so intended it. No such intention appears in this case, and the presumptions are the other way. But there are other considerations, arising from the motives. which prompted the Act of 1702, and from the language of the act itself, which confirm us in the view we take of this question. It will be conceded that the design of the legislature was to benefit, not the grantees of the society, but the society itself. It' would seem to follow, as a necessary consequence, that the exemption attached to the title of the society, and not to the land. If therefore the society sell the land, and with the avails create a permanent fund, from which an annual income is derived, the fund should be exempt from taxation and not the land. Otherwise the manifest intention of the legislature would be defeated. It will hardly be claimed that both the fund and the land should be exempt, as that would be a double exemption, neither intended nor contemplated by the legislature. But suppose the society, instead of investing the money in a permanent fund, exhaust it, as in this case, by the payment of a debt. In such a case the exemption must attach to the land or nothing. If it does so attach, and not in the case of a permanent investment, then we come to this result, that the land would or would not be exempt, according as the society used its avails for one purpose or another. It would seem to be trifling to impute to the legis lature any such intention. The immunity, if it attached to the land at all in the hands of the purchaser, cannot be affected by any subsequent act of the society. It may be suggested in the case last supposed, that the society received all the benefit the legislature intended, in the enhanced price of the land, and that the purchaser, by paying a larger price, has purchased the exemption, and therefore it is reasonable that he should enjoy it. A perfect answer to this is, that the legislature did not contemplate a sale for any such purpose, but, on the contrary, the chief object was to prevent such a disposition of the property. They intended that land, or other estates so given, should be and remain a permanent source of revenue. That intention is defeated in the case supposed, as we have attempted to show, and therefore the purchaser has no legal or equitable claim to the exemption. But again, the statute in terms applies to land previously given, as well as to that given subsequently. It cannot be successfully claimed that any contract exists in respect to such donations; certainly none with the donors. This would seem to be too clear for argument. However this may be, the point was substantially decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Armstrong v. The Treasurer of Athens County, 16 Peters 281. It appears in that case that in the year 1804 the legislature of Ohio by statute exempted from taxation for ever certain, lands previously granted by Congress for the purpose of founding a university in that state. In 1826 the legislature authorized the board of trustees to sell the land in question upon certain terms, but the act was silent in respect to the matter of taxation. The court held, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, that the land was taxable in the hands of the purchasers. If this point is established it is certainly true that the act in question is not a contract in respect to a part of the property therein referred to. In respect to the other part we ought to give the statute the same interpretation, unless its language, or the nature of the case, requires a different construction. We see no reason for construing the statute as meaning one thing when applied to one piece of property and another thing when applied to other property. There is another feature of this statute which deserves particular attention. It expressly applies to all property which had been, or which should thereafter be, granted by the General Assembly of this state. Now upon the supposition that the contract contended for was with the grantors,-and that is the ground of the decisions of this court in Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223, and Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335, cases upon which Landon v. Litchfield rests, we are driven to the necessity of holding that the state entered into a contract with itself, and pledged its faith to itself, that such property should never be taxed. If the statute applied only to cases of this description, no one would contend that it was a contract which tied up the hands of succeeding legislatures. On the whole, we think it reasonable, and the only reasonable course, that the statute, in relation to all the property named in it, should receive the same construction; that the legislature intended to place all such property upon the same footing. That can only be done by rejecting the idea of a contract. We will close this branch of the case by a reference to the language of Judge BISSELL, in Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 495. In speaking upon this question, and in relation to the cases of Atwater v. Woodbridge, and Osborne v. Humphrey, he says:"Were this now an open question we might well doubt whether it be in the power of one legislature by a general law to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures; and whether a statute, exempting a particular species of property from taxation, is in the nature of a contract of perpetual obligation." It is true he yielded to the authority of those cases; but as that authority is somewhat shaken by Brainard v. Colchester, we have felt at liberty to examine the question upon principle, and upon such examination, being satisfied that those decisions are not founded in correct principles, we feel constrained to disregard their authority and to declare the law to be otherwise. The plaintiff claims that the judgment of the Superior Court in Landon v. Litchfield estops the defendants from making this defence. To render a former judgment conclusive on any matter it is necessary that it should appear that the precise point was in issue and decided, and that this should appear from the record itself: Kennedy v. Scovill, 14 Conn. 61, and authorities there cited. The record in that case consists of the declaration, the plea, and the judgment. The declaration was in assumpsit, containing the common counts only, the plea was the general issue, and judgment was finally rendered on a default. It does not appear from the record that the question now involved was put in issue, much less that it was tried and determined. The finding of the Superior Court, which was merely for the purpose of taking the opinion of the Supreme Court upon certain questions of law therein raised, is not, strictly speaking, a part of the record. But even if it is, still it does not appear that the question was tried and decided in the Superior Court. A judgment by default determines nothing except the plaintiff's right to recover in that action. Notwithstanding that judgment, it was competent for the defendants at any time to assert their right to tax this property, and, if that right