of a railroad outside of the State, did not conflict with the Constitution of the State. 2. That it was a valid exercise of legislative authority, to authorize a county to incur indebtedness and impose taxation in aid of railroad companies. 3. That the Legislature could constitutionally authorize a donation of the county bonds to the railroad company. 4. That it could authorize aid to a railroad beyond the limits of the county and outside of the State. 5. That, under said act of February 15th, 1869, the county commissioners could lawfully issue the $150,000 of bonds, without a vote of the people, as provided by the Territorial act of January 11th, 1861, on the proposition to issue them and on the question of taxation to pay them. This court said, by Mr. Justice Strong: "If the Legislature had power to authorize the county officers to extend aid on behalf of the county or State to a railroad company, as we have seen it had, very plainly it could prescribe the mode in which such aid might be extended as well as the terms and conditions of the extension, and it needed no assistance from the popular vote of the municipality. Such a vote could not have enlarged legislative power. But the act of 1869 was an unconditional bestowal of authority upon the county commissioners to issue the bonds to the railroad company. It required no precedent action of the voters of the county. It assumed that their assent had been obtained. That prior to 1869 the sanction of approval by a local popular vote had been required for municipal aid to railroad companies or improvement companies, is quite immaterial. The requisition was but the act of an annual Legislature, which any subsequent Legislature could abrogate or annul."

It cannot be doubted that the two acts of February 15th, 1869, taken together, intended to legalize the $40,000 of bonds issued to the Council Bluffs and St. Joseph R. R. Co. These bonds fall within the description of section 8 of the act marked "C," as bonds theretofore "voted and issued" by the county of Otoe to aid in the construction of a railroad. The vote was a vote of the county to issue $200,000 of bonds "for the purpose of securing an eastern railroad connection for Nebraska City; and the $40,000 of bonds were issued as a donation to said company, to aid it in building a railroad so near to Nebraska City as to secure to that city and to the county of Otoe an eastern railroad connection by the way of St. Joseph. The defects and irregularities alleged in respect to the bonds were defects and irregularities in submitting to a vote of the people of the county the question of issuing the bonds, in regard to the publishing of notice, and in regard to including in the vote the question of taxation. It was alleged that the bonds were not voted upon or issued in conformity with law. The stat ute enacted that, notwithstanding such defects or irregularities, the bonds should be legal and valid, and should have the same legal validity and binding force as if they had been legally authorized,

voted upon and executed." The act of the same date, marked "D," refers to and identifies sufficiently the election held, and the authority given by the vote to the county commissioners to issue the bonds of the county to the amount of $200,000, "to any railroad in Fremont County, Iowa, that would secure to Nebraska City an eastern railroad connection." It recites the authority as one to issue the bonds "in payment of stock." But the question is one merely of identity, and it is not pretended there was any election in Otoe County to the purport set forth, including the words "in payment of stock," while there was just such an election leaving out those words. The identity is further shown by the words in the act," and whereas but forty thousand dollars have been issued, and by the authority given to issue $150,000 "of the bonds aforesaid," that is, of the $200,000 of bonds so voted, as a donation to any railroad company that would "secure to Nebraska City a direct eastern railroad connection." It is not pretended that any $40,000 of bonds were issued except those named in the bonds sued on in this suit. Taking the two acts together, the legislature recognized the fact that the voters of Otoe County had voted to issue $200,000 of bonds to secure an eastern railroad connection for Nebraska City in that county; that $40,000 had been issued; and that the defects and irregularities before named were alleged to have occured in respect to the voting upon and issuing the $40,000 of the bonds; and it enacted that those bonds should be legal and valid, and that $150,000 more of the $200,000 should be issued for the same purpose.

The decision by this court in regard to the $150,000 of bonds leaves but little more to say in regard to the $40,000. As the legislature had power to authorize the issue of bonds without any precedent action of the voters of the county, it could validate the issue of bonds by curing and legalizing defects in respect to the voting. The bonds were assigned by the railroad company, and came to the plaintiff after the acts of 1869 were passed, and he became a bona fide holder of them on the faith of those acts. The doctrine is well settled in this court, that the legislature of a State, unless restrained by its organic law, has the right to authorize a municipal corporation to issue bonds in aid of a railroad, and to levy a tax to pay the bonds and the interest on them, with or without a popular vote, and to cure, by a retrospective act, irregularities in the exercise of the power conferred. Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5 Id. 194.

Much stress is laid by the defendant on the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb. 227, in 1877. That was a suit brought in February, 1871, by an owner of property in Otoe County, to enjoin the county treasurer from collecting a tax levied on his property to pay the interest on these $40,000 of bonds and to have the bonds declared void. A judg

ment to that effect was rendered and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The question adjudged in the case was the power conferred on the county commissioners, by the acts of 1860 and 1861, to issue the bonds. It was held that the only authority, if any, given by the vote of the people, was to subscribe for stock in a railroad company. The act marked "C" was not considered. It was held that it was not the purpose of the act marked "D" to legalize the $40,000 of bonds, but only to authorize the issue of the $150,000 of bonds; and that the only subject or object expressed in its title was the issuing of bonds.

The adjudication in Hamlin v. Meadville is not set up as a judg ment binding on the plaintiff. Nor can it be. He was no party to it, nor was any holder of the bonds.

It is objected that the act marked "C" is void because section 9 of article 2 of the Constitution of Nebraska of 1867, provided that " no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title," and because the act does not comply with those provisions. It is plain, we think, that the bill does not contain more than one subject. That subject is municipal bonds issued or to be issued to aid in making works of internal improvement. There is but one purpose, object, or subject, and that is the aiding of such works by bonds and the status of such bonds. The subject of the act, to authorize future bonds and legalize existing bonds, for such purpose, is clearly expressed in its title.

