CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
contain provisions legalizing invalid municipal elections to subscribe to com-
pany's stock. Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. L. R. Co., xv. 615.
See CONTRACTOR; ILLEGAL CONTRACT.
Company liable for injury to person caused by fall of derrick furnished by
company to contractor which was obviously defective when delivered to con-
tractor. Conlon e. Eastern R. R. Co., xv. 99.
Corporation is liable for negligence or misconduct of servant or contractor in
same cases as natural person. Hughes v. Cincinnati & S. R. Co., xv. 100.
Corporation contracting with independent contractor to build road, not re-
taining right to control mode or manner of doing work, is not liable for injury
occasioned by negligence of the contractor. Aliter where it retains right to
control mode or mauner of doing work. Hughes . Cincinnati & S. R. Co.,
xv. 100.
Reservation in contract of right to direct quantity of work to be done or con-
dition of work when completed does not render company liable for negligence
of contractor. Hughes . Cincinnati & S. R. Co., xv. 100.
Where company retains control over mode of doing certain part of work
only, it is not liable for negligence of contractor in performing another part.
Hughes. Cincinnati & S. R. Co., xv. 100.
Company is not liable for negligence of an independent contractor as regards
real estate unless work is per se a nuisance or injury necessarily results from the
doing of the work in the manner specified by the contract. Hughes . Cin-
cinnati & S. R. Co., xv. 100
Where contractor to construct road assigned contract to president of railroad
company who proceeded to construct same, corporation was liable for injury to
servant caused by negligence in course of construction. Solomon R. R. Co. *.
Jones, xv. 201.
See NEGLIGENCE (CONTRIBUTORY).
Is not estopped to move to have contract entered into by its officers set aside
on the ground of fraud. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co. et
al., xv. 1.
Moving to have illegal contract of officers set aside is not debarred by judg-
ment entered with assent of said officers affirming validity of contract entered
into as aforesaid. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co. et al.,
Is liable for negligence or misconduct of servant or contractor as a natural
person. Hughes v. Cincinnati & S. R. Co., xv. 100.
Company is liable for injury caused by fall of derrick furnished by it to con-
tractor when same was obviously defective at time of delivery to contractor.
Conlon v. Eastern R. Co., xv. 99.
In absence of evidence to contrary, it will be presumed that company built
road and company is liable accordingly for injuries to servants caused by defects
in hand car used in construction of road. Solomon R. R. Co. v. Jones, xv. 201.
Where contractor to construct railroad assigned contract to president of rail-
road company who proceeded to construct same, corporation was liable for injury
to servant occasioned by negligence in course of construction. Solomon R. R
Co. v. Jones, xv. 201.
See MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.
Evidence as to usual mode of coupling and uncoupling cars at particular
switch is not admissible to show that party was not guilty of contributory negli
gence. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Clark, xv. 261.
When party crushed against platform, held that if he was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence, company was not guilty of negligence. Chicago, etc., R.
Co. v. Clark, xv. 261.
When injury was occasioned in coupling cars by unblocked frogs, witness
cannot be asked what danger is from that source or whether a person coupling
cars could see frogs on track. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Coates, Adm'r,
xv. 265.
When servant had notice of danger from unblocked frogs and was killed, ad-
ministrator must prove freedom from contributory negligence. Burlington, C.
R. & N. R. Co. v. Coates Adm'r, xv. 265.
When party killed in coupling cars by projecting timbers. Held, evidence
tended to show negligence on part of company and did not necessarily show
contributory negligence by deceased. Brown v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,
Measure of care required on part of railroad company to its servants is ordi-
nary care. Where party injured is guilty of contributory negligence, he may
nevertheless recover in case of gross negligence. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
McCoy, xv. 277.
When brakeman fell into ditch and evidence was conflicting as to how far he
knew of condition of road, verdict was left undisturbed. Houston & T. C. R.
Co. v. Pinto, xv. 286.
Brakemen negligently stepping between cars may nevertheless recover for
subsequent injury occasioned by backing up of cars before he gives the signal.
Romick v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., xv. 288.
In action for injury while coupling cars, court will not strike out allegation
in complaint that draw-bars were defective and insufficient." Tierney v. Bur-
lington, C. R. & N. R. Co., xv. 290.
When deceased was a minor and was killed while coupling cars, declarations
by him that he knew how to couple cars are inadmissible. Penna. Co. v. Long,
Mother may recover for death of her minor son employed to couple cars with-
out her consent, though not contrary to her known will. Penna. Co. v. Long,
xv. 345.
Whether company is negligent in setting minor to work to couple cars with
different styles of draw-bars and without special instructions, is for jury.
