minor character about which nations would not in any event go to war; while the non-justiciable questions are those as to which international arbitration is generally impotent to prevent a conflict. Thus, the great historic policies of nations or the instinctive movements of races,. slow and resistless as glaciers, could as little be checked by international agreement as the people of Chamouni could stay the onward course of the Mer de Glace.

Everyone should recognize the fact that international arbitration is of value in providing the procedure of peace, when and only when questions which admit of reasonable argument arise between nations and the disputants are equally desirous of ascertaining the justice of the issue. Lord Russell of Killowen, in an address which he made at the American Bar Association at Saratoga in 1896, after referring to the many instances of successful international arbitration in the nineteenth century, which then numbered nearly seventyfive, thus well defined the instances where such arbitration is a practicable remedy:

First, where the right in dispute depends upon the ascertainment of facts honestly in dispute; second, where, the facts being ascertained, the right depends upon the application of some

tangible principle of international law; third, where the dispute is one which may properly be adjusted by mutual concessions which do not involve vital interests or national honour.

No one will question the value of the remedy in such controversies; but it is in this very class of cases that the normal nation would in any event be indisposed to appeal to war. In such instances, the mediation of a mutually friendly power has proven as effective as a formal arbitration and is often much more readily resorted to.

The final suggestion of a league to enforce peace is the latest remedy for war and the one that is at the present time most prominently engaging the thoughts of enlightened citizens of different countries. It has had warm support both in England and the United States and undoubtedly has much to commend it. Its essential idea is that civilized nations shall by a league compel the resort to arbitration in all justiciable controversies.

The idea, like every idea connected with the world-old problem of war and peace, has little novelty. The idea of arbitration is at least as old as the Greek Republics. According to Thucydides, the King of Sparta pronounced all war unlawful if the attacked were willing "to answer for his acts before a tribunal of arbiters." Even

formal agreements to arbitrate are of very ancient origin, for Argos and Lacedæmon had a fiftyyear treaty of alliance to arbitrate all differences. Even the idea of creating a new sovereign authority above otherwise sovereign nations, by compelling compliance with the decision of arbitrators is not new. William Penn, the great apostle of peace, in his work called An Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe, suggested as his remedy for war an international court of arbitration, whose

judgment should be made so binding that if any Government offers its case for decision and does not then abide by it, the other Governments parties to the tribunal shall compel it.

However, the novelty or lack of novelty of the proposed league of peace has nothing to do with its possible efficacy. Its fundamental principle is that all nations have a common interest in peace and should co-operate to maintain it by jointly compelling every nation to submit its grievances to the impartial decision of an international tribunal. It is in effect an attempt in a rudimentary form to confederate the world and to merge all existing nations for certain world-wide purposes of international justice in a new governmental entity. The

chief value of this movement is that it emphasizes, as it seems to me most desirable, the joint responsibility of all nations for the peace of the world.

The curse of civilization and one of the most fruitful causes of war is the selfish spirit of nationalism, which declines to accept a share in the common burdens of civilization. This is not altogether unnatural, for the horrors of war are so stupendous that any nation, which is not directly involved in a particular quarrel, is generally indisposed to share in its burdens and sufferings. Moreover, many wars have resulted from questions which wholly or at least largely concerned the belligerent nations, and as to which other nations may reasonably disclaim any direct responsibility. To have a world-war every time two nations may quarrel would be intolerable.

But the weakness of this spirit of detachment is that many quarrels, that arise between two nations, however superficially they may seem to be peculiar to them, often raise moral questions which vitally concern civilization. These moral issues undoubtedly differ in degree and it would be absurd to contend that any nation is bound to implicate itself in every quarrel involving some minor moral issue. But as civilization becomes more closely interwoven by steam and electricity, the issues

which are now of sufficient importance to result in war often involve a moral issue of general importance as to which no great power can wholly divest itself of responsibility.

Take, for example, the present war. In the case of England, it was the invasion of Belgium that brought it into the conflict; and the horrors of that invasion have been such that we are too apt to conclude that this was the cause of the

war.

The refusal of Austria, instigated by Germany, to arbitrate a very simple question with Servia was the precipitating cause of the war. Servia had virtually yielded to every demand of Austria, many of which were plainly unreasonable; but it naturally refused, upon the broadest considerations both of sovereignty and universal justice, to agree that partisan Austrian officials should try the guilt or innocence of Servian citizens in the courts of Servia. But as this question of guilt and innocence ought to be determined by some dispassionate tribunal, it was willing to refer the question of the method of such trial to the Hague tribunal. Austria refused and commenced the war.

Every civilized nation had a direct and vital interest in this quarrel, and a consequent responsibility, for the action of the Central Powers was