injury, and join with them as defendants all who conspired to accomplish it.80 82 Actions for damages resulting from conspiracies have been sustained, based upon conspiracies for the following purposes among others: conspiracies to defraud in general, conspiracies to defraud creditors 2 conspiracies to prosecute maliciously; 83 conspiracies to falsely imprison," and conspiracies to injure a person in his business, property or calling.85 SECTION 69. MALICIOUS USE OF ONE'S OWN PROPERTY. It is a general rule in the law of England and America that where a person is dealing with his own property, he may act as maliciously as he desires towards his neighbor, this rule being based upon the idea that since a person has an absolute right to deal with his property as he desires the motive with which he acts cannot affect that right.86 A few cases take a somewhat contrary view, but the overwhelming weight of authority is in support of the above stated principles.87 808 Cyc., 647; Robertson vs. Parks, 81 Page vs. Parker, 40 N. H., 47. 85 Dorems vs. Hennessy, 176 Ill., 608. A contrary view is held in practically all other countries, especially those whose law is based upon the Roman or Civil law. 87 Walker vs. Cronin, 107 Mass., 555; Wheatley vs. Baugh, 25 Pa. St., 528; Harewood vs. Benton, 32 Vt., 737. This subject is very thoroughly discussed in an article by Robert L. Williams, in the Central Law Journal, Vol. 67, pp. 23-24 (July 10, 1908). CHAPTER XII. SLANDER AND LIBEL. SECTION 70. DEFINITIONS. In Closely allied with torts in which malice is an essential element are the wrongs of slander and libel. "The word, 'slander,' is the general and original word for all kinds of defamation, and at an early day in the history of the common law the term applied both to oral and written defamations of character. this sense it has been defined to be the defaming of a man in his reputation by speaking or writing words from whence any injury in character or property arises, or may arise, to him of whom the words are used. But in modern usage it has been limited to defamation by words spoken, and in this sense may be defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to the prejudice of the reputation, office, trade, business, or means of getting a living of another."" Other definitions are: "False defamatory words **** if spoken." "Oral or spoken defamatory words used by one person against another."" The following definition of libel has frequently met with judicial approval: "A libel is a malicious. publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures tending either to blacken the 1 25 Cyc., 248. Odgers, L. & Sl. 1. Menter vs. Stewart, 2 How. (Miss.), 698, 699. Woodruff vs. Woodruff, 36 Misc. (N. Y.), 15. memory of one dead or the reputation of one who is living and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.'' Other definitions of libel are as follows: "Any such publication as holds a person up to scorn or ridicule, or to a stronger feeling of contempt or execration, or impairs his enjoyment of general society, or imputes or implies his comm.ission of a crime not directly charged." "Any publication that tends to degrade, disgrace, or injure the character of a person, or bring him into contempt, hatred or ridicule.""" "Any false and malicious publication when expressed in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures which charges an offense, punishable by indictment, or which tends to bring an individual into public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or charges an act odious and disgraceful in society.' 118 SECTION 71. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SLANDER AND LIBEL. From the definitions contained in the last section it has been seen that slander consists in oral words, while libel is either printed or written, or otherwise put into material form. A second distinction is that libel is both a crime and a tort, while slander is only a tort. Charges put in the form of a libel are actionable • Commonwealth vs. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 168; 3 Am. Dec., 212, cases. Bain vs. Myrick, 88 Ind., 137, 138. ' Johnson vs. Stebbins, 5 Ind., 364, 8 Iron Age Pub Co. vs. Crudup per se.10 (i. e. there may be a recovery therefor without proof of special damage), but slander is not actionable per se, except in a few special classes of charges.11 Slander from its nature can never be a joint tort, while libel very often is. SECTION 72. SLANDER ACTIONABLE PER SE. Slander is actionable per se in the following classes of cases: (1) Where the charge, which is the basis of the action, imputes to the plaintiff the commission of an indictable offense involving moral turpitude; (2) Where it imputes that the plaintiff has a contagious or infectious disease of a disgraceful kind; (3) Where the charge is one tending to injure the plaintiff in his office, business or occupation; and, (4) Where the charge is one tending to disinherit the plaintiff. In all other cases of slander special damage to the plaintiff must be proved before there can be a recovery. SECTION 73. PARTICULAR CLASSES OF DEFAMATORY The following are among the most important forms in which defamatory words are to be found: Imputations of falsehood, but the charge must be of intentional falsehood and not of a mistake of judgment;13 Imputations of dishonesty or fraud.14 The con duct charged must be of such a nature as to reflect upon the character and integrity of the plaintiff,1 Imputations of indebtedness or delinquency in paying debts, at least if the charges are of such a character as will tend to affect a person in his business by injuring his credit;17 Imputations of cruelty;18 Imputations of rascality and general depravity, "written or printed publication imputing roguery, rascality or general depravity which carries with it a charge of moral turpitude and degradation of character, the natural tendency of which is to hold the party up to contempt, and expose him to the reprobation of the virtuous and honorable is libelous per se."'19 Certain single words may be libelous, when published of a person, as villain,20 swindler," hypocrite," or blackguard. 23 Charges of political corruption,24 Imputations upon men as to their relations with women.25 Even imputations which do not charge a man with immorality but which will tend to disgrace the man, or to render him ridiculous, are libelous.26 "Bush vs. Main, 12 Colo., App. 504; 55 Pac., 956; P. O'Connell vs. Scontz, 126 Iowa, 709; 102 N. W., 807, holding that a notice from a county officer to a taxpayer that the office had been apprised that the taxpayer had moneys not listed for taxation is not libelous as containing a charge of defrauding the state. 10 Sanders vs. Hall, 22 Tex., Civ. App. 282; 55 S. W., 594; 17 White vs. Parks, 93 Ga., 633; |