Penna. Co. v. Long, xv. 345.
See JURISDICTION; UNITED STATES COURTS.
In suit to recover damages for killing person on track in Tennessee through
failure to observe statutory precaution, same measure of proof is not necessary
as to convict engineer of felony. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R. Co. v. Humphreys
Adm'r, xv. 472.
See LIGHTS; SIGNALS; DUTY OF COMPANY.
Failure of engineman to sound statutory signal on approaching crossing does
not render company liable for injury occasioned thereby to brakeman who is
fellow-servant. Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., xv. 243.
Company moving and switching cars after dark at crossing in city, bound to
take means to notify public and prevent accident. Peoria & P. Ü. R. Co. v.
Clayberg, xv. 356.
In action for injury at crossing of private way at grade when plaintiff relies
upon negligence of engineer and want of flagman, defendant is not entitled to
ruling that if engineer used reasonable care plaintiff could not recover. O'Con-
nor v. Boston & L. R. Co., xv. 362.
In action for injury at crossing of private way at grade, court should not
charge that company is bound to exercise same care at crossing that person
using it is bound to use to avoid injury. O'Connor v. Boston & L. R. Co., xv. 362.
Allegation that railroad was so negligently constructed at crossing that train
could not be seen by person on highway until so near that it was difficult or im-
possible to avoid being struck, is sufficiently certain. Lehnertz v. Minneapolis,
etc., R. Co., xv. 370.
When car was moving too swiftly, no bell was rung, and there was no light
on forward car, this constituted negligence. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Zoffin-
ger. xv. 370.
When party injured at crossing by backing cars foremost of which had no
light, though engine had, question of negligence was for jury. Rohan v. Milwau-
kee, etc., R. Co., xv. 374.
Statute requiring signal on approaching crossing is intended only to provide
warning to those crossing or intending so to do. It does not apply when by
reason of failure to give signal parties are induced to approach so closely that
their horses are frightened by noise of train and so injury ensues. Rosenberger
v. Grand Trunk R. Co., xv. 448.
When company failed to provide flagman at crossing, it was liable for injury
occasioned by frightening of horse in consequence. Complaint held sufficiently
definite. Johnson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., xv. 467.
When company in backing cars in town was required by law to have man
stationed on last car to warn persons off track and man was stationed on front
part of last car. Held, that law was not complied with, and question of negli-
gence was for jury. Levoy v. Midland R. Co., xv. 478.
In action for killing at crossing, habits of deceased as to jumping on trains in
motion are inadmissible to prove contributory negligence. Peoria & P. U. R.
Co. v. Clayberg, xv. 356.
Company put up sign at crossing of much travelled private way: "This is not a
public way and is dangerous." Held, as matter of law, court could not say it
was a denial of right to cross, and that person crossing did so at his own risk.
O'Connor v. Boston & L. R. Co., xv. 362.
When boy of five under charge of brother of nine was injured at crossing,
question whether boys and their parents exercised due care was for jury.
O'Connor v. Boston & L. R. Co., xv. 362.
Declaration of bar-keeper immediately before accident that plaintiff had had
enough was inadmissible to prove drunkenness. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v.
Zoffinger, xv. 370.
When party injured at crossing by backing cars, foremost of which had no
light, though engine had, question of contributory negligence was for jury.
Rohan v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., xv. 374.
Company bound to use ordinary care and diligence as to cattle rightfully on
highway at public crossing. Lane v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co., xv. 526.
When cattle killed at crossing by hand-car running at high rate of speed,
which could not be stopped in time owing to defective brake, company was held
liable. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. King, xv. 529.
When animals are killed at crossing through negligence of company, owner
may recover damages though he has suffered them to run at large in violation of
herd-law. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. McAlpine & Co., xv. 544.
Company must use extraordinary diligence not to run over cattle at crossings.
Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. McAlpine & Co., xv. 544.
Company is bound as to cattle at crossings only to give signals when within a
quarter of a mile, under Alabama statute. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v.
McAlpine & Co., xv. 544.
Exemplary damages are recoverable in case of gross negligence. Louisville,
etc., R. Co. v. McCoy, xv. 277.
Verdict of $10,000 for injuries to brakeman causing permanent disability not
excessive. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moore, xv. 312.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
In action by administrator to recover damages for causing death, payment to
widow cannot be pleaded in satisfaction. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v.
Dowell, xv. 153.
Action cannot be maintained for personal injuries resulting in death where
evidence fails to show that death was not instantaneous. Riley, Adm'x, v. Conn.
River R. Co., xv. 181.