But it is objected that the title of the act is limited to bonds issued or to be issued to aid works in Nebraska, while the body of the act extends to works anywhere; and that so the subject of the act is not expressed in its title. The first section of the act relates to the future issues of bonds by "any county or city in the State," the seventh section relates to like issues by "any precinct in any organized county of this State," and the eighth section relates to "bonds heretofore voted and issued by any county or city in this State." The railroads and works of internal improvement referred to in the body of the act are not limited to those situated in the State." It would, we think, be a strained construction, to hold that the title of the act is to be so interpreted as to be limited to works situated in the State, when such limitation does not exist in the body of the act, and when the words "in this State," in the title, may fairly be regarded as applicable to the prior words " counties, cities, and precincts," to which words they are applied in the body of the act. This principle of construction is sanctioned by the views expressed in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, and in City of Jonesboro' v. Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 192. See also Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 141 et seq. We have not been referred to any decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska which we regard as in conflict with these views.

The question sought to be raised by the writ of error of the

plaintiff is, that the statute of limitations had not run against the coupons which were more than five years past due when the first suit was commenced, because, under section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Nebraska, the disability of a married woman, from whom the plaintiff purchased the bonds, intervened for a sufficient time between their date and such purchase by him, to prevent what would otherwise be the bar of the statute. Without considering that question, it is sufficient to say, that the facts on which it could be raised are not admitted in the pleadings or specially found by the court, and that the general finding for the defendant on the causes of action on coupons which were more than five years past due when the actions were brought, and the absence of any exception by the plaintiff to any ruling of the court in regard to the question, preclude any adjudication here upon it.

The fifth question certified is answered in the affirmative, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Ratification by Legislature. It is clearly competent for the Legislature by appropriate action to conform and ratify a prior unauthorized act of a municipal corporation. Estey v. Inhabitants of Westminster, 97 Mass. 324; Wilhelm v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wisc. 400; Att'y Gen'l v. Lathrop, 24 Mich. 235; Branham v. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585; Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Quincy v. Cooke, 107 U. S. 549; s. c., 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 645; City of Jonesboro' v. Cairo & St. L. R. Co., 110 U. S. 192; s. c., infra; Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568; 8. c., 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 300.

NORTHERN BANK OF TOLEDO

v.

PORTER TOWNSHIP TRUSTEES.

(110 United States Reports, 608.)

The act of the legislature of Ohio of March 21, 1850, as amended March 25, 1851, authorized county commissioners to submit to the people at special elections the question whether the county would subscribe to the stock of a railroad company and issue bonds in payment thereof; and if the subscription should not be authorized by the county, then that the question of subscriptions by township trustees might be submitted to the people of the respective townships. Held, That until refusal by the counties to subscribe, either by direct vote or by failure within a reasonable time to call an election for the purpose the townships were without legislative authority to subscribe, or to issue township bonds in payment of subscriptions.

A municipal corporation which issues a bond reciting on its face that it is issued in part payment of a subscription to the capital stock of a railroad made by the corporation in pursuance of the several acts of the general assembly of the State and of a vote of the qualified electors of the corporation taken in pursuance thereof, is estopped thereby from denying that an elec

tion was held, or that it was called and conducted in the mode required by law; but it is not estopped from showing that the corporation was without legislative authority to issue the bonds.

The facts which a municipal corporation, issuing bonds in aid of a railroad, is not permitted, against a bona fide holder, to question, in face of a recital in the bonds of their existence, are those connected with or growing out of the discharge of the ordinary duties of such of its officers as were invested with authority to execute them, and which the statute conferring the power made it their duty to ascertain and determine before the bonds were issued. The cases relating to this point examined and reviewed.

THIS was an action to recover principal and interest on bonds issued by the defendant in error (also defendant below), in payment of a subscription to a railroad. The defence of want of legislative authority is set forth in the opinion of the court. Verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs excepted to the charge, and brought the case here by writ of error.

E. W. Kittredge for plaintiff in error.

W. M. Ramsey for defendant in error.

HARLAN, C. J.-On the 15th day of April, 1861, the commissioners of Delaware County, Ohio, passed an order submitting to the voters of that county, at a special election to be held on the 17th day of June thereafter, a proposition to subscribe the sum of $50,000 to the capital stock of the Springfield and Mansfield R. R. Co., a corporation created under the laws of that State, and whose name was subsequently changed to that of the Springfield, Mount Vernon and Pittsburgh R. R. Co. This proposition was approved by the electors, and subsequently, August 4, 1851, the county commissioners made a subscription of the amount voted, payable in bonds of the county.

On December 6, 1851, the commissioners signed the requisite number of bonds, payable to the railroad company, and deposited them with the auditor for delivery when the road was located and a contract made for its construction through the county. It having been claimed that these bonds were defectively executed, others were signed by the commissioners on the 27th day of December, 1852, to be retained by the auditor until those first signed were returned, which being done that officer was directed to deliver the new bonds to the company or to some person authorized to receive them.

After the vote in favor of a county subscription of $50,000, and two days before the formal subscription in its behalf by the county commissioners, that is, on the 2d day of August, 1851, the trustees of Porter Township, in Delaware county, passed an order submitting to the voters of that township, at a special election to be held on the 30th day of August thereafter, a proposition for a subscription of not exceeding $10,000 and not less than $8000 to the capital stock of the same company, payable in township bonds, upon