was disputed, to have the question directly presented and judicially determined: Standish v. Parker, 2 Pick. 20; Arnold v. Arnold, 17 Pick. 4. But another conclusive answer to this claim is, that the statute of 1859 has materially changed the legal aspect of the question. The most that can be claimed for the former judgment is, that the land was not taxable as the law then stood. The question involved in the present suit is the right to tax the property as the law now stands. We advise the Superior Court to render judgment for the defendants. In this opinion the other judges concurred. The question of the perpetual exemption of specific property by statute, or legislative contract, from taxation is one of more essential importance to governmental functions, than, upon first impression, would be likely to be apparent to most legally educated persons even. It is one of those special privileges, or exemptions, attached to property, which could not be made universal or even general, without destroying the very existence of government. For the duties of government, being, as the very term implies, of a compulsory character, and naturally involving the outlay of large sums of money, could not possibly be accomplished without the possession of money and its expenditure. And no government can possibly have either money, or credit, without revenue, or revenue without taxation, or taxation without property liable to taxation. It may not be indispensable, that all public revenue be raised by direct taxation, but that must at least be in the power of government, in order to give it either credit or independence. Hence it will be very obvious, that the perpetual exemption of any property in this way, from taxation, must be an invidious privilege, inasmuch as it cannot be so extended as to become universal, without trenching upon the very vitality of the government itself. We may, therefore, very well comprehend, that such exemption, when granted, should receive a very strict construction; inasmuch as it is not only in derogation of public right, but, in principle, destructive of it. We are not surprised, therefore, that those persons, who hold property under any such exemption, should attempt to keep up, in the public conscience, a constant sense of the ex- But We publish this opinion because it manifests the manly disposition of a very able court, to bring this special and invidious exemption within the narrowest possible, and at the same time just limits. It is, we think, specially creditable to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, that so large a proportion of its recent decisions manifest so marked a disposition to bring special and invidious privileges, in which only a few persons at most can participate, within very narrow limits by the strictest construction consistent with the terms of the title deed, whether of private contract or legislative grant, and at the same time, as far as possible, not allow the processes of judicial administration to be defeated, or embarrassed by merely technical refinements; in other words, manifesting a disposition to maintain the fair and just merits of causes, in becom ing ingenious, rather how to do, than how not to do the thing, which moral justice demands. To this end the court have overruled all their former decisions, considerably numerous, and of many years' standing, upon which the exemption of certain property from taxation rested. These cases are referred to in the briefs of counsel and the opinion of the court. Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251, was decided in regard to the very same property in question in the present case. We had occasion to examine these Connecticut cases at an early day, in the case of Herrick v. The Town of Randolph, 13 Vt. Reports 525. And although we supposed at that time they might possibly be maintained, upon the ground that the title to the property was acquired while the exempting statute was in force, and so the exemption was made to inhere in the very title of the property itself as one of its essential conditions, we are now satisfied, that the exempting statute should not be held to attach any such permanent exemption from taxation by virtue of the estate or property being acquired during the operation of a general statute, creating the exemption. Such a general statute, exempting certain property from taxation should not receive any more extended operation, because it is expressed to be "for ever," than if it had been expressed in general terms. The legislature has no power to give its general enactments any more extended force than they take by the use of terms, unlimited in point of duration. The same or any future legislature may repeal, or modify them, unless they are of the nature of contracts. To have this force the exemption must have been granted upon a pecuniary consideration, so as to constitute part of the price of the grant, i. e. have made it more valuable. held for charitable uses, from taxation, attached a condition to the estate in the hands of a lessee for the term of 999 years, reserving no annual rent, but accepting a gross sum in full of all rents. This decision was based upon the virtual assumption, that the privilege of exemption from taxation of estates conveyed to charitable uses, while the statute exempting them from taxation, was in force, attached to the land itself, making it thereby more valuable in the hands of the grantee and that it must be transmissible to others with the same privilege, or else the holder failed to realize the full benefit of the privilege. The later cases, decided by the same court, treat this exemption as one of a very obnoxious character, and therefore deserving a very strict construction: ELLSWORTH, J., in The Town of New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn. 171. And in Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407, the case of Landon v. Litchfield is virtually overruled, the court making, as it seems to us, the true distinction upon this point of exemption of property from taxation: 1. That it should receive a strict construction and not be extended further than the fair import of the words require. 2. That when the exemption is based upon the use to which the estate is conveyed, it shall not be construed as attaching to the land beyond the time of its appropriation to that use. 3. That to attach a perpetual exemption of lands or real estate from taxation, it must form one of the elements of a contract or grant on the part of the state: as in State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164, where land was granted by the state to the Indians, upon the express condition to remain perpetually exempt from all taxes, and it was held an essen tial element of the grant and of the title, which the state could not thereafter be permitted to pass any law abridging or in any way qualifying or interfering The case of Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251, was decided by a divided court, upon the ground that an early Colonial Act, 1702, exempting estates with. This principle forms the basis of |