In action to recover damages for death, evidence is admissible as to condition
of remains of deceased. Leahy v. Southern Pacific R. Co., xv. 230.
Life-tables are admissible to show expectancy of life of brakeman. Burling-
ton, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Coates, Adm'r, xv. 265.
Instruction as to damages should be more definite than that they must com-
pensate loss sustained. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Coates, Adm'r, xv. 265.
In action for death, motion will not lie for nonsuit on ground of contributory
negligence. Carter v. Columbia & G. R. Co., xv. 414.
Loss of society and protection of deceased to her children cannot be compen-
sated in damages. Only such damage is recoverable as deceased could have
claimed had she lived. Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Smith, xv. 469.
No action lies except under the statute, and right to recovery is governed by
law of place where injury occurred. Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., xv.
503.
Mother has no right to recover for death of her illegitimate son. Gibson v.
Midland R. Co., xv. 507.
In action by administrator for death, loss or injury to children or next of kin
is not an element of damage. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Pound's Adm'r,
xv. 510.
When injury occasioning death has occurred, subsequent statute giving new
cause of action has no application. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Pound's
Adm'r, xv. 510.
Cause of action must be stated with reasonable certainty, alleging particular
duty and a breach thereof. Addison, Adm'r, v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., xv.
512.
Complaint stating names of next of kin and relationship to deceased and alleg-
ing damage to them is sufficient. Barnum, Adm'x, v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ř.
Co., xv. 513.
Servant does not assume all risks in going under defective car on siding to re-
pair same. Where rule is to have watchman to protect such car and company fails
to do so and injury occurs in consequence, question of negligence is for jury.
Luebke v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., xv. 183.
Company not liable for injury to servant from defect in car received from
another company. It is bound only to provide suitable and competent inspec-
tors of such cars. Mackin v. Boston & Albany R. Co., xv. 196.
Company is liable for injury caused by fall of derrick furnished by it to con-
tractor when same was obviously defective at time of delivery to contractor.
Conlon v. Eastern R. Co., xv. 99.
When servant is employed in operating derrick and is with others charged
with duty of keeping rope wet, and it fails to do so and rope breaks, injuring
servant, he cannot recover. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Fray, xv. 158.
See MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.
When minutes of board of directors show that director voted a certain way
and minutes are read and approved at subsequent meeting in presence of that
director and others, court will decide that director so voted notwithstanding
parol evidence to contrary. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co.
et al., xv. 1.
A husband whose homestead is taken may dispose of compensation without
consent of his wife. Canty v. Lattemar et al., xv. 380.
See BILL OF PEACE; INJUNCTION.
When bill contains no equity but evidence shows that complainant is entitled
to legal relief, bill will not be dismissed. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v. Man-
hattan R. Co. et al., xv. 1.
Will not interfere at instance of stockholders to annul agreement modifying
lease, unless rights of third parties intervene. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v.
Manhattan R. Co. et al., xv. 1.
Corporation is not estopped from applying to have contract or agreement
entered into by its directors set aside on the ground of fraud. Metropolitan
Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co. et al., xv. 1.
New board of directors not estopped to take steps to annul contract entered
into by old board. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co. et al.,
Company not party to suit not bound by decree entered in pursuance of
agreement to which it was a party. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan
R. Co. et al., xv. 1.
Corporation moving to have contract of officers set aside is not debarred by
judgment entered with assent of officers affirming validity of contract. Metro-
politan Elevated R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co. et al., xv. 1.
Verified petition of party in one case when offered in evidence against him in
another case does not operate by way of estoppel. Solomon R. R. Co. v. Jones,
xv. 201.
Municipality is estopped by recitals of election in bonds to deny that same
was held in statutory manner, but it is not estopped to set up lack of power
to issue the bonds. Northern Bank of Toledo v. Trustees, xv. 575.
Township is not estopped by recitals in bonds not signed by town clerk as
required by law. Bissell v. Township of Spring Valley, xv. 585.
Municipality is not estopped to deny facts contained in certificate of State
officers registering bonds as to regularity of issue. Dixon Co. v. Field, xv. 595.
Recitals in municipal aid bonds only estop corporation to deny facts which
corporate officers had by law authority to determine and to certify to. Dixon Co.
v. Field, xv. 595.
Recital that bond is authorized by certain statute does not estop county to
show that issue was not authorized by vote of two thirds of inhabitants as re-
quired by constitution. Carroll Co. v. Smith, xv. 606.
Town is not estopped by recitals in aid bonds that all necessary legal steps
have been taken as to their issue. Craig v. Andes, xv. 662.
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