Smith v. Hopper, 9 Q. B. 1005. (i) Beechey v. Sides, 9 B. & C. 806. (k) Rudd v. Scott, 2 Scott, N. R. 631. (1) Reed v. Coumeadow, 6 A. & E. 661. (m) Hughes v. Buckland, 15 M. & W. 346. (n) Huggins v. Waydey, 15 M. & W. 357. (0) Booth v. Clive, 10 C. B. 827; 20 L. J. C. P. 151. (p) Horn v. Thornborough, 3 Ex. 846. Contrast with this the Reasonable belief not necessary. who were authorised to take scheduled lands, and who, for the purpose of following the directions of the Act, took lands which were not included in the schedule (9). In some of these cases, indeed, the belief that is required to bring persons within the statute is called reasonable as well as honest. It was once distinctly laid down that mere honest belief was not sufficient, but the case in which this proposition was stated, if it can be supported at all, must rest upon other grounds than those assigned by the judges. In that case a local Act imposed a penalty on persons who exhibited any beast in the streets of Stroud. The defendants, professing to act under the authority of this statute, tried to remove a dromedary which had been exhibited in the street, but was then in a stable. It was held that, although they might have removed the dromedary from the streets on the ground of its being a nuisance, they had no pretence for removing it from the stable, and were therefore not entitled to notice of action (). "The act done," says Bayley, J., at p. 356,"must be of that nature and description that the party doing it may reasonably suppose that the Act of Parliament gave him authority to do it." And Littledale, J., adds, at p. 359, “I think, not only that the defendants had no authority, but that they had no colour or reasonable ground for supposing that they had authority to dictum of Lord Denman, C.J., in Lidster v. Borrow, 9 A. & E. at p. 657: "A person fancying he fills a character which he does not fill cannot claim to be protected." (q) Jones v. Gooday, 9 M. & W. 736. act as they did." These dicta certainly cannot must be grounds belief. While, however, the later cases expressly decide There that a reasonable belief is not necessary, they do some not sanction a "mere fancy," a "general persuasion," for such or a "vague opinion" that a person is acting under the authority of a statute (u). "It would be wild work if a party might give himself protection by merely saying that he believed himself acting in pursuance of a statute, for no one can say what may possibly come into an individual's mind on such a subject" (x). There must be some grounds for the belief, and in their absence there is no claim. to the protection of the statute. There must be "a belief in the existence of those facts which, if they had existed, would have afforded a justification" (y). Therefore, where a justice of the peace (t) 10 A. & E. at p. 588. (s) 9 M. & W. at pp. 743, 745. (u) Cann v. Clipperton, 10 A. & E. at p. 589, per Patteson, J.; Kine v. Evershed, 10 Q. B. at pp. 150, 151, per Lord Denman, C.J. (x) Cann v. Clipperton, 10 A. & E. at p. 589, per Williams, J. (y) Herman v. Seneschal, 13 C. B. N. S. 392; Roberts v. Orchard, 2 H. & Č. 769. H ordered the medical examination of a girl charged with concealment of birth, it was held that he was not entitled to notice of action (2). Where a person was given in charge for attempting to break into a house, and the statute only justified such an arrest where the house was actually broken into, no notice of action was necessary (a). The same rule applies where a statute sanctions the apprehension of a person "found committing" certain specified offences. Although his arrest some time after the offence has been committed does not take away the necessity of notice of action if the person apprehending him really believes that he is acting under the statute (b), yet a mere belief that an offence has been committed is not sufficient without a belief that the person apprehended was "found committing" it (c). Therefore, where a pursuit takes place two hours after the offence is committed, there cannot be such a bona fide belief as will bring the case within the statute (d). So, too, where a cab proprietor indorsed a driver's licence—an act which could only be done by a magistrate-he was not allowed any notice of action, and the Court observed that he could not honestly believe he was a magistrate (e). () Agnew v. Jobson, 47 L. J. M. C. 67. (a) Leete v. Hart, L. R. 3 C. P. 322. (b) Read v. Coker, 13 C. B. 850. (c) Roberts v. Orchard, 2 H. & C. 769; 33 L. J. Ex. 65. (d) Downing v. Capel, L. R. 2 C. P. 461. (e) Heath v. Brewer, 15 C. B. N. S. 803. |